Podcast Summary

Podcast: New Books Network / People Power Politics
Episode: All You Need to Know about Russian Politics Today
Date: January 30, 2026
Host: Licha Chaneti
Guests: Vladislav Gorin (Meduza), Alexandra Prokopyenko (Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center)

Overview

This episode offers a deep dive into Russia’s current domestic political dynamics, with a focus on how power operates under Vladimir Putin, the evolution of the regime over his 26-year tenure, elite and societal dynamics amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, and speculation about Russia’s future after Putin. Drawing on their expertise and recent publications, journalist Vladislav Gorin and author/policy expert Alexandra Prokopyenko lay out the machinery behind Putin’s rule, the fate of Russia's elites and ordinary citizens, the meaning of elections in today’s Russia, and the prospects—however grim—for political change.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Who Governs Russia?

(03:02–08:38)

• Alexandra Prokopyenko explains:

  • Absolute political decisions come from Putin personally.
  • Occasionally, he's influenced by security services or advisors, but ultimate responsibility and final say are his.
  • Everyday governance (economics, bureaucracy, social services) is managed by government, central bank, federal/regional bureaucracy—who consciously avoid political decisions.

    "If the decision somehow looks like political one, they think that it's a fire and they scared like it's an open fire." (04:08)

  • The dual structure: Political power (Putin) vs. administrative power (bureaucracy).
  • Recently, Putin has become "not super interested" in domestic policy, focusing instead on geopolitics and micromanaging the war in Ukraine.

• Vladislav Gorin’s “dual verticals of power”:

  • Russia’s system has both formal institutions (governors, ministers, president, parliament) and shadow/informal ones (relatives, friends, security services—especially FSB).

    "It is something like Soviet system, but there were Soviet offices and Communist Party offices and it was more declarable. In current Russia we have some secret parallel power vertical." (08:38)

  • The FSB embeds agents within businesses, ministries, even universities to supervise and influence operations.

2. How Did This System Evolve? Key Turning Points

(09:59–15:47)

• Prokopyenko on the evolution of “hyper-presidentialism”:

  • Early in his rule, Putin built a “vertical of power”:
    • Removed regional leaders from the Federation Council (upper chamber of parliament)
    • Appointed presidential representatives over regional governors (creating parallel chains of command)
    • Cancelled regional elections in 2004
    • Cracked down on oligarchs, media independence—signaling there’s only one “right” viewpoint from the Kremlin.

      "There is one point of view only, right point of view. And this right point of view goes only from the Kremlin." (11:13)

  • Key public punishments of insiders (Viktor Cherkessev, Boris Nemtsov, Alexei Ulukayev) set the tone that even high-ranking elites must not challenge the system or discuss internal disputes publicly.
  • By 2015, "there was no opposition to Putin anywhere" even among technocrats and economic elites.

• Gorin on the "commercial proposal" to elites:

  • Many officials and business leaders accepted trading political autonomy for security and prosperity under Putin.

    "Let's make money and let's live in some sort of peace with each other. No problem, just money." (16:00)

  • Opposition to centralization faded because aligning with Putin became "more safe and more prosperous."

3. Elites, Loyalty, and Lack of Choice

(19:56–22:58)

• Chaneti summarizes: By the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Putin's system made elite defection both too risky and, in some ways, profitable.

• Prokopyenko expounds:

  • Elite compliance rooted in fear—of imprisonment, death, or retaliation against associates.
  • Some became beneficiaries: gaining money, power, or proximity to Putin.
  • Western sanctions only cemented resentment and the Kremlin’s narrative of a hostile West.

    "Fear is very important for these people and that's also a glue how Putin keeps keeps his elite loyal to him." (21:00)

4. Society and the Fraying Social Contract

(23:54–33:16)

• Chaneti: Notes the old “social contract”—stability and prosperity in exchange for obedience—appears broken.

• Gorin is skeptical the concept ever truly fit:

  • The regime never truly consulted the people. Elections since 1999 have failed to offer real choice.

    "Nobody asked Russian people since I guess 1999..." (24:04)

  • Most Russians would not have chosen war if consulted.

• Prokopyenko:

  • Levels of repression have soared ("not only opposition leaders...even ordinary people" are at risk).

    "It's signals to the society that not to say not to expose yourself...that's the only right strategy." (25:59)

  • War and sanctions initially brought a stimulus—a temporary illusion of prosperity for those employed in the war economy or defense industries. By late 2024, hope had collapsed.
  • Many in poorer regions weighed the risk of death against improved short-term living standards:

    "Disadvantaged groups traded risk of death to boost their spending power." (28:34)

  • By October 2025, for every one person reporting improved circumstances, more than three said things were worse.
  • Summing up: There is no genuine mass enthusiasm for the war or regime—just manipulated people, coping, surviving.

• Gorin’s Metaphor (31:27):

  • "There is a very good actually writer from Russia, Vladimir Sarokin. He said about Russia that is some sort of cocktail of vodka, blood and snow or crushed ice...for someone there is more vodka or money. For some of them is more blood...and crushed ice something sedative...makes an illusion of normal life."

