Michal A. Piegzik, "Gamble in the Coral Sea: Japan's Offensive, the Carrier Battle, and the Road to Midway" (Naval Institute Press, 2025)

Summary

---

Podcast Summary:

New Books Network – Interview with Michal A. Piegzik, "Gamble in the Coral Sea: Japan's Offensive, the Carrier Battle, and the Road to Midway"
Host: Mark Klobus
Guest: Michal A. Piegzik
Release Date: December 7, 2025

---

Episode Overview

This episode of the New Books in Military History channel features an in-depth conversation with Michal A. Piegzik, author of Gamble in the Coral Sea: Japan's Offensive, the Carrier Battle, and the Road to Midway. The discussion explores Piegzik’s unique approach, focusing on the Japanese perspective of the pivotal 1942 Battle of the Coral Sea—contextualizing its importance, exploring operational failures and innovations, and considering its lasting impact on the Pacific War and naval warfare.

---

Introduction & Author Background

• Michal A. Piegzik introduces himself as a PhD in Japanese private law, lecturer, and prolific author, with a deep passion for Pacific War history (02:07).
  • Currently transitioning to a new academic post at Yokohama National University.
  • Written around 10 books on the Pacific War, both in Polish and English.
  • "I'm more a passionate researcher than a person doing it professionally, although I must admit that I put always my heart into it." (02:40)

---

Why Write about the Battle of the Coral Sea?

• The battle is underrated and often overshadowed by Midway and Leyte Gulf (03:25).
• Piegzik seeks to correct Western misunderstandings and bring forward Japanese perspectives, citing rare materials and unpublished documents:
  • "I wanted to describe it basically from the Japanese perspective because this is something which is still not very known in the Western world." (04:24)
  • "I've collected so many Japanese materials during my PhD period in Japan… wanted to contribute to the world's scholarship in this topic." (04:47)

---

Approach and Sources

• Piegzik emphasizes humanizing Japanese participants:
  • "In my book, you can also find some evidence that they sometimes objected. They openly criticized the orders they discussed. They showed their emotions, feelings." (06:56)
• Extensive use of Japanese language sources, previously underutilized in Western accounts.
  • Praises earlier Japanese researchers, especially Shiromori.

---

Setting the Stage: Spring 1942 in the Pacific

• April 1942: Japanese begin to sense vulnerabilities in their war strategy—failure to eliminate the British Eastern Fleet; realization that resources are overstretched (08:53).
• The South Pacific campaign is designed to:
  • Expand the Japanese defensive perimeter.
  • Capture Port Moresby and sever Australia/New Zealand from U.S. logistics (11:03).
• Japanese strategic optimism was based on four months of unbroken victories.
  • "They started to believe that the Allies are so weak that they can be defeated only by using the part of their forces. But eventually they learned that it's not possible. They gambled a lot and they lost a lot." (13:37)

---

Operation Mo: The Plan to Take Port Moresby

• Operation Mo: Plan to capture Port Moresby by amphibious assault, with support from carriers.
  • Commanded by Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, who possessed limited resources and struggled with challenging geography (18:11).
  • Carrier support (Shokaku and Zuikaku) provided grudgingly—Yamamoto held the better carriers (Hiryu, Soryu) back for Midway (19:55).
• Critical Flaw:
  • "If something went bad in the first or the second step, the entire plan was basically ruined. And this is what happened to the Japanese." (21:29)

---

Allied Intelligence & Response

• U.S. cryptanalysis only partially deciphers Japanese plans, but enough to anticipate a major thrust into the Coral Sea (22:12).
  • "Famous historians say it's up to 20, 25% of the messages were regularly read." (22:46)
• U.S. Navy commits all available Pacific carriers (Yorktown and Lexington), treating the threat with utmost seriousness, with Enterprise and Hornet to follow (24:51).
  • "Nimitz has sent basically the core of what's available. Straight away with the idea that the Enterprise and Hornet are going to follow." (25:06)

---

Japanese Miscalculation

• Japanese believed they faced only a single U.S. carrier—grossly underestimated enemy resistance (27:07).
  • "They felt that the Americans will have only one available aircraft carrier to defend Port Moresby. And this is why Shokaku and Zuikaku should be enough…" (27:50)

---

The Battle Unfolds

The Nature of Carrier Battles

• Coral Sea is the first naval battle where opposing ships never see each other—fought entirely by aircraft (28:05).

May 7, 1942 (Day 1)

• Japanese lose initiative after Yorktown’s raid on Tulagi (May 4).
• Both sides commit major errors:
  • Japanese misidentify the U.S. oiler Neosho as a carrier, wasting a full strike (34:20).
• Quote:
  "They failed, ultimately failed ... they pushed the entire striking group against the secondary target... But still, once the striking group arrived over the target, they realized, okay, there is, guys, there is nothing to do here..." (34:50)
• Shoho, a Japanese light carrier, is sunk by U.S. air attack—the first carrier loss of the war (35:54).

May 8, 1942 (Climactic Day)

• Both strike groups spot each other and launch simultaneous attacks; planes from each side literally pass each other en route.
  • "The airstrikes literally pass by each other. They can see. They could see each other exactly going out and striking each other." (39:21)
• Japanese determination and tactical skill result in the sinking of Lexington and damaging of Yorktown, while Americans only seriously damage Shokaku (40:34).

