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- [00:01]
Stephen Sakiewicz
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- [00:28]
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- [00:57]
Marshall Poe
Hello everybody, this is Marshall Po. I'm the founder and editor of the New Books Network and if you're listening to this, you know that the NBN is the largest academic podcast network in the world. We reach a worldwide audience of 2 million people. You may have a podcast or you may be thinking about starting a podcast. As you probably know, there are challenges basically of two kinds. One is technical, there are things you have to know in order to get your podcast produced and distributed. And the second is, and this is the biggest problem, you need to get an audience. Building an audience in podcasting is the hardest thing to do today. With this in mind, we at the NBM have started a service called NBN Productions. What we do is help you create a podcast, produce your podcast, distribute your podcast, and we host your podcast. Most importantly, what we do is we distribute your podcast to the NBN audience. We've done this many times with many academic podcasts and we would like to help you. If you would be interested in talking to us about how we can help you with your podcast, please contact us. Just go to the front page of the New Books Network and you will see a link to NBN Productions. Click that, fill out the form and we can talk. Welcome to the New Books Network.
- [02:05]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Hello. Welcome to the New Books Network. I am your host, Stephen Sakiewicz. My next guest is Danny Bello and we will be discussing his book Russian warfare in the 21st An Incentive Opportunity Intervention Model, published by Rutledge in 2025. Danny Bello is an Assistant professor of International Relations and Security and Director of the Global Policy Horizons Research Lab in Webster University in St. Louis, United States. Danny Bello, thank you for joining us on the New Books Network.
- [02:38]
Danny Bello
It is an absolute pleasure to be with you and thank you again for extending the invitation to speak about the book.
- [02:44]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Well, we always like to begin our interviews by asking our guests, tell us a little bit about yourself and what's the backstory behind writing this book. Sure.
- [02:52]
Danny Bello
So a little bit about myself. I'm originally from Vanderbilt, British Columbia, Canada and I completed my undergraduate at the University of British Columbia and then went on to do my doctorate at the Northern Patterson School of International affairs in Canada's capital. And basically in terms of my own interests, research interests, I've always, since basically my early days in academia, I've always wondered why people, governments, nations, communities decide to go to war. Even though it seems to be, at least on the surface, quite counterintuitive. Shouldn't there be a resolution to every possible conflict? Well, it's really. And basically from there I began researching foreign policy choice. How do communities and nations besides to engage in conflict and sometimes even more importantly, how do they choose to remain in those conflicts when the cost set up. And this is kind of the mindset that really began my journey in the field of international relations, security studies. And ultimately over the years my area of specialization increasingly focused on being what has been called the post Soviet region and specifically Russia. Considering how active Russia has been in foreign affairs over the last couple of decades, it became a special area of interest to me. So this led me to writing this book essentially asking the question how does Russia make the decisions that it does when it intervenes across but it calls it's near abroad? How do decision makers of the ride of peace difficult outcomes both in terms of human costs and infrastructure costs and just a lot of ethical questions. And just as importantly, after these interventions take place, how does Russia calculate basically the cause? Does the cause of benefit analysis of staying in these pockets of such a long time, continuously incurring class. So that was the beginning of this idea. It was the tribe to explain essentially human behavior. Yeah.
- [05:10]
Stephen Sakiewicz
And I thought we could probably begin with this question of what is the significance of Russia as a military power in the 21st century? Because I you probably still remember this like in the 1990s after the Soviet Union collapse, there was a common perception, oh, Russia is irrelevant, it's a has been power. But now, especially after 2014, we've been, you know, shocked to realize that no, Russia is still a significant player on the world stage, even if it's not as great as it's as the height of Soviet power.
- [05:45]
Danny Bello
That's right. And as a lot of policymakers, members of the academic community and others have been quite surprised at the decisiveness with which Russia decided to, for example, in Ukraine in 2014, as, as all of us remember, to a certain extent, there was a major debate about whether Russia is going to be intervening militarily or otherwise in Ukraine. And there were many people who said this is absolutely not possible. And others have said this is imminent. But what became quite clear is that even in the group among the people who said that Russia is going to be intervening, they were militarily, that is, they were inaccurate by approximately eight years. Right. Because we had an intervention that took place in 2014 that the military intervention that we're seeing now is eight years delayed by many. Right. So what that shows us is that as that you're not as clear about Russian decision making and the backstory story that goes into these decisions as we often like to believe, and we are often surprised by decisions that are taken at least a significant portion of the policy and the academic team. And with regard to Russia's increasing, let's call, presence in the security space, well, that's quite evident considering caution has some sort of footprint in many places, in the majority of places in the world from of course, it's what it calls near abroad, but also in Africa and Latin America and other places. So we've seen Russia become quite consequential in terms of decision making on our end because every decision that we will have to make moving forward will have to take into account what is Russia going to be doing. In order to successfully account for that, we need to have a much better understanding of how it meets the disciplines that it does.
- [07:53]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, in your own view and based on your own research, what are some common misconceptions that people in the west have about Russian power and Russian military power more specifically?
