Podcast Summary:

New Books Network – Samuel Helfont on "The Iraq Wars: A Very Short Introduction" (Oxford UP, 2025)
Host: Dr. Miranda Melcher
Guest: Dr. Samuel Helfont
Date: December 24, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode features Dr. Samuel Helfont, associate professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, discussing his 2025 book The Iraq Wars: A Very Short Introduction. The book provides a concise yet comprehensive overview of Iraq-related conflicts spanning from Saddam Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait through the defeat of ISIS, emphasizing the interconnectedness of these wars as components of a larger, transformative chapter in global and regional politics.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

Why Study the “Iraq Wars” as a Historical Continuum?

• Integrated Approach:
  Helfont explains his goal was to "bring this all together and make this argument very succinctly," offering an accessible, unified view of conflicts often treated in isolation ([02:20]).
• The title’s plural – "wars" – marks the book's central contribution: treating events from 1990 through the ISIS era as manifestations of a single, evolving conflict heavily influenced by post-Cold War realities.

The 1990 Invasion of Kuwait (Start Point)

[03:29 – 08:26]

• Motivations for Invasion:

  • Saddam’s crippling war debts post-Iran-Iraq War.
  • Low oil prices, economic hardship.
  • Perennial Iraqi claims over Kuwait, viewed as an imperialist carve-up.
  • Access to deep-water ports: Iraq’s own coast unusable for large ships, while Kuwait’s harbors were valuable.
  • The end of the Cold War: Saddam sensed the fading Soviet backstop and feared unbalanced American dominance.

• Why Begin the Book Here?
  The invasion marked the intersection of regional rivalries and a profound shift in global order, transforming a local dispute into a global test case.

  “It’s the end of the Cold War that makes these, the global event worth speaking about... these wars were caught up at...the post Cold War moment.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([07:22])

The American Response: Shaping a "New World Order"

[08:26 – 13:01]

• Initial Reluctance:
  Early White House assessments doubted the value in militarily opposing Iraq—Kuwait was not a core US ally or democracy.

  “Kuwait is a gas station, and what do we care if the name changes as long as they’re pumping out the gas?” ([09:19])

• Strategic Turn:
  President H.W. Bush’s commitment to a "rules-based" international order and “new world order” doctrine reframed intervention as a global order imperative, not merely an oil dispute.

  “If you have one country just invading and gobbling up another country because they can, this was a threat to that...world order.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([11:26])

The 1991 Gulf War: The War That Ended Badly for Everyone

[13:01 – 19:31]

• Successes and Failures:
  While diplomatic and military operations leading up to war garnered high marks for coalition-building, the end of hostilities was “unprepared” and improvised, ultimately sowing chaos and resentment.

  • Example: Allowing Iraqi helicopters was intended for “getting around Iraq”—they were instead used in brutal suppression of uprisings ([15:30]).
  • Misalignment:
    • The US public and rhetoric demanded Saddam’s ousting (“He’s Hitler...can’t live with Hitler”).
    • The UN mandate explicitly did not include regime change.
    • No plan for what would follow—a vacuum emerged.

  “The United States decided that the Iraqis had had enough and stopped....the Iraqis...looked at it as, you know, they took the beating...they survived, and it was the US who quit.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([18:52])

The 1990s: Sanctions, Cat-and-Mouse, and the Fracturing of Global Consensus

[19:31 – 26:01]

• Iraq’s Tactics:

  • Saddam’s government recognized Iraq’s role as a test case for the evolving post-Cold War order.
  • Their strategy: fracture the broad international consensus—especially at the UN Security Council—by leveraging oil contracts to entice Russia, France, and others ([21:45]).

• Sanctions and Suffering:

  • Blanket sanctions caused humanitarian crises; later eased, but resentment and economic devastation fueled regime defiance and international friction.
  • The US prioritizes maintaining the integrity and authority of international law via the UN.

  “It’s not over necessarily what’s happening in Iraq. It’s about these sort of global systems...Iraq wants to break up this kind of rules-based international system...the US wants to keep it in place and keep Iraq as a test case to show that it can work.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([25:18])

The 2003 Invasion: Is 9/11 the Whole Story?

[26:01 – 31:15]

• 9/11 as Accelerant, Not Sole Cause:

  • US regime change policy predated 9/11 (explicit in 1998’s bipartisan Iraq Liberation Act).
  • Post-9/11: Public and political willingness for high-risk intervention soared.
  • The Bush administration exaggerated Iraqi links to terrorism to garner support.

