Podcast Summary:

New Books Network — "The Revolution to Come: A History of an Idea from Thucydides to Lenin" with Dan Edelstein
Host: Moteza Hajizadeh
Guest: Professor Dan Edelstein
Air Date: December 10, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode centers on Dan Edelstein’s new book, The Revolution to Come: A History of an Idea from Thucydides to Lenin (Princeton UP, 2025). Professor Edelstein and host Moteza Hajizadeh explore how the meaning, perception, and possibility of revolution evolved from ancient Greece and Rome through the Enlightenment, and into the modern era. Their wide-ranging conversation analyzes key shifts in political thought about revolutions—both as disaster and as opportunity—across history, with a particular focus on the roots of modern revolutions, their structural risks, and lessons for today's turbulent political climate.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Origins and Structure of the Book

[02:23–06:59]

• Edelstein is a professor of French, political science, and history at Stanford. He began his academic path in French literature but quickly became engrossed in the history and legacy of the French Revolution.
• The inspiration for this book dates over a decade back, evolving out of his earlier work on the philosophical and legal foundations of political terror.
• Book Structure:
  • Part I: Fortunes, Revolution (ancient/classical understandings)
  • Part II: Constitutions and Revolutions in the British World
  • Part III: Modern Times (the shift in historical consciousness)
  • Part IV: The Progress of Revolution
• Edelstein initially set out to write a history downstream from the French Revolution, but recognized he needed to trace its deep roots to fully explain its transformational character.

2. Classical Conceptions of Revolution

[06:59–15:44]

• In ancient Greece (Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle), “revolution” (stasis or metabole) was viewed with deep suspicion and fear.
  • Quote:

    “Revolution is seen in Thucydides…as the worst possible catastrophe that can befall a city state, a revolution. There's nothing good that can come of it. It's destruction…an upheaval of all civilized values.” — Edelstein, [08:01]

• In these times, history was perceived as cyclical (“the wheel of fortune”), not meaningful progress. The aspiration was to minimize change and stabilize the constitution.
• Greek vocabulary distinguished violent social upheaval (stasis) from regime change (metabole), nuances often lost in modern discussions.

3. Conservative Nature of Early Modern Revolutions

[15:44–21:33]

• The English Civil War, Glorious Revolution, and American Revolution are traditionally labeled as radical, but Edelstein contends that the concepts of “conservative” vs. “radical/progressive” only gain traction with the French Revolution.
  • In the 17th–18th centuries, even revolutionaries saw themselves as restoring or preserving past constitutions.
  • Parliamentary and colonial arguments revolved around returning to ‘true’ constitutional principles—novelty and progress were not their stated aims.
  • Quote:

    “The future ideally was just going to be…the best version of the past that we could imagine.”— Edelstein, [17:09]

  • The U.S. Constitution, while divergent from Britain's, retains much of its structure and balance, with true constitutional innovation and radicalism more visible in the rapidly shifting and short-lived French constitutions of the 1790s.

4. The Idea of Revolution Principles

[22:57–26:17]

• “Revolution principles” referenced by figures like John Adams were not about violent change or novelty, but fidelity to the principles of the Glorious Revolution.
  • Americans justified their own actions as continuity with their British ancestry, not radical departure.

5. Enlightenment, Progress, and the Moral Imperative of Revolution

[26:17–32:46]

• The Enlightenment introduced the possibility of historical progress (culminating in “the quarrel of the ancients and the moderns”).
• Slowly, thinkers like Voltaire transition from suspicion towards revolution (as calamity) to viewing it as the necessary harbinger of a more rational, just society.
  • Quote:

    “Voltaire starts out…in this classicist view that…history has no purpose.…But then by the 1860s…he's starting to see the Enlightenment as this sort of cultural revolution…” — Edelstein, [30:41].

• By 1789, French revolutionaries saw themselves as inaugurating a new, better epoch—contrasting sharply with the American experience a decade earlier.

6. Modern Revolutions: Risks, Structure, and Pitfalls

[32:46–37:57]

• Edelstein links modern revolution’s dangers to Enlightenment faith in the rationality and consensus of the masses.
  • Quote:

    “The part that does become problematic…is this belief that…we're all going to agree on what the proper course of action is for the state. That's…most pernicious.…It creates this illusion of unanimity…” — Edelstein, [33:53]

• When reality fails to meet this ideal, violence frequently turns against fellow revolutionaries, with revolutionary struggles morphing into battles over who holds the ‘correct’ vision.
  • Dostoevsky’s The Possessed is cited:

    “…there can only be one solution to the social problem and it is mine.” — Edelstein, paraphrasing Dostoevsky, [36:17]

• The craving for a decisive, singular authority (“red leviathan”) emerges from disappointment with pluralism and failed consensus.

7. Contemporary Prospects for Revolution (USA and Beyond)

[37:57–42:20]

• Edelstein warns against complacency: no society, including the U.S., is immune to revolution.
• While mass stasis (violent upheaval) seems unlikely in the current US context, regime change through “metabole”—from within the institutions, perhaps via autogolpe (“self-coup”)—remains plausible.
  • He expresses concern about legislative complacency and vulnerabilities within American checks and balances.

