Newscast: The Boris Johnson and Sir Tony Radakin Interview

Date: February 22, 2026
Host: Laura Kuenssberg (BBC)
Guests: Boris Johnson (Former UK Prime Minister), Admiral Sir Tony Radakin (Former Chief of the Defence Staff)

Overview

This special episode of BBC's "Newscast," hosted by Laura Kuenssberg, marks the fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Laura sits down with former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, the former Chief of the Defence Staff, to reflect on the crucial early hours of the invasion, the West’s response, and the present state and future of the conflict. The conversation is candid, with both guests offering insight into leadership, intelligence, and the dilemmas faced by the UK and its allies—plus frank assessments of what’s needed to bring the war to a close.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

The Night of the Invasion: Recollections and Reactions

• Early Alerts & First Responses

  • Both guests recount being awakened in the middle of the night by the news that Russia had invaded Ukraine ([02:00] - [02:55]).
  • Boris Johnson received a call from the National Security Advisor around 4 a.m.
    • "We'd been expecting it really the night before... I uttered some sort of expletives and then went downstairs and got on with it." — Boris Johnson ([02:00])

• Intelligence and Expectations

  • Sir Tony Radakin notes that UK defense intelligence had been warning of an imminent invasion for months.
    • "At the tactical level, Russia was moving bloods up to their people on the border. They have mobile crematorium. You don't do that in an exercise." — Sir Tony Radakin ([02:55])
  • He describes a sense of "relief" when the expected finally occurred, transitioning to a focus on the response.

• Initial Western Response

  • Johnson critiques Europe’s disbelief and hesitation as limiting the initial response.
    • "Some of our European friends weren't convinced that it was actually going to happen. And that meant our initial response wasn't perhaps as robust as it should have been." — Boris Johnson ([02:00]-[02:53])

Interactions with Putin & Early Diplomatic Calculations

• Was Putin Lying?

  • Johnson asserts that Putin lied throughout and was determined to subjugate Ukraine ([04:11]).
    • "He lied right up to the very end... what we really should have rammed home to him was that we regarded...the sovereignty of Ukraine as a strategic objective for the West." — Boris Johnson ([04:11])

• European Reluctance & Debates within Whitehall

  • Describes European indecision and a "weird sense" that perhaps rapid Ukrainian defeat would be preferable ([04:59]).
  • In the UK, debates raged about whether to repeat the caution seen after Crimea or take a stronger stand ([05:45]).

Leadership During Crisis: Decision Making and Communications

• UK's Fast Pivot to Supporting Ukraine

  • Radakin describes the UK’s leadership in quickly rallying international support, a “political tsunami” ([05:45]-[06:38]).
    • "The prime minister then comes in. I think you were clear and categoric in taking the decision that we were all with Ukraine." — Sir Tony Radakin ([05:45])

• Low Expectations for Ukrainian Resistance

  • Defence intelligence initially predicted Kyiv could fall within five or six days ([06:49]).
    • Johnson's first call post-invasion was to Zelenskyy, urging his safety. Zelenskyy declined to leave, asking only for weapons ([06:49]-[08:03]).
    • "He said, absolutely not, we're staying. Just get us the weapons that we need." — Boris Johnson ([06:49])

• First Signs of Ukrainian Resolve

  • Radakin recalls the pivotal battle for Hostomel Airport and failed Russian advances ([08:21]).
    • "The Ukrainians were magnificent. But that changed hands...because the Ukrainians fought so hard at the airport." — Sir Tony Radakin ([08:21])

Retrospective Critiques: Crimea, Ambiguity, and Missed Signals

• 2014 as a Missed Warning

  • Both guests judge that the Western failure to strongly respond to Crimea emboldened Putin ([10:03]).
    • "The failure to do anything in Crimea in 2014 was tragic...we never made good that promise. If we'd had clarity and simplicity...we could have prevented that invasion." — Boris Johnson ([10:03])

• Regrets and West’s Strategic Ambiguity

  • Johnson admits a collective Western hesitancy and sees its remnants today ([11:49]).

