The New Battleground: U.S. vs. China in Africa | 1.4.25

Summary

Morning Wire Summary: The New Battleground: U.S. vs. China in Africa | January 4, 2025

In this special edition of Morning Wire, Daily Wire Editor-in-Chief John Bickley and co-host Georgia Howe delve into the escalating competition between the United States and China for influence in Africa. Featuring insights from Amaka Onku, head of Eurasia Group's Africa practice, the episode examines recent developments, strategic initiatives, and the future landscape of U.S.-Africa relations.

---

Biden’s Pioneering Visit to Angola and U.S. Aid Commitment

John Bickley kicks off the discussion by highlighting President Joe Biden's landmark visit to Angola—the first by a sitting U.S. president. During this visit, Biden announced a substantial commitment of over $1 billion in U.S. assistance aimed at strengthening bilateral relations and countering China's expanding footprint in the region.

John Bickley [00:03]: "President Biden recently became the first sitting president to visit Angola, Africa. While there, the president promised more than $1 billion in US assistance, aiming to strengthen relations in the region and combat China's presence there."

China’s Strategic Maneuvering in Africa: The Belt and Road Initiative

Amaka Onku provides an in-depth analysis of China's longstanding and strategic engagement in Africa, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). She outlines how China's policy since the early 2000s has focused on infrastructure development in exchange for resources, particularly oil. This approach has been largely welcomed by African nations seeking substantial infrastructure investments, a contrast to the more micro-focused funding from Western partners.

Amaka Onku [01:04]: "China has had an Africa policy, a very kind of clear strategic policy, I would say, since the early 2000s... They wanted to build bridges, roads, and sell lots of goods and services."

Onku emphasizes that while projects like the Nairobi to Mombasa Chinese-financed train have been beneficial as economic connectors, there are criticisms regarding their high costs and instances of incomplete or inefficient projects due to corruption and mismanagement.

Amaka Onku [03:22]: "It's a mixed bag, frankly... In some cases where there was a lot of leakages, collusion between African officials and the Chinese counterparts."

U.S. Assistance Through USAID and Strategic Allocations

Transitioning to the U.S. role, Onku examines the $1 billion aid package announced by Biden, noting that approximately $800 million is channeled through USAID, focusing on areas such as healthcare, education, and community development. She points out the challenges in distinguishing new initiatives from existing programs, rendering the true impact of such announcements sometimes unclear.

Amaka Onku [06:42]: "A lot of it is healthcare, education, and then there's some like community promotion type stuff... It's often very hard to figure out what is already existing programs and what is new."

Debt Dynamics: Debunking the Chinese Debt Trap Narrative

A significant portion of the discussion addresses the debt concerns associated with Chinese financing. Onku clarifies a common misconception by stating that while China is a major bilateral lender, the majority of African nations' debts are owed to multilateral agencies and commercial debtors like Eurobonds.

Amaka Onku [05:07]: "Most debts owed by African countries is actually owed to multilateral agencies and commercial debtors like euro bonds... it's not the case that most debts owed by these countries is owed to China."

The Crucial Role of Rare Earth Minerals

The conversation shifts to the strategic importance of rare earth minerals essential for modern technologies like semiconductors and electric vehicles. Onku underscores how both the U.S. and China prioritize securing access to these critical resources in Africa, viewing them as vital for national security and economic competitiveness.

Amaka Onku [07:58]: "This is an extremely important part of the calculation for both China and the US in securing access to those critical minerals."

Continuity and Adaptation Across U.S. Administrations

Looking ahead, Onku assesses the potential impact of the upcoming Trump administration on U.S. Africa policy. She argues that there is a bipartisan consensus on shifting focus towards trade and investment, mirroring China's infrastructure-driven approach. This continuity suggests that the newly promised aid to Angola is unlikely to be reversed under the Trump administration.

Amaka Onku [08:36]: "I don't see a shift because this is something that both sides can really agree on."

Future of Western and G7 Engagement in Africa

Onku explores the future role of Western nations and G7 countries in Africa, highlighting initiatives like the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure. She notes current challenges, such as anti-French sentiment in francophone Africa and Russia's attempts to fill the void left by France's retreat, posing new dynamics for U.S. engagement.

Amaka Onku [10:41]: "There's a transition period right now... there's a lot of moving parts to watch in terms of what the future relationship looks like."

