Old Newscast: The Oslo Accords, 1993 (Part 2)

Summary

Old Newscast: The Oslo Accords, 1993 (Part 2) — Detailed Episode Summary

Podcast: Newscast
Host: Adam Fleming (with Jane Corbyn and Lyse Doucet)
Episode Date: August 16, 2025
Topic: What Undermined the Oslo Peace Process — Settlements, Violence, and Shifting Politics

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Overview

This episode is a deep dive into the unraveling of hope that followed the 1993 Oslo Accords—the much-heralded peace agreement between Israelis and Palestinians. Host Adam Fleming, joined by veteran correspondents Jane Corbyn and Lyse Doucet, traces pivotal moments after the famous White House handshake. The discussion focuses on Arafat’s return to Gaza, the rising tensions from Jewish settlers, Palestinian opposition groups like Hamas, the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, suicide bombings, political changes in Israel, and the missed opportunities that followed. The episode carefully examines how a breakthrough moment for peace dissolved into renewed mistrust and violence, setting the region on a difficult path that continues today.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

The Hopeful Homecoming: Arafat Returns (00:55 - 09:57)

• Jane Corbyn recounts traveling with Yasser Arafat as he returns to Gaza in July 1994 after 27 years in exile.
  • “I have never seen crowds like this.” (Jane Corbyn, 04:16)
• Palestinian flags wave amidst chaos and excitement; forbidden under Israeli occupation, their public display marks a historic shift.
• Arafat is quoted:
  • “I come with the peace of the brave.” (Yasser Arafat, 06:47)
• Lyse Doucet describes the emotional resonance felt by Palestinian refugees watching from Amman:
  • “They were crying because they also dared to believe that for all of the imperfections of this deal, that it... would mean they would go home.” (Lyse Doucet, 11:09)
• There is widespread hope among Palestinians and many Israelis, but also intense protest and anxiety, particularly among Jewish settlers.

New Realities and Growing Dissent—Settlements and Security (12:19 - 14:48)

• Settlers were angry and protested Arafat’s return; their numbers were much lower than today but still significant (100,000 then, over 700,000 now on West Bank and East Jerusalem).
  • “They were not the force they have since become, but they were still a force to be reckoned with. And they were angry, very, very angry.” (Jane Corbyn, 12:25)
• Rabin and Peres lead a strong peace movement alongside powerful opposition from right-wing and nationalist Israeli groups.

Oslo’s Fragile Foundations—Area A, B, and C (15:41 - 17:58)

• Agreement to divide the West Bank for phased autonomy: Area A (Palestinian control), Area B (shared), Area C (total Israeli control).
  • Lyse Doucet: “The B area was where Palestinians would have civilian control, but the Israelis would control security. And area C... controlled exclusively by Israel.” (16:38)
• Arafat's frustration: “It’s like a Swiss cheese... we will never have contiguous territory.” (Yasser Arafat via Jane Corbyn, 17:58)
• Both sides show signs of disappointment and growing mistrust.

The Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin—A Turning Point (19:06 - 24:09)

• Lyse Doucet recounts being present the night of the assassination in November 1995 after a peace rally in Tel Aviv:
  • “Suddenly a little note comes up. Shooting at the, the rally.... Rabin’s been shot.” (Lyse Doucet, 20:55)
• News breaks across Israel and the world, signaling a catastrophic blow to the peace process.
  • “The night Yitzhak Rabin was killed was the night Oslo was killed.” (Lyse Doucet, 22:39)
• Jane Corbyn recalls: “Uri said to me, ‘It’s over. Everything we did, it’s over.’” (Jane Corbyn, 22:44)
• The assassin, Yigal Amir, is an Israeli right-wing extremist, not a Palestinian.

Politics Shift: Netanyahu, Violence, and Eroding Trust (24:09 - 31:16)

• Benjamin Netanyahu and the right surge; peace negotiator Shimon Peres is less trusted than Rabin.

• Rise of Hamas and other militant groups:

  • After a series of suicide bombings, Israeli public support for the peace process and for Peres collapses.
  • Notable bombings include attacks on the Jaffa Road in Jerusalem—one right outside the BBC office (Lyse Doucet, 25:50).
  • Mastermind behind many attacks: Mohammed Deif, still a major figure in the present conflict.

• Massive expansion of Israeli settlements (incentives for young Israelis, particularly under Likud’s government).

  • “... offered at cut prices and swimming pools and everything to young Israelis who would move from areas like Tel Aviv ... that's when the number of Israelis really began exponentially to rise on the West Bank.” (Jane Corbyn, 30:03)

Missed Final Opportunities—Camp David 2000 & Aftermath (33:00 - 37:12)

• At the end of Clinton’s presidency, another summit (Camp David) fails due to intractable issues like Jerusalem.
  • Lyse Doucet: “The phrase which came out afterwards … ‘We offered you 95% and you said no.’” (Lyse Doucet, 34:04)
• Both sides feel betrayed and embittered, leading to the outbreak of the Second Intifada—“even more violent and difficult and bloody than the first.” (Jane Corbyn, 36:26)
• The cycle of violence continues, hope fades; Hamas gains strength as the PLO weakens.

