Podcast Summary: New Books Network – Nina Wilén on "Securitizing the Sahel: Analyzing External Interventions and Their Consequences"

Host: Dr. Miranda Melcher
Guest: Dr. Nina Wilén
Date: November 25, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode features Dr. Nina Wilén discussing her new book, Securitizing the Sahel: Analyzing External Interventions and Their Consequences (Oxford UP, 2025). Dr. Wilén explores how diverse external missions—UN, EU, French, Russian, and bilateral interventions—have influenced the security landscape in the Sahel. The conversation unpacks the rationale behind interventions, their coordination and frictions, and their impacts on civil-military relations, coup cycles, and regional geopolitics.

Introduction to the Guest and Book

[02:54–06:20]

• Dr. Wilén is Africa Director at the Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations and Associate Professor at Lund University.
• The book is the culmination of seven years of research, combining academic analysis with policy engagement, fieldwork with military forces, and strategic advice for governments.
• She positions the Sahel as a complex, “ghost-like” region where roads and mobility are key, and seeks to answer overarching questions:
  • Why so many security interventions in the Sahel?
  • What are the mechanisms of intervention and cooperation on the ground?
  • What are the short- and long-term consequences?

"I wanted to get an answer to an overarching question that I had of so what, what does it mean that we have so many different security interventions in this region?"
— Nina Wilén [05:02]

Mapping the External Missions

[06:20–09:54]

• Multilateral Missions:
  • UN MINUSMA peacekeeping (2013–2023, focused on Mali)
  • Multiple EU missions: EUTM Mali (military), two civilian CSDP operations (UCAP Sahel Mali/Niger), and others.
• Bilateral Missions:
  • French counterterrorism (Operation Serval, then Barkhane 2014–2022)
  • Task Force Takuba (smaller, French-led, European troops)
  • Bilateral defense/training projects from Belgium, Germany, Canada, US, Italy, etc.
• Russian Involvement:
  • Wagner Group, then transformed into the "Afrika Korps" in Mali and Burkina Faso post-2021/22 coups.

"Since 2021 ... there have been Russian troops in Mali that have also provided security force assistance and combat assistance, firstly in the shape of the Wagner Group ..."
— Nina Wilén [09:34]

Research Approach and Unique Access

[10:09–13:17]

• Wilén leverages dual academic and policy roles, enabling access to fieldwork embedding with Belgian Special Forces, visits with French units, and top-level strategic meetings.
• Unique bottom-up perspective gained by living with troops, paired with top-down insight from policy advising and organizing/participating in high-level conferences.

"I've also had the possibility to join the Belgian Special Forces and be embedded with them in the field in Niger ... living with them for several weeks."
— Nina Wilén [10:46]

Origins of the ‘Crisis’ Narrative

[13:17–16:46]

• Traces securitization of the Sahel to post-9/11 shifts (early 2000s), as Western security shifted from interstate/nuclear threats to terrorism and "weak/failing states."
• France’s 2008 Sahel Strategy, mirroring the EU’s 2011 approach.
• Key events reinforcing crisis framing:
  • Cross-border jihadi attacks/kidnappings (2003+)
  • Libyan collapse (2011) and influx of arms/fighters into Mali (2012+)
  • Mali’s coups and rebel advances pushed the Sahel into international focus as a "crisis region."

"In the 2000s, weak states, ungoverned spaces, were framed as a threat not just to the states themselves, but to peace and stability more globally."
— Nina Wilén [15:06]

Logics and Motives of External Intervention

[18:00–22:08]

• France: Preserving regional influence, maintaining its "expert" status in multilateral fora, genuine terrorism concerns.
• EU: Testing projection as a "global security actor" and integrating diplomatic, political, development, and military tools in one region.
• UN: French pressure for MINUSMA as a future exit strategy; symbolic return of European troops to peacekeeping, often timed around countries’ UN Security Council candidacies.
• General: Interventions often motivated as much by external logics and institutional incentives as by realities on the ground.

"All of these external actors also had an interest in framing the Sahel as a security risk and ... intervening, not necessarily always related to reality on the ground, but to their logic of their own."
— Nina Wilén [21:40]

Overlap, Coordination, and Social Networks

[22:38–29:22]

• The Sahel often experienced what Signe Ramnikilde dubbed "a security traffic jam"—multiple missions, overlapping mandates, operating in the same country.
  • Example: In Mali, MINUSMA (13,000 troops), Barkhane (5,000), G5 Sahel (5,000), plus EU missions.
• Coordination often informal, based on personal relationships, language, and nationality, especially among French and Belgian officers.

"It was really personal relations, often between the different officers and soldiers, that made collaboration possible."
— Nina Wilén [24:35]

• Memorable quote:

  • "It's nowhere in the mandate how you do it ... how that was our problem. ... Sometimes it was purely thanks to the good relationship between officers."
    — EUTM Officer (quoted by Wilén) [25:24]

• Social networks facilitated resource sharing, e.g., accessing the better-equipped French Barkhane field hospital over the UN’s.