---

Lessons and Impact

Training & Attrition

• Japanese aircrews on Shokaku/Zuikaku lacked the experience of their peers on other carriers (32:25).
• Heavy aircrew losses were the real Japanese disaster—losses cannot be quickly replaced, a blow felt keenly at Midway and later in the war (43:23).
  • "They lost literally 40, 50% of their crews with some notable examples... after the Battle of the Coral Sea ... the real reason for the Japanese loss laid in the loss of the [aircrews], which was significant..." (43:45)
• Many surviving Japanese aircrew suffered PTSD, reducing combat effectiveness (45:51).

Strategic Implications

• The battle foreshadowed trends for the rest of the Pacific War:
  • Japanese operational rigidity and inability to learn from experience due to constant operations.
  • U.S. ability to quickly repair ships and rotate experienced crews contrasted with Japanese resource constraints (47:35).
• Memorable Insight:
  "This battle was very rich in lessons for Japanese. But... it was really extremely difficult for the Japanese to put those lessons in practice, especially considering the very tight timetable and ... deficiencies in numbers started to play a significant role." (45:51)

---

Memorable Quotes & Moments

• On Humanizing the Japanese Side:
  "For the first time in history, I showed what they really felt and how they really behaved..." (07:30)

• On Japanese overconfidence:
  "After four months of successful campaigns... they started to believe that the Allies are so weak that they can be defeated only by using the part of their forces. But eventually they learned that it's not possible." (13:37)

• On learning and operational strain:
  "It's like there's no time to learn the lessons of Coral Sea because they have to send the carriers off to Midway. And as you're pointing out, they're having these lectures as the carriers are sailing east..." (39:21)

---

What’s Next for Michal A. Piegzik

• Writing a book on the Dutch East Indies campaign (to appear in late 2026 or early 2027), again focusing on Japanese and Dutch perspectives (49:34).
• Already working on a study of the Philippine campaign (planned for late 2027).
• Actively updates his research, planning for both English and Polish editions, sharing new findings as he revises (52:36).
  • "My books is alive. So it has a continuation." (52:23)

---

Recommended Listening Segments

• Author's Background and Motivation: 02:07 – 04:47
• Japanese Perspective & Humanization Effort: 05:56 – 08:25
• Operational Context and Japanese Strategy: 08:53 – 13:37
• Intelligence & American Response: 22:12 – 25:06
• Battle Narrative and First Carrier Actions: 28:05 – 36:47
• Lessons, Attrition, and Aftermath: 39:21 – 47:35
• Future Projects and Research Philosophy: 49:29 – 53:04

---

Tone & Language

The podcast maintains a conversational yet scholarly tone. Klobus and Piegzik blend narrative storytelling with detailed operational analysis and historiographical context. Piegzik remains modest but passionate, often reflecting on the ongoing nature of historical research and emphasizing the importance of underrepresented perspectives.

---

Summary Conclusion

This episode provides a compelling, nuanced exploration of the Battle of the Coral Sea, with a rare focus on Japanese viewpoints and operational challenges. Through firsthand research and deep engagement with Japanese sources, Piegzik displays how this "underrated" battle set the stage for later Pacific War confrontations—and how its lessons, learned and unlearned, shaped the course of history.

Transcript

[Michael Pisgik]

Introducing Metaray Band Display the world's most advanced AI glasses with a full color display built into the lens of the glasses. It's there when you need it and gone when you don't.

[Mark Klobus]

Send and receive messages, translate or caption.

[Michael Pisgik]

Live conversations, collaborate with Meta AI and more. Be one of the first to try Meta Ray ban display. Visit meta.com metaraybanddisplay to book a demo.

[Mark Klobus]

And find your pair.

Limu Emu and Doug.

[Michael Pisgik]

Here we have the Limu Emu in.

[Commercial Narrator]

Its natural habitat, helping people customize their.

[Michael Pisgik]

Car insurance and save hundreds with Liberty Mutual.

[Mark Klobus]

Fascinating. It's accompanied by his natural ally, Doug.

[Michael Pisgik]

Uh, Limu is that guy with the binoculars watching us.

[Commercial Narrator]

Cut the camera.

[Mark Klobus]

They see us. Only pay for what you [e-mail] Liberty.

[Michael Pisgik]

Liberty Liberty Liberty Savings Ferry Unwritten by.

[Mark Klobus]

Liberty Mutual Insurance Company and affiliates excludes.

[Michael Pisgik]

Massachusetts.

The world moves fast. Your workday even faster. Pitching products, drafting reports, analyzing data. Microsoft 365 Copilot is your AI assistant for work built into Word, Excel, PowerPoint and other Microsoft 365 apps you use, helping you quickly write, analyze, create and summarize so you can cut through clutter and clear a path to your best work. Learn [e-mail] M365 copilot Welcome to the New Books Network.

[Mark Klobus]

Hello everyone and welcome to New Books in Military History, a podcast channel on the New Books Network. I'm Mark Klobus and today I'm talking with Michael Pisgik, author of the book Gamble in the Coral, Japan's Offensive, the Carrier Battle, and the Road to Midway. Michael, welcome to the New Books Network. And I apologize, I realize I did botch your last name there just a little bit.

[Michael Pisgik]

No worries, Mark. Thank you for the invitation. I'm really excited to talk about my.

[Mark Klobus]

New book and we're real excited to have you on our podcast. I was wondering if you could start us off by telling our listeners something about yourself.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah, so Basically I'm a PhD in Japanese private law. I'm also a lecturer in family law and Succession Law at Edinburgh AP University. But this is something which is now currently pending changes because I submitted my notice and I'm moving back to Japan on the 1st of March. I will start a new position at Yokohama National University. So I'm kind of coming back to my scientific, my scholarly saddle, which is Japan. Also, I am an author of about 10 books in Polish and English about the Pacific War. This is my side job, if I can say so. So I'm more a passionate researcher than a person doing it professionally, although I must admit that I put always my heart into it. So I treat it also as a serious research work.