- [08:05]
Danny Bello
Well, there has been a lot of the false speculation with regard to what Russia is able or unable to do in terms of deploying force across international borders. But what's quite interesting, and that goes into a much more strategic kind of discussion, is that there was a long standing perception that Russia's calculation can be reduced to the simple geopolitical geostrategic odds benefit calculation, which is essentially encroachment of NATO and what is, let's call it, the west doing vis a vis Russia and what Russia can do in order to deter all this, at least speaking from the perspective that's commonly observed in the policy community. But what has been missing is that effective dimension. In other words, the perception of Russia and how perception with regard to, let's call it the holdings that Russia had and the Soviet Union had prior to 1991. There that component which is ideological or affected as we call it in the policy and in the academic community, has to be a part of that equation. If we understand what Russia is doing, we have to have to understand it at the intersection of geopolitics, but also what happens on the ground from the perspective of inter ethnic relations, understanding what the calculation vis a vis what Russia calls compatriots. There are a lot of complex dimensions to this that have often escaped the conversation. And the purpose of the book is to bring these dimensions into the, into the single conversation. It's not that Russia only behaves based on geopolitical calculations or Russia only behaves based on these ideological effective populations. It's an amalgamation of both. And that's what I would say is the ultimate value added of this.
- [10:13]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Would you also say certain Cold War stereotypes have still kind of continue to influence the community? Because I notice a lot is made about Putin's background as a KGB agent and therefore it's like. It's more like the Bond villain type stereotype attitude. I notice even among, you know, experts in the supposed experts in the field.
- [10:34]
Danny Bello
Sure. I mean, in terms of studying Russia from an academic perspective, even if we're looking at how things are done in the policy community, there seems to be a path dependence. Right. Russia or the Soviet Union has been perceived in a certain way. So those ideas continue into the modern era. However, we really have to rethink many of these assumptions because the world was no longer bipolar, it is multipolar. There are a lot of interesting considerations. The diversity of the region also has to be accounted for in terms of trying to understand how things are done at the highest level. So hopefully moving forward we'll have the nuance that this topic deserves. And trying to escape misconceptions potentially.
- [11:30]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, a common terminology that's used when discussing Russian theories of warfare, especially since 2014, has been gray zone operations and also related hybrid warfare, the Gerasimov doctrine. And that's a whole can of worms in itself. How would you personally, in regards to your book, define gray zone operations? Because this has been debated among scholars. But I'd like to know what your own definition would be of this topic.
- [12:04]
Danny Bello
It's an excellent question, one that has been highly debated, especially in my field. Gray zone is a format of conflict. It's a format of conflict that on one hand escapes the definition of peace. We certainly know that the Majority of the countries are engaging in some sort of hostility visa be one or many more nations. But it's also a type of conflict that is not a state of total rule. So if we're taking conflict on an intensity scale, it's exactly between those two golf hosts. So in between those two billposts, countries can engage in cyber warfare, they can engage in warfare, they can impact inter ethnic conflicts in order to make certain gains. So ultimately it's about the intensity of conflict that escapes the definition of peace, but also that of athletes.
- [12:58]
Stephen Sakiewicz
So it's almost like a twist to Clausewitz's famous war is the continuation of politics by your means. But in some ways the gray zone is the continuation of war by other means. In a way, sure.
- [13:10]
Danny Bello
And in terms of gray zone conflict, we see that this phenomenon is becoming increasingly prominent in international affairs. Specifically because outcomes that were generally possible using military means in centuries prior can now be achieved using non military means. And that is one of the key incentives. Or engage in gray zone conflict at lower costs, similar outcomes can be achieved, even though they generally take longer to achieve, because absolutely, propaganda is not an immediate kind of tool to achieve whatever outcomes you want, but it is absolutely at a much lower cost and the costs that can be absorbed over a long period of time. So gray zone conflict has become the dominant form of international conflict, even though we see those militarized interchanges and nonetheless the majority of conflict takes place outside of the militarized good.
- [14:09]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, there has been some misinformation about this, but do the Russians have their own conception of gray zone operations or like an equivalent of such? Because I know gray zone and hybrid warfare, those are more Western terms. Those are not terms that the Russians themselves use. I think they use network centric warfare. That's one of their terms.
- [14:31]
Danny Bello
Yes. And the idea of gray zone conflict and hybrid warfare is very much a product of our own, let's call them transatlantic community inceptions of what conflict and warfare is. And in the 21st century. But when we're looking at what Russia, when strategists in Russia have conceptualized, not just in the 21st century but during the Soviet era, one of the ways that they refer to be to the specific tactics that are used deep Brad, they're often called active measures. And active measures can be ideological subversion, it can be cyber warfare. There are many dimensions to this. But from Russia's conception, it's very much about shaping operations as well. So as we've seen in 2008 in Abkazia, we've seen Russia engage in incredible prep operations that have taken place prior to the five day militarized intervention in Abkhazia and Georgia and other places. So the inception that Russia has, it's very much a prep stage for something else. And the prep stage can take much more in terms of resource than you have to a military operation, because the prep stage can be over many, many decades. And as I said before, it's something that has been developed as a concept in the Soviet Union, often labeled as ideologically supervision.
