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Welcome to the New Books Network.
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Welcome to the People Power Politics Podcast brought to you by cedar, the center for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Representation at the University of Birmingham. Hi everyone and thanks for joining us on another episode of IPO Power Politics Podcast. My name is Timitayo Odeyemi, I'm a Research Fellow in Democratic Resilience at cedar and I'm your host for this particular episode. I'm delighted, very delighted, to welcome Ibrahima Fall from Catherine Leonard Kelly to the podcast. Ibrahima is Director of Studies at the School of International Commerce, Communications and Business Techniques in Dakar, Senegal, and a long standing analyst of governance, constitutional politics and civic engagement in Senegal. Catherine is Director of Engagement at the Africa center for Strategic Studies and a leading scholar of democratic governance and the rule of law in Africa, with extensive work on Senegalese politics and democratic transitions. Kathleen is author of Party Proliferation and Political Contestation in Africa Senegal in Comparative perspective, published in 2020. Today's episode is part of our ongoing collaboration with the Journal of Democracy, where we engage directly with authors to unpack new research on democratic resilience, democratic backslid, and democratic renewal. And our conversation today is centered in a recent Journal of Democracy article entitled why Senegal's Democracy Survived, authored of course by Ibrahima Nkat and published in the October 2025 issue. At a time when democratic crisis around the world so often end in breakdown, authoritarian consolidation, or prolonged instability, this article marks a very simple but indeed powerful question. Why did Senegal's democracy hold despite the severe institutional Crisis surrounding the 2024 presidential election? So welcome to the podcast, Ibrahima and Kat. It's great to have you both with us.
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Wonderful to be here. Thanks for having us.
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Okay, to get us started, could each of you just briefly share what drew you professionally and personally perhaps to studying Senegal, Senegalese democracy, its political trajectory, and what prompted you to write this particular article at this particular moment?
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Thank you for having me. I am truly honored to be part of the Cedar Podcast at the University of Birmingham. It is a special moment for me and my co authors, Dr. Kelly. It is important to have opportunities like this z Francophone and Anglophone academics circle come together and I deeply appreciate the chance to share and learn across perspective. My name is Ibrahim Moffan. Here I am a graduate University of Bordeaux and Montpellier in France in Information and Communication Science, also serve as the Executive Secretary at Graceco and I am a member of the Research Group meetings at the University of Gastronbarge in Senegal. Currently I am the Academy Director at Etica Business School in Senegal. I am excited for this exchange and looking forward to to the rich conversation. We have been interested in Africa democracy for years. I am sorry my English is not very good so my co authors will be responding to most observation.
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Thanks Fall I have been working with Fall since I was in Senegal for my PhD thesis research in Tom 20102011 2012. So I've known him since then. He was one of the people as I was getting to know Senegal for my project on the political party system, which turned into the book that you mentioned in the introduction. He really helped me get to know the Senegalese media space, the Senegalese political space, and is just a friend as well. And so we share a passion for democracy, political communications, different aspects of politics, and I think this is what drew us to write about this together. Since I spent a lot of time living in Senegal and doing my original research in the 2010s, have stayed in touch with a wide variety of people whom I met during the study I conducted of the political party system. Things have changed a bit in terms of what the party system looks like since I was there as a graduate student, and I followed that out of great interest and as a result as well, of course, political party systems are very connected to election processes and more broadly even rule of law, justice and freedom of expression issues. And so that has continued to be one of the things that I've focused on in my research as I've moved through different parts of my career since graduate school. That's what brought us together for this article. I spent during my fieldwork significant time in Senegal during the 2012 elections, and so it was quite an interesting compare and contrast between 2012 and 2024. So that also got us thinking about different dynamics that were worth drawing out. In my current work at the Africa Center, I look at things from a security and democracy perspective, and certainly the rule of law and justice also enter into that perspective. And so since being at the Africa center in particular and in previous work at the American Bar Association, I was tracking different justice sector dynamics and how they intersect with all of these other issues that are of interest to my co author and myself. So some of the emphasis on judicial independence comes from an interest in tracking the politics and the discussions in the Senegalese public square about that as well.
