Podcast Summary

"Stalin's Gamble: The Search for Allies Against Hitler, 1930-1936"

New Books Network | Interview with Michael Jabara Carley

Date: September 26, 2025
Host: Ari Barbalat
Guest: Prof. Michael Jabara Carley

Overview

This episode of the New Books Network’s History channel features a detailed discussion with Professor Michael Jabara Carley regarding his trilogy on Soviet foreign policy under Joseph Stalin, focused on the critical prewar years from 1930 to 1941. The first volume, "Stalin's Gamble: The Search for Allies Against Hitler, 1930-1936" (University of Toronto Press, 2023), explores the Soviet Union's efforts to stave off Nazi aggression by seeking alliances with Western powers and reveals new insights from Soviet archival research. The conversation delves into the reasonable strategic behaviors of Soviet diplomats, the West’s ambivalence and strategic miscalculations, the collective security failure, and how the landscape set the stage for World War II.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

Carley's Background and Motivations

• Formative Influences: Born in Brooklyn (1945), grew up in New Orleans, influenced by inspirational teachers who encouraged unorthodox thinking.
• Academic Journey: Studied at George Washington University amid the civil rights and antiwar movements, then moved to Canada for graduate studies, eventually specializing in Russian and Soviet history.
• Archival Fascination: Strong emphasis on the revelatory power of newly accessible Soviet archives in the 1990s, likened to “pulling up the shades” and flooding the room with light (09:19).
  • Quote: “When you get into the Soviet archives, it’s like you’ve been living in a kind of closed room… you pull up the shades…and the light surges in.” (09:24)
• Purpose of the Trilogy: To correct conventional Western narratives about the origins of WWII and provide a more nuanced understanding based on Soviet and international archival evidence.
  • Quote: “Everything you think you knew about the origin of the Second World War… requires correction. Simple as that.” (12:19)

Main Themes and Arguments

Soviet Foreign Policy: A Rationale Approach (12:53-15:15)

• Stalin’s diplomats generally acted “reasonably, sensibly” in pursuit of security; early recognition of the Nazi threat to Europe.
• Soviet Union adopted proactive policies seeking alliances—particularly collective security pacts with France, Poland, and later Britain—to counter Nazi Germany.

The Central Role of Mein Kampf and the Nazi Threat (15:15-19:56)

• Soviet diplomats, especially Maxim Litvinov, were among the first to take Hitler’s Mein Kampf seriously as a blueprint for German aggression.
  • Most Western diplomats dismissed the book, often downplaying its significance when Soviet diplomats brought it up.
  • Quote: “Not too many people paid much attention to Mein Kampf, but Soviet diplomats did.” (15:43)
• Early alarms about Nazi intentions were sounded by the Soviets as Nazi political power grew after 1930.

The Political Context of the 1930s (20:03-22:41)

• The Great Depression (1929 onward) destabilized European politics and economies, paving the way for Hitler’s rise.
• The question for European elites: Was Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union the bigger threat?
  • Majority of Western elites saw communism, not fascism, as the primary danger, a perspective that critically shaped diplomatic responses (33:48-39:07).

Soviet Overtures and Western Rejection (22:41-42:17)

• Soviet Union tried to form alliances—first with France and its ally Poland, then with Czechoslovakia, Romania, Italy, Britain, and even the US.
  • France and Romania responded positively at first, but Poland outright rejected Soviet overtures, eventually siding with Nazi Germany in a non-aggression pact.
  • The Soviets even tried to engage Mussolini’s Italy in collective security; Italian aggression in Ethiopia (Abyssinia) in 1935 was seen as catastrophic for these prospects (42:17-45:00).
  • Quote: “All the potential allies of the Soviet Union against the rising menace of Nazi Germany fell away, one after the other.” (39:07)

Reception of Mein Kampf (39:07-40:48)

• Western diplomats and governments primarily dismissed Mein Kampf as outdated or not reflective of Hitler’s current intentions.
• Soviet diplomats remained alarmed, interpreting it as a real and present guide to German policy and expansionism.