Reflections—The State That Never Was (37:12 - End)

• Adam Fleming draws a line from Oslo to current two-state solution discussions, emphasizing today’s hope rests on the blueprint first signed in 1993.
  • “The blueprint for that is what you were witnessing being signed in 1993.” (Adam Fleming, 37:12)
• Lyse Doucet recalls Gaza’s brief taste of statehood, like its international airport, emphasizing how close and yet how far the dream remained.
  • “We went to the international airport and said, so what are the flights you offer? ... the mood there was that they were getting ready for the state...” (Lyse Doucet, 37:44)

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• Yasser Arafat on returning to Gaza:
  “Now I am returning to the free, to the first free Palestinian land. You have to imagine how it is moving my heart, my feelings.” (Arafat, 05:25)
• Jane Corbyn on the significance of Gaza:
  “Gaza was the important thing. And sadly today we understand that Gaza still is the nub of the question and the most difficult problem of all.” (Jane Corbyn, 09:41)
• Lyse Doucet on the shattering of hope:
  “The night Yitzhak Rabin was killed was the night Oslo was killed.” (Lyse Doucet, 22:39)
• Jane Corbyn on Rabin’s murder:
  “The irony… it was an Israeli right winger who shot him. Not… Hamas or a Palestinian… with disastrous consequences.” (Jane Corbyn, 23:29)
• Lyse Doucet on Israeli and Palestinian reactions:
  “Many of my Israeli friends who had embraced the Oslo Accords… after those years… wanted separation, instead of peace—just get out of our lives.” (Lyse Doucet, 34:50)

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Arafat’s Homecoming: 02:18 – 09:57
• Settler Protests & Israeli Political Landscape: 12:19 – 14:48
• Oslo II & Division of the West Bank: 15:41 – 17:58
• Assassination of Rabin: 19:06 – 24:09
• Hamas, Suicide Bombings, Israeli Politics Shift: 25:12 – 31:16
• Settlement Expansion & Palestinian Reaction: 31:16 – 33:00
• Camp David 2000 & Second Intifada: 33:15 – 37:12
• Final Reflections—Lost Statehood: 37:12 – 38:40

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Tone and Style

The conversation is rich in first-hand reportage, emotional reflection, and historical insights, blending journalistic rigor with the intimacy of personal memory. The tone is thoughtful, often poignant, balancing cautious nostalgia with clear-eyed analysis of why the Oslo dream has so painfully unraveled. The use of direct quotes and vivid description—crowds waving forbidden flags, journalists scrambling as news breaks, a bombed bus outside a correspondent’s window—draws the listener into the lived experience of history.

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Conclusion

This episode illuminates not only the political milestones and missteps of the Oslo era but also the human highs and lows that accompanied them. It is a chronicle of hope, betrayal, violence, and the everyday choices that shaped history. The legacy of Oslo, as the hosts argue, continues to define debates about peace—its success and its tragedy echoing down the decades.

Transcript

[Adam Fleming]

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[Ray Winstone]

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[Adam Fleming]

Thank you for listening to this episode of Old Newscast on BBC Sounds. Just a reminder, if you want to listen to our daily episodes of Newscast from the Modern World, they're available and you can subscribe to them on BBC Sounds.

[BBC Announcer]

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[Adam Fleming]

In the last episode of Old Newscast, we spoke about the famous handshake on 13th September, 1993 on the lawn of the White House between the Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, and Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the plo, which was a public acknowledgment of the Oslo peace process that produced a set of agreements known as the Oslo Accords. In this episode, we'll be looking at things that undermined the peace process, things like Israeli settlements, suicide bombings and changes in the leadership of Israel. All of this on this episode of.

[Lisa Doucet]

Old Newscast Newscast, Newscast from the BBC. We have been granted the great privilege.

[Ray Winstone]

Of witnessing this victory for peace.

[BBC Announcer]

For the past nine months, a secret channel forged the way to peace.

[Yasser Arafat (voice clip)]

Enough of blood and tears. Peace needs courageous men.

[Jane Corbyn]

There's a real fear of renewed turmoil.

[Adam Fleming]

In the Middle East. Hello, it's Adam in the newscast studio and I'm here with Jane Corbyn from Panorama. Hello, Jane.

[Jane Corbyn]

Hello.

[Adam Fleming]

And Lisa Doucet. Well, from the news.

[Lisa Doucet]

Hello. It's so excited to be with you, Jane.

[Adam Fleming]

So we've just had an incredibly hopeful moment. There's handshakes on the White House lawn. You've been. You've broadcast an amazing Panorama. Jane, with all this access and the secret talks, Lisa, you're thinking about moving to the region and setting up a BBC operation in Jordan. When. What happens next? What's the next bit of the story?

[Jane Corbyn]

Well, the next thing that happened to me was I went to Tunis to go with Arafat back to Gaza because it took a few months, the agreement after the agreements were signed, the idea was that he would form this government in Gaza. It would be Gaza first, Jericho, see how it works out, and then move into more areas. And he invited me on his Plane to fly from Tunis back to Gaza.