- [16:02]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yeah. And I think because I mentioned Gerasimov when he gave that speech or that article that became the Gerasimov doctrine, what most people don't realize, he's actually kind of talking about how Russia needs to defend itself from what we would call gray zone hybrid warfare from the West. So in some ways their own conception is they're the victims of these gray zones from the west, not that they need to projected onto the West. So it is kind of interesting there is that conceptual difference because it almost seems like both sides are kind of seen, well, the other side is the attacker, the aggressor. And in some ways that is a continuation of the Cold War, because I know the Soviet Union kept saying, like, oh no, we're just defending ourselves, we're defending our sphere of influence. But then NATO was like, no, no, no, the Red army is going to try to march on to Paris any day now.
- [16:54]
Danny Bello
And, and what's interesting is that difference in worldviews. From NATO's perspective, Russia's on the offensive. Russia is intervening in Ukraine, Russia is intervening in Georgia and other places in the world. But from Russia's perspective, it's actually on the retreat because it looks at its own history and said, well, our borders would extend much farther, our influence would extend much farther during the Soviet era. So it's quite a difference in worldviews. And that difference very much shapes the conflict because if Russia is on the retreat, as it sees itself, at least then it will fight much harder for every next step of retreat. Because it's essentially the endowment effect. People place much more value in things they own. Right. And the fear of losing those things compared to anything that's possibly gained. So that's why we're seeing Russia engage in interventions, because again, we see it absolutely as being on the offensive. Right. Intervention in independent countries in violation of international law. But the perception is quite different from the other side. It's a country under the retreat. It's a country that's declining in terms of its global influence. It's an entirely different perception. And the question becomes are we willing to demonstrate the same type of resolve we, meaning NATO and the transatlantic community superior to me? Are we able to demonstrate that similar levels resolve relative to a country that perceives itself to be on the retreat? And every kilometer of retreat is perceived to be incredibly costly. So that's a question for our policy neighbors. And kind of the future of my field is understanding how to engage in deterrence in this environment where there's such deep rooted role differences in the world.
- [18:52]
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- [20:25]
Stephen Sakiewicz
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Marshall Poe
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- [20:39]
Marshall Poe
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- [20:42]
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- [20:45]
Danny Bello
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- [20:46]
Stephen Sakiewicz
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Danny Bello
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- [20:53]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company affiliates excludes Massachusetts. Yeah, not to jump the gun in the discussion, but we're seeing that right now with the war in Ukraine and why even with the negotiate trying, the attempts to negotiate an end, it's like, you know, Putin is kind of taking a very hard line. But yeah, what you just said would explain it. It's like, no, no, no. We're fighting for every kilometer. This is like trying to preserve our country for the foreseeable future. Like, for them, it's like a real existential threat and, you know, fight for survival. And of course, for the Ukrainians, it's the same thing. And that's why in some ways there's, you know, this gridlock in the negotiations. And I think a lot of times some of the Western leaders, they don't understand. They don't kind of understand that, and they're or they're only favorable towards the Ukrainians, understandably so. But it's also, you know, you do have to kind of at least have some empathy for the Russians perspective in order to at least try to get somewhere with them.
- [21:51]
Danny Bello
And speaking of just the word ever being, it's something that scholars like Stephen Waltz mentioned, that this idea of strategic empathy, which is not an agreement with what's happening on the ground, but it's the ability to understand, simply the ability to understand, because that understanding is proof showing if there's going to be effective conflict, man. And this is ultimately the purpose of the book Russian warfare in the 21st century, is trying to understand why Russia behaved, has been behaving the way that it does. And not only that, trying to make sure that we have a detailed understanding of how Russian actions have differed across different places in Ukraine. And hopefully that understanding will be well positioned to inform both scholarship moving forward in the field of conflict management, resolution and financial security, but also inform policymakers on some of this backstory that goes into Russian decision making.
- [23:01]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yeah, I forgot the name, but I remember he was On American News, CBS, 60 Minutes. This was back in the late 90s. But he kind of was even saying, like, well, if you keep. This was literally his term. Like, if you keep sticking the Russians in the eye with NATO and also just rub it in their face that, hey, you lost the Cold War and we can do whatever we want on the World stage. This is going to cause us some problems later down the road. And I keep thinking about that with 2014 and especially with the war in Ukraine and the fact that we're kind of stuck in this, you know, this quagmire where how do we resolve this issue with Ukraine? Because like I. Because we just discussed, both are perceiving themselves in an existential struggle for survival and neither side wants to give anything up because of that. And we can judge the rightness or wrongness of those perceptions, but they are what they are. And it's just how do we as the west try to at least kind of not make the situation worse? You know, and I think sometimes because we don't try to at least try to understand where the Russians are coming from, we always seem to always try to make the situation worse rather than better.
- [24:17]
Danny Bello
And just to sort of work with that point, that is absolutely necessary. And again, this is about the implications. The implications and the applications that bespoke heard in for the policy community that in most conflicts today it is impossible to achieve absolute victory. In other words, someone to suffer. Absolutely. In other words, we have to go into any situation understanding that there will have to be a diplomatic resolution, especially for talking about nuclear, because NATO is absolutely involved. And even though it's Ukraine, Biden, Russia today, it is very unlikely that any of the sides would supper. Absolutely. So it is useful for us to think in terms of what are the incentives? Why are countries acting the way they do? What are, what are the elements of their decision making that are most crucial. And it'll help us find a contrast because ultimately this conflict will end with some sort of contract space and the different sides will take a b luxom. So it is absolutely imperative for us to understand what goes into. Then again, this is one of the key purposes of this talk, it's application.
