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- [00:00]
A
Hello, everybody.
- [00:01]
B
This is Marshall Po. I'm the founder and editor of the New Books Network. And if you're listening to this, you know that the NBN is the largest academic podcast network in the world. We reach a worldwide audience of 2 million people. You may have a podcast, or you may be thinking about starting a podcast. As you probably know, there are challenges basically of two kinds. One is technical. There are things you have to know in order to get your podcast produced and distributed. And the second is, and this is the biggest problem, you need to get an audience. Building an audience in podcasting is the hardest thing to do today. With this in mind, we at the NBM have started a service called NBN Productions. What we do is help you create a podcast, produce your podcast, distribute your podcast, and we host your podcast. Most importantly, what we do is we distribute your podcast to the NBN audience. We've done this many times with many academic podcasts, and we would like to help you. If you would be interested in talking to us about how we can help you with your podcast, please contact us. Just go to the front page of the New Books Network and you will see a link to NBN Productions. Click that, fill out the form, and we can talk. Welcome to the New Books Network.
- [01:07]
A
It's a pleasure to welcome back Professor Yong Chik Le. In our previous conversation, we explored his influential work, Law and Development, a book in its second edition that has shaped how scholars and practitioners think about the role of legal and institutional frameworks in fostering economic growth. Today we turn to Dr. Lee's latest book, Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia, published by Anthem Press. It comes at a moment when the region's major players, China, Japan, both Korea's Russia and the United States make it simultaneously the world's economic powerhouse and one of its most militarized flashpoints. Here, trade interdependence collides with nationalism, unresolved historical memory, and nuclear rivalry. At a recent conference in Seoul, South Korea, Nobel Prize recipient and political economist James Robinson, co author of why Nations Fail, reflected on the global strains facing democracy. He pointed to Pew Research data showing how trust in US Institutions has plummeted, how Americans increasingly view their political opponents as enemies, and how fragile liberty becomes when state and society fail to keep each other in balance. His message that sustainable prosperity depends on resilient institutions and a balance between state authority and social power sets the stage for Dr. Lee's argument that peace in Northeast Asia requires a similar institutional approach, even in a region so marked by rivalry and mistrust. So today we'll unpack what makes Dr. Lee's approach distinctive, how history and memory still shape nationalism, and what a cooperative order might realistically look like. Professor Lee, welcome back. It's good to talk to you again.
- [03:27]
C
Hey, Keith, it's great to be here.
- [03:29]
A
Let me start with the foreword of your book, written by distinguished scholar of comparative political economy and East Asian affairs, Stephen Haggard, who calls Northeast Asia the most complex theater in the Indo Pacific, and notes your book offers an alternative to conventional IR theory by examining each country's historical and cultural codes. What makes your approach distinctive, and why do you see institutions as central to sustainable peace?
- [04:04]
C
Great question, Kif. There have been some volumes discussing international affairs and sustainable peace in the region from the perspective of a one country or a particular point of view, which is natural. But I thought something's missing there because Northeast Asia is very complex region with several countries with distinctively different political, historical, and cultural perspectives. And I think it was important to address all of them. As much as I could. I thought it was important to address those multiple perspectives from different countries. So I think that is unique about my book when it comes to institutional importance. I think what we have in the region is something I called a confrontational balance. So on the one side you have United States, Korea, and Japan. On the other you have Russia, North Korea, and China. And these two groups of countries have rather on a confrontational stand. There's not really fitting for lasting peace in the region. I thought it was important to resolve that through some institutional framework that can overcome this confrontation. So this sort of institutional arrangement is important to sustain peace in the region.
- [05:23]
A
In your introduction, you highlight nationalism and Sinocentrism as recurring forces. Why did you choose these as through lines, so to speak, and how do they shape your analysis?
- [05:37]
C
Across the book, I talked about nationalism because they explain recurring events in Northeast Asia and between the constituent countries. Nationalism explains struggle for national independence in Korea and Mongolia and economic development drives in several countries in the region, including Korea, Japan and China. It also explains reinforcement of military capabilities in those countries that's going on at this point. So nationalism is a concept that explains dynamics in the region. Also Sinocentrism. China constantly makes an effort to draw political and economic support from Korea and Japan. They even ask for allegiance, knowing that these countries are close allies of the United States. It is because China, being the central political, economic and cultural center for centuries, they feel that it has a legitimate right to call for such a support and allegiance. So I think Sino centrism is important concept to explain this tendency.
- [06:40]
A
Sure. Well, you note that Japan's military buildup may trigger memories of war and colonialism. Given their invasions across much of Northeast asia In the first half of the 20th century, how do collective memories work against reconciliation? And is there a way to redirect them towards peace?
