Podcast Host (2:48)

Stay or should I go?

Tim Jones (2:49)

Question, I'm joined by Lorenzo Castellani, author of Alberto Beneduce, Mussolini's Power, Knowledge and Institutions in Fascist Italy, published in October 2025 by Routledge. Lorenzo Castellani is a tenure track researcher and professor at Luis Guido CARLI IN GRAM I'm Tim Jones and this is the 242 podcast with new books in European politics.

Podcast Host (3:17)

There will be specialists listening to this podcast who will know Beneduce and his works, but I suspect there are many more who won't. And I. I've got to admit, before I read your book, I was one of them. And in fact you make the points at the beginning of the book that political histories have tended to neglect him because he quite deliberately didn't want to attract too much interest. He lived in what you call a twilight zone. So could you begin with a brief portrait of who he was and where he came from?

Lorenzo Castellani (3:43)

Alberto Belluccio was a very peculiar character in Italian history for a series of elements. The first one was he was the son of small bourgeoisie of the southern part of Italy. His hometown was Caserta, near Naples. And so he was not the typical figure of the Italian establishment of the time. For many aspects he was a self made man. He had the chance to study, particularly exploiting his talent in mathematics and statistics. So he graduated from Naples University at the beginning of the 20th century in mathematics. And then he joined the civil service as a civil servant. I progressively made career and he was lucky enough to meet a very important political man of the time, who was Francesco Saverianitti. Nitti was between 1910 and 1920, both Minister for Industry and then Prime Minister in Italy. Nitti was the leader of the radical party, the centrist party. Bebeduso, at the beginning of his career, let's say after his graduation, was a socialist, not a revolutionary socialist, but a socialist reformist. So he was a social democrat, we might argue. And so as a consequence, meeting with Niti, he had the chance to join the cabinet of Niti as a. In the Ministry of Industry. And there he was able to widen his network of relationship both with the intellectuals, so with the professor of economics, for example, and with very important figures such as Wilfredo Pareto or Luigi Naudi. And he started as well to teach at university, even if it was not in principal activity. And in the cabinet he had the chance to draft a very important law that established a new entity, the INNA Instituto Nazionale Assicurazioni, that was the public entity for national insurance. And he became member of the executive board. So this first experience we are in 1912 was the first step for Beneduce to join the Italian establishment meeting during this period, another very important figure for him that was the governor of the bank of Italy, Bernaldo Stringer. And so Beneluce combined during this period's political career in the socialist reformists that were allied with the Radical Party of Nitti and with the Liberal Party of Giolitti, and at the same time starting his career as a public manager. So this is why I'm arguing that he was in a twilight zone, because Beneduce, for most of the historical research up to this moment, was considered a technician and economist. But from my standpoint, he was more. He was the architect of a new relationship between state and market, particularly after the First World War. And he played as well a political role. So he theorized for many aspects, an idea of technocracy, that is, you know, the use of technique in the political domain, protecting, you know, the independence of technology, also during fashion. So this is why I think he is more than an administrative or economic figure. He is a political figure as well, because he participated and sometimes his decisions, particularly during the Fascist era, produced very relevant outcomes in terms of policy and in terms of politics. So this is why I chose to spend nearly five years of my academic career to research on Benedicta's figure.

Podcast Host (7:30)

You actually compare him to John Maynard Keynes. They are almost contemporaries. They were first and foremost mathematicians who turned into economists. And they were very practical economists and economic diplomats.

