New Books Network: Who Fights for Governments? Paramilitary Mobilization in Ukraine and Beyond — Hussein Aliyev

Host: Stephen Sikevich | Guest: Hussein Aliyev
Date: September 13, 2025
Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic (2025)

Episode Overview

This episode features a deep-dive interview with Hussein Aliyev, lecturer in Central and East European Studies at the University of Glasgow, regarding his book, Who Fights for Governments? Paramilitary Mobilization in Ukraine and Beyond. The discussion explores the emergence, evolution, demography, and dynamics of pro-government paramilitary groups in Ukraine since 2014, drawing parallels to broader trends in armed conflicts worldwide. Aliyev’s research offers rare insights based on original interviews and quantitative data, shedding light on how such groups emerge, operate, and influence both military effectiveness and the fabric of the state.

Author’s Backstory and Research Motivation

• Personal and Academic Context
  • Aliyev, originally from the former Soviet Union, started his research around 2014 while conducting fieldwork in post-Maidan Ukraine.
  • Initial research focus was on informal institutions and how they relate to state reforms, but frequent references by informants to volunteer battalions shifted his focus to these powerful, informal, and little-understood actors.
  • Noted lack of academic work on Ukrainian volunteer battalions at the time amid a glut of conflicting media reports.
  • “There were no academic publications on volunteer battalions in Ukraine [...] And this is when I basically sort of unexpectedly started doing research on volunteer battalions in Ukraine.” (Aliyev, 03:36)

Methodology and Sources

• Rich Qualitative Interviews:

  • 150+ interviews with current and former paramilitary members, conducted across Ukraine, including frontline areas like Donbas and Dnipro (04:40–07:19).

• Quantitative & Documentary Data:

  • Analysis of 1,000+ obituaries of deceased paramilitary fighters (2014–2019).
  • Supplemented by mass media resources, YouTube interviews (in Ukrainian and Russian), and public databases.

• Archival Access:

  • Limited as much data remains classified or inaccessible due to ongoing conflict and operational security concerns.
  • Notable risk when Russian forces captured Ukrainian databases after taking Kherson (08:07).

Defining Paramilitary and Pro-Government Militias

• Key Terms Explained (09:00):

  • Pro-Government Militias (PGMs)/Paramilitaries: Organizations affiliated with the government, holding degrees of formal or informal governmental support (weapons, funding, legitimacy) but often remaining operationally autonomous.
  • Relationship with the state varies case-by-case, sometimes blurring lines with army/police forces.

• Academic Debate:

  • Scholarship traditionally focused on macro (state-level) dynamics; Aliyev spotlights the underexplored micro-dynamics—how groups recruit, fundraise, and operate internally (11:35).

Why Focus on Ukraine?

• Researcher’s Expertise:

  • Background in studying armed conflict in the former Soviet Union; Ukraine in 2014 became an intuitive and urgent focus (13:45).
  • Lack of existing scholarship and unique access to volunteer battalions provided fertile ground.

• Breaking into Informant Circles:

  • Challenge: Volunteer fighters accustomed to journalists, not academics, requiring trust-building.

Paramilitaries vs. State Monopoly on Violence

• Testing Weber’s Monopoly of Violence (16:47):
  • The rise of volunteer battalions challenged the classic notion that modern states hold exclusive rights to legitimate violence.
  • In 2014, Ukraine’s military lacked motivated, trained infantry—paramilitaries filled critical gaps.
  • Governments sometimes delegate violence to such groups either due to capacity gaps or to outsource controversial operations.

“The Ukrainian government was willing to share its monopoly on violence and sort of violate this Weberian concept, but just for the sake of this particular need that it had no other opportunities to, to deal with.” (Aliyev, 18:44)

• Why Volunteers Chose Paramilitary Units:
  • Greater efficiency, better fundraising, more flexible organization, and a break from rigid, demotivated military structures (20:36).

Ideology and Composition of Volunteer Battalions

• Ukrainian Ultra-nationalist Groups’ Role (23:56):
  • Groups like Azov, Right Sector, and UNA-UNSO had paramilitary traditions but were numerically a minority among volunteer fighters.
  • Other battalions (Donbass, Dnipro-1) were more populous and less ideologically homogeneous.

“…those ideologically driven paramilitary organizations were a relative minority back then. …They obviously received far less mass media attention and they were far less known at that time.” (Aliyev, 26:15)

• Media and Russian Propaganda:
  • Russia, from Maidan onward, magnified the image of Ukrainian ultra-nationalists as a pretext for interventions.

Foreign Volunteers and Far-Right Sympathies

• Foreign Fighters in Early Volunteer Units (31:52):
  • Initial openness allowed foreigners (often with far-right sympathies) to join early battalions, especially Azov.
  • Professionalization and integration into the state apparatus made foreign recruitment more selective and bureaucratic.

Military Effectiveness and Evolution

• Early Tactical Impact (34:30):
  • Volunteer battalions provided the motivated infantry Ukraine critically needed, especially before regular Russian intervention.
  • Once Russia deployed professional troops, paramilitary units were often outmatched due to lack of heavy weaponry and organizational support.

“...Ukrainian volunteer battalions were quite a poor match for this professional military.” (Aliyev, 36:33)

• Incorporation and Demobilization Post-Minsk (39:46):
  • Government sought to legalize and absorb most battalions into official structures; 20-30% stayed on, most demobilized.
  • Many transitioned to booming private security firms, some entered politics, others returned to civilian life.

