Podcast Summary:

Podcast: New Books Network
Host: Patrick
Guest: Francis Gavin, author of "Thinking Historically: A Guide to Statecraft and Strategy" (Yale UP, 2025)
Date: December 4, 2025

Overview

This episode dives into Francis Gavin's new book, "Thinking Historically: A Guide to Statecraft and Strategy," which argues that the discipline of history offers indispensable tools for understanding and navigating today's complex world. Gavin and host Patrick explore why the tradition of writing about statecraft has declined, the difference between historical sensibility and historical thinking, and how historians can (and should) contribute practically to policymaking and strategic decisions. The conversation is rich with anecdotes, case studies (from Thucydides to Ben Bernanke), and sharp, sometimes provocative reflections on the current state and future of history as a discipline.

Main Discussion Points

1. Motivation and Audience for the Book

• Gavin’s motivation to write was “very personal,” rooted in his passion for history and concern about current global uncertainty ([03:35]).
• He describes the audience as policymakers and his historian peers, “to be more self conscious and aware both of the opportunities that they have in front of them, their responsibilities, and also perhaps some of the unfortunate choices and pathways the discipline of history has made” ([05:25]).
• The book aims to make history a “problem solving tool,” not just a civic or cultural ornament.

2. Why Statecraft and Strategy Became Unfashionable in History

• After the Cold War, historians shifted toward cultural, identity, and economic subjects, sidelining grand strategic themes ([08:28]).
• Gavin blames both cultural/political movements (e.g., Vietnam-era disillusionment) and academic trends (e.g., the desire to see history as a crime scene rather than a realm for empathetic reconstruction) ([10:02]).
• Quote:
  “There was a sense that if you studied these issues, you somehow had sympathy for them, which is obviously absurd, but that was a view that came about.” ([11:27])
• “You see this in declining enrollments...the state of history as a discipline...is an unmitigated disaster. While at the same time, the need for serious historical study...is greater than ever” ([12:54]).

3. What It Means to “Think Historically”

• Many laypeople believe they already “think historically,” but Gavin argues professional historical thinking is uniquely rigorous and difficult ([13:36]).
• The difference between memory, antiquarianism, and true history is underscored.
• Quote:
  “Thinking historically is more difficult than neurosurgery and aircraft design. But...everyone thinks they do it particularly well. They actually don’t.” ([15:40])
• Gavin lauds academic historians’ method and research as “nothing short of a miracle” ([14:39]), while warning against "historical mistakes people make that can sometimes honestly be worse than having no history at all" ([15:12]).

4. History at the Border of Humanities and Social Sciences

• History’s identity crisis: its methods and aims are distinct from the “muscular epistemologies” of economics and IR theory ([17:28]).
• Quote:
  “Generalizations across space and time are something that historians will do, but far more carefully...We’re always complicating things, talking about complexity, contingency, chance and circumstance.” ([18:23])
• Historians, Gavin insists, are best equipped to understand “fuzzy” problems, such as the relative value nations place on loss and tragedy, which aren’t quantifiable ([20:02]).

5. Application: Historical Sensibility & Historical Thinking

• Gavin uses his own experiences (e.g., teaching after 9/11) to show how U.S. policy often treats major shocks as exceptional, ignoring historical precedent ([27:53]).
• He distinguishes:
  • Historical Sensibility: A cultivated openness, curiosity, empathy, and epistemological modesty developed via “traveling to the past,” but not always made actionable ([29:28], [32:10]).
  • Thinking Historically: Translating that sensibility into usable decision-making tools under uncertainty ([33:42]).
• Quote:
  “You can have a historical sensibility and not think historically...but you can’t think historically without a historical sensibility.” ([34:20])

6. The Limits and Value of Historical Insight in Policymaking

• Historical thinking does not guarantee “the right” answer, but improves the quality of questions, prepares for surprises, and facilitates course correction ([28:23], [33:42]).
• Gavin highlights the need for humility—acknowledging that outcomes and judgments shift with time.
• Memorable Analogy: “It’s like what Churchill said about democracy. Thinking historically is the worst method, except all the others.” ([36:36])
• Give decision-makers better conceptual tools (e.g., recognizing that 9/11 was not the world’s “day zero”).

