B (3:24)

Thank you very much for having me in the podcast, Anna.

A (3:28)

I'd say let's start actually by going back to that Monday, 8 September, the day of the first Gen Z protests in Kathmandu and also other places in Nepal. Much of the international reporting afterwards is initially framed these demonstrations as being mainly about the government's recent social media ban. It was a directive that disabled platforms like Instagram, Facebook, YouTube after these companies had refused to register locally, which was a directive given by the Nepali government. So in these media reportings then, that made it sound as if young Nepalis were mainly upset about losing access to their favorite apps. But then many protests are very quick to say that that's only a very minor part of the bigger picture. The ban was really just the last straw in a much longer list of grievances they had. So I was wondering, could you outline what really motivated the protest? What were the young people mobilizing against?

B (4:23)

Thank you, Hannah. Sure. Yes, as you rightly stated, also in the background that it was not just due to the social media bans that caused the resistance of the Genghis. I think the reasons were much more than that. And the protest was linked with so many other factors. The first of all, of course, the government's decision to temporarily suspend around 26 social media platforms, you know, those banned had direct impacts on these js as well as the other groups such as those who were making their livelihoods or they were running some businesses through online platforms. And some of the groups, including the public, were using them as a means of communicating with their family and friends, not only here in Nepal, but outside of Nepal as well. General public were also using the platform to also get updated about what's happening elsewhere in the world. So when these bans were imposed, then these mediums were disrupted. It turned out to be sort of suicidal for the government of Nepal. If you also have noticed some of the slogans in the play cards and the banner that was displayed on the first day of the resistance, you know, they came up with the slogans Like Metale Vanda Netale Deredukha die means in Nepali, rather than meta, the leaders gave pain to the people. So you know, the JS were demanding in the initial days for the revocation of the suspended platforms. That was the trigger point. However, the problem run much larger, I would say, you know, for a few days before the initial protest of September 8, some of the Nepali youths had been also engaged in online campaigns like Nepo Baby and Nepo Kids Trend, which was a sort of replica of what we saw in Indonesia where the president was perceived to have promoted sort of dynastic politics. So similar kind of campaigns were run online here in Nepal against some of the activities of the daughter and so on. So political party leaders and some of the business people here in Nepal. So people had a lot of anger against those lavish lies that these daughters and sons were leaving. And they were displaying this picture of luxury goods. Some of them would portray this picture about visiting like Dubai and elsewhere on vacation. Sure, people were really disenchanted about these activities. And even during the protest and even before that, we could clearly see that the protesters, young generations, Jain Js were protesting on the street with the placards like Gariblai China, Dubai Neta ka chori chahi chatima. Dubai means poor people do not have medicine. But the daughters of leaders are on holiday in Dubai. So it clearly says that people were quite displeased by what had happened. And the dissatisfaction and the anger with the political parties, particularly the top political party leaders, I would say was also, as you know, because of this frequent change of the government and lack of their political accountability. Hannah, you know that you've been following Nepal for quite some time as well. We've seen frequent change of the government here in Nepal even after the of the constitution. Or we could also say that after 2006, Jan Andolans or People's Movement second and also we've seen frequent changes in the provincial level governments here in Nepal. When there is the change in the coalition in the federal level, the provincial governments are also deserved. So we've seen eight night governments in some of the provinces over the past seven, eight years that also created disenchantment and dissatisfaction among the people. The other thing about why people were so much dissatisfied and displaced with the major political parties and their leaders were that before the election of the federal parliament, they would form certain kind of coalition with the purpose to just win the election. But after the election they would even form completely different opposite coalition in order to be in the government and in the power, the far left political parties would form the coalition with the far right or the left leaning political parties would also form the government with the right wing political parties. So there was so much of frustrations among people because that was not the mandate that people had given to those political parties but they could go beyond their pre election commitment and then form this kind of politics. So that was also the frustration was also piling because of the experience like this. But if you see, particularly after 2015, if you see that Nepal has also seen people being irritated with large scale corruption cases involving political leaders. For example, you know we had this bigger cases like Patanjali land related cases and Gribandu Tea state related Terrama Lalita Ni Vayas and we had this wide body purchase case as well. And recently we also had these cases about the fake Bhutanese refugees, gold smuggling cases of, you know, frauds and corruptions in the cooperatives and also the human trafficking under the COVID of visit visa. But you know, those who were involved in these kind of scandals and some of these criminal activities were not punished. Instead they were protected by these political parties. And if you see the data about the Nepal's corruption perception index, we are much lower than the global average which is I think 43, but Nepal scores just 34. That says volume about the corruption here in Nepal. That's why maybe because you know, the people of Nepal had very low trust on the anti graft body, particularly the CIA and special courts here in Nepal. Also recently I was, I was involved in a project which conducted research on folk provinces of Nepal. And that study also showed that people had very low trust on these kind of bodies. So people had a lot of resentment and dissatisfaction from these corruption related cases as well. And you know, what happened was that, you know, people had this kind of perceptions towards the political parties and the top leaders. But at the same time we saw this, the case on 8 in which, you know, Jenjis had initiated a peaceful protest against the ban as well as the demand gradually became the corruption. And what happened was that during the peaceful protest 19 youths were brutally killed by the firing, indiscriminate firing of the police. But there are also some narratives saying that there could be the infiltrators who were involved in igniting and inciting those firings. Anyway, that was the development on the 8th. But what happened was that there was a lot of requests from the public and intellectuals about stepping up the government and also to be apologetic towards what had happened. What happened was that the Prime Minister was quite Adamant and he did not want to resign. So without, even without apologizing for the killings on the first day, the Prime Minister kept moving. And then the next day it was obvious that that there would be the protest from the JS as well as the other groups. So the next day you could see people coming on the street all across the Kathmandu Valley. Most of the protesters, not only Genji, there are all kind of youths involved in. And then they were targeting the houses of the leaders who were perceived to be the corrupt kind of leaders. So those were some of the regions that really led to these kind of situation. And I think the other reason I would say, was also that some of these political leaders, particularly the top leaders, were also involved in collusion or in contracts and transfer and the promotion of some public officials, security officers. Oftentimes they would take the bribe. You also know that there were a lot of unpopular and controversial decisions about appointing the new managing director of Electricity Authority, replacing the previous md, which is quite popular. Kulman G. And similarly, some of the decisions, the process and the time that it took to appoint the head of the Raster bank, the governor of the Raster bank, and also the chair of the Nepal Insurance Authority, they were quite controversial. So people felt that they're quite detached from the political leaders. People had a lot of resentment and dissatisfaction towards the political parties and the top leaders. So the banning of the social media was just one of the cause, but the anger and the dissatisfaction had been piling up for a long time.

