Podcast Summary:

Podcast: New Books Network
Episode: Matthew A. Tattar, "Innovation and Adaptation in War" (MIT Press, 2025)
Host: Gregory McNiff
Guest: Dr. Matthew A. Tattar, Associate Professor, War Gaming Department, U.S. Naval War College
Date: December 15, 2025

Episode Overview

Main Theme:
Gregory McNiff interviews Dr. Matthew A. Tattar about his book Innovation and Adaptation in War (MIT Press, 2025), exploring why some militaries adapt to new challenges effectively during wartime, while others fail to keep pace. The discussion focuses on the importance of organizational learning, institutional friction, and the interactive nature of military innovation, traversing case studies from World War I to the modern era.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Who Is This Book For and Why Was It Written?

• Target Audience: Scholars, students of military history/strategy, and anyone fascinated by wartime organizational behavior.
• Purpose: To explore why innovation alone doesn't guarantee victory and why organizational adaptation is crucial in war.
• Motivation:
  • Tattar noticed "the most innovative militaries didn't seem to win very often," referencing the German Luftwaffe as the constant 'losing team' despite frequent innovation.

    "The Germans are examples of this in both World War I and World War II. They seem to find new ways of fighting, but... the wars did not obviously end up well for them." — Tattar (03:50)

  • The book aims to answer why innovation matters practically, not just theoretically. (04:45)

Defining Terms: Innovation & Adaptation

• Innovation:

  "A new mode of operation that yields some initial significant success on the battlefield...something the adapter has to react to in some way or they're just going to lose." — Tattar (05:25)

• Successful Adaptation:

  "When the adapter is able to significantly reduce the casualties that they're suffering from the innovation and blunt the operational effects of the innovation itself." — Tattar (05:52)

Why Focus on Wartime Innovation?

• Wartime as crucible: "It’s the most stressful time...the most rigorous test for whatever theory I was trying to test." — Tattar (06:41)

Why So Many Naval Case Studies?

• Background in naval history:
  • Naval innovation seen as underexplored in organizational terms, compared to land warfare.
  • Naval cases provided opportunities "to break new ground with naval case studies." — Tattar (08:50)

The Limits of Innovation: Necessary But Not Sufficient

• On resources vs. organization:

  "Resources are necessary, but not sufficient...If you have an opponent that has to adapt to your innovation, the better organized that opponent is, the less effective your innovation will be." — Tattar (09:50)

• Best adversary? One that is inflexible and unadaptable. But more subtly:

  "If you can come up with an innovation that crosses organizational boundaries in your adversary...no one knows what to do or it’s nobody’s responsibility...more likely than not, it will work out for you." — Tattar (11:53)

• Bureaucratic friction: Internal rivalries (subunits fighting over responsibilities) can paralyze adaptation efforts.

Major Case Studies & Lessons

1. British Admiralty and the U-Boat Threat (WWI)

Segment: [15:13–22:59]

• Initial Failure:
  • The British believed torpedo attacks would be easily countered; failed to appreciate their threat.
  • "The Royal Navy wanted to hunt for submarines...rather than letting them passively come to them," based on faulty cost calculations about convoys (18:40).
• Turning Point:
  • Creation of an Anti-Submarine Division (organizational innovation).
  • Shifted to convoys after realizing prior assumptions were wrong; convoys proved effective.
• Nature of Failure:
  • "It was more of an organizational failure...They knew how many vessels they were losing...but didn’t have the proper organization to interpret the results." — Tattar (22:33)

2. U.S. Navy vs. Japanese Naval Aviation (WWII)

Segment: [22:59–35:54]

• Dedicated Organizational Subunit (DOS):
  • U.S. Naval Aviation served as the adaptive 'subunit,' crucial when battleships were out after Pearl Harbor.
  • Unlike Japan, U.S. naval aviation was built for attritional warfare and adapted better over time.
• Adaptation to Kamikaze Threat:
  • Combined improved anti-aircraft techniques, technology, and overwhelming resources.
  • "They did it more cheaply than they would have if they didn't have any of those [adaptations]." — Tattar (30:54)
• U.S. Pilot Rotation:
  • "A large number of good pilots will beat...a small number of excellent pilots." — Tattar (34:28)
• Organizational Culture:
  • U.S. naval aviation was a viable career path, with officers as pilots and upward mobility, unlike Japan (35:29).