- [07:05]
C
That's an important point, Keith. The entire Northeast Asia region was occupied by Japan's invasion and much of it was destroyed in the 30s and 40s. The memory of war and destruction has been remembered for generations. Right. And it caused pain and public resentment for a long time. And it could be redirected and perhaps reconciliation might be possible if the country responsible for such aggression would make efforts through the public apologies and proper compensations and education of their own people, as Germany has done since the end of World War II. Now, if you look at what happens in Europe, Germany also committed aggression and war crimes during the World War II. And now because of the war in Ukraine, there was a talk of reinforcing German military in Europe, and that does not receive the degree of alarm and caution than when Japan was trying to reinforce their military self defense wars in recent years. And the difference is perhaps the response from each of those powers after the war.
- [08:11]
A
Good point. You're right that institutions alone won't bring peace unless they're rooted in each society's history and culture. North Korea seems like an ever present reminder of the Cold War. And North Korea's nuclear program remains the region's most acute security issue. Looking back at the 2016-2017 crisis in the 2018 Singapore Summit, how do you assess the persistence of Pyongyang's nuclear drive?
- [08:46]
C
Pyongyang seems to regard nuclear capability as necessary to maintain its power. Why is that? Well, the country is going through substantial economic difficulties due to continuing sanctions. There is a substantial political isolation from the rest of the world, although it maintains relationships with China and Russia. But North Korea's diplomatic relations is severely limited. So the regime survives by imposing extreme oppression on their own populations, including, I'm sorry to say, executions and large scale prison camps. Under these extraneous circumstances, the regime seems to think that nuclear weapons are their ultimate power against external enemies and can also be used to show their power and authorities internally. So that perhaps explains why Pyongyang is insistent on developing nuclear could you trace.
- [09:40]
A
A bit how Juche, the concept of self reliance became entangled with North Korea's nuclear identity?
- [09:50]
C
Sure. It's another important point. The Juche ideology promotes self reliance and independence. Now they advocated nuclear development as a means to protect their independence from external threats posed by the west, such as the United States and South Korea. So the nuclear power has become a symbol of their independence and resistance. I think that's how Juche ideology and North Korean nuclear drive has been entangled.
- [10:20]
A
Well, some scholars have argued Juche wasn't only inward looking, but also tied to global aspirations. How much of North Korea's persistence is explained by ideology versus hard security logic, do you think?
- [10:39]
C
The security justification for nuclear weapons is rather limited, and here's why. Your chances of invasion by the US or South Korea would be frankly minimal given the military concentration in the Korean peninsula. Right. And North Korea maintains a large conventional military, over 1 million men, and a major war would likely cause substantial casualties and destruction on both sides. Given this, the security justification for having nuclear weapons is rather weak. However, regardless of the security logic, from an ideological standpoint, like I said for your previous question, North Korea's possession of nuclear power can be seen as a symbol of independence and resistance against the world hegemon, which is the usa. So much of it has an ideological reason, so to speak, why they are so insistent on developed nuclear.
- [11:37]
A
Well, many frameworks have tried from the non Proliferation Treaty, IAEA inspections and the six party talks, and they've all ultimately failed. And I think the most recent is Kim Jong Un's retort to Trump last summer about look, denuclearization is off the table. Was this more about weak institutions or political will overriding design, do you think?
- [12:07]
C
Well, npt, IAEA and six party talks may not have succeeded in preventing North Korea's nuclear development. In the end, they could not eliminate nuclear weapons, but each provided a constructive process toward those objectives at the time. They eventually failed because the political and economic circumstances of North Korea changed through the 90s and 2000s. The country's economic situation worsened and the regime's security weakened due to the death of two hegemonic leaders in North Korea, Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Un. The relatively young new leader felt that he had to secure something to overcome the difficulties and he chose nuclear weapons. So the existing talks enragement became ineffective because of the change of those circumstances. So the institutional framework did not fit the situation anymore as time went by. And plus Kim Jong Un, the new leader, had a renewed political will in a way to ensure the regime's his own survival and to respond to the new circumstances.
- [13:19]
A
Well, how do you see outside narratives, from defector memoirs to humanitarian aid that often shape perceptions of North Korea? Do these meaningfully influence the regime or do they mainly help it survive without reform?
- [13:38]
C
I mean, they have Only a limited impact on the regime, if any. They may encourage the regime to make minor adjustments primarily to receive such aids. But it has not facilitated any fundamental reform. Then what sustained North Korea without reform? It was the assistance from China and more recently Russia. Right. China provided essential support so that North Korea could go on. And more recently, in return for North Korea's involvement in the war, Russia supplied a substantial amounts of food and energy to North Korea. So that sustained the regime. Now, does that mean that the outside narratives and inputs aid is useless? I think not. Right. They continue to help inform some North Koreans at least, of their own realities and about the outside world. So at some point in the future, this may instigate a move within North Korea. And it has been known that there are some resistance groups within the country. I don't have a confirmation of this, but I think these outside narratives could have a positive impact, although it doesn't seem to have any decisive impact on the regime itself at the moment.