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That's a really helpful context and it brings us directly to the events of 2024 themselves. So for listeners who may not be fully familiar with what happened, could you just walk us through the key moments of the 2024 election crisis and explain perhaps why Senegal suddenly found itself facing. What's. I mean, in your article, you described as a democratic stress test.
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Yes. This situation that led to the democratic stress test was provoked by delay of the election. The presidential election process in Senegal that was very highly contested when it happened. It was perceived by many as an attempt to overturn democratic rules that had long been in place in Senegal. And this is what provoked a major institutional moment of challenge and a popular mobilization that was without precedent in Senegal. So to go into a few of the more fine details on that, February 25, 2024, was the original presidential election date that had been set. It was set with the assumption, according to the electoral code, that there would be the standard three weeks of campaigning, formal campaigning, and the week before that election date, President Macky Sall seized opportunistically upon a claim that two of the seven people appointed to the Constitutional Council, this is the body that validates presidential candidacies, and all of the documents submitted in service of those that two of those seven people on the council were corrupt. So Macky Sall abrogated the decree that he had issued that had set the original election date, citing an open conflict between the legislature and the judiciary on this issue. Now, what brings the judiciary and the legislature into the issue? Well, the claim leading to the allegation of conflict between these branches of government originated from Kareem Wad, who is the son of former President Abdul Aywad, and. And he was the proposed candidate of the X ruling Senegalese Democratic party in the 2024 race. Now, Waad said the Constitutional Council was corrupt after it had declined to validate his candidacy. For some more context, there were 93 dossiers submitted for presidential candidacy. The council validated only 21. So it's not as if Kareem Wadd was the only person whose dossier was examined in a very fine tooth comb sort of way. In reaction to the allegation of corruption within the council, members of the PDS's opposition parliamentary group, along with some deputies who were in the ruling coalition in Parliament, opened a commission of inquiry within the legislature about the candidacy validation process. And they accused specifically the former Prime Minister, Ahmed Ubah, of having bribed those two of the seven Constitutional Council officials who arrived at that decision. After that, the legislature passed a law that postponed the elections until December. This also created a lot of contestation because this date was well after April 2nd. If you read the constitution, that is pretty much the required date by which the transition needed to be happening. If you look at the constitution as one of the Source documents for this. So people were claiming, particularly those affiliated with the opposition, that this is a constitutional couple. The people who are opposition figures in Parliament, though they did not have the majority, were trying to hold up the passage of this legislation or at least contest it in Parliament. Gendarme physically removed them from the chamber. This led to more protests and popular mobilization, which we write about extensively in the article. And then ultimately, in the midst of all of these different elements of contestation, the judiciary ruled that this aspect of the legislation that reset the election date to December was unconstitutional. So eventually, you know, the ball was in the president's court, according to the electoral code, to pass another decree resetting the election date to something more constitutional. There was some inaction in February and early March, and eventually the president complied with the law and pushed back the date. He reset a date, but it did shorten the standard three week campaign period. That said a glees citizens and candidates would normally expect the Constitutional Council around the same time, because there had not been action on resetting a date and time was ticking, had decided to issue their own declaration of what the date ought to be. It differed by a week with what the president issued when he did issue a decree. And because the president has the power to issue that decree, once the president decided on the date, the Constitutional Council retracted its declaration of a date. And saying now that the executive branch has taken relevant action to be in compliance with the constitution, you know, we defer to their power per codes and laws. So that's a little bit more of the deep detail on the crisis and how it was resolved.
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B
Interesting. Thank you for walking us through that series of events that eventually led to the election. So in the election itself, just to also provide some additional context for listeners who may not be not familiar with all of those, what about the election itself? How did it eventually play out?