Russia’s Limited Influence in Africa

Addressing geopolitical rivals, Onku discusses Russia's influence in Africa, concluding that it is significantly less impactful than perceived. While Russia maintains some historical goodwill, particularly in South Africa, its overall economic and infrastructural contributions are minimal. Online disinformation remains its primary tool, confined mostly to failed or small states with limited regional impact.

Amaka Onku [12:05]: "Russia's influence is a lot less than meets the eye... They don't have a lot of money and have a lot of resources... it's only in failed states."

Key Takeaways and Looking Ahead

In concluding the episode, Onku emphasizes the need for the U.S. to balance value promotion with tangible economic support. She advocates for ensuring that democracy and economic policies translate into concrete public goods like infrastructure and job creation, maintaining the appeal of democratic systems in Africa.

Amaka Onku [14:07]: "It's not just value promoting, but actually putting your money where your mouth is to make sure that those systems deliver concrete public goods to their citizens."

---

Conclusion

Morning Wire provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic competition between the U.S. and China in Africa. Through expert insights, the episode underscores the complexities of international aid, the significance of economic investments, and the evolving geopolitical landscape. As the U.S. continues to navigate its foreign policy in Africa, the emphasis on sustainable development and genuine partnerships remains paramount in countering China's influence and fostering long-term stability in the region.

Transcript

[John Bickley]

Joe Biden recently became the first sitting president to visit Angola, Africa. While there, the president promised more than $1 billion in US assistance, aiming to strengthen relations in the region and combat China's presence there. In this episode, we sit down with an expert on the region to discuss America's shifting focus in Africa and what it might look like in the new Trump administration. I'm Daily Wire Editor in Chief John Bickley with Georgia Howe, and this is a special edition of Morning Wire. Joining us now to discuss how the US Is approaching Africa is the head of Eurasia Group's Africa practice, Amaka Onku. Amaka, thank you so much for coming on.

[Amaka Onku]

Thank you for having me.

[John Bickley]

So President Biden just made this first ever presidential trip to Angola and announced over a billion dollars in U.S. aid to that country. The U.S. has made several trips to Africa in recent years, largely to combat China's growing influence in the region. First for our listeners, can you give us some background on China's presence in the region?

[Amaka Onku]

Sure. So China has had an Africa policy, a very kind of clear strategic policy, I would say, since the early 2000s. You can see some of the memes about how every Chinese foreign minister, the first trip was always to Africa. For 33 years, the strategy was clear. It was in exchange for us getting resources and oftentimes it was oil from these African countries will finance large infrastructure governments. A lot of it was government government financing, Chinese companies, some state companies versus African governments. I wanted to build bridges, roads, and we will then also sell lots of goods and services. But also our the money that we're financing is effectively being used to buy stuff from us to build the bridges. So that was a strategy from the African perspective. And this is kind of where you'll see we'll get to how I think it has now influenced how the US Sees Africa. But from the African perspective, this was welcome because a lot of the traditional sources of fund and the World Bank, US Western partners were not financing big ticket infrastructure projects. A lot of funding from the west was going towards more micro health care, democracy promotion, education, things like that, and not the things that some governments felt were critical for economic competitiveness.

[John Bickley]

Got it. And what you're describing is called the Belt and Road Initiative. Can you unpack that a little bit more for us?

[Amaka Onku]

Yes. It's a part of the Belt and Road Initiative, which is a global initiative that you could argue is a tool for soft influence for China. And often if you look at all the countries that are part of the Belt and Road Initiative, many of them Fell in line with China's. One China policy removed diplomatic requisition of Taiwan. So definitely a tool for software foreign policy influence.

[John Bickley]

Sure. And how are these types of programs going? How is it actually playing out in terms of building infrastructure, et cetera, what they're supposed to be accomplishing and how do citizens there feel about them?