- [15:00]
A
Well, your chapter on China situates its rise in a long history of regional dominance and humiliation. How did these historical continuities, including Sinocentrism and the century of humiliation, shape China's role today?
- [15:19]
C
So the memory of Sinocentrism tends to make the Chinese leaders to pursue a leadership role in the region and beyond, because that's what they had and that's what, what I believe that's what they would like to have in the future for themselves. But sometimes such tendency creates tension with the neighbors who do not wish to accept China's leadership. So the century of humiliation raises a caution on the part of the Chinese and alert about foreign powers. And that's, you know, what they have in their minds. And they try to guard itself from potential threats from the outside. Sometimes the caution is transformed into overreaction and even aggression to secure what it considers vital interest for their survival. So the memory also justifies a strong central leadership to protect China from external threats. So I think that's what has impacted the Chinese position today.
- [16:17]
A
Deng Xiaoping's reforms set China on its current economic trajectory. How decisive were leadership choices compared to underlying social and economic pressures, do you think?
- [16:32]
C
You know, by the late 1970s, the planned economy was stagnating in China. Agriculture shortages persisted, making changes somewhat inevitably unavoidable. At the time. What distinguished China's trajectory was Deng's pragmatic literature, his willingness to depart from Maoist orthodoxy, dismantle the communes and open the economy. Structural pressures created the conditions for reform. That's true, but Deng shaped its form and pace combining market liberalization with continued one party rule. I think this case shows, Keith, that while social and economic forces drive the demand for change, the leadership choices channel those forces into particular outcomes.
- [17:19]
A
China has shifted from the world's factory to a giant consumer market while also using trade coercively, as in the FAD dispute with South Korea. How sustainable is this dual strategy of integration plus coercion, do you think, Professor?
- [17:41]
C
China becoming one of the world's largest markets has served as an engine for growth for the neighboring countries. Okay. However, China, as you put it, also used trade as a means to impose the political agenda on its trade partners. Coercive trade strategy is increasingly counterproductive. I wrote an article entitled Weaponizing International Trade in Political Disputes and pointed out such trade strategy not only disrupts the rule based multilateral trading system under wto, but also undermines its own interests. After the FA dispute, there was a substantial divestment by major Korean companies such as Samsung and Lotte, causing substantial unemployment and a loss of confidence in China's economy and trade policy. So you actually pay for coercive trade policy which have some suggestion for a current Trump administration?
- [18:40]
A
Good point.
- [18:41]
C
And?
- [18:41]
A
Well, some scholars have stressed the CCP's adaptability as its strength, while others argue Xi's centralization narrows flexibility. How do you see the balance between adaptability and centralization shaping China's future?
- [19:01]
C
I see that under sea's rule, such adaptability and flexibility have decreased and rigidity has increased due primarily to the centralization of the power. Okay. The balance, in my view, has been compromised, at least to a degree, and it is expected to have an adverse impact on China's future. I think efforts should be made to restore the balance by strengthening collective decision making based on deliberation. And decisions should be made more accountable to the public. And then steps should be taken to increase the independence of the judiciary.
- [19:41]
B
This is a real good story about.
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C
Bronx and his dad, Ryan, real United Airlines customers. We were returning home and one of the flight attendants asked Bronx if he wanted to see the flight deck and meet Kathy. Andrew.
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A
I got to sit in the driver's seat. I grew up in an aviation family and seeing Bronx kind of reminded me.
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C
Of myself when I was that age. That's Andrew, a real United pilot. These small interactions can shape a kid's future.
- [20:04]
A
It felt like I was the captain.
- [20:06]
C
Allowing my son to see the flight deck will stick with us forever. That's how good leads the way.
- [20:11]
A
And of course, that's easy for us to say, but at the same time, to what extent does she revive a hierarchical Sinocentric worldview and how do neighbors perceive it so?
- [20:26]
C
At the beginning of the regime, Xi declared the Chinese Dream, which refers to the great rejuvenation of Chinese nation, and some interpreted that as a revival of hegemonic China and that of Sino centuries. Xi pursued this through development of industries and technologies and military buildup and economic and trade expansion. The neighbors such as Korea, Japan and Mongolia survived China's domination for centuries and do not prefer to return to their subservient position in the past. Therefore, they see the rise of China with caution as a potential threat to their independence and prosperity. While they may recognize China's economic and even political role in the region, they are unlikely to accept China's domination of the region.
- [21:19]
A
Given China's size and trajectory, is sustainable peace in Northeast Asia possible without China actively buying in or even leading the process?
- [21:32]
C
A sustainable peace in the region will not be possible without China's participation. At the same time, the others are unlikely to accept China dominating process. Okay, so China showed that it can participate without necessarily dominating the process. It has shown that in the negotiations for ARSA, which is a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, an FTA with 15 member countries in the Asia Pacific region, China participated in the process but did not dominate it. So negotiation was successful and our set began in 2022.