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A
Well, eventually the ruling party's main candidate, Prime Minister Ahmadu Ba, lost to Basiru Jomathai, who was the candidate for the past of movement. It originally sort of the Senegalese public expected that Usman Sanko, now the prime minister, would be the standard bearer for the Passtaf party and movement. But he was imprisoned at the time of candidacy declaration. And during the campaign, Basiro Jomai fai, one of his colleagues in the past party was released and they therefore campaigned with the idea that Basiru Jomai FAI was the stand in for Sanko. And there was even the well off phrasing Jo Mai Moi Sanko. So Jo Mai is Sanko for the purposes of the 24 election.
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B
Okay, so with that then we can move on to specifics of what you have discussed in your article and how that links back to event in Senegal in the 2024 election, Ricky Saul had already served two terms and the big question was whether was like it happened in 2012, whether he would try to test the constitutional structures and seek a third term. Even though there is a two term limit, he ultimately did not test this boundary. So his prime minister, Amadou Bar, became the ruling coalition's candidate even though he was not part of the ruling party alliance for the Republican. Osman Sonko was found guilty of corrupting youth but was acquitted on rape charges before the election. And it was this sentence that led Faye replacing him as a Pasteur candidate after Faye was released from prison himself due to an amnesty law without having been sentenced on charges against him for defamation, another infraction on which Sonkwo had been sentenced to earlier on in the article. We argue that Senegal's ability to withstand this crisis rested primarily on two pillars, judicial independence and civil society mobilization. Which of these two pillars surprised you most in terms of strength or effectiveness, especially given the level of pressure involved and how this played out in terms of the pushback against executive action?
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A
That's a good question. Which pillar surprised us more? It seems to me from talking with Fall during the writing of this, that the civil society mobilization didn't surprise him all that much. And I can say from looking at Senegal in the 2010s and having studied Senegal prior to that as well, that there's been a long history of citizen mobilization and particularly as we've seen the youth bulge play out in Africa and in Senegal in particular, and a variety of young people coming into their own being able to vote. In more recent elections, including the 2024 election, it seems like particularly young urban voters are looking for new models of governance. They were very active and quite well organized, along with some of their other colleagues in civil society, in academia, to contest and to have a dialogue through their actions about what was going on. So so certainly people power played a role in ensuring that this key electoral moment was handled in a way that was in conformity with the democratic rules that many Senegalese citizens are proud to have in their country. So perhaps that's not so surprising. Other than that in this particular case, it was interesting to see the confluence of that with how the Constitutional Council, which is appointed for the large part in majority by the executive branch and is therefore therefore has quite a few people who in some way owe their jobs to the appointment that was made in the executive branch, they were professional enough and galvanized perhaps by the public to weigh in on this. And there were certain entreaties, certainly entreaties by a variety of Senegalese academics, a variety of people mobilized in local social movements who are calling overtly for the Constitutional Council to assert its authority and sort of throw around its weight, despite the fact that appointments wise, the majority of the members of the Constitutional Council are appointed by the president. And then there is a minority of those members who are chosen by the president based on a list, a short list of names that are submitted to the President through the National Assembly. So that's a significant amount of dependence on the executive, but a very professional culture of judicial professionalism in Senegal that is also playing in, I would say for me, as a rule of law scholar, maybe the Constitutional Council's willingness to weigh in on multiple occasions and sort of deal with a delicate balance of exerting your power and forbearing from exerting your power under certain circumstances was quite interesting and fascinating.
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Interesting to learn of the enablers of whatever it is that the judiciary, the Constitutional Council was able to pull in this particular instance. But then, was that something that was unusual in Senegalese constitutional history? I mean, whatever happened in 2024, he reflects a pattern or something that was quite unique as far as the Constitutional Council was concerned.