Lorenzo Castellani (7:42)

Yes, you know, I quote Keynes a couple of times during my work, in my work, because I think, you know, these two figures are quite similar. Probably we don't have evidences, but it's very likely that the two met a couple of times in some economic conferences. Both of them were Sherpa, were advisors of power, particularly in the international sphere. During the a series of economic conferences after the First World War. Both were part of the delegations of their countries. Of course, the difference was that Keynes was a much more public intellectual figure, while Beneduce was, for many aspects, a man of power. He preferred to advise Mussolini. He preferred to build new institutions rather than writing his thoughts. Indeed, most of his thoughts are private or recorded into archives, but not into books or papers. So from this perspective, they have some similarities. Both of them were mathematicians, economists, involved in the debate, and particularly in the international conferences among economists after the First World War. But then Beneduce chose, contrary to Keynes, to remain in the realm of politics and power. He became in 1919, a Member of Parliament, then Minister of labor in 1921, 1922. And then he decided, even if he was not a fascist, to cooperate with Mussolini. So he represented basically the part of the Italian establishment that was not fascist, but decided to compromise with the fascists. And it is an interesting figure also for this transition. Let's say, you know, you wouldn't have bet nothing on Beneducci's political survival after 1922, 1923. Then after a couple of years, Beneduce was at the head of very important economic entities, blessed by Mussolini basically, and becoming his right hand man in the economics and finance. So this transition is very peculiar and it showed us how, you know, during an authoritarian regime there are many nuances and ambiguities also from that part of the establishment that formally opposed at the very beginning Mussolini. And then they decided to cooperate with them and to draw a pact with him, maintaining some characteristics of the Italian economy and the Italian governance that were preserved by fascism and on the other side, adapting themselves to the new fascist policies.

Podcast Host (10:27)

And this transition is what is particularly relevant and interesting at the moment. But I'd like to go back to the pre fascist period a little, because you talk about the creation of INA, his meeting with Nietzsche in 1910, 1911, 1912, the putting together of these dirigeesh agencies, really. And what was very striking to me, or interesting to me was how ahead of its time Italy seemed to be, because obviously this kind of state capitalism became quite normal in the 1930s, but Italy was doing this really from 1910 onwards. Was it leading the way?

Lorenzo Castellani (11:00)

Well, I would say that Italy was a forerunner in this field, in the field of public intervention. This was due to a characteristic of Italy. Italy was a late comer in terms of political unification. It was a late comer as well in terms of capitalistic developments. So the theory of Niti Stringer and Beneduce himself was okay. The state need to play. Needs to play a very relevant role in the economy. Why? Because we need it for development. Because we are late comer in the capitalist fields. It is necessary for us to use the states to attract investment, to propel, you know, loans, to propel developmental policies. So this is why Italy became a forerunner in the public intervention. And Beneguccio was perhaps the main protagonist of this process with Dina and later on with other entities as the public banks, the Crediop, the ICPU and then finally 1933, rescuing the failing major banks in Italy with Italy. This is why Italian economy during this period is an important object of study also at the international level. But what was study was the transformation of the economy and the relationship between state and markets. But not very much the protagonist of this transition, of this transformation. And this is why benegoce is so important for me, because, you know, the relevance of individuals was particularly important in making these choices. So, you know, we wouldn't have had such a level of public interventionism into the Italian economy after the First World War in particular, without figure as Beneduccio, that played a very important role both at theoretical level and above all, a practical level. So building up a series of institutions that were credible, that were performing well and in a quite efficient way, differing from the traditional public administration of the state and attracting talents as engineers or accountants or economists, that created a bulk, say a nucleus of the ruling class of Italy that then will spur the economic miracle in post war era. So that's what is interesting is also the continuity, let's say, from the 1910s up to the Italian Republic, where many things change at political level. We have basically three political regimes. But Beneduce and his stupid were capable to survive with these institutions that Beneduce created. And is another very remarkable point, let's say, of my thesis, that is, you know, the institutional continuity is stronger than political regimes, even when there's a shock such as the second World War and the collapse of fascist regime in Italy.

Podcast Host (13:57)

Two things he had in common with Mussolini was that he had very strongly held socialist beliefs. Mussolini was a revolutionary socialist until he wasn't. But also they were both in favor of entering the first World War. And you make the point. Mussolini seemed to be motivated more by the war as a propellant for nationalism, whereas Benaduce saw it as a propellant for the kind of economic reform you were talking about.