[Mark Klobus]

That interest, and I would even go so far as to say that passion that you have for the subject is really evident in this book. What led you to write a book about the Battle of the Coral Sea, especially given that it is while maybe doesn't get the same attention as say, the Battle of Midway or the battle of Leyte Gulf, it is a book that. That is a battle that has been written about before.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes. So there are two major reasons why I wrote this book. The first one is I have a feeling this is something very subjective, that this battle has been a little bit underestimated by both sides, so by the Japanese and also by the Americans. And I'm not only talking about the scholarship point of view, and this is something that the both sides were unaware of, that this battle will have significant ramifications for the future. And the second reason is because the battle itself is very, very passionate, very, very important, very, very dramatic. And it had, at least in my opinion, 3, 4 major turnover moments when it could end up in a decisive Japanese victory or the American victory, but it ended how it ended. So I wanted to describe it basically from the Japanese perspective because this is something which is still not very known in the Western world. And I wanted to give a try. I wanted to test my scholarship, to test my research abilities. I've collected so many Japanese materials during my PhD period in Japan. And this was a good opportunity for me also to maybe, you know, contribute to the world's scholarship in this topic. And in general, of course, I felt.

[Mark Klobus]

Like as I'm reading it, that what I was reading, in a sense was a discovery of a trove of information that, while it's not unknown, has just really been underutilized in so many of the American Council of the Battle. I'm thinking about all the various books that have been written about the Pacific War that really treat it, even though they describe what the Japanese are doing and maybe summarize the perspective and motivation to a degree, don't really go to the depth that you do of recounting what the commanders are saying, their decision making process in terms of a lot of the key points, and how that is really what makes your book such a unique or new contribution to our understanding of what was really in a historic battle, not just in the Pacific War, but in naval history.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes. So my primary intention was not only to present the Japanese perspective by quoting the orders or the intentions on the strategic perspective, but also to kind of humanized Japanese officers, pilots and the crew members. There is an abundance of Japanese language materials on the Battle of the Coral Sea. Some of them were collected by the Japanese researchers in the 70s, 80s, even 60s. I really appreciate the hard work of Shiromori, whose work, in my opinion, is the best Japanese language monograph on the Battle of the Coral Sea. So I use it really extensively. But even though I use it extensively, I also collected, gathered a significant portion of the primary documents from the archives. So I know everything what happened within the 5th Kokusentai, which can be translated in English as the First Carrier Squadron. I'm talking about the two very famous Japanese carrier. Yes, Shokaku and Zuikaku. I have a lot of materials about what happened in the fourth Fleet, which was commanded at the time by Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue. So this is something I really wanted to pass on. I wanted to show the real perspective. So what they felt, what they said, how they commented. And it might be also surprising to some readers that Japanese are usually commented. It is. It is very, very often said that the Japanese were so obeying the orders. They were like almost like a robots doing everything automatically because of the traditional Japanese hierarchy, sense of military responsibility. But in my book, you can also find some evidence that they sometimes objected. They openly criticized the orders they discussed. They showed their emotions, feelings. And I think this is something I'm really proud of in my book that I, to a certain extent, I managed to humanize them. And for the first time in history, I showed what they really felt and how they really behaved, based not only on the military assumptions and military assessment, but what they also believed in and how they wanted to. How they wanted to react to the changing situation on the battlefield.

[Mark Klobus]

Now, you begin the book by describing the context of the war in the Pacific in the spring of 1942. I was wondering if you could start us off by talking about what's happening in the Pacific in April of 1942 and how the battle that's to come fits within the context of what the Japanese are trying to do at that point in the war.

[Michael Pisgik]

This is a very interesting moment in the Pacific War because April is the first indicator of that something is going wrong in the Japanese war machine. Why? First things first. So the Japanese send their Kido Butai to the Indian Ocean with a huge plan to destroy the Eastern Fleet. So basically to rule out the United Kingdom, the Britain, from the war with Japan. They believed they would be able to smash Somersville, Admiral Somersville task force. They never managed to do it. They never neutralized the British bases in Ceylon. So they were victorious, but they were coming back to Japan in the sense that maybe it didn't work so well. On the other hand.

The command of the Imperial Japanese Fleet, I'm talking about the Combined Fleet, investigated the possibilities, how to question quickly finished the war with the United states, especially the U.S. navy and the major. The major. I think that the major conclusion was that they needed a decisive battle. The best one would be the carrier battle in the Central Pacific. Admiral Yamamoto was famous for his gambling attitude, and he wanted to put everything.