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A
I think, I think one thing that's interesting to note if we were to compare once again, what happened in 2012 when Wad sought to run for a non constitutional third term versus what happened in 2024. In 2012, Abdullah Wad first went to Parliament where he had a supermajority. At the time, there was a PDS supermajority in Parliament and he was proposing legislation that many perceived would set his son Kareem Wad up for an easy win and an easy succession were he to run in the following elections. Parliament said no to that, despite the PDS being in majority control in Parliament. And then after that, Abdullah Wade submitted a dossier for his presidential candidacy to the Constitutional Council. At the time, the Constitutional Council was five people, all appointed directly by the President. And I wrote about this actually in a Journal of Democracy essay that appeared in 2012. The council allowed him to run and there was a great deal of political mobilization, public protest, the Touche Pas Ama Constitution, Don't Touch My Constitution movement mobilized people. Ion Amar, one of the civic movements led by musicians in Senegal that's very well renowned across the continent and the world, was mobilizing people. But despite that, the Constitutional Council decided that it was constitutional for Wad to run for a third term, even though in the constitution there were clauses about two term limits. So there were some technicalities there that were played upon. And we got sort of the opposite in this case. Despite the fact that though the Constitutional Council had been expanded through the 2016 referendum in Senegal to have seven members rather than five, and for I believe it's two of them to be chosen through this list the national assembly submits to the president, there's still quite a bit of ruling party or ruling coalition influence over who's on that list. So it's interesting that we sort of got the opposite exertion of opinion and power by those who are on the Constitutional Council in this case.
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B
All interesting. So in your analysis in your article, you also mentioned quite often the role that the civil society played, the role of citizens, the bottom up dimension to, to all of these. And you described this inegalistical society as drawing on a kind of democratic muscle memory, to use the the exact language. How did earlier cycles of protest and mobilization mean the pattern over time in Senegal, particularly in the years leading up to 2024? How did all of this shape citizens ability to respond so, so quickly and then prevent democratic breakdown in that country?
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A
There has been quite a bit of activity for a while of citizens movements. So Yan Amar, whom I mentioned before, and others that really consolidated a culture of democratic vigilance in Senegal over the course of a variety several electoral cycles. So that muscle memory is embedded even more deeply than in say just the few years before the 2024 election. You did see a lot of violent and nonviolent mobilization in 2021 and 2023. There were largely peaceful in their origins, protests about Ousmane Sanko, the current prime minister leader of pasta, his imprisonment and his treatment within the Senegalese judicial system that led to the headline making sort of protest movements and in some cases violent suppression of those who were protesting in 2021 and 2023. So there was mobilization around Pass Def and Usman Sanko as a potential candidate in particular in several years leading up to 2024. So if you're talking about immediate sort of factors, there's certainly a fraught history of violence and nonviolent dynamics related to the people's mobilization, particularly in urban centers around Senegal around Passdef and these specific candidates and their affiliates who are involved in the 2024 elections. But I would say the citizen movements, young voters looking for a new type of governance or looking to be new types of Senegalese and looking for that in their politicians as well. It is a longer standing dynamic that also contributed to the muscle memory. I think that means that when the 2024 conflict, around the timing of the election arose, many civil society leaders were already pretty well equipped to build on efforts from the recent past to resist encroachment of civil liberties and fundamental freedoms. And you saw as well among those in the media some very brave and valiant efforts to cover all of this, despite at certain moments, the, the turning off of people's signals, the slow rolling of Internet access, or even abuse at the hands of the state of particular journalists. So there was a lot of, a lot of notable activity in the domain of the independent media in Senegal, which again goes back quite a while in terms of how long there's been a really vibrant press, radio scene and maybe even in these current days, social media sort of scene and coverage of some of these events.
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B
Right. So we, we eventually got to see the end of that. There was a democratic transfer of power. But your article is still very much clear that Senegal still faces some serious institutional vulnerabilities. So looking ahead now, what do you consider to be the most urgent challenges that remain in that West African country, especially around issues of justice, sector reform, executive dominance, and all of that fall?