Lorenzo Castellani (14:23)

Yes, exactly. Both of them were socialists. They believed basically in this idea that the state could accomplish a more just society, more equal and even a more powerful nation. This is the other element. Both of them were nationalists. Both of them were in favor of intervention in war, even if, as you correctly anticipated from different perspectives. For Benedict, it was a great chance to reform the economy, to introduce new welfare policies and new developmental policies through state intervention, while for Mussolini was the opportunity for eventually introducing a political revolution. So this is important because these two elements of socialism and nationalism were, you know, the common ground at cultural level on which these two very different figures also in terms of character, could cooperate together. For example, both of them believe that, you know, a certain level of state action in the economy was necessary. Both of them considered, you know, a good solution to eventually reform finance and avoiding the excess of oath finance, of private finance. That in Italy was particularly, particularly complex issue. These large banks, mixed banks, were on the brinks of failure in the 1920s and then in the 1930s. So they found a common ground for their political discussion. And the third element is that Mussolini And Beneduce steamed each other. They were in a very good relationship since the era of the First World War, even if they disagree. You know, Beneducci was very critical in the 1920s of, you know, the fascist approach, the authoritarian approach embodied by Mussolini. But, you know, in terms of culture, their culture was quite similar. And so, you know, this is a very crucial point to understand why in the end, Benedictine decided to cooperate with fascists.

Podcast Host (16:33)

I mean, it was an amazing transition. You know, you talk about the episode in 1922 where he. So he's Minister of Labor under Ivanoe Bonhomi. It's just before the fascist march on Rome, and he stands up in parliament and he attacks the Minister of defense for failing to crack down on the black shirts. And he actually suggests use of, you know, a police crackdown, use of the military. And yet within a year or two years, he writes this open letter in 1924, essentially telling his fellow socialists to stand down, that there's no hope of political change at this point. Do you think it was entirely calculation? What do you think was going through his mind over that period?

Lorenzo Castellani (17:12)

I think that, you know, for Benenuce was, as you said, was member of Parliament in 1919, and then he decided to step down from politics in. In 1923, basically after a legislature, a legislator in which was a minister as well. First of all, from one side, I think there was a deep disillusion, the dissatisfaction with the Italian political system of the liberal regime. The liberal regime was not working and was every very evident for anyone, including Beneduche. So a great disappointment for the political regime. The other element was he was not a fascist. He was not enthusiastic of fascism. But there was a realist calculation on two levels. First level was the personal one. Beneduce was a public manager. Basically, he worked for the state for most part of his life. And he was not enthusiastic, let's say, to come back, for example, to teach at university. It was an option, but not the best option for him. And he had a very large family with five kids. So there was a, you know, an effort to preserve his career that was quite relevant up to that moment. You know, coming from this small bourgeoisie from the south. He became member of parliament and the minister important public manager. The other level was to preserve not only his career, but as well the institutions he created, acting as a guarantor for the industrial and financial establishment of the time. This is a calculus that was made not only by Beneduce, but as well by Anders Tiger as Donaldo Stringer, for example, the Governor of the bank of Italy. And this role as guarantors was basically accepted by Mussolini, particularly the first Mussolini in 1922, but as well also after 1925, after the assassination of Matteotti and, you know, the authoritarian turn of Mussolini. Mussolini continued to rely upon some figures of the previous regime, because basically he did not have competent men to pursue economic policy, financial policy or infrastructures. So he relied upon technocrats that were not fascist. So the idea for Mussolini, for Stringer, for Serpieri and many others was, okay, we are in a new regime. The new regime is authoritarian, but we can preserve some elements. So the functioning of the market, the interaction between the state and the markets, and the future development of public intervention in the case of Beneduce, or preserving some liberal principles for the magistrates. For example, the important Jewish Santi Romano remained as a chairman of the Council of the State. And he was not a Fascist. The same is for a certain level of independence for the central bank. So what, you know, the idea, the calculus was for all these men and Beniluce as well, was, okay, fascism is a new regime. They did not want that fascism turned into a revolution, okay? So the revolutionary soul of fascism had to be taken by technocrats. And this is the calculus that Ben Gucci made there was personal, but was as well a systemic calculus that was made by a very large portion of the Italian establishment. Also, if you see the memoirs of industrials as Toreconti or Giovanni Nelli, you know, they were not sympathetic with fatigue, but they were accepting it and trying to preserve private property, entrepreneurial initiatives, say, a positive relationship with state institutions. So, you know, it was part of this transition, not a veering ideology, very too fascist, not refusing to join the Fascist party, but, you know, cooperating with Mussolini, say, using his technical competence for improving his career, and eventually to realize some policy objectives that he realized during the Fascist era from his perspective.