He wanted to risk everything to secure the greatest achievements. And this is also the moment when the Japanese realized that they don't have enough resources to pursue all the goals on all fronts. So they want to go west, they want to go south, they wanted to go east. And this was the moment when actually they wanted to expand their defensive perimeter down south to the South Pacific. They wanted to conquer the west eastern part of New guinea with two important major bases. So the first ones were of course, Lae and Salamarua, and the second one was Port Moresby, which is today's of Papua New Guinea. So basically they wanted to extend their spheres of their sphere of influence everywhere with limited resources. And the major plan for the Japanese in the South Pacific was basically to cut off Australia and New Zealand from the American support. And they intended to do it by establishing a seaplane base in Tulagi, which is the central part of the Solomon Islands, and also by conquering the crucial vital port and airfield in Port Moresby, to deny the Allied bombers access to Raba rule and all the Japanese bases in the area. So they felt if we secure those, this, this part of. Of South Pacific, we will be safe for the next months and we can focus on the Central Pacific. And if we conquer the mid. If we conquer Midway, if we secure the island, it will be significantly easier for us, for us to actually deny the US Navy domination in the Pacific. And if we deny it and the Americans push towards us, we will have the decisive battle, which is like the standard Japanese doctrine, which is Kantai Kessen, so the decisive battle. And they, of course, intended to win this decisive battle. And by winning this decisive battle, they wanted to bring the US Navy to its knees. And probably the Japanese believed, which was a wrong belief, a false belief, that the Americans will sue for peace. And by peace they meant acknowledging, recognizing the Japanese conquests from 1941 and early 1940. This plan looked really compelling on paper. But in reality it was far fetched and in my opinion it was super optimistic. But the Japanese needed to put their beliefs somewhere and still they felt that their proficiency in waging the war at sea, that they have a moral higher grounds that Americans will be enough to defeat Americans in major battles because they felt basically that they were better than their opponents.

[Mark Klobus]

And they had the previous months of unceasing victories to demonstrate that starting with Pearl harbor, the Battle of the Java Sea, the operation to the east into the Indian Ocean were success upon success upon success. And we're certainly feeding that sense that we, we can do this, we have quality and we can beat any degree of quantity.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah, yeah. And this is something which I also, I don't want to add any spoilers, but this is also something which I added in my newest book which I'm now currently preparing, which is about the Duchess Indy's campaign and it links with the current publication about the Battle of the Coral Sea. So the Japanese actually, after four months of successful campaigns in the Pacific, Southeast Asia and also Central Pacific, they started to believe that the Allies are so weak that they can be defeated only by using the part of their forces. But eventually they learned that it's not possible. They gambled a lot and they lost a lot. So this is something which could be avoided if the combined fleet planned in advance and thought about allies in more, more realistic ways. Because after genuinely speaking, honestly speaking from my perspective, after this successful, AKA non successful venture to the Indian Ocean, I think that the Japanese lost the sense of the good strategy. So they started to believe that everything could be achieved by only applying, by only using part of their forces. While they usually tried to concentrate as much ships, as many planes as, as many ships, as many planes as possible to achieve air domination, domination at sea. And this is also the reason why they were so successful in the first phase of the war.

[Commercial Narrator]

The holidays have a way of sneaking up on you. And I can tell you they snuck up on me. This year I have people coming and I need to buy those people gifts for them. As I say, I just didn't have everything I need. So what I did is I went to Wayfair. From bedding to linens to decor, for every room in the house, Wayfair is your one stop shop. Last minute guest prep. Wayfair has you covered. You can refresh bedding and throw pillows and accent chairs for way less. That's what I did. Pretty much all the bedding in my house is threadbare. So I decided to replace it. I went to Wayfair and I ordered some new sheets and pillowcases and I got a comforter which was really cool. I ordered it, the price was great, the shipping was free. It arrived and now I am ready for the hoards to descend upon me. And it's not just bedding, of course. You can get linens and towels and things for the kids room, kitchen essentials, things for your living room. And of course they have holiday gifts. So get your last minute hosting essentials gifts for all your loved ones and decor to celebrate the holidays. For way less, head to Wayfair.com right now to shop all things home. That's W a Y F A I R.com Wayfair Every style, every home.

[Michael Pisgik]

Deck your home with blinds.com.

Diy or let us install.

Free design consultation.

Plus free samples and free shipping.

[Mark Klobus]

Head to blinds.com now for up to.

[Commercial Narrator]

50% off site wide plus a free professional measure.

Rules and restrictions may apply.

[Mark Klobus]

That brings us to the operation itself, Operation Mo. I was wondering if you could explain briefly.

How it was they were trying to plan for the conquest of Port Moresby and what it was they had committed to that effort.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes. So Operation Mo, which in Japanese is called Mo Sac sense or Operation Mo, was generally speaking a plan to conquer, to seize Port Moresby, very important naval and air base on the southeastern part of New Guinea. It was a very, very destructive point for the Japanese strategy in the South Pacific because the Allied use it as an airbase to bomb Japanese positions. And basically this is the New guinea is the place where the Japanese actually, for the first time, they experienced war of attrition with allies and they felt so annoyed with, with the existence of this airbase. So they wanted to conquer it for good and for bad. And looking specifically at the Ariya for the South Pacific, we have the fourth Fleet with its commander.

Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, and he was responsible for securing this base, for conquering it, and he had very limited resources. And the next enemy of Shigeyoshi, in a way, of course, was geography. If we take a look at the map of New guinea, we can see it's really hard to penetrate it south. So if you go from north to Port Moresby, you can encounter the Owen Stanley mountain range, which is really hard to cross. So it's very easy for the land forces to block it. The Japanese initially intended to utilize some infantry units, but they couldn't make it. So it was very, very logical for them to basically bypass the land masses and go by sea. And still we have so many Minor, tiny islands, islets around New Guinea. So the fourth Fleet had to establish a plan which was safe for the Japanese Navy to send its convoy with infantry and to secure Port Moresby from the sea. And in the meantime, they also established that it's necessary to open up to open a new reconnaissance seaplane base in Tulagi. They didn't know at the time that Tulagi will become famous in the following months due to Guadalcanal campaign. So this plan looked very compelling at paper, but in reality, it was very, very complicated because as I mentioned previously, Inoue didn't get enough resources. He asked for courier support.