7. Historical Judgment, Uncertainty, and Changing Optics

• Cites Henry Kissinger’s concept of “51/49 decisions”—choices made under uncertainty, where even wise judgments sometimes end in failure ([44:43]).
• Our view of past decision-makers (e.g., FDR, Andrew Jackson) inevitably changes with time and context ([46:25]).
• Quote:
  “If we have grandchildren, they will look at us as fools and we have no control over it.” ([50:48])

8. Case Studies: When History Helped

• Ben Bernanke and the 2008 Crisis: As Fed Chair, Bernanke’s training as an economic historian pushed him to avoid mistakes of the 1930s, e.g., “flood the system with liquidity,” coordinate internationally, and innovate—actions that arguably prevented another Great Depression ([40:43], [41:16]).
• The Nobel Prize in Economics is increasingly recognizing the value of historical approaches ([43:22]).

9. Gavin’s “Historical Checklist” for Decision-Makers

• Inspired by Atul Gawande’s “Checklist Manifesto,” Gavin proposes a list of historical questions (e.g., “How did we get here? Was this inevitable? Is this unprecedented?”) to prompt reflection during decision crises ([55:52]).
• Unlike binary or technical checklists, these are open-ended, designed to widen debate and clarify options ([58:36]).

10. Why Historians Fail to Influence Policy—and How to Fix It

• Gavin sees the failure primarily on the “supply” side: most historians don’t offer policy-relevant frameworks or outreach; policymakers are “grateful for anything that can help them,” but don’t know how to access it ([61:20], [63:01]).
• Urges historians to create bridges with government, the private sector, medicine, and NGOs—fields that would benefit from professional historical thinking ([63:43]).
• Quote:
  “My plea is that history...should be saved from the historians or from history departments.” ([67:26])

11. The Case for Radical Disciplinary Innovation

• Argues that history as a discipline must innovate, perhaps even forging new interdisciplinary “departments” focused on statecraft—citing the example of MIT’s engineering departments which reorganize based on emerging problems, not old boundaries ([74:08], [76:09]).
• Expresses disappointment with history departments’ reluctance, but optimism about new movements and centers that prioritize practical and strategic thinking ([74:08]).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Misconceptions About History:
  “Thinking historically is more difficult than neurosurgery and aircraft design. But...everyone thinks they do it particularly well. They actually don’t.” ([15:40])
• On History’s Identity Crisis:
  “History could be in the social sciences or you could take it in the humanities...what that reflected to me was history has an identity crisis.” ([18:38])
• On the Need for Humility in Judging the Past:
  “If we have grandchildren, they will look at us as fools and we have no control over it.” ([50:48])
• On Decision-Making Under Uncertainty:
  “By the time a decision has to be made and it gets to the office of, say, a national security advisor or president, if it had been an easier decision or an obvious decision, somebody else would have made it.” ([44:43])
• On Historians’ Responsibility:
  “My plea is that history...should be saved from the historians or from history departments.” ([67:26])
• Host Patrick’s Reflection:
  “What struck me is that historical thinking is more of a meditation on self-awareness and possibilities than a formula for easy answers.” ([54:00])
• On Innovation:
  “Applying insights from one discipline to another is really innovation...why not attach our undertaking to what it is they do? Because...it will help preserve historical thinking, the discipline, provide opportunities for all sorts of historians...” ([67:46])

Key Timestamps

• [03:35]—Gavin’s motivation and personal background
• [07:06]–[12:54]—Why statecraft and strategy became marginalized in the historical profession
• [13:36]–[17:28]—What distinguishes professional historical thinking from everyday memory or storytelling
• [18:38]–[21:13]—History’s identity crisis: social science vs. humanities
• [23:54]–[35:41]—Historical sensibility vs. thinking historically; pedagogical anecdotes
• [40:11]–[43:22]—Ben Bernanke, economic history, and the 2008 financial crisis
• [44:43]–[53:37]—Kissinger’s “51/49” choices, changing historical optics, FDR and long-term judgments
• [55:52]–[60:20]—Gavin’s proposed checklist for policy decision-makers
• [61:20]–[69:02]—Why historians don’t influence policy and practical steps forward
• [74:08]–[77:56]—The case for radical innovation within the field

Final Thoughts

Francis Gavin’s “Thinking Historically” is both an urgent call for historians to reclaim a space in the realms of statecraft and public affairs, and a toolkit for decision-makers to make wiser choices by applying nuanced, professionally informed historical thinking. The episode is as much a meditation on the purpose of history as it is a practical discussion, marked by humility, wit, and a challenge to academic insularity.

Recommended for:

• Policy professionals, educators, historians, and anyone interested in how history can (and should) shape the decisions that affect our future.