Who Joined the Paramilitaries? Demographics and Motivations

• Regional Diversity (43:41):

  • Largest contingents from Donbas itself, Kyiv, and Southern regions; fewer from western Ukraine.
  • Early cohorts: Young, university-educated, and often with military, policing, martial arts or security backgrounds.
  • Later cohorts: Less security experience, joined for career and financial incentives following integration into state structures.

• Motivational Complexity:

“The same individual might be motivated by ethnonationalism, patriotism and financial incentives at the same time.” (Aliyev, 75:52)

Impact of 2022 Invasion on Paramilitaries

• Remobilization and Resource Value (47:26):

  • Veterans of 2014–15 provided a reservoir of experienced fighters at the 2022 outbreak.
  • Many old battalions, like Azov, quickly mobilized and led local resistance, especially in places like Kharkiv.

• Full Integration with Regular Forces:

  • Scale and conventionality of current conflict eliminated autonomy for almost all paramilitary units; most are now fully subsumed in Ukraine’s military framework.

• Continued Crowdfunding Tradition (54:20):

  • Modern Ukrainian units’ reliance on grassroots fundraising for equipment—most notably drones—directly descends from the 2014 paramilitary experience.

“Crowdfunding was invented by volunteer battalions back in 2014. And they were very effective at raising funds through social media...” (Aliyev, 54:54)

State–Paramilitary Relationships

• Shifting Dynamics (59:46):

  • Governments oscillated between patronage, co-optation, and crackdown on battalions.
  • Integration efforts met with resistance, often navigated via political or oligarchic patrons (notably Arsen Avakov with Azov).

• From Autonomy to Disbandment:

  • Only battalions with powerful connections retained partial autonomy; 70%+ did not survive demobilization drive after 2015.

Tensions and Cooperation with the Military

• Interpersonal Networks Key (67:10):
  • Collaboration or conflict between regular military and volunteer battalions hinged on personal ties between commanders.
  • Access to resources like ammunition, equipment, and artillery often a matter of who you knew, not official doctrine.

“...it all dependent on personal relationships.” (Aliyev, 68:19)

• Structural Integration and Shifting Roles:
  • After 2017, paramilitaries were pushed away from frontline roles, except where their connections allowed extensions.

Theoretical Pillars of Paramilitary Mobilization

• Key Insights (75:30):
  1. Motivations are Cumulative:
     • Individuals are driven by a mix of nationalism, injustice, financial incentives, and existing networks or skills—often all at once.
  2. Motivations Evolve:
     • Early recruits joined for ideological/patriotic motives and often subsidized their own participation; later recruits sought stable pay, career benefits.

Paramilitaries, PMCs, and Future Trends

• Potential for Private Military Companies (PMCs) (90:10):
  • The emergence of a large, experienced veteran cohort and occasional parliamentary discussions point towards a future Ukrainian PMC sector, possibly paralleling the Wagner model.
  • Such PMCs could allow Ukraine to contest Russia globally, in Africa for example.

Insights for Global Scholars

• Comparative Relevance (96:05):

  • Ukrainian experiences offer valuable parallels for scholars studying PMCs and paramilitaries in Iraq, Colombia, Myanmar, and elsewhere.
  • Techniques such as fundraising, use of social media, and network-based recruitment are increasingly universal in modern conflicts.

• Emergence and Evolution of Paramilitaries:

“There’s a lot of cross case learning and institutional learning that occurs across this militia paramilitary organizations around the world.” (Aliyev, 99:48)

Final Thoughts and Future Research

• Unsolved Puzzles:
  • Long-term evolution and fate of paramilitary organizations outside the conditions of constant armed conflict: How do groups evolve over decades? Do they transition into political parties or state-like entities (e.g., Hezbollah, Hamas)?

Notable Quotes/memorable Moments

• “When the paramilitary organizations were first assembled in April 2014 ... there were countless efforts on part of the government to take firmer control over this organizations.” (Aliyev, 59:56)
• “Crowdfunding was probably, well, it probably accounted to more than half, probably 60% of all the funds that volunteer battalions had back then.” (Aliyev, 54:56)
• “So in Ukraine, it was very often the other way around. And quite a few professional military junior and mid ranking officers by 2022 who participated in combat ... were actually former paramilitary combatants.” (Aliyev, 74:07)
• “Motives of mobilization into paramilitary organization are not necessarily mutually exclusive. … motives, they change over time as the conflict shapes.” (Aliyev, 75:45–77:27)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [02:46] — Author’s personal background, research origins
• [04:40] — Primary sources and methodology
• [09:00] — Defining paramilitaries and PGMs
• [11:35] — Scholarship debate on militias
• [16:47] — Paramilitaries vs. state monopoly on violence
• [23:56] — Role of Ukrainian ultranationalist groups
• [31:52] — Foreign (far-right) volunteers
• [34:30] — Tactical impact in Donbas
• [39:46] — Demobilization after Minsk
• [43:41] — Demographics of participants
• [47:26] — Impact of 2022 invasion
• [54:20] — Crowdsourcing, crowdfunding legacy
• [59:46] — Relationship with the state
• [66:28] — Military-paramilitary dynamics
• [75:30] — Summary of theoretical framework
• [90:10] — PMCs and future trends
• [96:05] — Relevance for scholars

Closing

The episode is an essential listen for scholars of armed conflict, security studies, and modern Ukrainian politics. Aliyev’s granular, long-haul fieldwork provides empirical clarity and theoretical contributions to our understanding of how paramilitary groups emerge, evolve, and interact with both state and society—findings that echo far beyond Ukraine.