From the Combined Fleet. Combined Fleet was very reluctant to give Inoue additional car years. Inoue felt it would be good to have Kaga and possibly Hiryu and Soryu, so possibly three carriers then opted for Hiryu and Soryu themselves. It was not possible because Yamamoto felt that Hiryu and Soryu are so important for the Battle of Midway. So he said, okay, I will give you two carriers, Shokaku and Zuikaku. They are not the best carriers in our fleet, but still there is a good, this is a good opportunity for the pilots and the crews to have some additional training before me Midway. So please use them smartly. Please use those carriers in a very, very safe manner. And you know, what can I say? He was a great military politician. He had brilliant ideas about waging war with the United States. He was a very educated, very, very smart man. He spoke several. He spoke fluently German, if I'm not mistaken. I don't want to make it up. So I think he's, I think he spoke German fluently and English. And this is something what I want to highlight. But he was not the best military leader in terms of the operations at the sea. So he, he devised the plan which looked very, very comprehensive, very, very compelling. But the major flaw of Operation of was that if something went bad in the first or the second step, the entire plan was basically ruined. And this is what happened to the Japanese.

[Mark Klobus]

And this gets to. And that's because one of the things they don't anticipate is that the Americans are going to deduce what is going to happen based upon their, the fact that they've, you know, they, they're reading some of the Japanese coded traffic. They're, they're, they're not exactly, you know, perceiving every detail of the plan, but they do have a sense as to what's coming. When did the Americans discover that the Japanese are preparing Operation Mo. And when do they. And how do they decide they're going to respond to this?

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah, so the Americans, from the very beginning, they put their efforts to read the Japanese messages, not only diplomatical ones, so the political decisions, but also military decisions made within the Imperial Headquarters, within the Imperial Navy and Army. And it's a little bit overestimated how Americans actually read the Japanese intentions. Yes, they were able to intercept some messages and read them, but not fully.

Famous historians, famous historians say it's up to 20, 25% of the messages were regularly read. And I think it's a good, a good number. But still the Americans discovered very pretty early, I mean, in time, at the very last moment, that the Japanese intended to secure some objectives in the South Pacific. And among them they identified Tulagi, Port Moresby. They weren't 100% certain if the Japanese actually intended to conquered those points, but there were some strong indications that they will send a significant part of their fleet to secure those positions in the South Pacific. And it is important to understand that in the intelligence actions during war, there are four critical components to understand what your enemy intends to do. So this is called 3W and 1H. So what, when and where? And the last age is how. And the Japanese, sorry, the Americans, they actually, they didn't know all the facts, all the circumstances about Operation mo, But what they learned from the deciphered and what they learned from the intercepted messages was enough to put up resistance and to send a very, very significant force, which was Task Force 17 and Task Force 11. So we are talking about two American aircraft carriers, Lexington and Yorktown. And they were enough to halt the Japanese expansion in this area.

[Mark Klobus]

I think this is something that tends to get a little overlooked. But you point this out in the book that committing Lexington, Yorktown, that's not half the carriers in the available carriers in the Pacific. That's all of them. Because the Enterprise and Hornet are still returning from the Doolittle mission.

They need to be redeployed. And so Nimbus has sent basically the core of what's available.

Straight away with the idea that the Enterprise and Hornet are going to follow.

Which speaks to just how serious the Americans are treating this.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, it was a serious response. And once the Americans learned that the Japanese will commit more, because actually they committed three Shokaku, Zuikaku and Shoho, one light carrier. But the Americans felt it will be. They believed it would be much more. So their response was immediate, very serious, and we could expect, and we actually witnessed that Enterprise and Hornet joining Lexington and Yorktown in the Coral Sea. And potentially this is something. I don't like it as a part of the scholarship, but I like it as an intellectual debate. What would happen if we had extended Battle of the Coral Sea as a replacement for Midway? Because it actually could happen. What. What could be. If the Japanese decided to send more carriers to the South Pacific and the Americans responded pretty fast. So we could have 4 versus 4, or even, I don't know, 2 versus 4 carriers in the Coral Sea, which would be entirely. This would be. This is entirely alternative history. But we can see from the American moves that they were very, very, very serious about the danger to Port Moresby.

[Mark Klobus]

In many ways, it gets to how you could have had that battle, because that's what Yamamoto was seeking at Midway. And in some respects, it may get to how he doesn't anticipate that the Americans are going to deploy all their available carriers to Coral Sea, which I think gets to just how much they underestimated the reaction that the resistance that Operation Mo would encounter.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes. So the Japanese intelligence was well beyond. Well.

I mean, the Japanese. What I want to say. Sorry, is like, I'm. I'm thinking what I want to say. So the Japanese intelligence was less effective than the American, but still the Japanese tried to predict what kind of moves the US Navy intends, intended to do in the following months. And what are the basic movements of the ships in the Pacific Ocean? I think that the major Japanese mistake laid in the belief that Saratoga was sunk in January 1942. So they believed Japanese. They believed that the US Navy has less couriers than in reality. So putting this into the realities of the South Pacific, they felt that the Americans will have only one available aircraft carrier to defend Port Moresby. And this is why Shokaku and Zuikaku should be enough for them to secure the goals of Operation mo.

