Transcript
Interviewer (0:00)
On exactly that. The fact that the more that we summarize what I think is a exceedingly clear body of work in the fabric of reality, in the beginning of infinity, when nonetheless you explain it to people, as Popper says, you know, it's impossible to speak in such a way as to not be misunderstood. I was just reading today on Twitter, someone claiming that you have said, quoting you, and they've put it in quote marks, you have apparently said, popper proves AI can't be super intelligent. And, you know, I sort of respond, you know, he never even speaks in those terms that you wouldn't rely upon the authority of Popper to begin with. He wouldn't say proof. So it's just another example that you go out there and as you say, these concentric circles of people that you bring in to trying to understand your worldview, the misconceptions compound. I don't know what you think about that. Have you said anything like, popper proves that? And this was from a journalist, by the way. I think a reasonably respected journalist was saying this.
David Deutsch (1:04)
No, of course not. So, as you say, I mean, as soon as you see a claim that somebody has proved something, then, you know, proved it from what? This isn't going to be Papa. It isn't going to be me. I've proved that. If quantum theory is true, then the Turing conjecture is true. In physics, you know, that's what you can do with the proof. Proving something about AGI is inherently impossible if we don't have a theory of AGI that, you know, you can't prove something about something that you can't define. And anyway, proof isn't what these kind of things are about. These kind of things are about argument and Popper. I can't recall Popper specifically saying anything about AI. It wasn't a thing in those days.
Interviewer (1:50)
This word proof is something we haven't talked about during our conversations, but you do hear it deployed quite often. You know, such and such has been proved. As if to say, this stands in contrast to our notion of conjectural knowledge or fallibility? After all, once something has been proved, can't we carve it into stone and there it sits for all time? Is the notion of proof on a different level to the rest of our conjectural knowledge? Because it sounds, I think, to the typical layperson, as if it is.
David Deutsch (2:20)
Yeah, well, it isn't. The difference between mathematics and other fields, as I've often said, is not in the way we find knowledge about them, but in the subject matter. The subject matter of Mathematics is necessary truth. So when we make a discovery in mathematics, we're making a conjecture about what is necessary truth, or we're making a conjecture that something or other that we have defined is a necessary truth. But there isn't a difference in the way we create knowledge in our minds about mathematics or computer science or psychology or physics. They're all the same epistemologically.