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Podcast Host (23:33)

Of course there were people around former mentor like Niti who criticized him for doing this and he compared him to Vincenzo Giuffrida who actually left, ended up in exile. And of course another mentor was Giovanni Amendola who was beaten to death by Blackshirts in 1926. At the same time that you have this episode where Benjamin Strong comes to Rome and as late as 1926 describing beneduce as a strong anti fascist.

Lorenzo Castellani (24:01)

Yeah, that's interesting because you have here many nuances and reactions to the fascist regime. There was of course a part of of the old liberal political class that was reacting against the regime. Well, Niti of course was very old, so basically he decided to retire in his villa in south of Italy and remain there, not participating anymore to political life. There were other cases as Giuffrida or as the Rosselli brothers that decided that they too opposed to the regime because they were liberal socialists and they. They did not accept basically the new authoritarian regime. And there were others, as I said, as Benelucha, that consider, you know, the regime as perhaps an opportunity to improve their career or to preserve continuity with the previous regime, at least, you know, in the economic and financial sector. What they, you know, what these men as Beneduce or what else Stringer feared a lot was the corporativismo. So this doctrine that was a deregist and socialist doctrine that was embodied by some fascist ministers as Botai. And of course, they perceived corporativism as a possible revolution to the balance of the Italian economy and into the role performed by industries and banks. It was something closer to socialism, but to, you know, Russian socialism from this perspective, very strong, say, introduction of the state within the realm of the economy. So Beneduche was a reformist. So it was against this idea, this deregist idea of corporativism and this idea to reduce basically the space of free entrepreneurship and private property. And it was joined by many industrials on this idea that they were against corporativism. And then corporativism failed also for the opposition and the divergent initiative taken by Beneduche and others in building up new technocratic public intervention rather than corporatist one. So for sure, for sure, you know, it was joining the cooperation with fascism was there was an element of opportunism that is undeniable. I write it. But there were, of course, also other motivation. Another interesting example is when we look at Italy, fascist Italy in the 1920s, in particular, with the eyes of the British statesman or American statesman, it is clear that, okay, Benelui is Mussolini, sorry, is a strong leader, he's an autocrat, but is surrounded by men that are not, you know, the typical fascist, very aggressive, even without any competence. And so this is why Benjamin Strong wrote, you know, Ben is not part of the Fascist party. He is critical with many ideas of the Fascist Party. Is it possible that during this international meeting, Belladuce might outline his criticism to international observers of the fascist regime and outlining as well, you know, the main problems that they would address, you know, in the. In the coming years. But it was not perceived as a fascism, but as Mussolini's advisors, a sort of gray eminence in the financial and economic sector. Indeed, all the central governors spent very good thoughts and worse for Beneduce during the 1920s and 1930s. And this is another interesting standpoint, I think, so up to the 1935 and the invasions in Africa and then joining Hitler in 1938. The perception of international financial establishment of Italy was more positive than negative.

Podcast Host (28:02)

I think what I found most convincing was the idea that he had these extremely strong views about a sort of agency led capitalism. And he developed them over five or 10 years and he basically had a vehicle to implement them. And he would have taken any political vehicle of any kind.

Tim Jones (28:21)

Is that fair?

