Podcast Summary - New Books Network:

Gudrun Persson, "Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War" (Georgetown UP, 2025)
Date: March 15, 2026
Host: Stephen Sakiewicz
Guest: Gudrun Persson, Associate Professor of Slavic Studies, Stockholm University

Episode Overview

This episode features a deep-dive interview with Gudrun Persson about her book, Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War. The discussion unpacks the historical, cultural, and strategic roots of Russian military thinking, tracing continuities and changes from the imperial period, through the Soviet era, to the present. The conversation explores how Russian approaches to war, strategy, and power differ fundamentally from Western paradigms, and why understanding these differences is critical in the wake of recent Russian military actions.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Origins and Backstory of the Book

[02:10–05:14]

• Gudrun Persson recounts her career in Russian studies, starting during the Soviet period.
• The book was born out of years of archival research and academic observation, especially her time in Moscow.
• The motivation stemmed from an "under-researched" field; surprisingly little work, especially in the west, had been done on Russian military thinkers post-Soviet period.
• Her approach is distinctive in connecting the tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet traditions to understand the "long evolution" of Russian strategy.
• Quote:

  “I think this is such an important and under-researched topic because to me it reflects the very heart of Russia. It goes to the heart of Russia as a state.” (Gudrun Persson, [03:44])

2. Why Russian Military Thought Matters Today

[05:14–11:03]

• Understanding current Russian leadership is impossible without the historical context of military thought; it's tied to national identity.
• Western surprise at Crimea (2014) and Ukraine (2022) stemmed from “mirror imaging” – assuming Russia's logic would mirror Western logic.
• Persson emphasizes the holistic Russian view, where military, political, economic, cultural, and even sports instruments are regarded as tools of strategy.
• Misconceptions in the West: focus on military technology at the expense of “why” wars are fought; failure to recognize Russia’s persistent view of the West as adversary.
• Quote:

  “If you had been following like I had the Russian military thinking about war and conflict and the entire framework, you would have avoided a rude awakening.” (Gudrun Persson, [07:08])

3. Western Misconceptions About Russia

[11:03–18:13]

• Persistent Western narrative of Russia as “irrelevant” is misguided.
• Western strategy is methodical, with benchmarks; Russian strategy is holistic, focused on the “why” and encompassing all "ways and means" of state power.
• The “gas station with nukes” trope ignores Russia’s enduring relevance and unique threat calculations.
• Domestic factors matter hugely to Russian leaders—fear of internal upheaval often outweighs external threats.
• Decision-making remains highly centralized: “the Russian ruler…decides strategy.”
• Quote:

  “This is not…a deterministic book or conclusion. There are many, many, many occasions when the Russian leader could have made other choices but chose not to do so.” (Gudrun Persson, [16:15])

4. Foundations of Russian Strategy & Identity

[18:13–24:18]

• Russian identity and statehood are intertwined with military history; the army is both state-builder and symbol.
• Territorial expansion, prestige-seeking, and the need to protect the Russian heartland are recurring themes.
• Russia is not a nation-state but a multi-ethnic empire—this imperial legacy shapes strategic outlook.
• The demand for great-power status frequently leads to strategic overextension.

5. 19th Century Transformation & Influence of the Crimean War

[24:18–34:40]

• The defeat in the Crimean War led to major reforms under Alexander II and Minister of War Milutin, including universal conscription and military professionalization.
• Early Russian military journals fostered debates between “academic” (technological, western-focused) and “national” (moral, willpower-focused) schools of thought.
• These debates paralleled cultural disputes between “Westernizers” and “Slavophiles.”
• Quote:

  “In literature, we talk about a controversy between the Westerners and the Slavo fields. So the academic school and the national school sort of mirrors this discussion.” (Gudrun Persson, [32:28])

6. Comparing Western and Russian Approaches to Military History

[34:40–39:13]

• Russian doctrine deeply integrates historical analysis, unlike the often compartmentalized approach in U.S./Western military education.
• Technological factors are important, but “soft” factors (policy, culture, history) often predominate in shaping doctrine.
• The legacy of purges and repression under Stalin silenced military innovators and shapes attitudes to this day.
• Quote:

  “History, or rather the view of, of, of history, is one of the foundations of Russian military thought.” (Gudrun Persson, [35:24])

7. Soviet and Early Post-Soviet Military Doctrine

[42:38–50:42]

• The 1920s saw dynamic debate and eventual formalization of military doctrine (political + technological parts).
• The “deep battle” theory (interwar period) was crushed by Stalin’s purges but revived later.
• WWII (“The Great Patriotic War”) remains central to Russian military identity and doctrine.
• The advent of nuclear weapons marked a doctrinal focus shift; eventually, MAD (mutually assured destruction) logic prevailed over “winning” nuclear war.

8. The Post-Cold War Crisis and Continuities

[50:42–55:15]

• Gorbachev’s reforms attempted to “demilitarize” doctrine, but the old threat perception (NATO/the West as adversary) quickly resurfaced.
• Serious internal identity crisis post-1991, but “Western betrayal” remains a useful narrative for leaders like Putin.
• Even earlier, Cold War offers to join NATO (both by post-Soviet Russia and Stalin’s USSR) were likely more rhetorical than serious.