- [25:38]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, there are a lot of case studies mentioned in the book. We did touch on Akazia briefly and then also Crimea. Is there anything you want to add about like the Donbas conflict? How did Russian gray zone operations conducted themselves there? And then maybe we could probably expand more on the ongoing war in Ukraine since, you know, a lot of people are interested in that.
- [26:00]
Danny Bello
Sure. One of the key findings of the book is that Russian action across different places in Ukraine, especially for 2022, have been guided by two dimensions. One is Russia's perception of its protectable vis a vis places such as Odessa and the Donbass region. Archivist Crimea and Russia actually has quite a diverse set of visions with regard to all these different regions. And that very much intersects with the idea of what type of opportunity Russia has to intervene on the ground. And in this book I look at it from the perspective of whether there's a secessionist movement or an irredentist movement. In other words, a movement that simply wants to separate from Ukraine. But also is it a movement that would like for that territory to join Russia and that provides different opportunities for Russia to intervene on the ground. With regard to Russia's perceived protector role, there are different levels that Russia has perceived. So in Crimea, that was very much a part of Russian identity vis a vis the Crimea, Russia saw itself and has then it's an ongoing philosophy in Russian decision. And the Crimea is very much a part of Russia. Russia is the ultimate protector of Crimea and its people. And it has a very much vested interest in that place as the cradle of a big part of its identity since many centuries ago. And that's not necessarily the case in other places such as the Donbass, where Russia has indeed a perceived protector war. Again, right or wrong, that's a different conversation. But Russia sees itself as a, as the protector of the people, the culture and so on and so forth, largely through that compatriots policy that Russia has developed over the years. And now it's in, it's even presumably some legal for universities like 1990s. But the Donbass, based on what my research found, is very different from Odessa as well. In Odessa, absolutely, Russia has affinity towards Odessa, but its perceived level of connection is, is much lower compared to the Donbass in Crimea. And at the same time, there was a movement in Odessa throughout the years that wanted to join Russia and that was simply not feasible for Russia. So based on this underground perception of what's happening, what type of movement is there? Is Russia going to have to permit if Russia is going to be supporting that movement, do they have to spend a lot of resources or not? And Russia's own perception vis a vis that. So across the cases in the book, what we've seen is that in many circumstances Russia simply did not engage or invest as much in very zone tools and tactics. Because yes, it has a protector role that it perceives, but at the same time, what was happening on the ground was too costly. The movement was not conducive for what Russia was trying to. But there's an irredentism. In other words, a movement that would like to for that territory could join Russia that has to that cost in terms of international ratification and monetary costs and political costs and many Many other assets can't outweigh the perceived benefit of providing that protection. So in many cases, we've seen Russia engage more intensely or less intensely, precisely based on this calculation that I outlined in the incentive opportunity intervention model.
- [30:02]
Stephen Sakiewicz
In the Bloat now getting to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, there was a common argument like, oh, this means Russia has completely abandoned its gray zone operations or hybrid warfare strategy and just went all out for high intensity warfare. But your book argues that's actually not the case. They continued even alongside the more conventional military operations, Is that correct?
- [30:32]
Danny Bello
And that's exactly right. What we're actually seeing is the military intervention that Russia has engaged in since 2022 seems to follow a similar pattern to what Russia has been doing before. So it's very difficult to treat what's happening now as independent, for all is happening. And what Russia has been doing is that it seems that the emphasis on the different regions is placed in terms of intensity is similar to the pattern of the intensity that Russia has engaged in gray zone conflict prior to 2022. So ultimately, what we're seeing is a similar pattern of behavior simply at a much more intense scale, which gives us an idea that Russian decision making isn't necessarily entirely different. It's simply that Russia sees a window of opportunity to do something and it was taped in that opportunity. And again, we're seeing Russian emphasis on Crimea, maintaining Russian presence there, maintaining Russian presence in the Donbass. Odessa fell by the wayside, relatively speaking, just as it did during the prior sort of phase of that intervention prior to 2022. So really the pattern of behavior is quite similar, again simply at a much more escalated pace and intensity.
- [32:04]
Stephen Sakiewicz
So it's not so much the abandonment, but more of like adapting as the situation evolves, which of course you're supposed to do anyways. And strategy, as the famous saying goes, no plan survives first contact with the enemy.
- [32:17]
Danny Bello
That's right. So Helmut von Bock was 100% right in saying, and Russia has adapted to you with the same mindset. With the same mindset and with the same pattern of decision making, simply to an environment where it sees a much more existential threat to its protectable. So that's why we saw this escalation. It's covered in the latter part of the book, how prior to 2014-2022, what was happening and then how a similar pattern of behavior informed the decision making with militarized by.