[Adam Fleming]

Why don't we have a listen to some of your panorama where you speak.

[BBC Announcer]

To Arafat since May when he flew to Cairo to finalize the peace agreement with Israel. We followed Yasser Arafat's progress, most at home on a plane, shuttling around the world, pleading the cause of his people. Arafat now faces a challenge how to make the transition to leader of the democratic modern state he espouses. From the start there's been chaos, disagreement, above all, delay. All part of his exasperating style, say his critics. The chairman airily dismisses the carping.

[Jane Corbyn]

Mr. President, if the last minute problems can be overcome, how is the situation on the ground? Are your people ready? Is the organization capable of moving ahead very quickly?

[Yasser Arafat (voice clip)]

Is ready.

[Jane Corbyn]

Some say there is some doubt about that.

[Yasser Arafat (voice clip)]

One of them, we told you so. That is certainly the, the committees are ready and they are staying there, waiting in Cairo.

[Adam Fleming]

What kind of plane was it?

[Jane Corbyn]

It was just a, you know, regular plane. It wasn't a small Learjet or anything like that. But there were a lot of people, I do remember on the flight, everybody was so keyed up. It's not a long journey from Tunis to Gaza. And he just went and laid at the back of the plane and covered himself with his kefir and went to sleep. And we were all like, how can he do that? This is such a momentous day. How can he sleep? But he did, he slept and he got up, put it on and we, we went out. Oh my goodness. I mean, I have never seen crowds like this.

[Lisa Doucet]

Okay, let me, but let me just tell you what was happening. So I was then on the ground in Jordan. So the world's media were descending on the region, including of course, most of all in Jerusalem. And I was going back and forth between Amman and Jerusalem. This is a very journalistic thing, but not just journalists, because diplomats were also waiting. Is that people were literally people were, were waiting to, to book the date of their wedding, waiting to book the date of their holiday. When is it going to happen? It went on for weeks. Is it going to. Oh, it's going to happen. Oh yes, it's going to happen. And I remember then when finally, what was it? July.

[Jane Corbyn]

It was July 1994.

[Lisa Doucet]

So July, ten months later, finally. And people then the stories went round that some, one of the BBC correspondents said he was lifting up, he finally decided, you know, the hell with this, I'm going on my holiday, I'm going to SC and literally in the pub raising a pint and then the message comes, Yasser Arafat's going back tomorrow. And literally, it's a measure of how. And not to just focus on the journalists, but everyone was waiting because it was such an important moment. After 27 years in exile, Yasser Arafat was coming home.

[Adam Fleming]

Let's hear how Arafat was feeling as he traveled to Gaza.

[Yasser Arafat (voice clip)]

You have to remember that the last time I left, I was there in. In Palestine, secretly. And I entered secretly, and I left secretly. Now I am returning to the free, to the first free Palestinian land. You have to imagine how it is moving my heart, my feelings.

[Lisa Doucet]

Okay, let's go to when he lands.

[Jane Corbyn]

So he lands. He goes down the steps. We're all behind him. And we see this absolute sea of excited humanity and waving of Palestinian flags. Because don't forget, Israel essentially occupied Gaza at that point, and Palestinians were forbidden to fly the Palestinian flag. Then all of a sudden, everybody had the big flags, the black, green, white and red, and they were waving them. It was a nightmare to film. We had a huge step ladder which we'd brought, but every time we put it up to get above to see the crowds, somebody would knock us over. It was really quite scary. But we did it. We filmed it and we made this film called the Homecoming, about Arafat coming home. It was an extraordinary day.

[Adam Fleming]

And did he have some words that. That match that moment?

[Jane Corbyn]

He kept saying, and this was his favorite phrase in English. I come with the peace of the brave.

[Yasser Arafat (voice clip)]

I said that me and Mr. Rabin had signed the peace of the braves. It is not a joke, this need from both of us, Israelis and Palestinians, to work hard to protect this peace process.

[Jane Corbyn]

He said it all the time because, of course, there was a lot of criticism. And at this point, Hamas was becoming Hamas, which grew out of the Gaza Strip. The more Islamist hardline group was obviously totally opposed to it. So he had to keep, you know, assuring his people that what he had done was the right thing. It wasn't capitulation. It was the peace of the brave. And this was the phrase he used endlessly from then on.

[Lisa Doucet]

And they said security then was the tightest ever since. Anwar Sadat, the president of Egypt, made his historic visit to Jerusalem as part of the earlier negotiations which led to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. And we forget now there were Jewish settlers, There were settlements in the Gaza Strip, and they forced. They went out and protested, and they forced a change of the route. He had a very short journey to make. He went through. We hear so much about Rafah and I'm sure listeners know all these places now, the border crossing from Egypt, because he stopped first in Egypt and then he went to. Had meetings, meetings there. And then he went through Rafah and to make that short drive from the border about 20 miles to Gaza City where thousands were waiting for him to make that speech. But they had to change route because. Because the Israeli settlers were so angry about this as were. And I think that the way it's written now is that when he addressed the crowds, when he spoke about Jerusalem, that helped to reassure some of the critics that he hadn't given up everything that he still had in mind. The ideals and the goals of majority of Palestinians.