[Mark Klobus]

I'd like to take us now to the battle itself. And it's a battle that, while it extends over the better part of a week, there are two major days where you see significant combat. And this is one of the things that makes the battle so unique. This is the. Famously, this is the first battle in naval history where neither the opposing fleet see each other. It's in a battle that is conducted entirely by air power, almost entirely by air power. And it plays out that way in stages. I was wondering if you could start by describing.

The fighting that takes place on the 7th of May between the American and Japanese fleets. Like, what is the Japanese fleet doing? And who meets who first. And what's the result of that?

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah, so before discussing 7 May, it is important also to mention the earlier developments because the Japanese basically already on the 7th of May, they felt a little bit desperate because they secured Tulagi. But the next day, on the 4th of May, they were raided by the Yorktown, basically, and the Yorktown did a significant damage to the Japanese. This is what the Japanese felt it was. They were quite helpless. On the 4th of May, during the 5th and the 6th, the Japanese really intended to find the task force 17. They sent several reconnaissance planes from the couriers, from the land bases, and also from the Cruisers. And on 6 May, the Japanese lost their only opportunity to attack the Americans first without being discovered. So this was something significant that the fifth Cocosintai lost as an operational surprise. And they did it because basically they had some problems with fuel. They didn't know what to do. They lacked significant. They lacked comprehensive information about the American positions. They were afraid about upcoming dark. So on. On the other hand, I would say it's. It's really easy to criticize Japanese and especially the fifth Coco Sentai for not committing to the battle on the 6th. But on the other side, it's also very, very important that they couldn't risk everything by not knowing the American position. So this on the outset. So when we think about 7th of May, it is the entirely different because now Japanese are really pushed to the wall to make it a decisive move and to sink the corps, to sink at least one American, at least they learned later on that the Americans had two carriers. But on the very morning of the seventh May, they believe they need to sink at least one carrier. And this is a moment actually when both sides made critical mistakes. So the Japanese send their reconnaissance planes of the famous Kanko, so the famous K torpedo bombers, so Nakajima B5M and one pair of the bombers.

And the crew of those bombers were not very seasoned airmen. They didn't have full training on air reconnaissance, so they were quite unseasoned.

[Mark Klobus]

Actually, I want to highlight that point, which is one of the things that you point out in your book that really deserves to be stated, which is that this is something that as someone who's not an expert in the field, but someone who's casually familiar with it, I was not aware of the disparity in experience between the crew, the Shokaku Zuikaku and the air crews of the other Japanese carriers, and how. How significant that was to how the battle plays out. I mean, this is not just the One time where this matters, this recurs previously because there's this impression in so much of the American literature that the Japanese are extraordinarily talented fliers, and they are, but also that they have this great experience and that they're basically every single one of them at this point in the war is a match with the craft. And you explain how that's not true and that is a factor in how the battle plays out.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah. And this is something that the reader must know, that the fifth Kokusentai. So the air crews of Shokaku and Zuikaku were considered inferior, much inferior to the first and the second Kokusentai, which were Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. And the reason for that is basically because they didn't have enough training. I mean, the training within the aircraft carrier landing operations operations, air operations in general. Also, they didn't have significant combat experience compared to the other crews from Akagi, Kaga, Hiryen, Soryu, because most of the air crews from these carriers participated to certain extent, some extent, in the operations over China. So what the fifth Kokus Sentai intended, they basically wanted to catch up. They wanted to catch up not only with the training, with the experience on the battlefield, with the real training, but also with the reputation. And the reputation within the Imperial Japanese Navy was a really significant thing because they wanted to fill equal parts of the Kido Butai, and they were never treated like this. So the Battle of the Koro Sea was the best opportunity for them to prove their value and to show that they are not inferior compared to the other career crews at Capella University. Learning online doesn't mean learning alone. You'll get support from people who care about your success, like your enrollment specialist who gets to know you and the goals you'd like to achieve. You'll also get a designated academic coach who's with you throughout your entire program. Plus, career coaches are available to help you navigate your professional goals. A different future is closer than you think with Capella University. Learn [e-mail].

[Mark Klobus]

And yet what they end up doing is they end up misidentifying the Oiler Neosho as a aircraft carrier. And through this misidentification, they commit this massive strike force to and sinking in Yosho. As you point out, it has an impact on the battle because those fleet oilers are important to America's the endurance of the task forces. But it's hardly worth the effort they put into it.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah, yeah. So they failed. They failed, ultimately failed. There is a story about Khan, Pineapple. You will find it in my book. I will not make any spoilers right now. And this is partially the reason why Japanese made it. Critical reconnaissance, mysterious take on the 7th of May morning. And what they basically did, they pushed the entire striking group against the secondary target. But still, once the striking group arrived over the target, they realized, okay, there is, guys, there is nothing to do here. We need to sink this group because it's really important for us to deny the enemy, to have an oiler Euler. So they sank the group very quickly. And this is where actually, because on the other hand, the staff of the 5th Kokusentai had a different report on a different group with one confirmed aircraft carrier in the west. So this is the moment, actually the afternoon of 7th May when the Japanese started the race against the time because they wanted to to land the striking group from the morning, rearm refuel the planes, and then send the second striking group to finally sink the American carrier. And in the meantime, they learned that the Americans sank their first career in the war, which was the light carrier Shoho. And it was very, very shocking experience for the Japanese on multiple sides. So not only for the 5th Kokusentai, but especially for the 4th Fleet Command in Rabaul, because they sent Shohol to support the convoy, they felt Shoho would be safe within the convoy. But in reality it was just a very vulnerable position and it was a really, really bad mistake. What Inoue did in early May 1942.

