Episode Summary:

Podcast: New Books Network — New Books in Philosophy
Host: Carrie Figdor
Guest: Amie Thomasson (Daniel P. Stone Professor, Dartmouth College)
Book Discussed: Rethinking Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2025)
Release Date: November 10, 2025

Main Theme & Purpose

This episode features an in-depth conversation between host Carrie Figdor and philosopher Amie Thomasson about her new book, Rethinking Metaphysics. Thomasson argues against traditional, “heavy duty” approaches to metaphysics, proposing a deflationary, more practical vision of the field centered on "conceptual engineering." This reconceptualization seeks to clarify the aims, methods, and successes of metaphysics by treating it as a field concerned with understanding and improving our conceptual and linguistic frameworks, rather than uncovering mysterious or fundamental structures of reality.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Thomasson's Philosophical Trajectory & the Trilogy of Books

• Early career: Thomasson began in “first order metaphysics,” investigating fictional characters and social/cultural objects.
• Shift to metametaphysics: Repeated questioning about the nature of metaphysical inquiry led her to explore what metaphysics itself is, its successes, and failures.
• Trilogy:
  • Ontology Made Easy (2015): Deflationary approach to existence questions—a “Carnapian” view that such questions can often be resolved with empirical and conceptual work.
  • Norms of Necessity (2020): Extends the deflationary strategy to questions of modality (possibility/necessity).
  • Rethinking Metaphysics (2025): Asks, with the “hard” questions dissolved, what useful work remains for metaphysics. The answer: a broad, pragmatic program of conceptual engineering.
    (03:28–07:01)

2. What is "Conceptual Engineering"?

• Origins & expansion: Term draws from work on Carnap by Richard Creath, but Thomasson adopts a much broader understanding.

• Analogy with engineering: Like engineers assessing or reconstructing structures, philosophers can “reverse engineer” concepts to understand their roles and “retrofit” or replace them as needed.

• Inclusive view: Conceptual engineering includes both backward-looking (understanding existing functions and structures) and forward-looking (improvement or replacement) work.
  (09:00–11:31)

  “I want to bring all those projects into the fold of how I understand conceptual engineering … involving both a kind of reverse engineering … and reconstructive and reparative work when they're not working as they should anymore…”
  —Amie Thomasson (10:00)

3. Debunking Traditional Metaphysics and the “Metaphysical Malady”

• Problem with traditional approaches: They assume all discourse works in a single, uniform way, seeking “truthmakers” for every statement (moral, modal, mathematical, etc.).

• Key diagnosis: This “metaphysical malady” is the tacit functional monism about language.
  (16:54–21:34)

• Examples:

  • Truthmaker Theory: Mistakenly demands entities in the world to account for all truths, e.g., “the possibility of rain” or moral obligations.
  • Quinean naturalized metaphysics: Assumes all terms should be referential and quantifiable for scientific explanation.
  • Grounding approaches: Look for an ontological “bedrock” for all claims, failing to appreciate functional variety.

• Thomasson's response: Different discourses (moral, modal, mathematical) often serve different social, inferential, or organizational functions, not all meant to map onto reality in the same way.

  “I treat the metaphysical malady as the sort of totally tacit assumption that all this discourse serves the same function and works in the same way.”
  —Amie Thomasson (20:45)

4. Truth, Discourse, and Assessment

• Truth and deflationism: Thomasson sides with deflationary or disquotational theories of truth, rejecting heavy-duty correspondence requirements for all forms of discourse.
• Standards of assessment vary: The right to assert the truth of a statement depends on the function/rules of the relevant discourse (e.g., moral vs. everyday descriptive vs. mathematical claims).
  (24:28–26:29)

5. Rethinking Metaphysical Progress and Success

• Science progresses, metaphysics stagnates: Thomasson critiques the field for endlessly debating the same “pseudo-problems.”

• What counts as success?

  • Dispelling pseudo-problems (e.g., mere existence questions about abstracta)
  • Making conceptual progress (e.g., refining notions of freedom, time, privacy, intelligence)
  • Reconciling conceptual schemes as our knowledge and technologies evolve
    (26:10–28:57)

  “One of the ways that I try to succeed … is to try to get rid of some pseudo problems so we're not wasting our time on them anymore. Eradicate some old confusions.”
  —Amie Thomasson (26:29)

6. Rival Conceptual Schemes & Practical Examples

• Handling disagreement: Rather than aiming for metaphysical “essences,” Thomasson recommends surfacing the practical purposes behind concepts (e.g., ‘woman’, ‘marriage’) to clarify stakes and make disputes more productive/transparent.
• Case study:
  • Debates over defining “marriage” during equal marriage debates: Instead of searching for an “essence,” discuss what functions/needs the concept should serve.
    (29:06–30:41)

7. Relationship to Science and Other Disciplines

• Is metaphysics still rivalrous with science?
  • Thomasson draws distinctions:
    • “Normal science” discovers empirical truths within existing conceptual schemes.
    • “Conceptual engineering” is often a collaborative or interdisciplinary process (e.g., philosophers and biologists discussing species concepts).
    • Some target concepts (person, right/wrong) are broader than science.
  • Philosophy isn’t proprietary; others can engage in conceptual engineering, but philosophers have useful training for assessing conceptual schemes.
• Descriptive work: Mapping actual linguistic/conceptual structures is ongoing and often involves drawing on linguistics, cognitive science, psychology.
  (33:25–38:22)

8. Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL)

• Halliday & SFL: A branch of linguistics emphasizing that every mature-language utterance serves multiple functions (ideational, interpersonal, textual).