A (14:33)

Yeah, thank you so much for adding so much context to those events on the 8th and the following days. Many of the issues that you just pointed out in terms of corruption and political misuse of powers and so on, they are not new in Nepal, as you were rightly saying. These have been going on for quite some time. Then why did things erupt in this particular moment, or why was it this particular Generation Z that really engaged in these protests? Can we also understand this as some sort of generational shift and how young people engage with politics and political leadership in the past?

B (15:07)

Well, that's very, very interesting question, I would say, because some of the recent data have shown that there has been a lot of migration into the cities from the rural areas of Nepal for education, employment, and also for other kind of entrepreneurial activities. And not only now, but we've also seen in 2006 that the country we saw also the political change in which also youths were involved in. But I would say that why this Genji in this particular point of time? Because there are A lot of expectations that were generated from 2006 movement. You've heard that our leaders wanted to create or make new Nepal or they wanted to make Nepal like Switzerland or Singapore. Or recently if you have heard the slogans like Sambrita Nepal, Sukhi Nepali, which means prosperous Nepal and happy Nepali. But if you see in the reality, many of these promises had not been fulfilled and it's not yet fulfilled. And the governments, irrespective of which political parties came into the power, they've really not been able to address the issue of jobs, employment, etc. So there is a lot of gaps in terms of people's expectations from the past and what they can get. For example, the country has this unemployment ratio of slightly above 12.5. But if you look at the unemployment among the youths, the Gen G group, let's say here, in this case 15 to 24, the recent Nepal Living Standard survey suggests that unemployment among these group is almost 23%. And then they have to pay for their livings. The cost for living and the education in the urban area is skyrocketing. But there are no decent employment, there are no regular incomes. That's why, you know, the number of these people was growing. And also I would add that these young populations who are now exposed to what's happening in the outside world and the kind of changes and developments that they've seen elsewhere, that has also led to kind of growing expectation but at the same time frustration as they don't see those things here in Nepal. So in a way they were quite imbued for this kind of protest and the movements which was slightly building up, up and you know, social media ban became the opportunity for them to express those frustrations.