Lorenzo Castellani (28:22)

Yes, I think, you know, when, you know, Mussolini turned fascism into a regime in 1925, it was very clear that you cannot build up any state led agencies, capitalism without a positive relationship with political power. So the indusia that at the time was the chairman of crediop, a public bank for infrastructure, and the chairman of icpu, that was an entity that was financing the electric industries that were the strategic industries of the time. You know, the only possibility for him was to cooperate with Mussolini, offering his competencies to Mussolini in order to accomplish his mission of full fledged public intervention for helping the development and the survival of Italian industries in the interwar years. Moreover, he created in 1931 IMI, there was the Instituto Mobiliere Italiano, that was, was another bank, another financial institutions, where, you know, there was a mix between public and private financing structure in order to provide loans, term, medium long term loans to strategic industries. And then in 1933, in front of a huge existential crisis of the three most important Italian banks, and a crisis that was investing the bank of Italy as well, he exploited this crisis to create this huge public holding that was incorporating basically all the holdings of these three banks, called Iri Situto, Ri industriale. And Erie was a huge holding shared by Beneduce, basically governed by Beneduce, who was the sovereign of this huge entity that was incorporating, as you know, a majoritarian shareholders, or sometimes a minoritarian one. A very large number of industries, basically all the largest industries, except very few, as Fiat, were involved in the Erie galaxy of control and of shareholders. So, you know, through this path, with an incremental process, Beniduce was capable to realize this more solid interaction between the public intervention of the state and the private sector. Let's say the basic idea of Beneduce in this era was that private capitalism in Italy was not strong enough to survive in an unpleasant environment as it was during the interwar years. So it was necessary for the state to to create a bond market through which it was possible to guarantee loans and financing to strategic industries to survive and to develop. So the idea was not to reduce or to eliminate the private sector, or reducing freedom of entrepreneurship or private capital. The idea was to aid private capitalism with public intervention in order to. To make the country more dynamics, to mobilize savings, to create, you know, these new bond markets. So Beneduccio basically was the creator of the bond markets in Italy, in Italy and abroad, because most of these bonds were then contracted, negotiated in London or in New York. So it was as well, you know, the architect of the financialization of the Italian economy that will survive after the collaps of fascism and will spur the economic development of Erie, Emi and all the other entities after the Second World War, along with the private sector. His vision was not a socialist one, in this case, was perhaps a dirigist one, but respecting the role of private capitalism that should be aided by the public intervention of the state.

Podcast Host (32:26)

You write that his ultimate goal was to, quote, create a state outside the state. So a network of autonomous institutions led by a new class of technocrats with their own funding channels, essentially ring fence from the treasury that he seemed to see, to believe had a sort of dead hand for the state, dead hand for the markets. How well did he succeed in that? By the time he had his stroke.

Lorenzo Castellani (32:50)

In 1936, he succeeded in the sense that he was able to create this network of entities that were basically technocratic institutions where he can hire the people he considered as the suitable for these, for the mission, let's say, of these entities. So we was able to create a technocratic network, so to kick up particularly young people, young engineers, young managers, young statisticians that were able to provide the necessary competencies to these institutions without the interference of politics or limiting as much as possible, the interfering of the Fascist party and Mussolini basically allowed him to pursue, you know, this project and these policies. Most of the people that were working in Bellucia's entities, the hundreds of people that were working in these entities, were technicians not enrolled in the Fascist Party, no member of the Fascist Party. They were, of course, accepting the authoritarian regime. They were not, of course, opposing to fascism, but they were very focused on their institutional mission. So they were more loyal to the state and to the Benedici's entities rather than to the fascist regime. And you can see after the collapse of the regime and as well, when Ben duce retired in 1939, you know, he was able to guarantee the survival to these entities both during the Second World War and even after the Second World War. And this is a clue that Beneduce was very skilled in selecting people. You know, he was a great human resources Manager as well, in the sense that he chose, you know, the group of young people that was able to carry on his work and to preserve it and to expand it. And among these young men there were some very important figures of the Italian politics and Italian economy of Posturira, just to mention a couple of them. There was widow Carly, who then will be governor of the bank of Italy, Minister of Finance and Director General of Conf Industria, and Enrico Cuccia, who will marry one of the daughter of Beneduce and will be the most important private banker of Italy between 1945 and 1990. So along with Donato Minichella, another very important figure that will be the governor of the bank of Italy in the 1950s. So one of the main protagonists of the Italian economic miracle, he joined the area as a director general in 1934. Minichela played a very important role as a juncture between the Fascist regime and the new republican order. So if you think about these three characters, these three men were considered as three pillars of the Italian economy of the post war era and the guarantor of institutional continuity. It seems, you know, a very important work that was made by Benny Duchenne as well. Thinking to the future, overcoming for many aspects the future of the Fascist regime. It was quite evident at the end of the 1930s that perhaps things might get worse. And so his idea was to create institutions that can work in any environment, not specifically in the Fascist regime. And you can see it in the transition to the republic, where most of the Fascist institutions, the ones that were useful for propaganda, for political control, were eliminated. But the economic and the wealthy ones were maintained and ruled by these men that were Beneducci's pupils. So this is why he is such an interesting figure, because the Italian technocracy that played a huge role during the Republic was created by him and felt by him during the 1930s and 1940s.

