C (2:31)

I think that's a fair comment that I think I would add that most people in the thirteen colonies had only a limited appreciation. I think if you lived in Massachusetts, your understanding of Georgia was often quite limited and vice versa. But yes, I think you're right. But then of course, that's the nature of far flung systems and the nature of in particular transoceanic empires.

B (2:57)

Would it have been better for the UK if it had, in retrospect, have followed Edmund Burke's proposal for the conciliation of the colonies and to have foregone military solution?

C (3:07)

I think that's a very interesting question. I certainly think that what became a civil war in the empire and one in which hostile foreign forces intervened and to great effect was very detrimental for Britain and also drove up the national debt enormously. On the other hand, I think it's quite difficult to see how you could, as it were, readily compromise authority and power in that period. Yet if you want to go back to Burke, you could argue, well, that's precisely what had happened with and after the Glorious Revolution. And that in a sense, what he was proposing was another iteration of that, more particularly for the 13 colonies, but also by extension for other colonies of a similar situation.

B (3:58)

What, if anything, was novel about the American Continental Army?

C (4:01)

I personally do not feel that the American Continental army represented a revolutionary new development. There had, after all, been forces that had fought for their vision of their independence before one can think of the army of the Dutch Republic in the late 17th century. So no, I don't see the American Revolution as leading to a new age of warfare. I think that really comes from subsequent American historians and or people trying to put a peg on which to look at the late 18th century to group, shall we say, the American Revolution and the French Revolution. But those are two very, very different forces in terms of their military efforts.

B (4:54)

Why, in your opinion, is it a mistake to regard the British army of the time as hindbound?

C (4:59)

Oh, I think the British army of the time was a very flexible force, which is one of the achievements of the American patriots or rebels, depending upon what you want to call them, to defeat them. I mean, the British army of that period successfully had engaged in counterinsurgency struggles suppressing Jacobitism, and they were to do so again. In the case of Ireland in 1798. They'd fought European opponents within Europe, they'd fought European opponents outside Europe, principally in the West Indies and India, and obviously they'd fought non European forces, principally in India. So that showed a kind of flexibility and multi range capability that you don't see. For example, in the case of the army of, I don't know, Frederick the Great, which very much engages simply in symmetrical warfare against other similar European forces.

B (5:57)

Why was George Washington chosen as commander of the Continental Army?

C (6:01)

Well, he had military experience, he was a gentleman and he was a Virginian. And I think all of those were important factors.

B (6:11)

Why was the American invasion of Canada in 1775 a failure?

C (6:15)

Well, it was initially successful. I mean, initially they moved up the Lake Champlain corridor very rapidly, they captured Montreal with relative ease and they advanced on Quebec relatively easily. So initially it was successful, but of course it lacked a degree of, as it were, local support. It lacked a backing naval force to blockade the St. Lawrence or indeed to move up the St. Lawrence in order to aid operations against Quebec, crucially by bringing forward artillery. And I think it's fair to say that it shows the difference between an army, in this case a revolutionary or amateur army or whatever term you wish to use, which had only just been assembled and which lacked the sustaining institutional organization in order to maintain itself. Having said that, it's worth pointing out that of course the 1775 invasion did better than those in 1812, 1813 and 1814, admittedly against unprepared opposition in 1775. It's really a question of why they failed in 1776 in the face of the British counteroffensive. And that owes a lot to the skill effectiveness of the British forces in Canada at that point.

B (7:46)

Why was the American defeat in the Battle of Long island not a game changer in terms of the war's outcome?

C (7:53)

It wasn't a game changer because the American Continental army got away as it were, retreated across the east river successfully, and because you've got this classic problem of changing Upwell, transforming operational success into strategic outcome. And I think that was an issue. It's always an issue in both insurgency and counterinsurgency struggles. And I think it was a particular issue there. On the other hand, what the Battle of Long island did do was set in motion the British conquest of New York City and a series of steps by which by mid December 1776, the Revolution was in grave difficulties in the middle colonies.

B (8:47)

Do you agree with those who contend that Sir William Howe was at fault in not pursuing more aggressively Washington after the Battle of white plain.

C (8:54)

I certainly think that Howe could possibly have pushed harder, but of course, I mean, in a sense, without going as far as the comment on Jellicoe at Jutland, you know, the experience of Bunker Hill was one that encouraged a measure of caution. And of course, the. Howe had to think about the wider implications, both tactical and operational, of particular moves on the day and on the next day. So I would say one can understand what Howe was doing. He was, to a degree, a cautious general. There's no two ways about that. But on the other hand, he was winning, and to jeopardize that victory did not appear wise.

B (9:43)

How important to the war's outcome was the American defeat of the Hessians in December 1775?

C (9:51)

The battles of Trenton and Princeton, particularly the initial surprise at Trenton, were important because they pricked the bubble of confidence that the British had at that point and because they came to demonstrate, whether you think this is sensible or not, that an overland advance on Philadelphia would face major problems. So from that point of view, they're very consequential. But you could argue that. That what makes them more consequential is the handling, or one could say, multiple mishandling of British strategic and operational options in 1777, rather than the steps themselves, which, after all, were not responsible for particularly heavy casualties.