- [32:55]
Stephen Sakiewicz
So just based off your own research. And of course, as we know, it differs from case to case, but what are some of the major strategic or strategy prerogatives that are found in a lot of Russian gray zone operations? As far as we can tell across the board, taking into account different contexts.
- [33:17]
Danny Bello
What we're observing is a very strong emphasis on information space. Information space is very much a part of that older conception of active measures that was developed in the Soviet Union and Russia. Even in the midst of, let's call it a pre censorship and you know, countries especially in, in Central Europe are trying to regulate Russian information inflow and so on. We are seeing a lot of information still proliferate, whether it's into Ukraine or whether it's into the Baltic states. We know that people can still watch Russian television channels using satellites and people still continue to do that. So in terms of an attempt to influence public discourse, those operations are still happening. And you know, those things are captured by the policy community. But frequently there are different types of, let's call them, operations that Russia engages in. Most, most of the emphasis is really on fracturing public trust, whether it's inter ethnic or whether it's one ethnic group vis a vis the government. But the question becomes ultimately is what is the response? If we see an attempt to fracture trust and the immediate reaction is try to increase censorship and increase suppression and repression, is that really going to achieve the desired result of making peace or is it just simply going to aggravate the existing interacting divides and the lack of trust? So ultimately the next logic step is to ask ourselves, well, what are effective policy in order to respond to these types of operations that, that Russia is engaged in and will continue to engage in? Because ultimately the policies communities across Central Europe have responded quite differently and often what it seems did not achieve things.
- [35:27]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now have any of these type of information operations been done in like say Asia or Africa? Because I know Russia has been trying to gain like the, the approval or at least the support of China and India and other major non Western countries saying like, hey, we're just trying to protect ourselves from the west and kind of building on a common framework that these countries could also relate to. And I know from some of my previous discussions, even like with Wagner in Africa, sometimes they're like, well yeah, this is like a non Western alternative. And you know, there's not as many caveats as Western military aid would have. So could you, is there anything you would like to say on this issue?
- [36:14]
Danny Bello
Well, we, if we look at some of the maps that have been published by various academics and policy institutes, Russian V has quite a significant footprint, especially using non State actors in Africa, for example, the Wagner Group and some of the others. So Wagner is certainly not the only organization that Russia sponsors across, across the world. And we can see that there is significant influence on the political landscape in Africa. I know Russia is very active in the psycho African Republic and Mali and other places in the world. And it's absolutely shifting public perception. It is indeed going into this idea that there is an alternative that all of you leaders, communities should not necessarily be dependent on the former Hadroman. We can provide an alternative. And not only do we provide an alternative, but we provide one that has fewer strings attached. So in countries where there's, let's call it, challenges with rule of law, challenges with corruption, challenges with governance, significant democratic backsliding, that alternative is quite appealing and that those incentives are very much playing a role in creating a global perception of what's happening in Ukraine. And Russia is actually a fight to restore some sort of balance in the world and justice. So those messages are very much proliferating. And these non state actors, such as the Wagner group and many, there are many other ones. Wagner is simply one of the more famous ones because they've done a lot of fighting on the ground in Ukraine, so we start hearing it often. But there are many other organizations that provide work for locals in Africa, for example, Central African Republic, because they extract a lot of minerals so they can hire locals and benefit them economically. So there are many, many formats to gain trust, to gain an audience. The specific messages there and all that seems to be going successfully because as we've seen many polls, there are actually quite positive perceptions of Russia, certainly not in the transatlantic community, but elsewhere in the world.
- [38:37]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yeah, I've even seen this myself or some people. I remember one, I was talking with a taxi driver and he was from Kashmir and he says, well, yeah, I mean, this is kind of a similar situation. So he could empathize with what was going on because it was like a similar issue with Pakistan and India and so forth. So it's just a lot of non Westerners, they can kind of relate to Russia, but also Russia's not a Western power, so to speak. So again, there's no strings attached like you get with NATO or America or the eu.
- [39:12]
Danny Bello
That's right. And considering that the. There are many centers of power and there are many consequential actors in the world, those perspectives matter. It's not simply the perspective of Canada, the United States, Western Europe, Right. NATO more broadly. The world is complex. There are many interests in public perception, especially in an era where information can flow so easily, where we have technology, the proliferation of technology that allows us to see newsy media information space is incredibly important. So from Russia's perspective, it makes sense why they're making these investments in not just military equipment but these other platforms that in effect and produce the outcomes they want. And as you mentioned with regard to Asia, similar type of story. From China's perspective, what Russia is doing is quite beneficial in the sense that Russia's taking on the foster a lot of the battle that China can forego and test the waters with regard to NATO resolve, especially if the question becomes what water would be. From Beijing's perspective, what are we going to do with Taiwan? I didn't, it's really an interesting test case as China's planning its strategic future.
- [40:45]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yeah. And I believe China has even publicly said they're not going to allow Russia to be defeated in, in Ukraine. So, so again this kind of adds to the whole thing because it's like China's not going to allow Russia to be defeated and we in the west, we're not going to allow Ukraine to be defeated. So it just adds to the, you know, to that gridlock over a resolution.