Podcast Host (37:04)

Was there any retribution for any of these people given the power of the Communist Party under the First Republic? Or was the fact that they were operating in this state, outside the state, was that protective for them?

Lorenzo Castellani (37:16)

Yes, they were protected by the state umbrella. They were protected by this idea that they were technocrats. So, you know, their power was based on technical competence. They were protected by a wide network that was including public sector, public entities and as well private industries. What is interesting is that there was quite effective in and out from the public and the private sector sector. So people that were that used to work for IRI then joined private corporations and the country as well. So, you know, that there was a sort of osmosis between, you know, these two elements, the public and the private sector. And so this was one of the most relevant legacy of Beneduce that was to protect creating a sort of insulation of these technocratic entities before from the Fascist party and later on from the Democratic parties. And this order lasted at least until the beginning of the 1970s, when the level of partytocracy, the influence of the parties and their intrusion into economic life became more prominent, more relevant. And other reforms by Menducha lasted even more. If you think about IRI and IMI survived up until the end of the 1990s. The same for Frediop. And the banking law that Beneduce and menichela wrote in 1936 lasted up until 1993, during the season of privatization and liberalization. So his legacy was very profound and introduced this concept that, you know, people might get protected by the state and by this very peculiar form of the state, because these men were not officially part of the public administration. They were not civil servants. They were working for corporations. These corporations were controlled by the state, but the regime was the regime of the private law. And this technique was used by Beniduce in order to hire the best and the brightest and avoiding all the limitations in terms of pay and in terms of regulation of public administration. This is why we used to say that he built up a state outside the state in the sense that there were public entities, but these public entities were not part of public administration. So it was for many aspects, a parallel technocratic state made by different islands. I called it the archipelago state, where, you know, there was the center of power, but then there were these technocratic islands protected from politics. I mean, this was a very peculiar form of governance that characterized Italy and that characterized the importance of the Italian technology. You think about, you know, some present figure as Mario Bragi, for example, Draghi, came from that tradition of the bank of Italy that was basically initiated by Bernaldo Stringer and then by Donato Minichella and Guido Carni. So there's a very long standing influence of his mentality on the Italian ruling class.

Podcast Host (40:22)

You touch on the idea that this evolution led to something like Italian capitalism's in quote, good club, where there is this room full of top financiers, industrialists, politicians that work to stabilize existing realities and power balances. Is the implication there that it eventually ended up as a club for incumbents and was a dissuasive factor in the further development of Italian capitalism and innovation?

Lorenzo Castellani (40:51)