9. Contemporary Period: Gerasimov and the Ukraine War

[55:20–62:03]

• Valery Gerasimov (Chief of General Staff since 2013) is not so much a theorist as an operational leader.
• The so-called “Gerasimov doctrine” is a Western media invention; Russia’s holistic approach to war has long roots.
• The 2014 and 2022 invasions were not primarily military campaigns at first, but security service–led operations.
• Quote:

  “To me he’s a doer…makes things happen…Rather than being this deep thinker about what strategy should we have, where should our armed forces be in 10, 15, 20, 30 years.” (Gudrun Persson on Gerasimov, [55:48])

• Russia's warfighting methods reflect its land-power orientation, logistical realities, and ingrained traditions—not "backwardness."

10. Debates about Assessing Russian Military Effectiveness

[62:03–67:33]

• Western analyses often wrongly dismiss Russian methods by measuring them against Western benchmarks.
• Failures or backwardness are sometimes rhetorical devices for internal reform, not accurate self-assessment.
• Russian wars typically begin as “unannounced”—theorized since the late 19th century.
• Russia’s enduring offensive tradition (“cult of the offensive”) is acknowledged openly in their own literature.
• Quote:

  “The key word in my book is thought…because that’s another thing that war start basically behind a desk. They start in someone’s head because someone has been thinking about it.” (Gudrun Persson, [64:04])

11. Future of Russian Military Thought & What the West Gets Wrong

[67:33–75:14]

• Public debate inside Russia on military doctrine is shrinking; repressive laws are stifling open discussion.
• Internal debate between theory and practice is a recurring Russian theme; strategic goals often only need to be “partially accomplished” for Russian leadership.
• Western failure to “pay attention” to Russian words, doctrines, and assessments causes repeated surprise and misunderstanding.
• Key piece of advice:

  “Pay attention to that side and take it seriously. Then we can avoid mirror imaging or just thinking that, oh, we are so much smarter than they are, because that is a mistake.” (Gudrun Persson, [71:16])

12. Geopolitical Position and Multipolarity

[75:14–76:32]

• Russia’s sense of itself as a major world power endures, despite not always being “number two.”
• The concept of a multipolar world actually dates back to Foreign Minister Primakov's initiatives in the 1990s—not a recent Putin invention.
• Russia’s path prioritizes strong leadership and prestige over economic fundamentals.

13. Negotiation Strategy: War Continues During Talks

[76:48–78:27]

• Russian tradition is not to halt military operations during negotiations—a deeply historical pattern still relevant today.
• Quote:

  “If things aren’t going as good as they should on the battlefield, we should engage in negotiations. But during the negotiations, the military operations must never stop under any circumstances.” (Gudrun Persson, [77:08])

14. Final Thoughts & Ongoing Research

[79:24]

• Persson is developing a future project on Russian-Swedish relations, promising more historical insights on Russia’s posture toward its neighbors.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On Western Surprise at Russian Military Actions:

  “This is classic mirror imaging. And if you had been following...Russian military thinking...you would have avoided a rude awakening.” (Gudrun Persson, [07:08])

• On Doctrine and Policy:

  “It is policy. Who decides? It's the Russian ruler, whatever his name is, that decides strategy, that decides when Russia is going to use military force.” (Gudrun Persson, [16:15])

• On Reforms After the Crimean War:

  “We need educated soldiers who can act in the spirit of the commander.” (On Milutin’s reform era, [26:35])

• On Theory-Practice Gap:

  “From time to time these people...complain that there is such a big difference between theory and practice.” (Gudrun Persson, [68:15])

• On the Dangers of Mirror Imaging:

  “Then you will run into these rude awakenings and misunderstandings...” (Gudrun Persson, [63:27])

Timestamps for Key Segments

• Book Origins & Author’s Background: [02:10–05:14]
• Why Russian Military Thought Still Matters: [05:14–11:03]
• Western Misconceptions About Russia: [11:03–18:13]
• Russian Identity & Military Doctrine: [18:13–24:18]
• 19th Century Reforms & Debates: [24:18–34:40]
• Western vs. Russian Use of Military History: [34:40–39:13]
• Soviet Doctrine Development: [42:38–50:42]
• Collapse of the Soviet Union & Continuities: [50:42–55:15]
• Gerasimov and the Modern Period: [55:20–62:03]
• Debating Russian Effectiveness: [62:03–67:33]
• The Future and Advice to the West: [67:33–75:14]
• Multipolarity and Global Standing: [75:14–76:32]
• Negotiation Traditions: [76:48–78:27]
• Final Thoughts: [79:24–end]

Conclusion

This episode compellingly illustrates why Russian military thought can only be understood through its unique historical, cultural, and political contexts. Persson’s book and this discussion urge Western observers to “pay attention,” recognize persistent myths, and take Russian doctrine seriously if future “rude awakenings” are to be avoided. The conversation is dense with historical detail, personal insight, and rewarding comparisons—essential listening for anyone seeking to understand what drives Russia’s choices on war and strategy.