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A
And I have even mentioned at the end of our article, the Asses of Justice. So a consultative process that President FY has sought to engage in in 2025 about reforms that are needed in the justice system for a long time, through a variety of consultative dialogues and processes, Senegalese citizens have indicated their desire for a more independent judiciary, structurally independent, rather than just relying on the professionalism of the individual serving within the Constitutional Council or other judicial bodies. When we had the Estis national, which was a national dialogue in 2007-2009, this was a large part of the set of institutional reforms that it appeared Senegalese from different regions, when they were consulted, were asking for. There was the National Council for the Reform of Institutions under early Macky sall times. In 2013, these sorts of demands were similarly repeated and came up through that examination of possible institutional reforms. And of course, we had the referendum in 2016 that changed the number and composition of the Constitutional Council. But that didn't, in many people's minds, go far enough for that particular body because there's still executive majority dominance in terms of choosing who's there. And similarly, there have been discussions in 2017, 2018, in years that were leading up to the previous 2019 presidential election about the independence of the Supreme Judicial Council. So that's the body that oversees the professional core of magistrates and judges and that controls their promotions and where they go in their career geographically within Senegal to some extent. And so there is a confluence of these demands for broader political institutional reforms with very specific technical discussions about promotion of judges and the professionalism of the core and how independently they should be judged, how many politicians from the executive branch, like the president, should be on those committees or not, in terms of how we determine the advancement of those professionals. So these are long standing discussions. I think it's interesting that President Feyh took this up once again early on in his term. It'll be interesting to see what steps might still have yet to be taken to improve Senegalese citizens faith in the independence of the justice system. I think beyond that, overall, in relation to the legislature, in relation to other institutions in Senegal as well, balance of powers will continue to be something that will be interesting to watch and study and learn from Senegalese experts about. The executive branch remains relatively dominant. In fact, as Fahl and I have put it in our notes here, very dominant, very strong. And that does have an effect, as you've mentioned, Timmy Tayo, on the justice system and how it's perceived by citizens and how it operates in effect to advance a professional core of magistrates and judges, but also in terms of how it affects public media. And I referenced already a little bit of what happened with journalists who are working for independent outlets during this trying time. There's still work to be done, I think, in terms of the press code and fundamentally how we preserve this really positive culture of dialogue, debate and independent reporting that is accurate and useful for citizens as we're going forward.
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B
Okay, well, that's very interesting and very interesting to hear in the context of wider discussions about the a relatively weak nature of institutions in that region and of course, the way that the executive tend to dominate when it comes to interaction between branches of government and between institutions. So I'm going to take you to the aspect of generational change. Issues of young people. Young people will always be an important subject when it comes to politics in Africa, considering the numerical majority status in that particular region. The 2024 election brought a younger generation of political leaders and voters, you know, to the limelight. Do you see this generational shift as a sort of stabilizing force for Senegalese democracy? Or is this something that you think will be disruptive or perhaps both at the same time?
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A
I think probably both. Certainly this dynamic is one that shows that younger People are taking charge of what they want to get out of politics in Senegal, who they want their leaders to be, what kind of dialogues and debates they want in this domain. And so in that sense, there's an element of renewal in terms of vibrancy of democracy and exchange around political institutions and governance. This has also created tensions, of course, and it is certainly pressing up against more traditional ways of doing politics. It's pressing up against how political elites in Senegal have played the game and been in the democratic game for a while. For example, political parties are maybe less popular than they were as the main form of organizing oneself among particularly the youth demographic. Pasta to some extent at certain times has been a formally registered party, but they're really more at the heart of it, a social movement. And that's not the first time we've sort of seen social movements as opposed to the traditional political party structure where you work your way up a hierarchy over a long period of time, being maybe a place where specifically younger, younger citizens and younger potential politicians are gravitating towards. So I think, I think the answer is both. The founder of Passda, current Prime Minister Ousmane Sanko, has advocated a paradigm shift that is inspired by, if we look back at the 60s, at very early independence, post independence Senegal, Sanko is inspired in some ways by former Prime Minister Mahmoud Udiyah from the early 60s. He turned out in the end to be an opponent of first President Leopold Sadar Singhor, even though they worked together for, for a period of time. And Sanko himself is standing for a model where youth and social actors are sort of the political anchors and not necessarily the leaders of the conventional political parties, although they're still important in certain ways within the system. Of course, I think in the past, the most resilient opposition party leaders have had some form of international private financing to sustain themselves in the opposition. It can be hard to last in the opposition without being co opted into the government at some point to refresh your sources of financing and to take a break from that hard work. And the most resilient opponents have not only that kind of financing source, but also experience as statesmen or women. And so I think one thing that will be very different as we see younger politicians and their movements playing a more outsized role in the political space and in these public forums, they don't have no state experience, but they have a lot less than some of the other classic ruling party or opposition politicians we've seen in past administrations in Senegal, under Saul, under Wad, under Juf. So Maybe some of these findings about what it takes to be a strong opponent are, are going to change. It will be really interesting as a scholar of this myself, to sort of track that and look at it as we move into the future of Senegalese politics.