Yes, well, benduche played a role also in the private economy. As said, particularly was the chairman of Bastogi. Bastogi was a very important, I would say it was not a standard bank, it was something in between a bank and a holding. But it was the place in which all the most important families of Italian capitalism had their shares, their holdings. And it was the place where some sort of balance in the competition among these families was found. And Beneduce basically acted as an arbiter, as umpire to this. And so he played a very important role as well in the private sector. The Bastogi was the forerunner of the most important Italian bank of the post war era. Founded the between 1944 and 1946. It was Mediobanca, created by Enrico Puccia. And it was the place in which all the most important industrial families in Italy had their own, had their holdings. And it was the bank that was basically financing all the merger and acquisition operations and important loans for industrial development. With a long term perspective, of course, it was a club for incumbent. It was a way to stabilize capitalism. What Beniduce experienced in the beginning of the 1920s was a very harsh competition among industrial families to control the banks. And his idea was, you know, the, the excess of this competition was destabilizing the banks, was creating a situation of conflict in which it was extremely difficult to manage a bank, to run a bank as a, as a CEO or as a president. So this is something has to be avoided through a series of pact among, among private capitalists, among the most important families. You know, the role of family in Italy is very relevant as well in the private sector, in capitalism, where, you know, the industries are maintained by families for generations. And so, you know, Menucha used this approach to stabilize as well private capital to avoid nexus of competition that might ruin into disorder. So, you know, these elements lasted from the Menucha era up to the present days. Basically today we are in last years in the midst of a very harsh competition in the Italian banking sector with state interventionists. So we are, as we used to be, of course in a different form, but 100 years ago, it's a moment of chaos in which there's interaction between the state and the different bankers, you know, to stabilize financial capitalism. Major bank in the last 20 years lost progressively his role of, you know, the good club of the Italian capitalism. But this role lasted for nearly eight years, basically so quite a long time. And he was inspired by Benedicta. So his legacy was very strong in the state owned companies, but as well very strong in the private Sector as well.

Podcast Host (44:08)

Bara Matei, in her book the Capital Order from three years ago, she argues that the economic legacy of fascism was free market liberalism combined with authority authoritarianism. Now you take issue with this in your book. You argue that particularly with the Benedictary reforms, it was authoritarian, but was offering a reformist alternative to liberal capitalism.

Lorenzo Castellani (44:29)

Yes, this is true. Well, for the reason I explained before, for the historical legacy that was having on Italy. Italy was not a place of free market capitalism, say full fledged free market capitalism. Since the beginning of the 20th century, the level of public intervention was. Was very strong. And the story of Bernard told us that fascism was not marrying completely the free market approach. At the very beginning, Mussolini decided to compromise with some member of the liberal establishment with a free market that approached as Alberto De Stefani. But this lasted for a couple of years. Then by 1925 it became very evident that the socialist approach, the Beneduce socialist reformist approach, and as well the socialist mentality of Mussolini prevailed. So the regime failed or Mussolini's will basically to pursue entirely the corporativism or the corporatist approach. But this does not imply that there was a winning of, you know, the free marketer advocates quite the contrary. The idea of BENE was to have, you know, a very solid public intervention, a virgin approach, while maintaining private capitalism. So what I think is that there was a compromise, but not, you know, the great success of the free market approach. It depends of course, from which standpoint you are, you are observing. But yes, it's true, the, you know, all the industrial families and the private sector maintained their own holdings, but at the same time they were not particularly happy of some choices made by the regime or also the ones made by Benedusa. Beneducho was considered a reasonable man. He was credentialed. So it was appreciated by part of the establishment. But of course this establish would have preferred to not have Credio Porimi or IRI if they could have chosen. So my point is Mussolini was not a free marketer at all. And he was not considering free market as something useful. Because as you know, with this authoritarian mentality, a certain level of public intervention was necessary to lead the economy, basically to manage the economy. Okay, so what Mussolini was looking at was a capitalist economy, of course, private, but as well managed by a way or another by the state. So, you know, I think it's too much to say that there was an alliance between the authoritarian regime and the. And the free marketer view. There was an alliance between an effect or a compromise. If you prefer between the fascism that get rid of the revolutionary part of his political offer and partially of the corporativism that ended up into a useless bureaucracy, basically. But at the same time, the regime pursued a series of policies, the nutrients ones, but as well in the welfare sectors that, you know, expanded very much the role of the state. You know, if we look at Italy in the 1930s, was the place in which the state played a major role, asides ussr. So I think, you know, this, this kind of thesis depicting the ASHES regime as a sort of free market authoritarian regime, as they are. They are too much, you know, it's an exaggeration, Sam.