B (10:42)

Who was at fault in the debacle that was General Burgoyne's defeat at Saratoga.

C (10:49)

I think that Burgoyne bears the major responsibility for his defeat, but clearly the American response was a wise one and they were able to use particular advantage of the nature of the terrain and cover. I think it's fair to say that the. That the problem the Americans had is that Burgoyne had the initiative and that, as it were, he gave them battle and therefore they were able to win. You could argue the same thing is true of Andrew Jackson. The Battle of New Orleans in 1815. It might have been a very different battle if Burgoyne had sat tight, or indeed, which he couldn't have done for any length of time, time because of supplies, but indeed had instead simply withdrawn, because then the Americans would have been obliged to attack and I think would have found that much harder.

B (11:52)

Why did the British evacuate Philadelphia in 1778?

C (11:56)

French entry into the war was clearly imminent. And I think what that does is encourage a sense that there needs to be a rethinking of strategy, not least in terms of the allocation of forces and in particular a determination to protect the British position in the West Indies and to that extent to pull back on Philadelphia and I think that was probably a wise decision in terms of the struggle against France, a less wise decision in terms of the war in North America, because it did send a very strong message about British lack of success or lack or inability to sustain success in the middle colonies.

D (12:49)

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B (13:49)

Would it be true to say that for you, the American War of Independence had something of the nature of a civil war, especially in the southern colonies?

C (13:56)

Well, I think the American War of Independence definitely was a civil war within the thirteen colonies as a whole. I mean, there were Loyalists and patriots throughout the 13 colonies. There are obviously particular concentrations in particular areas, and that did involve a degree of civil conflict. In some cases it involved people killing each other, more obviously in the backcountry of the Carolinas. But at the very least it involved conflict, including intimidation, seizure of property, driving out of opponents. And there were other areas, of course, besides the south, you know, for example, around the Chesapeake, in which there's, you know, fighting between Patriots and Loyalists and separately but linked to this, it is a civil war within the Empire. And, you know, many of the people in the thirteen colonies have considerable family linkage with the British Isles. But leaving that aside, it is a civil war within the Empire.

B (15:08)

How did France and later Spain's entry into the war change its course and nature for the British as well as the Americans?

C (15:15)

I'm always careful about the phrase the Americans. The Loyalists were Americans, too. I would use the term that they used at the time, patriots. Or I would call them rebels, if you wish to use a functional term. It's interesting as to how one thinks of the American Civil War, but going back to French and then Spanish entry That completely transformed the situation for Britain. France and Spain were the second and third largest naval powers in the world, respectively. They had a considerably larger army, each of them, than Britain. They had a capacity, as they showed in 1779, to try and invade the British Isles, and they had an ability to strike British possession elsewhere, from the Indian Ocean to the Caribbean via Minorca, Gibraltar, West Africa, etc. So Britain was very much put onto its defensive. And from the point of view of the war in North America, that had both the immediate consequence that there could be the dispatch of French forces to North America. French warships were there from 76 onwards. French troops followed. Spaniards did not, as far as the 13 colonists were concerned, though they obviously did in terms of the conquest of what was called West Florida. But there was also the indirect impact on the British, ranging From the specific, I.e. now it was necessary to protect New York City against the possibility of French attack to the more general, in the case of where the British state was to send resources.

B (16:56)

Would it be true to say that the British Southern strategy was flawed?

C (17:01)

It became flawed in its implementation under Cornwallis in 81. But I don't think I would say it was flawed in terms of the capture of Savannah, which was a major success, in terms of holding off the American French assault on Savannah in 79, which was a major British success, or indeed in the capital of Charleston in 1780, and indeed in the initial exploitation of that down to and including the Battle of Camden. I think what I would argue is that the decision to march across North Carolina to the Chesapeake was much less prudent than the ability to base operations on a strong control of the littoral, the coastline, if you like, of the Carolina of South Carolina and Georgia.

B (18:05)

Why was the battle of Guilford Courthouse a, quote, tactical defeat for the Patriots, an operational strategic defeat for the British, unquote.

C (18:15)

Well, it's a defeat for the Patriots in patriotic terms. Sorry. In tactical terms, I'd been up working too early this morning. It's a defeat in tactical terms because they take heavy casualties, they're driven from the battlefield, their army suffers a kind of significant disruption and an opportunity to use a large number of forces in order to defeat Cornwallis fails. On the other hand, it also costs Cornwallis a lot of men, and he isn't able to deliver a decisive enough outcome in order to affect the regional balance of power sufficiently.

B (19:09)

How would you rate Lord Cornwallis as a commander prior to the Battle of Yorktown?