- [22:10]
A
Thanks, professor, for the background there. And that kind of frames the opening of your book. A key chapter, though, is your chapter on South Korea. And I want to ask, historically, Korea as a whole has balanced between larger powers. How does this history shape South Korea's current identity as a middle power?
- [22:36]
C
Oh, that's an excellent question. You know, for much of history, Korea was able to balance between powers in the region. Example would be they stopped the Khitans from conquering whole of China in the 11th century through major warfare, and also stopped Japan from occupying the entire east asia in the 16th century. However, the country lost its role after being defeated by the Manchus, the Qing Dynasty later on in the 17th century. As a result, nothing could stop Japan to collide with China in the late 19th and 20th century and turn the whole region into the bloody battlefield. So since the 1960s, South Korea's unprecedented and economic development returned the country to the position of Regional coordinator. It's still not powerful enough to balance between larger powers or stop collision between them. But as a middle power, the country can exert meaningful influence. The region was stable when Korea was robust and assumed the role of balancer. And this experience shaped Korea's identity as a Middlepo. So through robust economy and solid military base, the country can act as a coordinator or regional balancer, if you will.
- [23:56]
A
South Korea, as you put it there, is Now a top 10 economy and military power, yet remains highly export dependent and vulnerable to the North. How do these strengths and vulnerabilities shape the balancing role you just talked about?
- [24:17]
C
So, being a top 10 economy and trader in the world, South Korea has substantial economic resources that can support its role. However, at the same time, South Korea is an export dependent economy and limits its power as a balancer because of this export dependency. So efforts to diversify its exports and it could reduce export dependency on a few major markets and increase its autonomy. So the process is ongoing to overcome that export dependency. Also, South Korea is also vulnerable to the nuclear armed north and depends on the alliance with the US for its defense, particularly against a possible nuclear attack from the North. However, as seen in the Ukraine, Russian war nuclear weapons are not easy to use, and South Korea is a superior to the north in terms of the conventional military force, now ranked at number five according to the Global Firepower Index. So the large conventional force increased South Korea's regional capability and influence and its leverage.
- [25:27]
A
Well, you highlight Roh Moo Yun's balancer vision with Moon Jae In's mediation attempts. What do these cases reveal about the constraints and possibilities of Korean leadership? And you'll have to excuse my pronunciation there.
- [25:46]
C
Your pronunciation is great to my ears at least. On both occasions, South Korea showed its aspirations, but also revealed its limits in dealing with the world's superpower. The Bush administration did not want South Korea under the ROE Administration to increase its regional autonomy. Okay. And Moon's mediation attempts eventually failed through the increasing geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China, resulted in each power approaching South Korea for diplomatic support, technological alliance and economic cooperation. So the situation has changed since then. It provides South Korean leadership with leverage vis a vis other powers in the region, including U.S. and China.
- [26:34]
A
Well, you describe South Korea's democracy as deeply polarized, shaped by weak party, institution, and even fandom politics. How does polarization affect Seoul's ability to act as a consistent balancer?
- [26:52]
C
I think this polarization affects its ability. Frankly, the oppositions went to other powers such as the United States, and made their case to secure a political support. Such divisive act does not help with South Korea's agenda and undermine its ability to play in the region. Obviously, to play an effective strategic role in the region, the country needs a bipartisan strategic platform.
- [27:20]
A
Well, you conclude that unification is the only permanent solution to to South Korea's vulnerability why do you see unification as essential for sustainable peace?
- [27:34]
C
Despite its immense costs, the division in the peninsula has been confrontational and hostile for several decades. In the worst case, a war could break out, in which case the scale of cost would be unimaginable. There is also a humanitarian concern. The families have been split and could not see each other again for several decades. From a security standpoint, most experts agree that the north is unlikely to agree to denuclearize, and the unification is likely the only permanent solution to the ongoing nuclear issue. North Korea's nuclear issue is obviously one of the most pressing issues in the world today, so the need for unification is reinforced for that reason.
- [28:20]
A
Well, your book's fifth chapter is titled A Power With Rising Escalation of Tensions between Japan and Its Neighbors, Japan's post war economic miracle made it the world's second largest economy by the 1960s. What were the decisive factors behind this success and how do they still shape Japan's role today?
- [28:46]
C
The Japan adopted the state led industrial promotion and export facilitation policy. The government supported strategic industries for economic growth and also supported exports to help expand production. Japan also had educated labor force capital earned from supplying US Military during the Korean War and well disciplined and trained administrators determined to pursue national economic policies. And also there was military protection from us. All these factors were important for Japan's success. Now the Japanese government still has a large influence on its economy through industrial and monetary policies, and the cited factors still exist and shape Japan's political and economic parameters in the region. With ongoing economic and industrial influence, Japan's.
- [29:39]
A
Pacifistic constitution coexists with one of the world's most capable militaries these days, with Tokyo now doubling its defense budget. Is this still the old paradox of Article 9? Or is Japan becoming a normal military power so to speak?