- [41:05]
Danny Bello
And it's, it's again, what's happening in Ukraine and Russia is consequential far beyond that reading. It's, it's, it's consequential for global politics as a whole. And that was the purpose of the book, was to try to establish and understand not just what Russia is doing, but creating a foreign policy decision making model that can then be applied to other places in the world. And that's my plan. Looking ahead is to try to take the ioi, the incentive opportunity and prevention rule and apply to other case countries such as China and even the United States because we know, you know, there's many plans in there and try to test it. These are the, the raritable, this IOI model. So those are sort of the future projects that I hope to undertake because this is the first step, hopefully the larger series of books and just the research.
- [42:09]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yes. Towards the end I'll ask you what you're working on now. But for now the war in Ukraine is still ongoing. In your view, what impact is the war going to have on Russia as a military power in your own view, based on your research?
- [42:26]
Danny Bello
Well, the lure will have an interesting impact both on Russia as a military power, but also on the ability to deter. In other words, what we're seeing in Russia is the ability to reboot because certainly at the beginning of the war we saw a lot of failure, but what we're seeing is an incredible amount of adaptability with regard to what's happening on the battlefield, the ability to even be resilient as Russia is absorbing significant costs, especially when we're talking about people dying on the battlefield. And even in the midst of all that, when we had hundreds of thousands of casualties, Russia is still able to absorb all of these plots without collapsing. And I think that moving forward, Russia will do some learning from this case and probably implement a lot of these policies that is chosen because they seem to be going quite successfully. So what is likely to happen? And again, Russia has created quite a strong disconnect from the last as if Baltus dealer It will likely happen that Russia will continue to leverage its I wouldn't say isolation from the global community, but certainly wariness and readiness to resist because that the resistance narrative is clearly able to mobilize a lot of the resources to continue fighting. And I think that Russia has proven primarily to itself that, that it's a, that it's a coding narrative that will continue to play a role. And based on this narrative, Russia will continue to invest in hardened power, but also absolutely in Brazil and Contra because Gray's own strategies, in fact it's absolutely achieved in outcomes.
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- [44:55]
Stephen Sakiewicz
See mint mobile.com yeah I that's often a common theme in Russian military history where at first they do poorly, but then over time they adapt and become resilient and then they kind of improve. We saw this even with World War II, the Winter War. I mean a lot of people don't realize the the Red army did win the Winter War. It's just it took longer and more costly. But and I noticed it's almost like a flip side to how NATO or especially the American military sometimes operates where the initial stage, it's so spectacularly successful and it's almost like, you know, shock and awe like we saw in Iraq. But then the longer the war drags on. It's almost like the ability to adapt is a. Takes more strain and all that. So it's kind of interesting, that contrast. And it's almost like perhaps the Russians are kind of using that to their advantage in the narrative sense at least.
- [45:55]
Danny Bello
And it's, it's a very interesting point you're making that as. Let's call it members of NATO intervene. It goes very successfully in terms of the tactics and the operation of the ban. The costs increase. And once the costs of occupation, the costs of, of operations increases, then the willingness to continue decreases. In Russia's case, it seems to be the opposite that, that the operation may be successful or unsuccessful, but then there's an entrenching that happens and then it's the persistence that. And the. And the costs increase. Absolutely. That the persistence and the resolve is maintained. And I would argue that it's a function of that backstory that the. That Russia engages in conflicts to which it is very highly committed to begin with. It's. Russia doesn't seem to engage in conflict. Again, good or bad is a different conversation. Right. Are we critical? Are we not critical? But Russia seems to be engaging in conflicts to which it has an incredible attachment. And it's not just an attachment, clearly it's not just an attachment that is simply geopolitical cost benefit because that the costs were so high. Right. And absolutely the NATO has imposed incredibly costs on Russia, the various economic, military and so on. But even with those costs, Russia is still maintaining resolve, which is incredible. It truly is incredible from, from a military strategist perspective, because at the surface we would think, okay, considering the costs are so high, shouldn't it give up already? Well, the answer is probably no. Therefore, there's something that we do not understand. And this is what we have to do is try to understand in detail what is going on from Russia's perspective. And then maybe we will have a better understanding what we can do and what can be done in order to manage the conflict and decrease violence and potentially have an early warning system for the next will likely occur at some point.
- [48:08]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, one part of it I know is the legacy of World War II or the Great Patriotic War where they lost 30 mil. The Soviet Union lost 30 million during the conflict. And since then, they almost make sure you never forget what happened, you know, and there's always a sense never again will we allow ourselves to suffer this. But if they want to come at us, the west or NATO, and of course they want to try to portray NATO as the new axis, so to speak. But you know, if you come at us, we will fight you to the very last. You know, if we have to. Even if we have to fight you beyond the earls, we'll fight you beyond the earls, you know, so there is kind of that. And anyone who's ever been to Russia, you know, sees this. Almost every street corner has a World War II monument and, and every family lost at least one member during that conflict. So it's just, it's very ubiquitous. Like this whole, this narrative, like.
- [49:09]
Danny Bello
No, this.
- [49:10]
Stephen Sakiewicz
We owe, we owe it to that generation. Not only are we alive today, but also we owe it to them to continue to fight for our country.
