Podcast Summary: Andrew Monaghan, "Blitzkrieg and the Russian Art of War" (Manchester UP, 2025)

New Books Network | Host: Stephen Sikevich | February 3, 2026

Guest: Andrew Monaghan

Episode Overview

This episode centers on Andrew Monaghan's latest book, Blitzkrieg and the Russian Art of War. The discussion explores how Russia understands and conducts war, reevaluates prevalent Western misconceptions, and analyzes the evolving nature of Russian military thought, especially in light of recent conflicts and the ongoing war in Ukraine. The goal is to bridge gaps in Western perceptions by delving into the historical, cultural, and strategic contexts that underpin Moscow's approach to war—past, present, and future.

Key Discussion Points

1. The Need for a Nuanced Understanding of Russian War Strategy

• The Western image of Russia shifts abruptly: either “just a gas station with nukes” or an imminent threat to NATO.
• Such binary thinking exposes the West to repeated strategic surprises (03:31).
• Monaghan’s goal: Provide a structured “handbook” for understanding the continuity and evolution in Russian military thought, grounded in history, culture, and a clear-eyed view of Moscow’s motives (04:42).

2. Russian Military Thought: Culture, History, and “National Ways of War”

• Russian strategic culture is deeply intertwined with its history and civilization. It extends beyond Clausewitzian state-centric concepts to broader civilizational and meta-historical frameworks (09:24).
• Strategic culture is not uniquely Russian, but Russia strongly asserts the notion of a "national way of war," rooted in its unique geography, societal structure, and historical experience (12:28).
• Western analysis often exoticizes Russian notions (e.g., maskirovka) instead of parsing their largely European roots (09:24).

3. Fundamental Russian Conceptions of War

• War is conceptualized at the state level: not just armed forces, but all organs of state—diplomacy, economy, information—mobilized for a political outcome (12:35).
• Four levels of combat are recognized, scaling from local armed conflict to large-scale, existential war (12:35).
• The Western tendency to separate military from society leads to mistranslation and misinterpretation (18:39).

4. Misconceptions in the West and in NATO

• Western analysts tend to mythologize Russian theory (e.g., focusing on arcane concepts or highlighting famous strategists) while ignoring practice and context (18:39).
• There is a persistent, problematic belief in either Russian genius or complete incompetence, both of which obscure the real, nuanced picture (25:15).
• “We do too much 'what,' not enough 'why'” – Monaghan’s critique of Western analytic habits (22:54).

5. The Central Role of History in Russian Military Discourse

• Unlike the West—where history is often divorced from doctrine—Russians see military history as a vital source for practical lessons and scenario planning (29:02).
• However, the “health” of the discipline (history as taught/written) fluctuated, especially under Soviet repression (29:02).
• The cyclical suppression and revival of historical inquiry have directly shaped the development of military strategy (29:02).

6. Post-Soviet Transformations: From Disarray to Strategic Reassertion

• The 1990s meant strategic disaggregation for Russia: economic crisis, attempted reforms, and military defeats (Chechnya) (35:29).
• Continuity: Many Soviet-era military thinkers remained influential (35:29).
• The return of geopolitics as a central organizing theme, especially under Putin, who asserted state (not strictly military) control and advanced major reforms (42:05).

7. Geopolitics: The Heart of Russian Strategic Vision

• Russian leadership frames international affairs through a geopolitics/geoeconomics lens, not the vocabulary of globalization (47:28).
• The priorities center on controlling access to critical regions (Black Sea, Caucasus, Baltic), maintaining export routes, and preparing for competition with maritime powers (51:11).
• “The language our leadership is fluent in is globalization. The language the Russian leadership is fluent in is geopolitics.” – Monaghan (47:28).

8. Recurring Historical Analogies and Strategic Empathy

• Russian leadership deliberately draws analogies from the 19th–20th centuries, seeing current threats and alliances as echoes of past struggles (51:50).
• Effective Western deterrence and defense require "strategic empathy"—to understand, if not sympathize with, Russian perspectives (55:02).

9. Current and Emerging Russian Military Trends (Post-2022 War in Ukraine)

• Emphasis on military-industrial integration, state-wide mobilization, and expansion of the military’s societal role (“military patriotic fortress”) (69:02).
• Acceleration, not reversal, of trends: more geoeconomic focus, more state oversight, and a move toward embedding the military deeper into society (73:32).
• No clear new crop of military theorists—future developments likely to come from practical frontline experience (84:12).