[Jane Corbyn]

Yeah. And he used the symbol of Al Aqsa, the Great Mosque in Jerusalem was constant for him, constantly on video, constantly behind him on posters because he didn't want his followers to believe that he'd given up on it. So a combination of that and the peace of the brave. And then he made this journey where he carried on by road to Jericho, which is in the west bank and historic. And the reason that Jericho was chosen was there were some quite difficult and febrile areas in other parts of the West Bank. Hebron for example, and Nablus. So they chose a city like Jericho, which had had a fairly quiet and peaceful history when it came the Israeli Palestinian conflict. But Gaza was always difficult. And for him, for Arafat, he knew that Gaza going to Gaza and taking Gaza was what really mattered to his people. You know, Jericho was kind of an add on to say, yes, we're also taking control in the West Bank. Gaza was the important thing. And sadly today we understand that Gaza still is the nub of the question and the most difficult problem of all.

[Adam Fleming]

And Lisa, on that moment, I think on the moment of Arafat's return, I think you were watching it in Jordan. I was in someone who knew him very well.

[Lisa Doucet]

So I was watching it. And it's interesting because there were the Palestinians who were there to welcome him. They had the front row seats to history. But I was in Amman where there are so many of the Palestinians who had either been who either fled or were forced to leave during the 1948 war which led to the creation of the state of Israel. And so they had been up and I was really struck when I first moved to Jordan that you'd say to people, where are you from? And even though it was generations on, they'd say, well, I'm from Nablus or I'm from Gaza, I'm from. They were all glued to their TVs and the tears. And I had just arrived in the region, was beginning to understand the enormity of this issue. But one person who was with me and someone Jane must have met is Bassam Abu Sharif, who in his very physical self represented the path of the plo. He had lost four fingers. He was blind in one eye, deaf in one ear, because the Mossad, the Israeli secret service, had sent him a package and it blew up in front of him. So he was really badly injured. Time magazine at the time called him the face of Terror. He was involved in all of the airplane hijackings at the time. This was the.

[Adam Fleming]

Which in the 70s was happening all.

[Lisa Doucet]

The time, was all the time. This was the old plo, which underlined again the significance of that handshake at the White House lawn. The Palestinians were moving away from that violent history. And Bassem Abu Sharif, who couldn't go to Gaza that day, he became then a senior advisor to Yasser Arafat. The tears were flowing down his cheeks. And he too, Jane, talks about the hope, he too dared to believe that this was a new chapter for the Palestinians and a new chapter in the relationship between Israelis and Palestinians. And in fact, Basim Abu Sharif, decades later, went on to write a book with an Israeli journalist, the Best of Enemies, with an Israeli journalist who'd worked in military intelligence. But the Palestinian refugees who were also with us that day, they were crying because they also dared to believe that for all of the imperfections of this deal, that it off. They dared to hope that it would mean they would go home. But of course, the issue of refugees, the right of return, as it was called, had really not been dealt with yet.

[Adam Fleming]

But just to focus a bit more on that moment, I mean, presumably, though, to lots of Israelis, it was. It was scary.

[Jane Corbyn]

It was scary, yes. And there was Leese mentioned the settlers. You know, the settlers at that time were not as numerous or as powerful a force as they are today. There were around 100,000 of them. Today there are over half a million on the west bank and another 200,000 odd in East Jerusalem. They were not the force they have since become, but they were still a force to be reckoned with. And they were angry, Very, very angry. And, you know, they warned of hell would open and those in Gaza, the settlers in Gaza did. And it would take many years before Israel pulled out of Gaza and the settlements there were removed. And of course, the settlements still remain on the west bank and have multiplied. So, yes, Israelis were angry, but there was a lot of hope. In Israel, these were days when the Labour Party was strong. There was a big peace movement, Peace now and other organizations were strong. Young people belonged to them and they would go out and they would protest and hold rallies. And Rabin was a great figure to them and they believed that this would lead to peace in the end. The fact that all the problems happened actually created a real problem for the more liberal, peace oriented wing of Israeli society. And it's changed radically today. And numerically, demographically, the right wing, the nationalist viewpoint is in the ascendant, just simply force of numbers. But in those days there were a lot more people in the peace lobby. That was personified by Yitzhak Rabin and by Shimon Peres at that time, who were the architects of the Oslo accords.

[Lisa Doucet]

Israeli leaders tended to be military leaders because they had the credentials. And so Israelis who wanted to put their trust, despite their doubts and worries, fears, trust in it. Because if anyone knew how to make peace was someone who knew how to wage war. And if Yitzhak Rabin had been convinced that the best way to achieve security is through peace, then certainly there must be something, there must be something worthwhile. Because Shimon Peres, of course, did not have the kind of military background, but.