[Mark Klobus]

As you point out, though, the Americans also are making similar mistakes because their crews are still, while they're well trained, they're still learning the ins and outs. That's the fascinating thing about this battle is that because it's the first carrier battle, as you emphasize, both sides are learning how such a battle is fought.

It's an experience for both sides to define the type of battle that really is going to characterize the entire war in the Pacific.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, and my also I think that this significant contribution in my book is that I identified the lessons which were maybe not learned, but which Japanese understood because we have several reports, we have two lectures of two major officers of the 5th Cocusentai that participated in the battle with, who participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea. And they knew the stuff. They saw the mistakes. They knew what should be done in the future to improve the general tactics of the carrier warfare of the Imperial Japanese Navy. In the end, and this was something which I don't understand even today, after reading tons of the Japanese primary sources, those lessons, those Observations were totally ignored by the Combined Fleet.

Just before the Battle of the Midway, just before the Battle of Midway. And for me, I think that those. If Japanese learned those lessons earlier, I think they would be more successful not only during the Battle of Midway, but also the Guadalcanal campaign and the other, you know, the other battles in the future. And specifically, I want to expand on this opinion. I think that the Japanese basically failed the entire first half of 1940 to, in terms of the carrier warfare, because they could learn as early as February 1942, when they failed to sink the Lexington doing the famous action of Bougainville.

20Th, February 1942. And this is actually the moment when the Japanese should have realized that they need a radar mounted on one of their carriers. At least one. One radar set within a carrier squadron. And they didn't do it. They basically ignored it. The fact that the radar is essential to.

Basically to conduct a war at this stage of war.

[Mark Klobus]

Well, with all due respect, I have to disagree with you on that one point that you're making there, because I feel like you do at the end of your book, explain that the factor in why they're not learning is that they're just constantly in motion. It's like there's no time to learn the lessons of Coral Sea because they have to send the carriers off to Midway. And as you're pointing out, they're having these lectures as the carriers are sailing east and not taking a pause and reassessing and how in doing so, they're missing out on these, on what really becomes the pattern of the war. I like, for example, how you describe how on the 8th of May, which is the climactic day of the battle, how, you know, you're seeing for the first time the two fleets have identified each other. They send out their airstrikes. The airstrikes literally pass by each other. They can see. They could see each other exactly going out and striking each other. I was wondering if you could talk a bit about why the battle plays out the way it does. Why Is it on 8 May, the Japanese are able to claim a carrier while the Americans are not quite as successful?

[Michael Pisgik]

I think that the answer for this question is also embedded within the evening of the 7th of May, because, continuing our story, during the evening of the 7th May, the Japanese, they start to gamble. They start to gamble and they send the striking group against unknown target in unknown location. They were not very precise. They didn't know precisely the location of the American carriers. They had very limited time frame to Attack the Americans before coming back to the carriers during the dark, they selected the best flyers, the best pilots which who had experience.

With landing on the carrier dark courier deck. Sorry, in dark. And this venture against the American carriers on 7 May evening ends up in a great failure. The group, this striking group was destroyed in ambush by American fighters. It was a matter of a little bit of mystery how one of the Hiko Tai chose or one of the most important Japanese pilots I'm talking about the eldest lieutenant commander Shimazaki. Shigeru Shimazaki. He returned to Zuikaku, but he still made it. So on the 8th of May. This is not even a question of being effective or not. This is a question of honor. So the Japanese crews from Shokaku and Zuikaku, they now had a hint where the American carriers were located. And only they needed. What they needed to do was to scramble and head the opponent as hard as possible and sink both carriers. So they were very, very desperate. And this is partially the answer for your question why they sunk one aircraft carrier and why they damaged the second one, Yorktown, while the Americans only damaged the Shokaku. And the answer is because the Japanese were extremely, extremely determinated to deliver this battle for personal, strategic and other reasons.

[Mark Klobus]

I mean, there is the bit of luck involved in which that the Zuikaku is hidden by squalls and it's much harder to strike at. But you have this result which allows the Japanese to walk, to leave the battle with this claim that they have emerged from it the better. And yet, as you explain that is that they can definitely be read that way. But it is at the very best an optimistic spin on it. And the reality is that the Americans in many ways come out with a better victory.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, yes, I agree with that. Because the ultimate goal of the Japanese Navy, the 4th Fleet was to conquer Port Moresby. Without Port Moresby, the Japanese strategy for the South Pacific is just basically denied. So in my opinion, even if we look at the fact that Shokaku was seriously damaged, which is unfortunate for the Japanese, I think that the most negative factors of the most negative outcome of the Battle of the Coral Sea is the outcome is the result the losses among the aircrews and the planes themselves. Because if we take a look at the entire fifth corner focus entail, which maybe wasn't an elite carrier squadron, but still they had significant training, they were good pilots in general. They lost literally 40, 50% of their crews with some notable examples of Lieutenant Commander Takahashi, who was a really important person to the entire carrier squadron, also including other senior officers that constituted a core of this carrier squadron. So basically after the Battle of the Coral Sea, maybe Shokaku was just damaged, maybe it was needed to send her to the, to the, to the shipyard. But the, the real reason for the Japanese loss laid in the loss of the irkrs, which was significant, especially on the eve of the Battle of Midway and especially when the Japanese didn't have time to reconstruct both air groups. So group of Shokaku Air Group and Zuikaku Air Group, because they had no time, there was no time in their schedule and the timetable.