- [49:19]
Danny Bello
And over the person of my research for bua, I looked at a significant number of primary sources, both from Russia and Ukraine. And the narrative of the Second World War plays a key role in again, the effort to mobilize for a fight. Again, this is on behalf of Russia and also a lot of the long standing separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine, Crimea and so on. The, the experiences of the Second World War have been opened that around which people have roused and in Russia's own perception of the different territories and that idea that the Soviet Union, the people here locally, the people from Russia and other places have fought very hard to defend. And again, right or wrong, that's difficult. But nonetheless, it's kind of an established recession. That resolve is maintained based on the legacy in the history. And again, that's clearly the case across the different regions that I've existed.
- [50:29]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Now, you did mention that Russia's kind of disconnected from the west, but what do you think is the, in your view, based on your research, what is the future for Western or more specifically NATO, Russian relations? And how do you think NATO should deal with Russia moving forward? And this is just your own view, based on your own research?
- [50:50]
Danny Bello
Sure. I mean, moving forward, one of the things that we have to think about, and especially considering that there are so many books that say this is Putin's war, whereas my book challenged that and says, well, it's actually Russian war. It is not entirely clear that Russia's behavior would change with a changing garbage. In other words, Vladimir Putin is leaving, therefore Russia would behave differently. That's not entirely the case. So when we're thinking about strategy vis a vis Russia and its relationship with what we call the west, in other words, Central Europe and onwards, we have to plan for a much longer term. It's not simply that change of government. We only yield a change in their relationship. It is very likely that these ideas that Russia, and again, from Russia's perspective, that Russia should maintain presence across what used to be the Soviet Union will persist. It's not something that can simply change with a switching of a leader. It's very much a part of the social fabric, especially with. As long as there are people who have lived during the Soviet era, many of whom have traveled across their region, more broadly, they used to be one country. So it's so deeply entrenched that even if tomorrow there's a change of leadership for any reason in Russia, this is not likely to go away, and the next leader will have to. Again, regardless of the policy that that leader chooses, when that government chooses, the social fabric will remain the same, because that changes much more slow than any leadership. Therefore, it is very. The implication is that it's very likely that we will perceive Russia in a very similar way. A country that's trying to. To be imperial, a country that's trying to sort of move forward, and Russia will continue to maintain the position that it's actually on a retrieve. And every kilometer that's lost is an existential threat. I mean, increasingly so as you're moving eastward. So it's an excellent question, hopefully that there will be some pragmatic policymakers who can come to the table and say, you know what? Here are clearly the differences, and how do we create a situation where we can have an early warning if these differences in perspectives will yield another conflict? Because that's certainly not something that can be. Because what we're seeing now in terms of the level of violence is the worst level of violence of this region since the Second World. The idea is to make sure that we're. We're pragmatic enough and understanding enough.
- [53:32]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Yeah, that's interesting. And I probably would make one point here. Although we often like to refer to this as the post Soviet sphere, we also have to remember, even going back to the czars, the. The Russians have had a presence in this region, in these areas for at least since Peter the Great. That's like the 18th century. So the Soviet Union kind of inherited a lot of the borders of the czarist empire. So of course, that's kind of contributing to the Russian perception that, no, this is our sphere of influence. Just like how, in a certain sense, America kind of sees the Western hemisphere as our sphere of influence, going back to the Monroe Doctrine in a way. So it's kind of like you do have to kind of understand at least that history or that perception of history moving forward.
- [54:20]
Danny Bello
And we also, just in tandem with that point, there are many people, millions of people across what used to be the Soviet Union. There are millions of people who consider themselves to be Russian. Absolutely. Many of them have moved there as a function of reciprocation and many other policies. Sure, but we live in the environment in which we live today. Right. We're talking about millions of people who were born outside of Russia. They consider themselves Russian, they, they speak Russian in their everyday life. Well, what do we do with them? Is it about social, economic exclusion in order to maintain some sort of common identity? Yes. It's quite understandable that for many of these, for many of these countries it's their first real opportunity to establish national union. But the question is, how is that going to be done if there are millions of people who consider themselves to not be Estonian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Ukrainian. And it seems to be the case that there is a very strong nationalization, national identity. It's an understandable why that's happening again post imperial kind of opportunity to finally get your own state. But how the different countries treat ethnic mindworms will determine very much their relationship with Russia. Because it does not seem to be simply a cynical perception. If they're using compatriots policy or to achieve something, there is some sort of true belief in that connection and that unity with the diaspora. So when we in the NATO community think about what are we going to do with regard to security, we have to look at inter ethnic relations. Yes, it seems to be outside of the traditional perspective of NATO, but we're living in a different time. It's no longer the Cold War. We have to amalgamate these non traditional security dimensions into our thinking. NATO is actually presented this concept called the comprehensive approach, where that's understanding of security through the lens of non traditional, non military means. And this is a good first step. But that concept hasn't been developed particularly in any meaningful way after 2008. So looking ahead, it might be interesting for us to think about security in a much more comprehensive way. In a way that's not simply a balance of power between military, but a balance of power. Even if we consider balance of power, it's much more complex. It's policy, it's whole of society approach to thinking through security. And hopefully that's the direction where our, our research and political thought will continue to develop.