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B
Thank you very much. I think we should then be looking at how, I mean, what Senegalese politics and democracy, what it adds to our knowledge of what's obtainable in other contexts, especially within that region. Especially if you then play Seneg in a wider regional perspective. Several countries with serious, from mild to severe institutional crisis, Mali, Guinea, Nigeria, among others, with recent histories of coups and authoritarian onto things. So I'm going to ask why did you think Senegal moved in a different direction, so to speak? And then are there elements of Senegal's political culture or institutional arrangements that other countries in the region perhaps could emulate to sort of strengthen their resilience story and trajectory? Or is it just a case that Senegal was just a case of highly contest specific experience?
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A
Great questions. Senegal is indeed surrounded by countries that have had coups nowadays, other than the Gambia, I suppose, and Mauritania. Senegal, I think, distinguishes itself in this democratic domain for a couple of reasons. When Fall and I were trying to make a list, we had on our list the strength of its civil society, as we've covered in the article in Extenso, a non political army, so very healthy civil military relations that are based on historical commitment to separation of the army from politics. Religious leaders who have consistently over the long Duray promoted peaceful electoral transitions. There's been significantly different degrees of respect for the electoral calendar as it is set in Senegal. 2024 was upsetting to a lot of people and a really watershed moment because there were leaders trying to change that electoral calendar. That's not normal within Senegal as much as it may be in some cases in certain other countries. And a tradition of really open debate and media reporting on that debate, which again is somewhat unusual in relation to some of Senegal's neighbors whom you mentioned. To explain a little bit more on the non political army, in particular, the organization I currently work for, the Africa center for Strategic Studies, has put out a short piece on this that I recommend to those listening the podcast on military professionalism in Senegal. And in that piece there are interviews with Senegalese leaders from the armed forces themselves, current or retired, who reflect on this for us. And one really interesting aspect that a variety of scholars look at in the case of Senegal is this concept of the army serving the nation. The Armee nation is a concept that was inculcated within the ranks of the Senegalese armed forces from the jump at independence. The idea that those in the army are not only doing classic defense and security functions, but are also helping the nation develop. They're providing specific services, sometimes medical services or health related things, sometimes infrastructural improvements in specific communities in Senegal. And all of that is done in service of really being part of the national project that also fosters trust and respect between ordinary citizens and civilians and those who are serving in the armed forces. So that's part of it. Another part of it is that Senegal's presidential guard is not permanent. So nobody permanently belongs to Senegal's presidential guard. There's a rotational element to how the presidential guard works. And if you look at the coups in some of the neighboring countries, often the presidential guard or people in it are involved in some way in the perpetration of those unconstitutional changes in power. And part of it often relates to the fact that those presidential guards might be answering to a completely different chain of command than those who are in the rest of the armed forces. That's not the case in Senegal. And I think that plays into that, combined with the civic culture in Senegal really is part of the magic formula, for lack of a better term.
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B
Okay, all right, thank you very much. Very interesting points there. And it's really interesting to see how Senegal has developed and all of the. The ways that the nature of society itself, the institutions, the military, and all of that have come to shape the resilience that was more or less reinforced with the events of 2024. You did mention the aspect of civic culture. And that brings me to my next question. You know, there is this argument that is now very pronounced that democratic resilience as, as we have come to see today, depends institutions and more citizens themselves. Do you agree? And what does Senegal's experience suggest about the balance between institutional safeguards and sort of people power?