Frictions and Tensions

[29:29–32:46]

• Not all was harmonious—divisions along lines of intelligence, resources, and trust.
  • Barkhane withheld intelligence from some partners.
  • Within MINUSMA, splits between European ("skiing nations") and African contingents; Europeans reluctant to share intelligence even within the mission.

"There was some sort of tension about sharing intelligence between the mission where ... Barcan was not as willing to give it to these missions as others because they were afraid that it would then leak out ..."
— Nina Wilén [31:37]

Consequences: Military, Political, and Regional

Civil-Military Relations and Coups

[34:44–39:09]

• Externally-led security interventions amplified existing civil-military imbalances.
  • Framing the crisis as "security" led to increased military prestige, budgets, and sway—potentially enabling further coups.
  • Sahelian coups accelerated (e.g., Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad).
• Wilén does not claim direct causality, but shows strong correlation.

"If you send in militaries and security forces to improve the local security forces, then you're also increasing that imbalance. You're also tilting that balance further towards the military."
— Nina Wilén [36:25]

Coup Waves and Strategic Learning

[39:23–41:58]

• Coup attempts increasingly successful; neighboring militaries followed each other’s example, forming alliances.
• After coups, new alliances and mutual support networks emerged among Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s junta leaders.

"If at one point ... there was a 70% chance of a coup attempt actually succeeding ... the temptation becomes bigger."
— Nina Wilén [40:07]

Effects on Security Institutions

[42:12–45:55]

• Interventions led to duplication and competition among local security agencies (e.g., multiple "mobile border companies" across police, gendarmerie, National Guard).
• New units, better training/equipment, increased rivalries and confusion over mandates.

"All of a sudden you had this duplication ... of the same type of force ... but from three different forces .... it increases the tensions, there was rivalry between them."
— Nina Wilén [43:40]

Strategic Realignment: The Turn to Russia

[46:08–50:30]

• Since 2021, observed a dramatic reversal: Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and to a lesser extent Chad expelled Western/multilateral forces and invited Russian assistance (Wagner/Afrika Korps).
  • Russian footprint seen as a flagship, but increasingly challenged by Jihadist expansion and instability.
  • Wilén predicts an eventual forced exit of Russia, but the timeline is uncertain.

"The strategic realignment takes place in the midst of a global power competition ... Russia is trying to increase its presence ... the Sahel region has become really a flagship for Russia in that regard."
— Nina Wilén [47:27]

• Despite Russian involvement, security outcomes have worsened: jihadi territorial control is expanding, and foreign interventions (whatever their flag) have proven unable to stabilize the region.

Looking Forward

[50:30–52:00]

• Wilén continues research on security collaborations; is now examining prospective risks arising from post-war demobilization of Russian soldiers from Ukraine, with a concern about the creation of new Russian mercenary groups in Africa.

"There is a big risk that that will have a very detrimental effect on Africa's security."
— Nina Wilén [51:33]

Key Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “It’s nowhere in the mandate how you do it … how that was our problem. But we simply didn’t have the means to be self-sufficient or autonomous. Sometimes it was purely thanks to the good relationship between officers.” (EUTM Officer, [25:24])
• “If you send in militaries … then you’re also increasing that imbalance. You’re … tilting that balance further towards the military.” (Wilén, [36:25])
• “All these external actors … had an interest in framing the Sahel as a security risk and … intervening, not necessarily always related to reality on the ground, but to their logic of their own.” (Wilén, [21:40])
• “If at one point … there was a 70% chance of a coup attempt actually succeeding … the temptation becomes bigger.” (Wilén, [40:07])
• “The Sahel region has become really a flagship for Russia in that regard.” (Wilén, [47:27])

Suggested Timestamps

• Guest intro/purpose of the book: [02:54–06:20]
• Mapping interventions: [06:20–09:54]
• Research methodology: [10:09–13:17]
• Crisis narrative origins: [13:17–16:46]
• Motivations of actors: [18:00–22:08]
• Coordination and informal networks: [22:38–29:22]
• Frictions and trust issues: [29:29–32:46]
• Civil-military impacts/coups: [34:44–39:09]
• Strategic realignment (Russia): [46:08–50:30]
• Looking ahead: [50:30–52:00]

Overall Tone

The conversation is analytical but accessible, blending deep regional expertise with nuanced political analysis. Both host and guest candidly examine failures, frictions, and unintended consequences, offering granular examples and quoting directly from field research and interviews.

Takeaway

Wilén’s book and this interview offer a sobering, multidimensional account of how external security interventions in the Sahel, though well-intentioned and sometimes well-coordinated, have deepened local tensions, accelerated coup cycles, and failed to secure the region—culminating in a dramatic pivot towards Russia, whose own efficacy is now in doubt. The Sahel thus remains a site of global competition and local instability, with lessons for both policymakers and scholars.

For those interested in the complex realities of international intervention and security sector reform, Nina Wilén’s book, Securitizing the Sahel, provides essential insights and field-based evidence.