• Philosophical significance: Helps clarify how language structures impact metaphysical questions.

• Challenge for metaphysics: Understanding linguistic functions can dissolve or clarify longstanding metaphysical debates.
  (39:20–44:11)

  “I found an area… that had books that started to answer the questions I had about the functions language serves in human life and how it serves them. So that's how I found systemic functional linguistics.”
  —Amie Thomasson (40:01)

9. Concerns About Human-Centeredness and Relativity

• Critique considered: What if conceptual engineering “shrinks” metaphysics to parochial, local projects, or ignores reality-independent aspects of metaphysical debate?
• Thomasson’s reply:
  • Metaphysics is a human practice—questions are always asked from within our languages.
  • Some conceptual structures (e.g., grammatical metaphor) are cross-cultural/universal, allowing for general answers to metaphysical questions (e.g., properties, numbers).
  • Some topics will be local and culturally bound (e.g., marriage, art), but others are general in virtue of cognitive and linguistic universals.
    (47:35–52:00)

10. Recognizing Sudo-Problems vs. Real Problems

• Pseudo-problems: Some standard metaphysical questions dissolve once we recognize they result from faulty linguistic/conceptual assumptions (e.g., properties, truthmaker demands for abstracta).
• Real (hard) problems: Others (e.g., reconciling different conceptual schemes regarding time) remain but are better treated as issues of conceptual engineering—knitting together frameworks, clarifying compatibility, etc.
  (54:13–55:42)

11. Next Steps & Response from the Field

• Future work: Applying the developed methods to topics such as modality, morality, truth, law, and mind.
• Reception among metaphysicians: Primarily pushback—many still see language as irrelevant, focusing instead on “the world.”
• Thomasson’s challenge: Show why understanding language and its development is crucial before engaging in metaphysical theorizing.
  (56:42–61:02; 59:04–60:03)

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• Defining conceptual engineering self-consciously:

  “Some engineers are involved in retrofitting buildings before an earthquake … I want to bring all those projects into the fold … involving both a kind of reverse engineering … and reconstructive and reparative work when they're not working as they should anymore.”
  —Thomasson (10:00)

• On the “metaphysical malady”:

  “They go wrong by assuming that … all the indicatives of interest in metaphysics … all work in the same way and all serve the same kinds of functions.”
  —Thomasson (17:07)

• On pseudo-problems:

  “One of the ways that I try to succeed … is to try to get rid of some pseudo problems so we're not wasting our time on them anymore.”
  —Thomasson (26:29)

• On interdisciplinary philosophy:

  “Some of the concepts we’re engineering are much broader … right, like person and object and right and wrong … and then probably the sciences won't be involved as directly...”
  —Thomasson (35:37)

• On local vs. universal:

  “Some topics will be fine-grained and local, but it’s not obvious that all of them will be … Some of the perennial topics in metaphysics … have been around … since at least the Greek times … and that’s going to be broadly cross-cultural and cross-linguistic.”
  —Thomasson (47:38)

Timestamps for Important Segments

| Timestamp | Topic | |------------|--------------------------------------------------------------| | 03:28–07:01| Thomasson's background and the trilogy of books | | 09:00–11:31| Broad conception of conceptual engineering | | 16:54–21:34| Diagnosis of the “metaphysical malady” | | 24:28–26:29| Truth, standards, and deflationism | | 26:10–28:57| What counts as progress in metaphysics | | 29:06–30:41| Negotiating rival conceptual schemes: marriage, woman | | 33:25–38:22| Metaphysics versus science: cooperation, boundaries | | 39:20–44:11| Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) | | 47:35–52:00| Human focus, parochialism, universal/language structures | | 54:13–55:42| Real problems vs. pseudo-problems in metaphysics | | 56:42–61:02| Future research and reactions from the field |

Closing Thoughts

Amie Thomasson’s Rethinking Metaphysics is a call for philosophers to abandon the search for deep, mysterious “truthmakers” or grounding relations, and instead to take up the practical, intellectually fruitful work of conceptual engineering. Rather than making metaphysics trivial or obsolete, this shift promises genuine progress—elucidating the roles our concepts play, solving pragmatic problems, and clarifying age-old disputes.

Her arguments invite philosophers (and sympathetic scientists) to assess, revise, and reconstruct the frameworks that structure both philosophical and everyday inquiry, offering a more honest and impactful vision of metaphysics for the 21st century.