Key Diplomatic Figures

• Maxim Litvinov: Soviet Foreign Commissar, instrumental and pragmatic, deeply invested in fostering collective security.
  • Quote: “When he became a diplomat, he stopped being a revolutionary...he was a Soviet patriot, but he saw that the best way to protect Soviet security was in good relations with Western powers.” (54:38-61:18)
• Mikhail Ostrovsky: Model diplomat, Francophile, crucial in improving Soviet-Romanian relations (49:53-51:55).
• Nicolae Titulescu: Romanian Foreign Minister advocating (often alone) for improved Soviet relations, undermined by internal right-wing and Polish sabotage (61:29-64:06).

Obstacles and Failures

• Poland as Spoiler: Consistently undermined Soviet attempts at collective security, sabotaged Soviet-Romanian relations, and sided with Germany diplomatically (52:02-54:33).
• Rhineland Crisis (1936): Hitler’s remilitarization weakened French security guarantees for Eastern European allies, leaving many states vulnerable, eroding faith in Western resistance to Nazi Germany (45:07-48:40).
• Italian Aggression in Abyssinia: Marked Italy’s drift toward Nazi Germany, making collective security against Hitler impossible (42:17-45:00).

Key Misjudgments (48:40-49:53)

• Chief Soviet miscalculation: Belief that Western powers would unite in a meaningful anti-Nazi coalition. Their persistence in this hope, despite mounting evidence to the contrary, prolonged a failed policy.

The Road to the Nazi-Soviet Pact (70:17-82:47)

• Final Soviet push for a military alliance with Britain and France in 1939 met with insincerity and stalling.
  • Quote: On Western negotiating posture: “Go very slowly.” (70:25-82:47)
• Frustration with Western inaction led Stalin to reluctantly sign the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact (Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact) as a "marriage of convenience".
  • Western condemnation of this pact ignores the evidence—Carley insists that the Soviet Union did not share responsibility for the war’s outbreak in the manner often claimed.
  • The secret protocol dividing Eastern European spheres of influence is described, with emphasis on Soviet realpolitik and defensive motivations.

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On archival discovery:
  “When you get into the Soviet archives, it’s like you’ve been living in a kind of closed room… you pull up the shades…and the light surges in.”
  (Carley, 09:24)
• On Western misperceptions:
  “Everything you think you knew about the origin of the Second World War...requires correction. Simple as that.”
  (Carley, 12:19)
• On Western diplomats' view of Mein Kampf:
  “When Soviet diplomats raised the question with German diplomats, the German diplomats dismissed it as, ‘Oh, you know, it was Hitler writing in the 1920s. What he thought then, he doesn’t think now.’”
  (Carley, 39:13)
• On collective security failure:
  “All the potential allies of the Soviet Union against the rising menace of Nazi Germany fell away, one after the other.”
  (Carley, 39:07)
• On the Nazi-Soviet Pact:
  “It was a marriage of convenience by the two sides...each one of them is holding a pistol behind his back indicating the nature of their relationship.”
  (Carley, 70:25-82:47)

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [03:19] Carley’s biography and academic influences
• [09:19] Motivation for trilogy and the significance of archival research
• [12:19] Message to readers: correcting misconceptions about WWII’s origins
• [15:15] Mein Kampf and the early Soviet alarm about Hitler
• [20:03] Political and economic context of the 1930s
• [22:41] Soviet diplomatic overtures to France, Poland, US, Italy, Romania, Czechoslovakia
• [33:48] The Western elites’ reluctance to recognize the Nazi threat
• [39:13] How Mein Kampf was dismissed in the West
• [42:17] Soviet attempts to unite Italy in the anti-Nazi alliance, and the impact of the Abyssinia crisis
• [45:07] The Rhineland crisis’ effects on Eastern European security
• [48:53] Soviet policy failures and miscalculations
• [49:59] The roles of Ostrovsky and Titulescu
• [54:38] The importance of Maxim Litvinov
• [61:29] The complexities of Romanian policy and Titulescu’s efforts
• [64:15] Anschluss, Czechoslovak crisis, and the fate of Soviet collective security
• [70:25] The 1939 Nazi-Soviet pact negotiations: context and consequences

Conclusion

Throughout the episode, Prof. Carley persuasively argues that the Soviet Union took a pragmatic and prescient stance against Nazi Germany, hampered at every turn by a Western reluctance to see Nazi Germany as the primary threat. The trilogy, based on deep archival work, dismantles many entrenched narratives and urges a fresh, evidence-based reevaluation of interwar diplomacy and the causes of World War II.