C (19:14)

Well, I would say that he showed a lot of ability at the level he Was at. But I'm not sure he showed sufficient strategic insight. And I think ending up in Yorktown reflects that. You could argue that he anticipated naval relief and that had that happened, as indeed happened for Clinton on the New Jersey Campaign in 1778 after Monmouth Courthouse, absolutely fine. You could argue that, for example, Cornwallis in India campaigning against Tibbin Salton does well in part because there is naval power at the background. You could argue the same in terms of Ireland in 98. So you could say it's somebody else's fault other than his. On the other hand, he, as it were, loses the operational initiative in 81 and does that to an extent that jeopardizes the situation strategically. Earlier on, of course, in the 80 campaign against Charleston, it's Clinton who is in control. But Clinton goes back to New York City after the fall of Charleston.

B (20:42)

Why would. What. I'm sorry? What explains the outcome of the battle of Yorktown?

C (20:46)

Oh, the naval blockade that is imposed by the French. Otherwise, the garrison would have been able to evacuate, and it wouldn't have been serious at all.

B (20:58)

Why was the defeat of Yorktown such a game changer for Britain's willingness to continue the war?

C (21:03)

Well, because of the political consequences. I mean, battles are often significant because of how they're read by contemporaries. I mean, in terms of north America, as you're aware, it wasn't the British major field force that, of course, was in New York. It wasn't the major British position. Those, of course, were New York, Charleston and Savannah. But. And, of course, one always has to be wary how one reads between examples, I think, so that, you know, I'm not implying an equivalence. I'm just trying to say this in order to, you know, to expand the mind. It's a bit like Dien Bien Phu at the end of the French presence in Vietnam. I mean, that made no difference to French control of Hanoi, Hue, da Nang, Saigon, etc. But what it did was, as it were, greatly affect the domestic political opinion. That's the key thing. The war's been going on for a while. I think it's fair to say that war weariness has been growing. Incidentally, it's been growing in America as well, among both patriots and loyalists. And at that point, a serious failure is one that leads to a sense of, well, this isn't working out, is it? Now, ironically, you could argue that the defeat at Saratoga was more significant, but that doesn't have the same political consequence as the one at Yorktown. What essentially happened is a number of independent MPs and there were a lot of MPs who, as it were, weren't part of the political wait. A number of independent MPs decided to press the King and the King's First Minister for a change in policy. And Lord north himself, who'd been trying to resign for quite a while, was also manoeuvring to go as well as for a change of policy. And the combination of those and the opportunities provided to the opposition to take the initiative exposed the growing political strains in the Ministry. I think I would argue all of those. There was no inherent military reason to change policy, and you could argue that Britain was in a worse state against Napoleon in the early years. But there was felt to be a need for change, and that need took more, had more effect than any particular policy prescription or analysis.

B (24:14)

Which party would you rate it having done better in terms of the learning.

C (24:18)

Curve thesis, I certainly think the Continental army did well in the learning curve thesis, I mean, famously so in inoculation or vaccination against smallpox. But on the other hand, the Continental army was in a pretty poor state in 81, and for the siege of Yorktown was very dependent on French troops as well as warships. So I would say the Continental army, some respects, yes, but some respects falling to pieces. I would say that the British were pretty good at the outset. There were too few of them there in 75, but they're pretty good in 76. And as it were, they're still essentially fighting in a similar fashion in 81 and 82. But their major problems are posed by strategic questions, not least the implications from 78 onwards of fighting also against France, Spain and by Haiti, the Dutch, as well as the problems of a counterinsurgency struggle, rather than there being any deficiencies on the point of the actual army. As far as the French were concerned, I think it's fair to say that their navy was able in 78 off Ushant, to thwart the British attempt to have a decisive early victory. But in 82, of course, their navy lost at the saints. So I think there was a significant successful learning curve for the British Navy and that that helps to ensure that the war doesn't end so detrimentally for Britain as it might have done.

B (26:13)

Would you agree or not with Paul Kennedy's statement that the war, from a British perspective, was doomed to failure from the very beginning?

C (26:20)

No. I like Paul, but he knows absolutely nothing about the American War of Independence. He's never done any archival research in the 18th century at all. He has no idea what the intentions of the British policymakers were. And I think that was a rash and foolish remark of his.

B (26:40)

Point well taken. If you wanted people to take one thing away from the book, Professor Black, what would it be?

C (26:46)

I think what I would say is that this is a struggle in which the military history is important. A lot of the work on the revolution has looked at ideology. It's looked at. Looked at political structure, it's looked at social dynamics, it's looked at identity politics. All of which can be interesting, though sometimes they're overplayed. But ultimately, the War of Independence, like the Civil War, is a military struggle and has to be understood not only in its own terms, but also by applying insights gained from a learned consideration of military history more broadly. And what I was trying to do was not only use my archival work on the period, both on British and American archives and French as well, incidentally, but also what I was trying to do was use my insights gained from work on Other periods of 18th century European military history.

B (27:51)

On that observation, I would like to thank you very much, Professor Black, for being so kind to speak with us today. This is Charles Catillo. You're listening to New Books in History, the podcast channel New Books Network. Thank you, Professor Black, very much.

C (28:03)

Great pleasure.