[Amaka Onku]

I think it's a mixed bag. When I was in Kenya, for example, for the summer, I took a Chinese finance train from Nairobi to capital to Mombasa, one of the main coastal cities. Every time I took it packed lots of people. Clearly a very valuable economic connector in the country. But there also criticism that it was very expensive. And there are other infrastructure projects that have not been as useful or were never finished. And there were in some cases where there was a lot of leakages, collusion between African officials and the Chinese counterparts. That just meant that there were money was wasted. So I'd say it's a mixed bag, frankly, like anything else, you know, really big picture. The way I see it, in the 2000s, China was the new kid on the block. When it came to Africa. In the 1960s, the US was the new kid on the block. When it came to Africa, it was the new non colonial power. And both of them made a lot of mistakes when they were the new kid on the block. In 1960s, the U.S. it was very controversial when the U.S. came on the scene in Africa again, nuke it on the block. After the colonial era, these new African countries had just won independence. There was a lot of controversy with the US relationships. It was accusations of the US supporting funding, coups, assassinating people. Of course, it was in the middle of the Cold War. Right. So I feel like there's always that kind of controversy when there is a new block of power emerging and growing.

[John Bickley]

Obviously there's a debt involved here with these loans. Do a lot of these countries end up finding themselves in crippling debt? Are they able to actually pay their way out of them? How's that playing out?

[Amaka Onku]

Good question. So that's something that comes up a lot. So a lot of the belt and road projects. Yes. Involves finance and big infrastructure projects. It's a lot of money. It does mean that there is a lot of debt, savings and costs that come along with it. But the narrative that somehow Africa's debt problem is a Chinese problem is actually misleading because if you look at, we look at the numbers a lot here at Eurasia Group, but if you look at the numbers, most debts owed by African countries is not owed to Chinese entities. Most Debts owed by African countries is actually owed to multilateral agencies and commercial debtors like euro bonds. People often say China is the biggest bilateral lender. That is absolutely true. But that's a very specific, narrow category. Most countries do not loan directly. Most Western countries do not give big loans directly to African countries. So of course, China would be the biggest bilateral lender. But other countries like the us, France, uk, a lot of their funding, their loans goes through the multilateral agencies, the Bretton woods agencies. So I think it's an important thing. It's an important kind of caveat to put that it's not the case that most debts owed by these countries is owed to China.

[John Bickley]

So now the Biden administration is giving 1 billion in U.S. aid. What is that designated to do? What kinds of stipulations does that come with in terms of how it can be used?

[Amaka Onku]

Yeah, so my understanding is that a lot of that goes through USAID. It's about 800 million of it goes through USA. Some of it is through the US Department's Agriculture Commodity Credit Corporation. So you can think about a lot of the things that USAID funds. A lot of it is healthcare, education, and then there's some like community promotion type stuff. So, I mean, that's how I would think. Look, I'll be honest with you. All of these numbers, it's always. It's very hard, even when it's the US numbers, certainly when it's Chinese numbers. When it's Chinese numbers, like you take it with a big grain of salt, because they always come and announce big numbers and most of it never materializes. But even when it's the US numbers, it's often very hard to figure out what is already existing programs and what is new, because they'll always come and announce a collation of stuff that is already existing. It's really hard to tell apart, like, what's actually new there.

[John Bickley]

Right. There's that political drive to make things seem more generous than they are a lot of times. How do you think the presence of rare earth minerals that we use in many electronics, including semiconductors and EVs, how does that play into both China and the US desire to influence Africa?

[Amaka Onku]

I think it's extremely important. And, you know, if you think about the choice of Angola, it's in part because of the libido corridor, which is all about access and critical minerals. So, absolutely, this is an extremely important part of the calculation for both China and the US is securing access to those critical minerals, or at least ensuring that access to them is not Blocked off by your competitor.

[John Bickley]

We're about to have a new administration, the Trump administration. Do you see anything changing in regard to what was just promised to Angola as the new administration comes in? Is this the kind of thing that might be reversed or not?

[Amaka Onku]

No. So more, more broadly, Africa policy in the US has been pretty stable across administrations. And if you look, you can draw a line through all the way from Bush through Trump. And this is what I mean. So I do think that there is a broader shift happening. So when we started this conversation, you asked me about what's China doing in Africa. Over the last decade or so, there has been a growing awareness in the US Amongst US Officials that the failure to center economic transformation in their relationships with African countries. That doesn't. Not to say that human rights and governance and those things that usually the US Led with are not important. They're very important, but it's failure to center what is most critical, what is most top of mind for these African countries, economic transformation, which in their relationships was a mistake, or at least there could be improvement. So there has been a shift in terms of centering the relationship on value promotion to trying to center it more on trade and investment. And we've seen that shift run through both the Democratic and Republican administrations. So that shift has been happening starting with Obama's power. Africa through Trump's prosper, Africa through Biden's kind of really major focus on the libido corridor, which is all about trade, which is all about investment and infrastructure, and kind of like taking more of like, you know, you could call it a Chinese approach to fund infrastructure projects. It's something that both sides agree on dealing. What can we get in return? We get critical minerals, you get infrastructure. Fine, let's make a deal. That sounds like something Trump's people will go along with. So all of that to say that I don't see a shift because this is something that both sides can really agree on.