3. U.S. Air Force vs. North Vietnamese Air Defenses (Vietnam)

Segment: [36:57–45:20]

• Rolling Thunder's Flawed Premise:
  • "Rolling Thunder was not going to do its job no matter how much effort we put into it." — Tattar (38:09)
• Organizational Challenge:
  • The Air Force’s leadership was dominated by "bomber generals" focused on nuclear war, ill-prepared for conventional conflicts.
  • SAC (Strategic Air Command) had resources; TAC (Tactical Air Command) had to improvise on the ground, starved of equipment.
• Adaptive Response:
  • Formation of 'Dempster Commission' — temporary, cross-functional group that led to innovations like 'Wild Weasel' aircraft and adoption of Navy technologies.
  • Example of successful ad hoc organizational flexibility in response to acute need.

4. Royal Navy and the Falklands War

Segment: [45:20–51:05]

• Mission Misalignment:
  • Royal Navy focused on anti-submarine missions in the North Atlantic, neglecting expeditionary/naval aviation capabilities needed for the Falklands.
• Luck and Improvisation:
  • "The Argentines chose the time when the British were getting rid of this capability but hadn't gotten rid of it all the way..."
• Layered Defense:
  • Used ship numbers and arrangement to protect valuable carriers, making do with resources at hand.
  • Absorbed missile hits to shield carriers; ultimately, "the British used their resources to the best effects." — Tattar (50:11)

5. Japanese Failure to Counter U.S. Submarine Campaign (WWII)

Segment: [51:05–56:24]

• Failure as Instructor:
  • "Japan’s fate was ultimately sealed regardless...but it’s interesting to see how many mistakes they made."
• Key Problems:
  • Dismissal of merchant protection and lack of focused command structure.
  • Allocated resources to battleships over destroyer escorts.
  • Believed (wrongly) they were effective—“simultaneously ineffective and believed they were effective, which is probably the worst combination you can imagine.” — Tattar (56:02)

Memorable Quotes & Notable Moments

• "Resources are necessary, but not sufficient. If you have an opponent...better organized...the less effective your innovation will be." — Tattar (09:50)
• "We want to face an inflexible, not adaptable adversary." —Tattar (11:36)
• "A unified effort is superior to having multiple different directions of adaptation." — Tattar (12:57)
• “When innovations appear on the battlefield, they're kind of, I don't want to say half-baked, but they haven't reached their full potential in a lot of ways.” — Tattar (57:36)

Important Timestamps

• 01:36–03:10 – Introduction & book motivation
• 05:14–06:35 – Defining innovation and adaptation
• 09:08–13:00 – Resources, organization, and the limits of innovation
• 15:13–22:59 – Royal Navy vs. U-boats (organizational adaptation)
• 23:40–35:54 – U.S. Navy adaptation: carrier aviation & kamikazes
• 36:57–45:20 – U.S. Air Force, Vietnam War, and ad hoc adaptation
• 45:20–51:05 – Falklands: organizational focus, adaptation, and 'luck'
• 51:05–56:24 – Japanese failure vs. U.S. submarine war
• 56:58–57:58 – Organizational flexibility vs. first-mover advantage
• 57:58–End – Closing reflections

Conclusion: Organizational Flexibility or First Mover Advantage?

“I would choose organizational flexibility...innovations appear on the battlefield...haven't reached their full potential in a lot of ways...use in battle gives everybody an example of what's possible and how to counter and tilt it towards your own advantage.” — Tattar (56:58)

Summary Takeaway:
Innovation is valuable, but adaptability—rooted in organizational flexibility, clear subunit responsibilities, and the capacity to learn rapidly—ultimately determines military success in the crucible of modern war.