10. Implications for NATO and the West

• There’s recognition of the Russian challenge, but Western analysis remains uncomfortable with the full repercussions (81:15).
• Until policymakers thoroughly work through Russian scenarios and strategic forecasts, responses will remain reactive and surprised (81:15).
• Russia’s future vision is neither simple decline nor Soviet restoration—rather, a repositioning for geoeconomic competition and multipolar global influence (78:17).

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• “There is this tension between the immediate threat, which is sometimes inflated... but also this idea that, well, Russia's just in decline sets up this sense of perpetual surprise.” – Andrew Monaghan (03:31)

• “We so often exoticize Russian aspects of approach to war... The Russians have developed a new form of war... when in fact actually if we go to our Clausewitz, as you know, Clausewitz was a Russian officer, so was Jomini... the Russian debate about strategy and war is entirely familiar to us.” – Monaghan (09:24)

• “War is not synonymous with military operations. War is synonymous with a whole of society approach and a whole of state approach.” – Monaghan (12:35)

• “It's absolutely true that the Russians have had some sophisticated thinkers... but Moscow also shot a lot of these sophisticated thinkers. We shouldn't forget, when you speak about culture and politics, the armed forces are part of the body politic.” – Monaghan (18:39)

• “Too much 'what,' not enough 'why'.” – Monaghan (22:54)

• “If you go to a British university and say, well, we're going to draw lessons from history... it's quite rare that you'll find an audience for that. So history is not deemed to demonstrate propositions or confirm laws. It's deemed to be valuable in its own purpose. And you note, I'm talking here about how the armed forces use it, not how the politicians use it.” – Monaghan (29:02)

• “The language our leadership is fluent in is globalization. The language that the Russian leadership is fluent in is geopolitics.” – Monaghan (47:28)

• “Unless you're interpreting [Russian strategy] through the appropriate lens, it's ships in the night disagreements.” – Monaghan (51:50)

• “Even colonel Gray called this strategic empathy, where you at least try to understand what the enemy is thinking. But of course, empathy is not the same as sympathy. I notice people always confuse those two.” – Sikevich (55:02)

• “It took almost the entirety of the 1920s and early 30s for the Red Army to even contemplate Both World War I and the Civil War… theory can't fully predict everything or anticipate everything.” – Sikevich (87:16)

Timestamps for Core Segments

• [02:21] – Western cognitive dissonance: Russia as declining power vs. imminent threat.
• [04:42] – Monaghan’s intellectual journey; the need for nuanced frameworks.
• [09:24] – The civilizational, meta-historical Russian perspective; “national way of war.”
• [12:35] – Russian state-level conception of war.
• [18:39] – Western misconceptions and translational pitfalls.
• [29:02] – The didactic, practical role of history in Russian military thinking.
• [35:29] – Post-Soviet strategic disaggregation, continuity, and geopolitics.
• [42:05] – Putin’s ascendancy and the centralization of military reform.
• [47:28] – Geopolitics, geography, and the Black Sea/Caucasus focus.
• [55:02] – The necessity of “strategic empathy” in Western analysis.
• [69:02] – Russian military evolution post-Ukraine invasion; societal militarization.
• [73:32] – Russia’s quest for global influence and geoeconomic competition.
• [78:17] – Russia in 2030: Three global powers and a new world order.
• [81:15] – The challenge for NATO: matching Russian scenarios and strategic forecasts.
• [84:12] – Contemporary absence of new theorists; practical retrospection likely.

Final Thoughts and Reflections

• Monaghan calls on scholars and policymakers to look forward, focusing on how and why Russia acts, not just what it does (91:30).
• The narrative of Russian decline oversimplifies; change in power dynamics is not synonymous with decline (93:34).
• Both Monaghan and Sikevich stress the need for research and policy to shift from peering endlessly into Soviet history to grappling with Russia’s present and probable future (94:13).

Guest’s Current Work

• Monaghan is developing a project on mapping Russian power, centered on strategic futures and scenario-based analysis, aiming to help Western audiences understand Russia as a fundamentally strategic actor looking toward 2030 and beyond (96:42).

For listeners, this episode is a dense, insightful journey through how Russia thinks about war and why it matters for understanding today’s most consequential security dilemmas.