[Jane Corbyn]

Yitzchak Rabin had led the forces, the Israeli forces to victory and when they took, took East Jerusalem in the 1967 war, so he was personified the general who had actually delivered a victory for the Israeli forces. And that's why he was trusted when he later became a politician.

[Lisa Doucet]

I'm sitting next to Jane, she's got her book here, Gaza First. And to think that that was the thing and now it's Gaza last. It's just if anyone knew at that time where would be. And I remember that the time just shortly after this all happened, Yasser Arafat went to Singapore and he saw the beauty of Singapore and the grand successes, the glittering skyscrapers, everything was so clean. And he came back to Gaza and he said, oh, I want Palestine to be the Gaza, to be the Singapore of the Middle East. And again, Palestinians with their trademark humor said, oh, Abu Ammar, that's what they called him. Abu Amr, not Degar. Yeah, Abu Amr. We would really love to believe that Gaza will one day be Singapore, but we will always be Gaza poor.

[Adam Fleming]

So tell us then about the negotiations that then resume on the diplomatic track that then culminate with this Oslo 2 agreement.

[Jane Corbyn]

Yeah, I think in a way, what, what really, from my point of view, that, yes, that was ongoing and obviously it was getting, looking at Jerusalem, the status of the settlements, it was looking at these different areas because Israel retained security control over the west bank and Gaza. And it was all about how you, how you move them out of this area. And this, you know, know, highly complicated that was all going on. But then of course what happened was that, you know, there were problems internally in Israel. And I don't know if you want to talk about that now, but you know, I think, you know, then we had the situation where all the anger that was building in the west bank amongst the settlements and the right wing nationalists unfortunately found its outlet in one particular student who went with a gun to a peace rally where Yitzhak Rabin was speaking and he shot him, Yigal Amir.

[Lisa Doucet]

So they just not to get too complicated. It was interesting because I was reading back about that. The first meeting then that Yasser Arfat and, and Yitzhak Rabin had to discuss, you know, how we, how they would start implementing this, their new position and that it was very tense. It was still very tense between the two leaders. But they came up with this scheme which exists to this day and has never really been properly implemented, that there would be three areas of the West Bank, Area A. And it's important because I was there then and I saw the implementation of Area Area A would be under exclusive Palestinian control. So all of that year we saw the withdrawal of Israeli troops, you know, from Bethlehem, from Nablus, from Tulkan, from Jenin. We were constantly going out to another west bank city to see this historic pullout of Israeli troops. They didn't pull up from everywhere, but they did from the population centers. The B area was where they Palestinians would have civilian control, but the Israelis would control security. And area C, which is still to this day controversial, which is controlled exclusively by Israel, that had to go to the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, and already there was an uproar there. And it passed, but it only narrowly passed. So that was a barometer that you saw in the Israeli parliament of the feelings inside Israel.

[Jane Corbyn]

There was also anger on the Palestinian side. And I remember seeing Yasser Arafat at that time and he said to me, it's like a Swiss cheese. It's a piece of cheese with holes in it. And we will never have contiguous territory which was a reference to these areas A, B and C. They couldn't have a bit that joined to another bit. The Israelis controlled the roads, the roots, and, and there were real problems with the geography of it all and these three areas. And I think they could see that it was going to be much more difficult than they thought. And against that background, there was anger in the settlements, anger amongst the right wing nationalist parts of Israeli society. And that's when Yigal Amir, the student, decided to take matters into his own hands. He decided that there had essentially been a religious direction to kill Rabin because Rabin had betrayed them. And he would use that as justification for shooting and killing Yitzhak Rabin in that terrible night in the square in front of thousands of people who'd gathered for a while.

[Lisa Doucet]

So let me give you that, because I was there. So I was there that night. So I didn't know that.

[Adam Fleming]

I've known you for a long time.

[Lisa Doucet]