5. Conscription, Mobilization, and Bureaucratic Stress

(33:16–35:40)

• Conscription becoming more difficult/complex:
  • All willing volunteers already enlisted; now the state must digitize, streamline, and enforce conscription more systematically.
  • Mobilization in 2022 exposed bureaucratic and administrative chaos; reforms now aim to prevent future breakdowns if further mobilizations are needed.

6. Do Parliamentary Elections Matter in Russia?

(35:40–40:54)

• Prokopyenko:

  • Elections are a "farce," but they matter bureaucratically: officials’ careers depend on turnout and "appropriate" results.
  • Corporate and institutional actors (e.g., company heads) mobilize voters to deliver desired outcomes.
  • Sensitive economic policies (tariff hikes) are postponed until after the polls, signifying the regime takes the performance—if not the fairness—of elections seriously.

• Gorin:

  • Elections are periods of potential crisis; authorities remember the surprise protests of 2010–2011.
  • Popular candidates, even semi-independent ones, attract attention and support, causing paranoia within the regime.
  • Even loyalist parties (e.g., the Communist Party) are now targets of crackdowns pre-2026 elections.

7. After Putin: Scenarios for Russia’s Future

(40:54–47:07)

• Host references Navalny's widow's "plan for change" and asks—how do you imagine the end of Putinism and the 'day after'?

• Gorin:

  • Two scenarios:
    1. Dynastic succession: Putin tries to pass power to one of his young sons, emulating Azerbaijan or Central Asian dictatorships.
    2. Typical autocratic succession: System persists with a "softer," less personalized autocracy, as in Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.

    "I guess he could want to transfer his power to one of his sons...It could be...some sort of conspiracy theory or fantasy. But...not absolutely unuseful to think about that scenario." (42:08)

  • Neither scenario offers real hope for democracy.

• Prokopyenko:

  • Emphasizes the unpredictability and inherent instability of autocratic transitions.
  • Putin’s biggest problem is managing power transition without making himself a lame duck.
  • Two major axes: Russia’s massive economic imbalance and the inevitable pressure to normalize with the West vs. the demands of a radicalized, war-hardened segment of society.
  • Little real demand for democracy inside Russia; the association of democracy with prosperity is gone.

    "I don't think that the democratic future of Russian system is possible. There is a very little demand on this from the inside..." (45:45)

  • Predicts a "mess with lots of problems" after Putin.

Notable Quotes & Timestamps

• On bureaucracy’s role:

  "The state is still functioning. We are not talking about failed state in Russia. Bureaucracy works, pensions are paid, budget sector is functioning."
  — Alexandra Prokopyenko (03:40)

• On informal FSB supervision:

  "There is...some secret parallel power vertical."
  — Vladislav Gorin (08:38)

• On ‘stick and carrot’ elite control:

  "Fear is very important for these people and that's also a glue how Putin keeps his elite loyal to him."
  — Alexandra Prokopyenko (21:00)

• On the illusion of a social contract:

  "Nobody asked Russian people since I guess 1999, because the first elections of Putin was not clear...he has never elected in competitional normal elections."
  — Vladislav Gorin (24:04)

• On the exhaustion of hope:

  "By October 2025, for every one person who reported about improved circumstances, more than three said they were getting worse."
  — Alexandra Prokopyenko (29:30)

• On elections and the machinery of power:

  "It's very important for the system because lots of people involved. They have KPI on how to conduct the elections, how to bring people to the polling stations."
  — Alexandra Prokopyenko (37:05)

• On possible futures:

  "I don't think that the democratic future of Russian system is possible. There is a very little demand on this from the inside..."
  — Alexandra Prokopyenko (45:45)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Start of main discussion: 02:49
• Who governs?: 03:02–08:38
• System evolution/pivotal changes: 09:59–15:47
• Elites’ incentives & constraints: 19:56–22:58
• Social contract/society’s response: 23:54–33:16
• On conscription and mobilization: 33:16–35:40
• Parliamentary elections: meaning and function: 35:40–40:54
• Scenarios for post-Putin Russia: 40:54–47:07

Memorable/Light Moments

• Gorin's metaphor of Russia as a “cocktail of vodka, blood and snow”:

  "For some...more vodka or money. For some...more blood like violence and repressions...crushed ice something sedative...makes an illusion of normal life."
  (31:27)

Further Resources

• Alexandra Prokopyenko’s book: "From Sovereigns to How the War against Ukraine Reshaped Russia's Elite" (available in Russian, forthcoming in English)
• Meduza (Vladislav Gorin’s outlet) offers English-language coverage of Russian events

In sum:
The episode paints a picture of a heavily personalized, dualistic Russian political system where both formal and shadow networks enforce Putin’s continued rule. Elite compliance is built on fear and rewards; ordinary Russians face poverty, propaganda, repression, and a war economy that has failed to deliver hope. Elections are managed performances for bureaucracy, not competitions of ideas. The prospects for democratic change after Putin are bleak—and the only certainty is tumult.