A (17:48)

Right. When we talk about this Gen Z movement that is really the force behind the recent events in Nepal, how can we understand it in terms of the heterogeneity of it? Because Nepal is a highly diverse country. Do you see significant differences within the movement, for example, along the lines of class, caste, gender, but then also urban and rural differences? Because the media reporting was very heavily focused on Kathmandu and also the demands of the movement in Kathmandu. Was it the same in other parts of Nepal? Like how homogeneous is this movement really?

B (18:27)

Right, yeah. In terms of the report, you are right that not only in these cases, but in other cases in the past as well, most of the news coverage in a normal situation as well. But also in. In this kind of situation, Patmandu gets the priority in the news news media. But in the beginning also it was not so much clear to so many people about this movement and the group of these Jainzhis. But gradually it became clearer that there were different groups of JIS involved in this protest. Some people say around 25, some say even more than that. Groups were mobilizing. But clearly what was visible and clear was that there was not a single group and there was not a single leadership. These different sort of groups were acting independently in the beginning, but some of these group were also trying to connect and get organized and united even during the period of the protest. So in the beginning they had a very less contact. We saw the Jenzhis meetings and it was also quite clear from that meeting that Jenjis were coming also from the different parts of the country. Right. Pokhara, Biratnagar, you know, because they were claiming their leadership from their respective places. So in terms of the geographical coverage, they came from different places. Although the Kathmandu groups seem to be in the larger, larger number. So that, that, that is it. But in terms of the caste, gender, I would say that almost all sort of youths were involved in these Genji movement, but. But it was because of the shared goal that they had. So the shared goal was the ban of social media as well as the protest against the corruption. So all kind of J's were there. However, if you see the characteristics of Jesus movement, it seems to me that most of the Ganges came from the urban area. Rural Jenses were less connected, less mobilized. And in terms of the glass as well, I think it was mostly the middle class phenomenon. So that was kind of heterogeneity in that regard as well. However, as I mentioned earlier as well, on the second day, not only the changes, it was like the Generation X and Millennials were also expressing their solidarity on the street. So second day, it was much more bloody in terms of the protesters on the street. And the other thing that I wanted to re emphasize here is that it was mostly, you know, the migrants from elsewhere to Kathmandu who were involved in this protest. Local people were not so much involved. If you also look at the number of youths being killed in these protests, it's mostly from the outside of Kathmandu. So you can imagine these groups, their aspiration, their situation in the cities. I think that was more or less the characteristics and heterogeneity of the group.

A (21:44)

Thank you. Let's zoom out again. Going from these five days to Nepali politics more in general, when I think of Nepali politics, the image that comes to mind is dominated mostly by older men. There are a few notable exceptions. We can think of sumana Shasta, of course, Kathmandu's mayor Balin or Walenda Shah. But still in a country where 56% of the population is currently under 30, their political representation and also so participation is really low. I was wondering why that is. Why haven't they been able to penetrate politics more?

B (22:18)

