Callum Pickering (14:42)
They'll be seeing it in the main through their bond exposure. And I suspect if you inflation adjust, most people's house prices, especially in London and the southeast, house prices have declined appreciably over this period. And again, just to get out of the abstract economics for a second, what we all know is true, and it's why QE worked so well to stimulate the recovery, is people on a Friday night at their dinner parties like to say, oh, I'm feeling frightfully well off. My house price has just gone up by £50,000 in the last month. I'm going to go and borrow some money to do some repair, maintenance, improvement on my extension or whatever. This is not happening in the uk. And so this net wealth shock which is persisted because we have these obstructively high interest rates, is holding back the normal cyclical momentum. Let me just come at this from two different ways because the thing that's really important when you have economic problems, which we do, is to demystify and to just sense check the narrative. And that's why I think it's important just to push back on these notions of confidence and uncertainty and tax worries when we can see this real effect. Consider this in a different way. If I look at consumer confidence for the UK and I look at it across age groups, the GfK index is split by four different demographics. Under 30, under 50, 50 to 65 and then 65 and over. You can, you can see the picture for these cohorts all the way back to the year 2000. And if you think about all the things that have happened since the year 2000, we of course had the dot com bus, we had 9, 11, we had the global financial crisis, the euro crisis, we had Brexit, we had Covid, we had the Russian invasion of Ukraine. And at every single one of these events, we have seen a co movement in cohort confidence. Younger people, and I think this is, this is the silver lining in all of this, remain and always are more optimistic. So young people are just looking forward to the future. I think that's great news. But very recently, the last two years, we've seen for confidence among young people. So those under 50 rise to the extent that for the youngest cohort it's actually close to its all time high, but for Those aged over 50, it's declining. Now again, it's where we apply a narrative in the UK without thinking about the underlying fundamentals. The common view is this is driven by political preference, that we have a left wing government and young people are happy about that and the older voters that would have preferred perhaps a Conservative government are unhappy that the Conservatives are no longer in office. Then I say, okay, let's ignore the narrative and look at what we can see in the underlying fundamentals. Two things that we've already established. The first is we've had decent income growth in inflation adjusted terms for the last three years. But we know that asset prices have suffered for young people. So under 50, they typically either don't own many assets or the assets that they have, such as a house, they tend to have debt associated with it. So they're not as sensitive to these net wealth effects. They're much more sensitive to income effects. For older voters that have gone through their lifetime earnings growth, that have accumulated assets, they tend to be sensitive to asset prices. And what you see is a decline in inflation adjusted house prices coincides with this weakness in confidence among older cohorts and explains confidence over a long period. The rise in real wages over the past two to three years explains the rising confidence among young workers and younger cohorts. And this is what the divergence is capturing in the confidence data, which means just returning to the economy. The wage driven, income driven parts of the economy, day to day spending are doing okay. That's the reason you have this 1.7% mostly services oriented growth. But the stuff that's really asset sensitive, where we need to feel better off before we go out and borrow and speculate. The people with the real purchasing power at the older, richer end of the income spectrum, they have such depressed asset values that they are reluctant to go out and drive the kind of cyclical activity. And the reason that this is such a confusing concept, I think, is because at the start of a cycle, we are viewing an economy that is entirely, entirely the inverse of what we typically see the start of a cycle. We normally have high unemployment, low real wage growth, low inflation and rapid falls in interest rates which spur on asset price inflation. And the first sectors that usually signal that there's a recovery to come are things like the housing sector, things like credit. Okay, credit's kicking up, let's get excited about economic growth. This time around we have the opposite. We have interest rates elevated. We also have elevated real wage growth. And so the pattern that's emerging at the start of the recovery is very different. And the kicker in all of this is to say I don't think that this is a one off in the UK's case. We have been here repeatedly through history and the fiscal framework that we need to understand in this context is that the UK goes through cycles of strong credibility in face of markets and it outperforms, followed by periods of weakness and impaired credibility that it needs to correct. And I'll stop because I suspect there's a question here. But I want to just go through the history to help people understand why this fiscal matter so much.