- [29:59]
C
As you say, Keith, Japan is already a large military power with the second or third most powerful Navy in the world. Now, regardless of stipulations in the constitution, that's the reality now. Japan also expanded the notion of defense so that it can support its allies and can now make preemptory strikes if it considers the attacks on Japan or its allies are imminent. It will be more difficult though if the government were to start a war where the attacks on Japan or its allies are unclear due to constitution. However, the constitutional amendment might be possible at least in the future, although it's not clear whether the public would indeed support constitutional amendment right at this moment.
- [30:46]
A
Thanks, Professor. Well, the historian Roger Brown described Japan as, and I quote, an economic giant but political pygmy. Why has Japan struggled to convert economic strength into political leadership?
- [31:03]
C
You know, given Japan's aggression during the war and resulting destruction of the region, Japan concentrated on economic recovery after the war and remained cautious about political engagement in the region. Japan for a long time avoided sensitive issues after the turn of the century, though, with the scent of the right wing in Japanese politics, Japan raised political voice, creating some tension with the neighboring countries. But it failed to build political leadership and agenda that appealed across the region. There is an episode that demonstrates Japan's political ambition. Japan became interested in taking up a seat as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, tends to admit and apologize for its war crimes, such as the comfort women issue and the Nanjing Massacre eventually blocked its move. The lack of vision and leadership that can appeal to the region and beyond, and the lack of the courage to admit the crimes committed during the war was the reason for the struggle, in my view.
- [32:10]
A
Well, wartime memory then, from comfort women to the territorial disputes, continues to fuel tensions. How central are these in particular to grievances today?
- [32:24]
C
For the past few years at least, both South Korea and Japan tried to stop escalation of those issues. But without agreeing on a permanent solution, Japan maintains its position that all compensations had already been made under the terms of the treaty between the two countries back in the 1960s. And Korea's position is still that it does not block the treaty, does not block private actions against the Japanese government, and the Japanese government will be responsible for the outcome of such private actions. Many Koreans feel that there has been no proper acknowledgment, apology, or compensation. So the grievances are there, perhaps below the surface now. Now that Japan's new Prime minister is a hardliner on those issues, those grievances could once again be a central problem, depending on what Xi choose to do. So if she provokes Koreans to garner support from her hard line, you know, the right wing constituencies, the situation could get complicated.
- [33:27]
A
Well, as you alluded to earlier, you've contrasted Japan with Germany's path of reconciliation after World War II. What explains Japan's reluctance to follow that model and what might shift its stance?
- [33:45]
C
The Japan's right wing faction, which dominated Japanese politics for over the past two decades, have a different perspective. They do not seem to acknowledge the existence of the tragic crimes and contend that even if there was an issue, all was compensated and resolved back in the 1960s, which in my view was not quite the case. There is a fundamental difference between the Japanese and Germany's approach and the latter. Germany acknowledged the problem, apologized, compensated and educated. And this is important future generations. Perhaps growing public awareness in Japan might create pressure on the government. The problem is that most of the young Japanese generations do not seem to have been educated and unaware of the tragedy, unlike the Germans. So this might take some time. International pressure might have an impact. But the late Japanese Prime Minister Abe did not accept recommendations from the former German Chancellor Merkel to follow Germany's path. And the US is at the moment reluctant to press this issue on Japan to secure Japan's alliance and cooperation against China.
- [35:01]
A
At this point, given its advanced economy, democracy and US alliance, what realistic role can Japan play in building sustainable peace in the region?
- [35:15]
C
Japan, one of the largest economies and traders, have much to offer in this regard. It can provide material and political support for sustaining peace. However, its unwillingness to acknowledge and fix the problems caused by its conduct during the war create a substantial block to building deeper trust and confidence in the region that's required for sustaining peace. As a result, Japan has a limited political capital in the region and perhaps it could play a supporting role for the U.S. but in my view, Japan can play an even larger role by fixing those issues.
- [35:55]
A
Seems like a no brainer. Appreciate you articulating it as such. You describe the United States as an insider from the outside that is embedded through alliances, yet not of the region. Could you unpack this for us?
- [36:14]
C
Sure. The US is not from this region obviously, but became an insider because it was in a position to rebuild Japan. So the US was intimately involved in the political, economic and social processes of both countries for several decades. Its presence in the region also created a fundamental impact on the political and economic posture of its former communist enemies such as China, Russia and even North Korea. China's economic rise may have been very difficult, frankly, had us not supported its export driven economic development by opening up it's a vast import market since the 1980s in its effort to keep Soviet in check.
- [37:00]
A
Interesting you put it that way because one of the people that you reference is realist IR scholar Christopher Lane, who argues that China's rise undermines US hegemony.
- [37:16]
C
Do you see?
- [37:16]
A
Washington is still able to play a stabilizing role.