8. Socialist and Marxist Theories of Revolution

[43:53–49:08]

• Marx’s approach to revolution builds on 19th-century socialist dilemma: the tension between revolutionary transformation and democratic processes.
  • Early revolutionary thinkers (Jacobins, Babeuf) also struggled with the ‘dictatorship of the transition’ — democracy was the goal, but not the means.
  • Marx spoke of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” emerging out of the failed liberal revolutions of 1848—highlighting the necessity, in his view, for temporary authoritarianism to bring about a future egalitarian society.

9. Lessons from the 20th Century and Beyond

[49:08–55:14]

• The Bolshevik Revolution (1917) epitomizes the “hard progressive revolution.” But by the late 20th century (Philippines, Iran), revolutions increasingly have to justify their legitimacy via popular will, constitutional referenda, and parliamentary democracy.
• Patterns since the late 20th century suggest a return to cycles of strongmen and unstable democracies (Egypt, Philippines), echoing ancient anxieties about instability.
• Modern societies are caught between political models inherited from antiquity (balance, consensus, rights—to slow down change) and unmet expectations for transformative politics.

10. Paths to Change and the Limits of Politics

[55:14–60:30]

• All routes to change—participatory reform, constitutional revision, or disruptive revolution—carry significant risks.
• Attempts at complete rupture (violent revolution) can result in unpredictable and often undesirable outcomes (“real watch what you wish for”).
• The challenge is balancing liberal commitments to self-determination and rights with the dangers of political paralysis and gridlock.
  • Quote:

    “We've come to expect too much from politics.…There's just so many differences of opinion…we’re just not going to all naturally converge on the same solutions for society.” — Edelstein, [58:06]

• Edelstein advocates resetting expectations, prioritizing compromise, and revaluing pluralism to avoid destructive cycles of overreach and reaction.

Notable Quotes (with Timestamps)

• On the cyclical nature of history and ancient suspicion of revolution:

  “Revolution is seen in Thucydides…as the worst possible catastrophe that can befall a city state, a revolution. There's nothing good that can come of it. It's destruction, it's death, and it's also this upheaval of all civilized values.” — Edelstein, [08:01]

• On the Enlightenment transformation of the idea of progress:

  “This modern idea of progress emerges…people start to really have to make some historical claims…progress starts to look like this inevitable law of history.” — Edelstein, [29:47]

• On modern revolutions and discord:

  “It creates this illusion of unanimity…when it's broken by reality…It can lead to a real sense of betrayal. And it leads people…to look for reasons why we are not all in agreement…probably the best way to deal with you is to cut your head off.” — Edelstein, [34:10]

• On the impossibility of revolution-proof societies:

  “Every country is prone to revolution and…I think it's wishful thinking to imagine that some countries are revolution proof.” — Edelstein, [38:50]

• On the risks and limits of political transformation:

  “I think we've come to expect too much from politics.…so many differences of opinion…and so if you expect government to really make a lot of changes…someone’s always going to be pissed off and someone’s always going to feel like the state is doing the wrong thing…” — Edelstein, [58:06]

Memorable Moments

• Edelstein notes his initial surprise at John Adams, a founding father, using Greek history (Thucydides) to warn against revolution—even after himself participating in one.
  [07:09–09:03]

• The shift from fearing revolution as catastrophe (ancient world) to seeing it as historical necessity (Enlightenment/French Revolution) is vividly unpacked.
  [11:21–13:16]

• Dostoevsky’s parodic but incisive summary of modern revolutionary hubris:

  “There can only be one solution to the social problem and it is mine.”
  [36:17]

Suggested Timestamps for Key Segments

• Host/Guest Introduction & Book’s Genesis: [02:23–04:25]
• Book Organization & Approach: [04:31–06:59]
• Classical Attitudes toward Revolution: [07:09–14:22]
• British & American Revolutions as “Conservative”: [15:44–21:33]
• ‘Revolution Principles’ and Legitimacy: [22:57–26:17]
• Enlightenment and Modern Progress: [26:32–32:46]
• Modern Revolutions & Authoritarian Risks: [32:46–37:57]
• Revolution Today & American Prospects: [37:57–42:20]
• Socialist/Marxist Models: [43:53–49:08]
• 20th-Century Revolutions and the Fragility of Pluralism: [49:08–55:14]
• Future Change & the Limits of Expectation: [55:14–60:30]

Overall Tone and Style

Edelstein is careful, scholarly, and nuanced, blending deep historical knowledge with accessible analogies and reference points (from Thucydides to Dostoevsky to the present). The conversation is intellectually rich but clear, modeling the measured skepticism and pluralism Edelstein advocates.

Takeaway

The Revolution to Come traces how “revolution” has been conceived as both existential threat and moral imperative, how expectations of progress shaped the dangers of modern political transformation, and why pluralism and compromise—even if frustrating—may be as vital as ever for societies seeking change without disaster.