[Mark Klobus]

And that foreshadows what we're going to see over the rest of 1942, which is how these experienced, very talented air crew crews are basically being attrited to the point where they are not as effective as they were at the start and that their replacements, unlike those in the United States, don't have quite the same skills and are not really being given the same opportunities to reach that same level of ability in terms of conducting it. So in this sense, we're seeing another example of how the Battle of the Coral Sea really foreshadows so much of what is to come over the rest of the Pacific War.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, and also what I want to highlight in my book is that the Japanese, even those crews who survived the onslaught, they survived the Battle of the Coral Sea. Not all of them were fit for service. Some of them suffered from the serious ptsd, Some of them were relocated, transferred to the training units to reconstruct the air groups. So the Japanese couldn't actually benefit from, from their knowledge 100%. And they needed to learn like maybe a little bit blindly by following the guidance, following their opinions. But they couldn't directly benefit by taking the crews that participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea, put them on the carriers again and go again for the next battle. It was not possible. So this battle was very rich in lessons for Japanese. But as we already mentioned that it was really extremely difficult for the Japanese to put those lessons in practice, especially considering the very tight timetable and also the fact that the, the Japanese deficiencies, deficiencies in numbers starting to, started to play a significant role. They didn't have enough pilots. Even if they had enough pilots, the training process was very, very long, very, very time consuming. The aircrews were still not very, very well suited to, to go for the battles like the Japanese wanted to. What they presumed in their official doctrine, carrier, air, sorry, air carrier doctrine. And this is something which actually Japan was worse than The United States, from the very beginning of the Pacific War, it was not prepared for the total war war.

[Mark Klobus]

And I'm thinking about the comparison that exists between what happens with the Shokaku and what happens with the Yorktown after the battle, where you have the Shokaku is effectively out of combat for several months. And the Yorktown, which, you know, the Japanese assume they've sunk is very. Is turned around in time to where it's able to contribute to the Battle of Midway, not just in terms of being a third carrier, but having now an air crew that has the, you know, the significant benefit of the experience of having fought in a carrier battle.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yeah. And also merging the story with what happened during the Battle of the Coral Sea. Actually, the story with Yorktown is really important because this is an example how actually one entire squadron and I talk about the squadron of the dive bombers from the. From the Zuikaku, which was led by Lt. Tamotsu. Emma under delivered, actually did not deliver at all because they dropped 14 bombs on. Sorry, they had. Yeah, sorry, they had eight. 14 dive bombers. They attacked Yorktown during the critical moment of the battle. And this was actually very, very important to Japanese. Maybe they couldn't sink Yorktown, but they could damage her to the extent she would be ruled out from the further operations. But they only delivered one hit and one close miss. And this was not enough. Looking at the numbers, looking at the. The efficiency of the Japanese dive bombers at the time, they should have scored at least three or four hits. And given this number, it would be enough to rule out the Yorktown from the Battle of Midway.

[Mark Klobus]

Well, we appreciate the time you've taken to speak with us, but before we go, could you tell us what you're working on next?

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, sure. So, as I mentioned now.

I'm currently finishing writing up the book about the Dutch east indies campaign of 1941. 1942. And this is going to be again, a book from the Japanese, plus also Dutch perspective. I've collected a lot of Japanese and Dutch primary sources and I want to use it. I use them extensively for the first time in the Western historiography, although I'm quite aware of the existing Dutch books. So the Dutch perspective might not be as new as the Japanese. And this, because this book is almost ready, it will be released again with the US Naval Institute Press. Because I'm very satisfied with the collaboration with this publisher, I'm thinking about the next step and naturally, because I started drafting this book two years ago and I'm still figuring out how to make A significant contribution to the scholarship. And my newest book, which I will return to drafting, is about the Philippine campaign, Philippines campaign, 1950, 1941, 1942. So we can say the greatest American defeat in the first phase of the war. And also I have some interesting observations on the Japanese strategy and tactics. And I would like to prove in my book, so the book about the Philippines campaign, that maybe it wasn't a blunder, but it was a very significant.

Mistake and planning wise in the Japanese war machine. So those are the two major projects I want to deliver in the next three years. The book about the duchies in this campaign should be released next year, I think late 2026, early 2027, and the Philippines campaign. I want to finish it by the end of the next year. So this is my plan. And because I'm moving to Japan, I'm quite excited to see additional sources because my scholarship never ends except with. Yeah, I'm laughing about myself. So because my scholarship, my research never ends when I publish a book. I published Gamble in the Coral Sea with the US Naval Institute Press. I am now translating this book in my native Polish, so it will be released in Poland next May. And during the translation process I found two additional sources, Japanese sources. And of course I will use them in my Polish version. So I can see, I can tell you already that my books is alive. So it, it, it has a continuation.

[Mark Klobus]

So for listeners who are. Who can also read Polish, you may want to wait a few more months before you buy this book. But for the English language readers, this is the time to buy Gamble in the Coral Sea.

[Michael Pisgik]

Yes, this is the dynamics of my research. Why constantly try to improve? I constantly look for the sources and it's impossible for me to say stop because even if I deliver a book, I always try to find new memoirs. I know, like new interviews, new books. Books and the market and.

The landscape. The research landscape is very rich. So I don't know what I will find in the next years.

[Mark Klobus]

Okay, well, I do look forward to reading your next book and hopefully we can have you back on the New Books Network to discuss it.

[Michael Pisgik]

Thank you very much for the invitation. I really enjoy talking about it.

[Mark Klobus]

Oh, it was our pleasure, Michael. I hope you have a wonderful day.

[Michael Pisgik]

Thank you.

Sam.