- [37:21]
C
China's economic and industrial development created financial and technological resources for massive military buildup position in the region and perhaps beyond. The US administration tried to contain China's challenge through alliances including South Korea, Japan, Australia and others. But the current Trump administration has weakened this alliance by attacking them with tariffs and coercing them to make investments in the United States in massive amounts which burden their economies. So as a result, Washington is losing its ability to stabilize the situation.
- [38:00]
A
You emphasize US withdrawal from the tpp, that is the Trans Pacific Partnership and blocking the WTO appellate body. And you mentioned that in our last conversation. How much does US Economic credibility matter alongside its military presence?
- [38:21]
C
So United States has the largest import market in the world, so it's economically important for the countries in the region and beyond. So it'll cause substantial economic disruption to those countries if US economic credibility will be undermined due to unpredictable, unreasonable and inconsistent policies that threatens the rule based multilateral trading system. The US blocking the appellate body is particularly concerning as it deprives the WTO of its ability to adjudicate trade dispute cases by rendering final decisions. So it matters. And the present state is very concerning.
- [39:04]
A
With US leaders increasingly explicit about defending Taiwan, how does that flashpoint reshape Northeast Asia as a whole?
- [39:14]
C
So I'm not sure whether the Trump administration will continue to commit to defending Taiwan. But the existing US Commitment has raised a degree of tension as China considers the US Commitment as interference with its own internal affairs and it warned South Korea and Japan not to support United States on this. However, South Korea and Japan does not prefer to see Taiwan invaded by sheer force and occupied by China. So the the commitment will likely have some support from these countries. Although some of the US allies such as Korea, might try to appear neutral due to its relations with China.
- [39:58]
A
You categorize Russia as another outsider insider. How should we understand Moscow's role, especially as it leans toward Beijing?
- [40:09]
C
You know, Russia was another architect of post war Northeast Asia, directly supporting the establishment of Communist Mongolia, North Korea and even China. However, its role and influence in the region has been reduced. Now its role and influence in the region is likely to be a further diminished due to the war in Ukraine, at least vis a vis South Korea and Japan, with whom Putin wants to cooperate for economic development in its northeastern Asian territory. But also there's a large economic disparity 10 times or so between Beijing and Moscow, and this might place Russia in the position of a junior partner vis a vis China due to the war. Prospects for economic cooperation with South Korea, Japan and the US has been diminished, at least in the short run, and Russia is more likely to focus on its relations with North Korea and China for the time being.
- [41:08]
A
So you're saying you see Moscow as a junior partner in their alignment with China. So let me ask you then, Russia's war in Ukraine has had ripple effects from sanctions to energy. Even Pyongyang's posture. How should we read these spillovers for Northeast Asia?
- [41:32]
C
So on your point about deeper alignment in China, let me just make a comment on that. Russia never wanted China or any other power to dominate Northeast Asia. Okay, so this alliance might be a tactical, but there is not realistic power imbalance as I talked about, and limits Moscow's ability to deal with China. But remember this, Russia relied on support from China and North Korea to continue its war with Ukraine. And this puts Russia in the position of junior partner, but whether or not it wishes to be aligned with China at a deeper level. So there is a degree of dependency already created. Now as for your point about the spillover effect of the war, you know, the war and Pyongyang's cooperation with Putin changed Pyongyang's posture because in return for North Korea's participation in the war, Russia provided support to North Korea, including food, energy, and possibly some military technology. This support has undermined the extensive economic sanctions imposed on North Korea that enabled North Korea to continue with its nuclear buildup, perhaps with less economic difficulties otherwise. And this indeed affects the political and security landscape of the entire region.
- [42:54]
A
Do you see any scenario where US And Russian interests converge constructively or are they destined to clash?
- [43:04]
C
You know, in the short run, United States and Russian political positions will collide over the Ukraine war as long as Putin wants to end this war by securing all of its acquisitions in the war. But both the United States and Russia could have had a common interest to contain China from expanding its sphere of influence. However, due to Russia's weakened position from the war and its dependence on China, Russia might never be in a position to pursue this objective with the United States, especially when the US also starts to lose its political capital around the world with coercive trade policies.
- [43:44]
A
Well, your Mongolia chapter From the PAX Mongoliaca to today's democracy, what makes Mongolia a hidden player worth watching?
- [43:56]
C
You know, Mongolia's role in the region was rather unknown but noteworthy for the following reason. Mongolia is currently the only country in the region that holds continuing international dialogues such as Ulaanbaatar dialogue started in 2013 where nearly all of the countries in the region if North Korea participated in the first dialogue and beyond so EU and most of the countries in the region participate. Mongolia maintains a good relations with all of the regional players, including North Korea and South Korea, and showed willingness to moderate them, aspiring to become a Switzerland of Northeast Asia, so to speak. Okay, and why is it worth watching? Because it's the only country in the region that can be in constructive dialogue with every other country in the region. The country has a goodwill from everyone and no active dispute with any other country in the region. And it showed diplomatic competency. So Japan once asked Mongolia to broke a meeting with North Korea on some Japanese abduct issue. The country is also the only formal communist country in Asia that is democracy today. So it is noteworthy.