So. Well, I was there for part of the night. So, you know, as a correspondent there, then there was so much anger. There were so many protests by the right wing, by Orthodox Jews. And the anger, anger was rising. And then people said, what about the, you know, why isn't the Labour Party? Why isn't, why isn't the peace. Why not the peace act claiming back the streets? And so it was announced that there was going to be this rally in tel Aviv in November 1995. And even though it was a Saturday and it was very so, myself and my colleague from Australian Broadcasting, I thought, let's go out. It'll be different, it'll be nice, it'll be something different to do. The mood will be different. And a colleague from the cbc, another public broadcaster, said, I'm gonna, I'm gonna stay home. You know, I've, you know, I've kind of. I need a break from all this. So we went, we went to Tel Av was lots of Songs for Peace. And then the speeches were starting. And so we'd done all of our filming, we had all of our vox pop. And then we said, well, we better get back to Jerusalem. It took an hour or so to two hours to drive back to Jerusalem, and we can follow the rest on tv. So we left just as Yitzhak Rabin was starting to speak. So I get back to the office and that's when we had telex machines. So I'm sitting there, chick, chick, chick, chuk, chuk, chuk, you know, the telex. And suddenly a little note comes up. Shooting at the, the rally. I'm thinking, oh, my God, shooting. And then, you know, the telex is, is clattering away a teletype machine. And then another thing is shooting at Yitzhak Rabin. And then Yitzhak Rabin has been shot. And then it's all coming So I immediately called my colleague from Australia. I said, stop editing, stop editing, the story's changed. Rabin's been shot. And then I called my colleague from the, from cbc and I said, anna Maria, you've got to come to the office. And she replied with an expletive, as if to say lise was joking. I said, I'm not joking, you know, do you know, do it. And I would just tell you very quickly a little story because we use it to this day. So us women, we all told each other immediately, even before we follow their stories. There was a famous dinner party that night in Jerusalem. All the correspondents, pretty well, all male, were sitting around the table and we had beepers in those days. So one of the news, I won't say one of the news agency guys gets a beeper and he puts it in his pocket and he goes, guys, I've got everyone had them, right? He says, I gotta go back to the office, doesn't tell anyone, right? So then he leaves. And then someone else gets a beeper. He who is hosting this gets up, really tall guy, puts his arms across the door and says, you tell us what is happening. You tell us now. And then all the beepers went off and everyone had, Rabin has been shot. Now, I'm not going to get a theory out of this, but the women told each other and the men didn't anyway, so everyone rushed and the rest then. The rest then is history.

[Adam Fleming]

Yeah. And I was. So I was 15 and I was at home Saturday night watching BBC One, probably watching like Jaws for the 98th time. And then I really, really remember the news bulletin that came after the film or whatever the TV program was. And just hearing that news being announced.

[News Reporter]

The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, the architect of the Middle east peace process, has been assassinated. He was shot at least twice as he left a huge rally for peace in Tel Aviv tonight and died shortly afterwards in Hospital. A 27 year old Jewish man has been arrested and an extremist Jewish organization has claimed responsibility for the killing. A short while ago, the Israeli Foreign Minister, Shimon Peres was appointed acting Prime Minister at an emergency cabinet meeting.

[Lisa Doucet]

The night Yitzhak Rabin was killed was the night Oslo was killed.

[Jane Corbyn]

So I was on holiday then I was skiing in Switzerland, finally on holiday, finally on holiday. And I got a phone call from Uri Seville, who was the lead negotiator. And phone calls started to come in from we. They called themselves the Norway Channel. And I was like an honorary member because of what I The coverage, they all called me and Uri said to me, it's over. Everything we did, it's over. It will. Yeah, it will not survive this. And everybody was, you know, they were all in tears. And the Palestinians were calling. They knew he was dead. And he. And I remember sitting there in Switzerland, so incongruous. I was a million miles away and thinking, can that be the end of it? But they were right, of course. Because of what?

[Adam Fleming]

Subsequently, why did they reach that conclusion so quickly?

[Jane Corbyn]

Because I think they knew that Yitzhak Rabin was such a powerful person who had, you know, he'd been the guy who, at the very top, who'd okayed the Oslo channel and who'd okayed the peace process. And with him gone, although it would be pretty obvious that Shimon Peres would succeed him, he didn't have the trust and support of the Israeli population in the same way. And this was going to run into problems. And the irony of irony was that it was an Israeli right winger who shot him. Not what people might have expected. Hamas or a Palestinian who had tried to kill him, but he had been killed by his own side with disastrous consequences.

[Lisa Doucet]

You remember that Prime Minister Netanyahu. Well then, before he became prime Minister first in 1996, a lot of condemnation of Prime Minister of Benjamin Netanyahu for being so provocative, for denouncing Yitzhak Reimbibim, for holding these rallies, and so much anger and so much. And that he was accused of stirring up this kind of violence. Some even accused him of being responsible for the murder of Yitzhak Rabin. Because the atmosphere was so explosive. The anger was just being churned by these really, really provocative statements by politicians. Of course, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu denied it, but there was a certain mood that produced Yigal Amir. He didn't. He acted alone. But the mood then, which is why, as I said, I went to that rally because I thought, let's try to get something which is not so, so, so, so hostile.

[Adam Fleming]

I mean, does Shimon Peres try and give it a go?

[Jane Corbyn]

He does and he is. He becomes the prime minister by 1%.

[Lisa Doucet]

He wins.

[Jane Corbyn]

He wins.

[Lisa Doucet]

He wins. We literally 1%, just by 1%.

[Jane Corbyn]

And then, of course, Hamas enters the picture because they know that they're extreme Islamist organization at that time. They're growing in strength. They're very strong in Gaza. They've begun to get established in the west bank. And they know that, you know, the Israeli public is not fully behind Shimon Peres in the way that they were with Rabin, this trusted military man. And they a series of devastating bus bombings start. And I was there and covered some of them, particularly on the Jaffa Road in Jerusalem. Whole buses were blown up.