- [57:12]
Stephen Sakiewicz
I think one other dimension, I'll make this real quick, is also in the west we've been focusing, especially since World War II, to emphasize the importance of civic institutions as the basis of social order. But in some ways The Russians and other parts of the world, they kind of have this conception of ethnicity and culture as a foundation. So of course, I think we also need to kind of account for that. And even recent political tensions, even in the United States have been over these questions. So I mean, it is part of our world and we have to kind of more. We have to take it seriously and address it responsibly. Everything can't just be civic. You do have to take into account culture and how this creates certain narratives and certain perceptions that you have to kind of, at least kind of engage with. You can't just dismiss it. Otherwise. Otherwise you're going to get into, you're going to heighten tensions that don't necessarily need to be there, in my view.
- [58:11]
Danny Bello
Sure. And one of the key sort of dimensions to this is this idea of deterrence to resilience. And resilience is very much a phenomenon where we, where you have to take into account interactive dimensions. You have to take into account a sort of effective cultural reasons for ease. Right. The idea that, so deterrence is the ability to prevent influence. Right. So if we're talking about gray zone conflict, resilience, achieving resilience through social inclusion, the economic inclusion, things that we still are struggling with will help us provide effective deterrence. Because as soon as an outside intervener says, well, you know, you ethnic group who are my compatriots should be greed because you're socially, economically excluded. And that exclusion simply doesn't happen because the ethnic group, ethnic minority, is fully integrated into society, society and to the diverse landscape. It will essentially nullify that attempt to intervene because it'll simply say, well, we seem to be happy, we are integrated. We're fully integrated into country A, B or C. On the other hand, if an external intervener comes in and says, you should be breed, it's like, yes, you know what? We are socially and economically excluded. That is going to set up the landscape for conflict. So resilience is incredibly important. And this is hopefully an expanding area of research what resilience means in conflict studies in the 21st century. But also practical consideration for policymakers, whether military focused policymakers who are looking to expand their field of view beyond just military means, but also for elected officials.
- [60:07]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Well, this has been a very fascinating discussion and we could probably talk about these sorts of issues and the implications all day long. I mean, I could just get into just from what you just said, I could just talk about like transnationalism and how that's playing a role both in Russia, but also across the Board, but unfortunately we don't have that amount of time. But we could always have you back on the podcast to talk more. But do you have any thoughts, final thoughts, maybe touch on anything we didn't get to in the book? In the main discussion, I would say.
- [60:38]
Danny Bello
Looking ahead, there are many interesting, in fact research avenues, very practical policy, applicable research avenues, the first of which is what actually goes into foreign policy decision making. The research that I'm doing is very much the beginning of this broader potential path of research. So my hope is that look me ahead, more scholars will undertake this foreign policy modeling type of work because there are many interesting patterns that are transcending different contexts. And also the idea of the deterrence, because again, in the midst of Brazil and Hoffa, deterrence is, was probably important. How do we prevent and how do we stop different types of interventions. And one of the positives all this is that it's becoming increasingly apparent that it's on the minds of our military and policy security practitioners. And that can be said. I would like to sort of leave it on this positive and hopefully, yeah.
- [61:48]
Stephen Sakiewicz
It'S almost like you can't ignore it. You know, the old. And there is this conception like the old ways of looking at the world from like the 1990s, the end of history thesis that's no longer the case, that no longer works. We need new paradigms now. And yeah, in your book and our discussion touch, we barely have. I don't think we've even touched the surface, much less scratched it on what can be said or done. Both related to the book, but also just the wider topic. But yeah, no, this was a very fascinating discussion and we always like to end by asking our guests, what are you working on now?
- [62:26]
Danny Bello
Well, my major pro tip right now is a handbook on the Brazil conflict which will look at the phenomenon of Brazil and conflict. Different case studies, bring in my own expertise with a colleague of mine from Canada, but also the expertise of a very diverse group of academics and practitioners who will speak to different dimensions of gray zone conflict. And basically what is the road ahead for the field in terms of research, but also in terms of what's happening in the world in the 5 CPU. So it's a very exciting project and hopefully you'll be listening to for the publication of this.
- [63:10]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Do you already have a publisher for that?
- [63:12]
Danny Bello
Yes. So it'll publish with Rocket English.
- [63:17]
Stephen Sakiewicz
I was almost about to think like, oh, it must be one of those Rutledge handbooks of gray zone operations, so to speak. But no, when that comes out, we could definitely have you. If you want, you can come back on the podcast and we can talk more and maybe we could have several series of conversations because we could talk. Like I said, we could talk about this all day long.
- [63:38]
Danny Bello
That's wonderful. There will be a lot of material to cover, a lot of interesting case studies study. So that book will also set us up for a very interesting discussion.
- [63:53]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Danny Bello, thank you for joining us on the New Books Network.
- [63:58]
Danny Bello
Thank you very much, Stephen. It was a pleasure to have this conversation.
- [64:02]
Stephen Sakiewicz
Thank you for listening to this episode.
- [64:03]
Danny Bello
Of the New Books Network.
- [64:05]
Stephen Sakiewicz
I am your host, Stephen Sakiewicz.
- [64:06]
Danny Bello
Until next time.
- [64:20]
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