Podcast Summary

Title: Thomas Graham, "Getting Russia Right" (Polity Press, 2023)

Podcast: New Books Network
Host: Dr. Andrew Pace (New Books in Diplomatic History)
Guest: Thomas Graham (Council on Foreign Relations)
Date: September 10, 2025

Overview

This episode features Thomas Graham, a veteran U.S. diplomat and Russia expert, discussing his new book "Getting Russia Right." The conversation delves into the evolution of U.S.-Russia relations since the Cold War, critical missteps on both sides, and Graham’s argument for a new U.S. approach: competitive coexistence rooted in strategic empathy, realism about Russia’s strengths and vulnerabilities, and a clear assessment of mutual interests.

Key Topics & Insights

1. Thomas Graham’s Path to Russian Studies

• Early Interest & Cold War Context (02:36)
  • Sparked by the Sputnik launch in 1957, Graham’s interest began in childhood amid American anxieties about Soviet competition.
  • Personal exposure to Russian language and studies from an early age: “I had the good fortune of going to... one of the first high schools in the United States... that offered Russian as a foreign language. So I started learning the Russian language when I was 13.” (03:23)
• Lifelong career at the State Department, U.S. embassy in Moscow, and National Security Council.

2. Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine as a ‘Day of Reckoning’

• Misjudging Putin (05:14)
  • Graham candidly admits U.S. and expert community failed to predict the scale of the 2022 invasion: “We got it wrong, many of us, because we didn't anticipate the massive invasion.” (05:15)
• War upended previous assumptions about Russian restraint; led Graham to reassess American policies and write the book.

3. Where U.S.-Russia Relations Stand: Not Cold War 2.0

• “I’ve never liked the idea of Cold War 2.0” (08:29)
  • Graham underscores that while rivalry is intense, the context and global power dynamics differ: “Our major strategic challenge... is China,” not Russia. (09:13)
• Advocates viewing current relations as "great power competition" rather than a replay of the past.

4. Post-Cold War Integration – Hopes and Failures

• Unrealistic Expectations (12:44)
  • U.S. policymakers believed Russia would adopt Western liberal democracy: “there was a widely held view... that Western liberal democracy had come out on top, that this was the political model...” (12:56)
  • Integration efforts ignored Russia’s autocratic traditions and great power self-image.
• Why Integration was ‘Doomed’ (16:17)
  • Russia never wanted to be a student of Western democracy; sought recognition as a co-manager of global affairs.
  • “We wanted to change Russia. Russia wanted to restore its power. That's the fundamental... contradiction.” (17:25)

5. America’s Repeated Underestimation of Russia

• Disrespect for Russian Power (20:21)
  • In the 1990s, with economic and military collapse, U.S. officials dismissed Russia as “Upper Volta with nukes.”
  • Even after Putin’s consolidation and Russia’s resurgence, American hubris persisted.

6. Strengths and Weaknesses of Russian Power

• Paradox of Weakness and Endurance (23:25)
  • Serious economic and innovation challenges, yet still possessing formidable military, geographical, and mobilization capabilities.
  • “Throughout history, even when Russia has appeared weak, it has this sort of unnatural ability to mobilize its resources for state purposes.” (24:23)

7. Strategic Empathy: Understanding Russian Interests

• Core National Interests (26:21)
  • Russian worldview shaped by geographic exposure, resource insecurity, and a historical focus on survival and “strategic depth.”
  • “Expansion... seen as defensive, strategically defensive.” (27:41)
  • Ongoing fears regarding Europe, the Middle East, China, and even northern borders.

8. Grand Strategy: Depth, Balancing, and Buffer Zones

• Ukraine as a Buffer (31:52)
  • Ukraine’s territory historically key to Russia’s security perception—current conflict continues that logic.
• Russia’s balancing act: preventing the consolidation of hostile coalitions (Europe), alignment with China as counterweight, and now needing the U.S. counterbalance against China’s rise.

9. The ‘Putin Factor’: Agency and Messianism

• Putin’s Unique Role (35:40)

  • Russian leaders have always been pragmatic; Putin overreaches with “messianic view of himself and Russia’s role.”
  • “Another Russian leader, more pragmatic, would realize that now's the time for retrenchment... That doesn't appear to be where Putin is at this point.” (39:37)

• Ukraine as Putin’s War, Not Russia’s (41:08)

  • Initial invasion mostly Putin’s initiative; over time, Russian elites have become complicit, while popular support remains passive.