- [45:14]
A
Mongolia sits between Russia and China with little military capacity, yet it pursues its, and I quote, third neighbor strategy. How effective has this been?
- [45:29]
C
You know, it's been working to a degree. While its economic dependency on China is clear, it has engaged in military cooperation with the United States, such as a conquest where US sends military personnel for training and cooperation. It also sent troops to several countries, including Iraq, Afghanistan and South Sudan. Mongolia also deepened economic cooperation with South Korea. Some 300,000 Mongolians, that's about 10% of whole Mongolian population, have visited, worked and lived in South Korea.
- [46:07]
A
That said, Professor, Mongolia's economy is tied overwhelmingly to China. How much leverage does it really have?
- [46:16]
C
You know, 80% of Mongolia's export goes to China. Right. So this generates economic vulnerability on the part of Mongolia. That's true. And it has a limited leverage from that standpoint. But politically, Mongolia's strategy lies in the broadened cooperation with other countries in the region and beyond. And this cooperation and networks create some political credit vis a vis other countries in the region, including China. China also have over 4 million Mongolians living in Inner Mongolia, which is China's territory. Does its relationship with Mongolia could affect this sizable population. And this also may create some leverage for Mongolia.
- [47:02]
A
So with Mongolia's mineral wealth, which is increasingly of importance these days, and its governance challenges, how does resource dependency shape Mongolia's options?
- [47:16]
C
Mongolia can use the mineral wealth for its economic development, and it has done that. But the research dependency may detract from efforts to industrialize and diversify. And Mongolia is aware of this danger and pursues economic diversification. So there is something called a Vision 2050, drafted by the Mongolian government, aims to boost Mongolia's development through reforms in education, digital technology, science, and signaling the strategic move to diversify the economy and modernize governance. Now, the question is this. It requires a substantial investment in infrastructure and education, science and technology. And this requires effective political leadership and efficient governance. So these are governance issues, and there is a corruption and internal strife. And it's up to the Mongolian government to see if it's ready to tackle these challenges and move on with the stated vision.
- [48:19]
A
So do you think the description of Mongolia as the first communist democracy is that Akin to offering a symbolic model for the region. Could it even inspire reform in North Korea, do you think?
- [48:35]
C
I think it does. And the former Mongolian President Albek Dorzi visited North Korea and spoke at Kim Il Sung University, North Korea's flagship university, about the importance of individual freedom. He spoke about it. It may have inspired the minds of young students, but it did not seem to affect the North Korean regime or persuade it to embark on democratic reform. But nonetheless, North Korean elites witnessed the economic advancement and political recognition of Mongolia after democratization. And perhaps this might have some impact on that, if not the region itself at the moment.
- [49:15]
A
In your conclusion, you argue that peace requires more than managing disputes. It demands a cooperative framework. What does this framework look like and how does it differ from today's alliances?
- [49:32]
C
So this framework will have three components. Economics and trade, political and military. First, economic and trade integration. And by this I mean a regional fta, Free Trade Agreement. Now, there are FTA in Asia, so there is an FTA between China, Japan and South Korea. And there is rcep, which includes many of the countries in the region, but not all of them. There is no FTA that includes all of the countries in Northeast Asia. And there should be one. Second, there has to be a degree of political integration, such as the eu. As in eu, each country will have to remain as a sovereign country, but there should be a political framework that addresses common political interests and objectives with a mandate to make binding decisions on member states. Obviously, such a framework presupposes a degree of political trust and sharing of certain common values among member states. So there is kif, a long way to go. But eventually such a political framework would be necessary to secure lasting peace in the region. So this is a long term goal, but there has to be a degree of political integration in the region. The third component is a military cooperative framework. In order to stop the war in the region on a permanent basis, there has to be a collective defense. Now, again, this is a long way to go. It is difficult to imagine the Chinese military and Japanese, or even South Korean military serving under the same command. But in the long run, such an arrangement will be necessary to ensure lasting peace and prevent regional disputes.
- [51:22]
A
In the early iterations of talking about it, it makes no sense to most people. It sounds like some sort of utopian.
- [51:31]
C
I mean, here's the thing, you know, you know, a lot of people say this, having, you know, Chinese and Japanese, South Korean military serving under the same command sounds like, you know, it's, it's illusion almost. But I think you would have Same response. If you had asked the question whether or not the French and Germans could be serving under the same command at the turn of, you know, 20th century, and everybody would have called you crazy. But within 50 years, I mean, there were two major wars in between. However, by 1950s, it was even considered necessary for these two powers to put under collective defense. Like I said, I mean, it's not going to be feasible in the short run, but after some decades they will have to see the need for collective defense. Otherwise you won't be able to stop rivalry between countries like the US and China and the region, however unseemly might look. You will have to put them in the framework where you would pursue some integration economically, politically and collective defense. Otherwise there is not going to be a breakthrough given the level of tension that each players can generate. Also, Xi doesn't appear to be a very synclessial leader, although compared to Trump. Now he gets a better look.