[Lisa Doucet]

In that period where of this rising militancy violence by the more extreme Palestinian groups, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, you had what were called the master bombing. That was what they were called then and Israel then the Mossad, of course, had all these techniques and really amazing infiltration of the Palestinian society. And it managed to actually get the master bomb maker, Yahya Hayash, by giving one of the people close to him. They infiltrated it, got a collaborator, and they got to someone who would have a phone that Yahya Ayash would use because he knew the Israelis wanted to get him. And so he was given a phone that had explosives in it. And when he called his father, the Israelis were alerted. They detonated the phone. This was the first time this was used. They detonated the phone remotely and Yahya Ayesh was killed. That set off weeks in February and March. Get the dates right of 1990, there were suicide bombings in the Dizzongoff shopping mall in Jerusalem, in Tel Aviv, where children were killed. Dozens of children were killed, all under Israelis under the age of 17. But also Jaffa Road. It was bus number 18. I lived on Jaffa Road. There was a bombing at the start of the week. On bus number 18. There was a bombing at the end of the week. One of them exploded it outside my door, which was. I lived right across from the Israeli city, the city hall. One of them, the bus blew up outside my door. The second one blew up right outside the BBC office, because the BBC office then was in something called jcs, which was right across from the main bus station. So the bus number 18 became synonymous with suicide bombings and how they managed to put to in two buses that same week.

[Jane Corbyn]

But as I understand it, and I went into Gaza when Aash was killed to try to actually find out from Hamas people in there how this had happened. They told me about the mobile phone. But the man apparently behind the mastermind, the Hamas mastermind behind the bus bombings was none other than Muhammad dav, who has of course, in this. This recent conflict came, was identified as the secretive, but the military mastermind of October 7th. He planned it. And as far back then as those bus bombings, it was Mohammed Deif who was behind it, who apparently created the bombs that blew up those buses that caused such a huge change in Israel and indeed subsequently in the history of the peace process.

[Adam Fleming]

And what's Arafat doing at this Point.

[Jane Corbyn]

Arafat is struggling and you know, he is still on the track to keep moving down the road, to keep taking more areas and spread the influence. But Hamas is making ground and their message is uncompromising. Their message is no, do not recognize the state of Israel, no peace with Israel. And they are proving it by blowing up up buses and killing a lot of Israelis. And this creates a totally different political environment in Israel whereby Netanyahu and the Likud government come to power and essentially the peace process is over because they do not believe in a two state solution.

[Lisa Doucet]

So Prime Minister Netanyahu comes to power against all odds given the what had happened before then with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. So he comes to power in, in May, winning by 1%, as we said, in September, they meet at the Eris Crossing. So Yasser Arafat, Benjamin Netanyahu have their first meeting. Very tense, but there's a handshake. This is the second big handshake. And everyone thinks, oh, they shook hands, even though the trust is now at rock bottom and the hopes are almost dashed. But they shake hands and so there's another little glimmer of hope which is quickly dashed.

[Jane Corbyn]

Rabin allowed settlements to be on the west bank for military and security purposes, but not for, if you like, political purposes, to allow nationalists to take more land. Under Netanyahu, that changed completely. The settlements weren't just there for security reasons, as it were, to ring around Israel. They were there for, you know, to basically take over the land to establish large numbers of Jewish families. And people were given incentives. You could go and buy a house cheaper in the settlements if you were a young couple from Tel Aviv. So the feeling was that there was a very strong move by the Likud government to, and I remember going to a city called Ariel on the west bank with the mayor, who was Likud, and he was taking us in a bus and showing us all the foundations of all these new houses that were being built. And there were big hoardings up and posters offering them at cut prices and swimming pools and everything to young Israelis who would move from areas like Tel Aviv, leave and go to live on the West Bank. And that's when the numbers of so called settlers, although many of them were just, they weren't, they had no particular political outlook, but they were offered cheap housing. And that's when the number of Israelis really began exponentially to rise on the West Bank.

[Lisa Doucet]

Shimon Peres, for a short time, he capped the budgets that the settlements could have. It was a little gesture to show that he will stop the settlement building. But in fact, it increased every single Israeli prime minister, no matter what they said, no matter how much, how hard they tried to get a peace deal, and some did try, they all failed to stop the expansion of settlements. And they went in lockstep expansion of settlements. And then the suicide bombings, the continuing occupation. And the moment that I really remember about settlements was in March of 1997, where Prime Minister Netanyahu gives the go ahead for a settlement right in eyesight of Jerusalem. A hilltop in between the west bank city of Bethlehem and Jerusalem, a tree, carpeted hill. And I remember at the time thinking, oh, my God, this is what they call. Yes. And I suppose now you go there and the Har Horma is full of the trees, are down the houses, you know, as if it's a normal part of.

[Jane Corbyn]

I remember because Abu Allah, who was one of. Was the main Palestinian negotiator in the Oslo process. I knew him very well. And every time I went, I would go to Abu Diz, which is a Palestinian village just outside East Jerusalem where he lived. And I remember him taking me to Hamar and saying, look what's happening. This, you know, what they tried to do at Oslo was establish a sort of economic basis for a future state. He was, because he was a banker, he was very keen that part of the process would be to expand, you know, economic opportunity for the Palestinians. But he said, they are taking the land and they are establishing these villages for settlements, and it will never happen. And I remember him being very upset and sad walking around that settlement with me.