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A
Good question. I think political institutions, whether formal or informal, are still very important pieces of the puzzle. But I do think that the other lesson to draw from Senegal is that people power is real. And what citizens do to stand up for their democracy, to really say what they think in the public square, to organize together, to place pressure within the democratic political system, where pressure can be placed if there are common demands, can really make a difference in how formal and informal institutions end up functioning. I think Senegal's formal and informal institutions over time have certainly fostered this kind of civic culture, Free and independent media, outspoken citizens, commitment to debate. Even as I mentioned in the Previous question, key religious leaders who tend to stay out of being in politics directly, but who behind the scenes, just like the military, are encouraging key officials to have peaceful transitions, to respect the electoral calendar. All of these are really important things that do also relate to what citizens decide to organize and demand of those who are their leaders, whether they're elected leaders or, you know, traditional or religious leaders. So I think fall, when you asked us this question about democratic resilience, do we agree that the role of people power is on the rise? He says yes. Their implication, their active implication in all of these affairs has become truly central in Senegal. It's citizens who guarantee democratic vitality, even outside of the texts that are supposed to help us do that. My answer might be a little bit different. I'm still an institutionalist, fundamentally formal and informal. And so many things have had to go right with Senegalese institutions to permit citizens to reach the point that they have been at recently to do what they did. But what they did was very. A very important piece of making the outcome that we analyze in the article actually happen. It couldn't have happened only with the independent judiciary. It's sort of this combination of the two that really played a key role in this context.
- [37:34]
B
All right, thank you very much. So finally now, as we begin to wrap things up on a more reflective note, if you had to identify one key lesson for government and another one for citizens from Senegal democratic stress tests, what would they be?
- [37:51]
A
Okay, we came up with two. Because you asked for one. We came up with two. One is that government should not underestimate, estimate the power of citizens and their democratic maturity. A second is that the voice of citizens and their mobilization in a peaceful fashion can really change the course of things institutionally, politically and otherwise. I think a third lesson I would add, based on our discussion of more of the balance of powers between the three branches of government, is that when we look at how the Constitutional Council acted during the 2024 crisis, we learned that institutional cultures can be built around executive branch dominated institutions, especially when those cultures are really building on individuals commitments to professionalism that can create windows of opportunity for individuals within those institutions to stand up to unpopular executive branch actions. In 2024, it was the Constitutional Council. In 2012, it was Parliament.
- [38:53]
B
All right, thank you very much, Ibrahima and Catherine. This has been such a very thoughtful conversation, and it's really clear that it wasn't exactly about perfect institutions or the absence of democratic erosion, but how courts, citizens and civic norms interacted under extreme pressure to prevent democratic collapse. It's a powerful reminder of that. Democratic resilience is not automatic. It has to be practiced. It has to be defended. It has to be mobilized, often in moments of real uncertainty. Thank you to our listeners for joining us again on this episode of People Power Politics Podcast, produced in collaboration with the Journal of Democracy. And if you enjoyed this conversation, do subscribe, share and join us again as we continue to explore how democracies survive. My name is Timitayo Odeyemi. I'm a Research Fellow in Democratic Resilience at CEDAR and host of this episode of the People Power Politics Podcast. And I'll be speaking with Ibrahima Fall, Director of Studies at the School of International Commerce, Communications and Business Techniques in Dakar, Senegal, and Catherine Lena Kelly, Director of Engagement at the Africa center for Strategic Studies in Washington. Both are authors of the Journal of Democracy article why Senegal's Democracy Survived. Thank you. I'll see you again in the next episode. Thank you for listening to the People Power Politics Podcast brought to you by cedar, the center for Elections, Democracy, Accountability and Representation at the University of Birmingham. To learn more about our center and the exciting work we do on these issues around the world, visit our website using the link in the podcast description. Sam.