- [52:44]
A
You propose deciphering the region's codes. Nationalism, Confucianism, liberalism, economic development and balance of power. Why are these the key codes and how do they point us toward peace?
- [53:01]
C
These are the codes that help us understand the political, economic, cultural and military dynamics in the region. Nationalism is a code because all countries in the region have strived for national independence, even under colonial and imperial rule. Confucianism also helps to explain political dynamism emerging from North Korea, China, South Korea and even Japan, where social hierarchy and orders remain still important and affects their international relations too. Liberalism explains political involvement and struggle toward freedom and democracy in South Korea, Japan and Mongolia, and even in China, although the moves there, I mean China have not yet materialized into democratic rule. The countries in the region also mobilized national resources toward economic development through several decades and have achieved economic development, lifting a vast majority of populations from abject poverty. So economic development is also important code to understand what happens in the region. Finally, the balance of power. You know, you see the complex dynamism in the region that allies with the United States and also at the same time cherish its relations with China. So sometimes confrontations, sometimes cooperations, and much of that is toward achieving balance of power, so that these smaller players in the region could maintain degree of independence and totality. So also the last, the balance of power is an important key to understand the dynamics in the region. Now, these factors codes may either support or detract from peace, depending on how each country handle that. So for example, the use of nationalism to consolidate power would not help with peace process, but the promotion of liberalism could encourage free and open dialogue with neighbors, and this will help with the process. So these factors could either support or distract, depending on how the governments and societies will embrace them.
- [55:17]
A
Thanks, professor. And the U.S. china rivalry. It is in many ways quite literally the elephant in the room. How much of Northeast Asia's future depends on how they manage competition.
- [55:34]
C
So the US and China have their own alliances in the region. So for us it's South Korea and Japan. For China it's North Korea and Russia. Although China and Russia do not have a formal alliance treaty, rivalry between the two countries have resulted in the confrontational balance between these two groups of countries. And this confrontation is inherently unstable. So if the competition is not properly managed, the regional stability will be adversely effective and could be even developed into conflict.
- [56:08]
A
North Korea's nuclear permanence raises, I guess, another hard question. Must peace be built on managing a nuclear North Korea rather than eliminating it?
- [56:21]
C
You know, accepting nuclear armed North Korea is a difficult proposition for the us, South Korea and Japan to accept. Perhaps it's not consistent with the long term interest of China and Russia either. In the long run, perhaps all prefer to see North Korea's nuclear weapons eliminated. However, a realistic approach could be to manage it so that North Korea's nuclear issue will not be escalated into critical danger for the region and the world. In the long run, steps will have to be taken toward the elimination of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula.
- [57:00]
A
Well, finally, looking ahead, what should readers and policymakers take away from your book about what it really, really takes to build peace in Northeast Asia?
- [57:12]
C
First, I would like the readers to understand the importance of sustaining peace in the region. The region includes over 20% of the world population and nearly a quarter of the world's economy. And also the world's largest military powers have been deployed in the region. As a result, there is more military forces concentrated in the region than any other part of the world. So any major conflict in the region will have a devastating impact on the world economy with potentially millions of casualties in the worst cases. Second, what the region currently has is a confrontational balance between US And South Korea and Japan on one hand, and China, Russia and North Korea on the other. This confrontation can be escalated into an active conflict. Thus it has to be turned into a more cooperative framework that achieves a degree of economic, political and military integration across the region. It's a long term objective, but the necessary one to sustain peace in the region. Third, the regional cooperative relationship means that the current rivalry between the US and China will have to be managed so that it's not escalated into an active conflict. As I mentioned earlier, the lasting peace in the region cannot be achieved without China's participation and the escalation of tension between the two countries will create critical challenges to China's participation in the process. Not just the US and China, but each of the other countries in the region has a unique political, economic, cultural and historical context that affects sustainable peace in the region. This context should be studied and understood. Lastly, for China to participate in the peace process meaningfully, it has to gain trust and confidence from the other countries in the region. However, its unilateral trade measures and aggressive engagements have undermined this trust. The political reform might be necessary to restore China's confidence. Why is it necessary? Why political reform? Because internal governance style tends to be reflected in external engagements and even direct the latter. For external engagements to be more balanced, accommodating and reasonable, internal decision making process will also have to ensure the process of consultation, deliberation and the outcome should be made publicly accountable. Collective decision making process is a more stable essentially then one that is controlled by a single leader. So Keith, I want the readers to take away these four points.
- [59:56]
A
Thanks Professor. Well, thank you for taking the time to join us again today. Sustainable Peace in Northeast Asia published by Anthem Press.
- [60:07]
C
Thank you so much. I have enjoyed this interview and I look forward to talking with you again. Sa.