[Adam Fleming]

And then I'm sorry to leap ahead in the timeline, but we get to the year 2000, and it's the end of Clinton's presidency, and there's another American moment where they try to. Yeah, so a lot has happened in Israeli politics. There's a new prime minister and Labour again.

[Jane Corbyn]

He's back. Ehud Barak again, another military man, a much decorated general. And they meet at Camp David with the intention of reaching agreement over these very troubled issues like Jerusalem. And they don't. I remember at the time, actually, that Arafat was very worried about his personal safety. And I was told that he had been threatened by other factions, more extreme factions within the Palestinian camp, that if he made this deal and he negotiated over such sensitive issues as Jerusalem, he might not survive. And nobody could tell whether the failure of this was because there really was no way they could reach agreement. And let's face it, the issue of Jerusalem is a tangled one or whether he blinked because of the threats made against his own personal safety. That's certainly what I learned at the time.

[Lisa Doucet]

There are so many accounts of what really happened. But I remember because I was still based in Jerusalem then. The things were. Which I remember at the time is that they said Ehud Barak, who a former military guy, well decorated, a decorated soldier, big ego. And that he went to Camp David planning to put Jerusalem on the table, but not preparing anyone. Nobody knew that he was gonna put Jerusalem on the table. He didn't really prepare the Israelis for it. He suddenly put Jerusalem on the table. Cause he wanted to take this bold move, if you like. And throughout the negotiations, it was always said, the Palestinians said that the Americans would come. And sometimes it was Bill Clinton in person. The Israelis have this. But they would say, are you sure? The Israelis said this? And they never were quite sure whether Bill Clinton was spinning it and whether they were actually. Whether it was actually what the Israelis were ready to give. But the phrase which came out afterwards, and at the time, I remember thinking, this phrase is going to be used again and again and again. It's going to be thrown at the Palestinians. And it was. And it went like this. We offered you 95% and you said no. So for years and years afterwards, whenever there was a discussion of the failures of Israeli and Palestinian peacemakers, and there were failures on all sides, including the Americans, including the international community, is that the Israelis would say. And these were Israelis who believed in peace. Because by then, then many of my Israeli friends who had embraced the Oslo Accords, but some hesitate, but some caution, but they embraced it because they talked about peace. Then after those years of suicide bombings and the failure to make progress, they wanted separation. Separation instead of peace, became just get out of our lives. And they were bitter and angry. They felt let down. But Palestinians also, also felt it down. So that was it. We offered you 95. And that is not really the way. The way it was. And I remember Bill Clinton later said that Yasser Arafat called him up and said, I'm ready to accept it now. And he used some expletive. It was after Bill Clinton had left power. It's too late, you know, because Bill Clinton wanted, you know, to claim another. So many American presidents wanted to have the prize of making a peace deal, essentially.

[Jane Corbyn]

I wash my hands of them now. You know, a plague on all your houses. I've done my best. I've devoted years of my life to this. And of course, the failure of the camp David, the 2000 initiative, led the very, you know the bitterness in the Palestinian camp resulted in a second uprising, the second intifada, even more violent and difficult and bloody than the first. So we began to see this terrible cycle of violence and regeneration, rejection, and I'm afraid we never came out of it. And we have seen it all too clearly in the last year or two, along with at that time the growing strength of Hamas and the weakening of Arafat and the plo, which is quite.

[Adam Fleming]

A bleak place to end. What's been an absolutely fascinating conversation. So thank you, you two. I suppose my takeaway from all of this is when people talk about the two state solution now and there's been a massive resurgence of that in the last couple of weeks. Weeks they are talking. The blueprint for that is what you were witnessing being signed in 1993.

[Jane Corbyn]

Yes, that's where it was supposed to lead. That was in everybody's minds that two people would have self determination and live in states in peace alongside each other. The two state solution.

[Lisa Doucet]

Do you know, just, and I'll say this ask, because Gaza is on the minds of everyone in was it 19, 1998 they agreed that they could have an airport in Gaza. This was the beginning of the establishment of the state. So the state should have boundaries, but it should also be able to have what other countries should have. So an airport, so an international airport was open in Gaza and I went with some friends, in fact the woman who owned the American Colony Hotel, we went and pretended to be tourists to Gaza. So we went to the international airport and said, so what are the flights you offer? We went to the Gaza Tourism Authority where they had brochures about tours in Gaza. We went to a new hotel on the beach which wanted to be the American Colony Hotel of Gaza. And the mood there was that they were getting ready for the state and they were putting in place the institutions that would actually make that happen. And still it wouldn't happen.

[Adam Fleming]

Lys, thank you so much for your reflections.

[Lisa Doucet]

It was really good to see you.

[Adam Fleming]

Adam and Jane, thanks so much.

[Jane Corbyn]

Thanks Adam. It's been really interesting to look back over it all.

[Lisa Doucet]

Newscast, newscast from the BBC.

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