That's absolutely true, Hannah. If you see this organizational structures and the process and the structure to be a member and the promotion of these leaders, it seems to me that it's very, very difficult for the youth to get into. First they can get into politics, but it's very difficult for them to be promoted and to become because the parties, mostly these three parties. If you look at the Nepali Congress, UML and the Nepal Communist Party Maoist center, it's mostly controlled by the few groups of male leaders. So if the youth, they are interested to become a patron of these leaders, then they can get some incentives and benefits. Otherwise it's become very difficult for the youth to get into the leadership in some of the parties. Yes, you see that, that like in Nepali Congress, after so much struggle, persons like Gaganthapa, you know, Pradipodil have been trying to take over the leadership. But still it's proven to be quite difficult for them. And in terms of the gender also if you look at these three parties is almost the male dominated parties even in the Central Committee and Permanent Committee as well. If you look at that's how they, they've been able to maintain their power in the political parties. Once they control the using various kind of capital, I would say the economic capital, coercive capital, any kind of capital, they have been able to maintain the control over the political parties. And when they contest the election, they can distribute the candidacy to their respective patterns. That's how they control their political parties. And once they control their political parties and their likelihood to be in the government after they get certain seats in the parliament is, is bigger. So that's how almost all the three parties have been, have been doing over the past decades. That was also something that people were not really liking because, you know, recently I mentioned about the survey that I was involved with the four provinces of Nepal. The result is not out yet. But if I share that the people had increasing resentment and dissatisfaction toward these old guards. The survey was conducted one and a half months before this incident. That survey also suggested that people were looking for the alternatives. Two kind of alternatives. One, alternatives of the youth within the political parties and alternatives outside of the political parties. So people had a lot of dissatisfactions towards this political leadership and they were also irritated, which was also reflected somehow in the recent mayoral elections here in Kathmandu. And also some of the independent candidates who won local government and the federal parliament as well. So due to this recent Genji revolution. So what I can say is that clearly pressure is piling on these traditional political parties top leader for change in the structure. And also I would say the shift in these incompetent and largely discredited leadership. You know, they've been there for some of them, like Prachanda. He has been there for in the power and the leadership of the party for 40 years and nearly more than three decades. DOPA and KP have also been there in the leadership. So people want to see them out in the coming election. However, I need to also mention a caveat here that the generational shift in the party is a must. However, not all youths can be equally competent, so one needs to be quite also careful about it. But people are looking for the leaders who can relate to the aspiration of the youth and their future and how they can unleash the potential that Nepal and Nepalese have for the developments and well being of Nepalese.

A (26:42)

Right? Yeah. So you already point to quite a few existing barriers of political representation of Nepali youth. As we are now coming to an end. I was hoping that we could close by looking ahead, not predicting anything, but really looking in terms of possibilities. As you say, there is a need for more representation of younger Nepalis. But through which channels do you see them realistically able to influence and participate in politics? Politics at local levels, national, also transnational, given that a lot of young Nepalis are currently abroad. Yeah. How do you see this in the aftermath of this uprising?

B (27:18)

Yes. As in the past revolutions and movements here in Nepal, you saw, and I also saw that there is a lot of euphoria about the kind of political opposite structure that has been created by the resistance of the Jenji movement. I was quite hopeful in the beginning that that the demand of the Gen Z was kind of transformative. Change in the governance system, electoral system and the way that the party are formed. The leadership is developed. Apparently during the initial few days I also noticed some kind of, you know, directionless and uncertainties among the JNG movement and their agenda because they did not have clear agenda and framework for the future course, both for positive and negatives. Maybe Genjis are not leading the government right now. They have asked the independent people to lead the government and the major agenda or the mandate of the interim government has also changed. I mean, it's a little bit different from what Genji had initially demanded for. So which is to conduct fair elections, as you mentioned, in March, in six months of time, and to also investigate cases of killings and atrocities that happened during the movement. So, you know, some people believe here that this time marks the beginning of the new era here in Nepal. I hope that turns out to be the case. However, my personal take is that unless the Gen Z and other youth groups or the progressive force form a political party contest of cupping elections, I think there will not be a drastic change in the balance of power. Although I see that there is a possibility of new leaders from all political parties to be in the power the second. I also see some rays of hope in the sense that if you look at the number of new voters that are coming in the new elections in last almost 28 months or so, additional 160,000 voters have been added and I think more voters will be added until the election. So I hope that the people of Nepal and these new generations vote for the transformation in the coming up elections. But fundamentally in the power among the political parties, I still see the possibility of Hong Parliament and the possibility that some of the old guards might come back to power again. Let's see how it pans out. But let us hope that the current fires and blaze will drift away soon and we rise again more resilient and there are more strength and confidence among Nepalese even in this chaotic situation.

A (30:20)

Yeah. Yes, it sounds like Nepal really has some very significant months ahead until this election next year and of course beyond that too. Dear Jeevan, thank you so much for joining us today and for filling us and with so much context about the recent events that are still quite underreported actually in at least the European and the Nordic media. Yeah, thank you once again. My name is Hannah Gr. Thank you all for joining the Nordic Asia Podcast showcasing Nordic collaboration in studying Asia. Thank you. You have been listening to the Nordic Asia Pod, Sam.