[John Bickley]

Yeah, it makes sense. Now, what do you think the future of Western nations and G7 nations in Africa is going to look like in the next decade or so?

[Amaka Onku]

That's a really big question. I'm not sure where. There's so many ways I could go with it. Right. Like, but, you know, like the G7PGI Partnership for Global Infrastructure, I think it's called, which is part of what the Lobuto Corridor in Angola is meant to be like a pilot of. Right. It's supposed to be a G7 initiative, even though it was something started by Biden. So that's Something, you know, we'll keep an eye on. But like more broadly, if you've been paying attention, there's a big issue right now in francophone Africa in terms of anti French sentiment because France has been like the other kind of, you know, major Western country that had significant influence in the region. So I think there's an inflection point here to see, you know, how as France is being forced to retreat from francophone West Africa, Russia is trying to fill that gap. What does that look like? Can the US do more with France not being there? Can France do more in anglophone and African countries? I think it's a transition period right now, frankly, I would say. And so there's a lot of moving parts to watch in terms of what the future relationship looks like between these countries and G7 member countries.

[John Bickley]

You brought up Russia. I would like to ask specifically about that. What is Russia's role or influence in the region, in Africa in general?

[Amaka Onku]

Very good question. Look, I think Russia's influence is a lot less than meets the eye. Russia doesn't have a lot to offer to these African countries. When I say a lot to offer in terms of resources, it's not. They don't have a lot of money and have a lot of resources. Trade between Russia and these African countries is minuscule. But there is in some cases a historical relationship that's in particularly South Africa in the sense that Russia finance deliberation movements there when none of the Western countries were willing to. In fact, the Western countries were supporting the minority white apartheid regime. So there's a little bit of goodwill, historical goodwill there in francophone Africa, it's really more about regime security for non democratically elected governments that came to power and can't trust their own militaries. So all that I say that to say I don't see Russia's influence growing over time in any substantial way. The one area they've been pretty influential and it's just online disinformation, as they have been everywhere else in the world. But that's not a path to, in my view, substantive influence on countries like you can destabilize. You can profit in already unstable situations. Right, in that way. But that's pretty much it. You hit a ceiling pretty quickly. And that's why, in my view, you know, the only places where you can talk of some form of Russian influence in Africa are the failed states. And they're also small states, mostly small states that are not where most Africans live. Burkina, Paso, Mali, Niger. I mean, some of them have a number of people in them, but they're not the most significant countries in the economies in the region.

[John Bickley]

Final question, from your perspective, what do you think is one of the most important things to keep an eye on in the next couple of years in terms of developments with relationships between the US and Africa?

[Amaka Onku]

So. Yeah, well, I think so this a little bit philosophical, but I think that the big challenge for the US is to figure out how to center, in my view, state capacity, like, make sure at the core, I guess, of what the US's foreign policy tries to convey is our values are better. Right. Like, we want you to look like us. Democracy is good. Don't be like China or Russia and the rest of them. And most African countries agree with that. But I think that there is a challenge in not just value promoting, but actually putting your money where your mouth is to make sure that those systems deliver concrete public goods to their citizens. It's not just for values, democracy for democracy's sake. It's does it deliver electricity, infrastructure, prosperity, you know, jobs. Right. Really centering that as well on not just talking about those values. And I think that's for me, that's the challenge. And I've seen a shift moving in that direction and I think that the US needs to continue moving in that direction and figuring out how to crystallize and bring those two things together better to ensure that people don't give up on the idea of democracy or that they don't decouple that democracy can also bring like we actually have to work hard at making sure that those two things link up. It doesn't happen automatically.

[John Bickley]

Yeah. Well, let's hope that we do see that progress. Amaka Anku, thank you so much for talking with us.

[Amaka Onku]

Sure. Anytime.

[John Bickley]

That was Eurasia Group's Amaka Anku, and this has been a special edition of Morning Wire.