  “911 was a trigger, but it fed into something...going on for a long time.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([27:19])

Planning & Execution of the 2003 War: Military vs. Political Leadership

[31:15 – 35:54]

• Debates Over Force Size and Strategy:

  • The military preferred a massive force (400,000+), based on 1991 experience.
  • Defence Secretary Rumsfeld sought a lean, "transformed" military—cutting troop numbers for a quick, cheap intervention; opposed "nation-building."
  • Result: Forces sufficient to oust Saddam, but insufficient to secure postwar Iraq.

  “He [Rumsfeld] wants his legacy to be a transformation of the military....which means we can use them in many more cases than we would have been able to previously.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([34:10])

Was a Better Outcome Possible?

[35:54 – 42:58]

• Inevitable Mess?:

  • Helfont argues a more successful postwar occupation was unlikely, even with more troops.
  • Saddam’s regime, though weakened, retained extraordinary internal control—once broken, chaos followed.

  "Once you break that regime...there was no way that the US or outsiders...were going to be able to come in and replace those Iraqis who had decades of experience with running these institutions..." ([37:08])

• Lost Hearts and Minds:

  • Early hope among Iraq’s middle class swiftly evaporated amid disorder, looting, and mismanagement (Abu Ghraib scandal, officer purges).

The Rise of ISIS and End(ish) of the Iraq Wars

[42:58 – 49:53]

• From Al Qaeda in Iraq to ISIS:

  • Initial US refusal to acknowledge the insurgency; later counterinsurgency under Petraeus contained, but didn’t destroy extremist groups.
  • US withdrawal (2011) and the Syrian Civil War fueled ISIS’s resurgence.
  • Obama administration’s reluctance to re-engage (dismissing ISIS as "JV team") proved shortsighted.

  "They [ISIS] were operating freely in eastern Syria, but...the Obama administration...didn’t want to get sucked back in."
  —Samuel Helfont ([47:04])

• When Did It End?

  • Defeat of ISIS’s “state” in Iraq/Syria (2018-19) marks the likely endpoint.
  • America’s focus and direct involvement dramatically waned—though remnants/inspired attacks persist.

  “Between 1990 and 2018, Iraq was the center of American foreign policy...that era seems to be over.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([53:42])

Notable Quotes & Moments

• On the Start of the Iraq Wars:

  “His regime was in debt from the Iran Iraq war and...needed money...No Iraqi leader...accepted that Kuwait should have been its own independent country.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([04:36])

• On Bush’s Policy:

  “Why is the U.S. going to send, you know, 500,000 troops to the other side of the planet to save Kuwait? It wasn’t just about Kuwait. It was about shaping an international order for generations to come.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([12:37])

• On the Occupation:

  “There’s a fine line between just freedom and anarchy.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([39:08])

• On US Policy Pre-9/11:

  “From 1998 on, the policy of the United States is to get rid of Saddam Hussein...”
  —Samuel Helfont ([28:27])

• On ISIS’s Legacy:

  “...they do seem a little bit more manageable. They’re not, they don’t control territory....the era seems to be over.”
  —Samuel Helfont ([53:49])

Key Timestamps for Major Segments

• [02:20] – Rationale for writing the book; concept of the “Iraq Wars”
• [04:27] – Why Saddam invaded Kuwait; archival evidence
• [08:51] – End of the Cold War and American response
• [13:59] – Why the Gulf War’s messy ending set the stage for what followed
• [19:31] – 1990s: Iraq, sanctions, global order, and diplomatic maneuvering
• [26:59] – 9/11 and the rationale for the 2003 Iraq invasion
• [31:33] – Troop levels, Rumsfeld’s vision, and military-political tensions
• [35:54] – Was failure inevitable? Societal consequences of regime collapse
• [43:36] – The rise of ISIS and why US response lagged
• [49:53] – Are the Iraq wars truly over?
• [54:37] – Helfont’s current/future research themes

Next Projects & Closing

On Future Research:

• Helfont is co-editing a volume on research from newly opened Iraqi archives, due Summer 2026, and beginning a new book on how the post-Cold War Middle East became—and ceased to be—the epicenter of global politics.
• He suggests that the struggles of Western-led liberal internationalism in the Middle East contributed to global democratic backsliding.

For listeners, Dr. Helfont’s book offers a compact but rich synthesis of three decades of war, policy, and consequence—framed as an instructive, cautionary chronicle of world order and disorder in the modern era.