10. Washington’s Blind Spots and Policy Errors

• Critical Missteps (44:26)

  • Overestimating the possibility of democratization, underutilizing opportunities for counter-terrorism cooperation, disrespecting Russia’s interests and power.
  • “The fundamental failure has been to respect Russia, to respect its interest, to respect its potential power... led us to the policies that have unnecessarily antagonized the Russians.” (45:09)

• Strategic Empathy, Not Appeasement (47:50)

  • Understand Russia’s worldview and red lines—but be prepared to push back: “Just need to be prepared to deal with the response...” (48:00)
  • Missed signals before Crimea—policy could have avoided a harsh response with better understanding.

11. Outlook and Prescriptions for the Future

• Competitive Coexistence (51:27)
  • Permanent rivalry is expected but need not be lamented: “Push that competition away from the military realm into the economic, cultural, diplomatic.” (51:56)
  • U.S. should recognize Russia’s enduring role in multipolar global order, manage the relationship to advantage American interests, and seek cooperation on transnational issues (nuclear, climate, strategic balance with China).

12. Expertise and the Limits of Forecasting

• Admitting Mistakes, Learning Forward (54:28)
  • “Russia’s a complex problem. You’re not going to get everything right... Humility is always important... You should be willing to acknowledge when you’ve been wrong. But then... understand what it is that you missed and factor that into your judgments going forward.” (54:54)
  • Graham defends the value of expertise and the necessity for honest, ongoing reassessment.

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the origins of his interest:
  “I started learning the Russian language when I was 13... my work has been my avocation. So it never really felt like real work.” (03:23)

• On getting Ukraine wrong:
  “We got it wrong, many of us, because we didn't anticipate the massive invasion. ...I assumed that President Putin would be more cautious in his approach.” (05:14)

• Cold War 2.0 skepticism:
  “I’ve never liked the idea of Cold War 2.0, in part because the world has changed dramatically...” (08:29)

• On U.S. underestimation of Russia:
  “We had still... overweening confidence in the ability of the United States to dominate Russia, to push it in ways... advantageous to the United States.” (21:47)

• On Russia’s sense of vulnerability:
  “If you were going to build a great power, you wouldn't have started from where Russia started...” (26:43)

• Putin’s unique agency:
  “In the past decade, I would argue that Putin has begun to develop... a messianic view of himself and Russia's role in the world, which has exaggerated his own role and exaggerated Russia's influence.” (37:27)

• On responding to Russian red lines:
  “Just because you understand where Russia's red lines are doesn't mean that you don't violate those red lines if you think it is in your national interest to do so. You just need to be prepared to deal with the response...” (48:00)

• About humility in policy analysis:
  “A certain amount of humility is always important in dealing with a problem. Russia. You shouldn't... exaggerate the confidence you have in certain judgments. You should be willing to acknowledge when you've been wrong...” (54:54)

Timestamps for Important Sections

• Graham’s early fascination with Russia — 02:36–04:36
• Failure to predict Ukraine invasion, reevaluating U.S. approach — 05:14–08:10
• Why ‘Cold War 2.0’ is misleading — 08:29–11:43
• Post-Cold War integration strategy and its flaws — 12:44–18:57
• Economic collapse and American hubris — 20:21–23:01
• Russia’s enduring strengths & vulnerabilities — 23:25–25:46
• Russian worldview and strategic depth — 26:21–31:45
• Putin’s agency, ‘Putin’s war’ in Ukraine — 35:40–43:43
• Washington’s strategic missteps & blind spots — 44:26–50:34
• Prescriptions for future U.S. policy: competitive coexistence — 51:27–53:26
• The limits of expertise and value of humility — 54:28–56:52

Conclusion

Thomas Graham’s “Getting Russia Right” and his interview here challenge persistent American misapprehensions about Russia’s motives, power, and trajectory. He calls for a recalibrated U.S. approach based on honest strategic empathy, as well as humility in both diplomacy and expert analysis. U.S.-Russia relations, Graham argues, are destined to be competitive, but they can and must be managed wisely to prevent catastrophe and seize opportunities for necessary cooperation in an increasingly multipolar world.