The West’s Support for Ukraine: Incrementalism and Escalation Fears

• Pattern of Caution

  • Laura highlights repeated scenarios where Western support lagged behind Ukraine’s pleas ([12:53]).
  • Radakin and Johnson both criticize slow, incremental weapons deliveries and escalation anxiety ([13:18]), noting UK’s earlier leadership with certain weapons systems.
    • "Each time the reported red lines of Putin evaporated...But if you're in Kyiv, then this feels like incrementalism." — Sir Tony Radakin ([13:18])
  • Johnson argues delays have actively cost lives ([14:01]).
    • "We've always delayed needlessly...What we're doing, I'm afraid, is continually giving the Ukrainians too late. Just enough to stop them from losing, but not enough to help them bring the war to a successful conclusion." — Boris Johnson ([14:01])

• Escalation and What’s Needed

  • Radakin details the scale of Russian missile and drone attacks ([15:21]), arguing Ukraine needs to be able to "strike deeper."
    • "You need to go deeper in order to relieve the battle in the close. And that's where Russia is at an advantage. And Ukraine needs more help." — Sir Tony Radakin ([15:21])

How to End the War: Ideas, Provocations, and Guarantees

• Flipping Putin’s Calculus

  • Johnson: Only by convincing Putin he cannot win or hold on to Ukraine will the war end. Suggests bolder actions:
    • Giving Ukraine more advanced weapons
    • Impounding Russian assets ("shadow fleet")
    • Providing meaningful financial support ([16:25])
    • "You need to flip a switch in Putin's brain...to show that we're willing to give the Ukrainians the military support." — Boris Johnson ([16:25])

• Boots on the Ground?

  • Johnson has advocated for European forces in Ukraine not to fight, but as a show of intent ([17:04]-[18:01]).
    • "Why not do it now? There's no logical reason that I can see why we shouldn't send some peaceful ground forces...to show our support." — Boris Johnson ([18:01])
  • He acknowledges he’s ahead of current UK thinking, but stresses the symbolic value.

• Role of European Defence and Unity

  • Johnson is skeptical of the effectiveness of current European efforts to unite on defence ([18:45]-[19:12]):
    • "The person who benefits from that nervousness is Putin." — Boris Johnson ([19:12])

Zelenskyy’s Leadership and Internal Challenges

• Assessment of Zelenskyy

  • Radakin lauds Zelenskyy’s leadership, crediting him with maintaining morale and international support ([19:28]).
    • "It's utterly pivotal...he’s been incredible." — Sir Tony Radakin ([19:28])
  • Johnson supports this view and celebrates the wider Ukrainian people's resistance ([19:59]).

• Has Ukraine been too stalwart?

  • Laura asks if it’s time for concessions given the stalemate, but Radakin points out Zelenskyy has already agreed to a ceasefire, and the obstacle is Putin ([22:09]).
  • Johnson adds Ukraine cannot make further concessions without assurances, but the real problem is Russia's intransigence.

The US, the White House, and Ending the War

• US Reluctance: "Delusions" on Putin’s Intentions
  • Johnson argues the US is mistaken if it thinks Putin wants peace ([22:38]).
    • "I don't think we will end the war by asking the Ukrainians to make...further concessions." — Boris Johnson ([22:54])
  • He insists only convincing Putin of his strategic miscalculation will bring war to a close ([24:56]).

The Case for UK and NATO Defence Spending

• British Defence Spending and NATO Commitments
  • Radakin stresses the importance of not only pledging but also transparently funding increased defence spending ([25:21]-[27:02]).
    • "We made, the Prime Minister made an international commitment...That's why NATO is galvanized...that has to be resolved." — Sir Tony Radakin ([26:23])
  • Johnson agrees, affirming urgency. If the UK fails in its commitments, its leadership and security reputation may falter ([27:02]-[27:17]).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

“We'd been expecting it really the night before...I uttered some sort of expletives and then went downstairs and got on with it.”
— Boris Johnson ([02:00])

“At the tactical level, Russia was moving bloods up to their people on the border. They have mobile crematorium. You don't do that in an exercise.”
— Sir Tony Radakin ([02:55])

“He lied right up to the very end...what we really should have rammed home to him was that we regarded...the sovereignty of Ukraine as a strategic objective for the West.”
— Boris Johnson ([04:11])

“We could have solved this problem if we'd been clear about what Ukraine was...If we'd had clarity and simplicity about Ukraine rather than endless fudge and obscurity, we could have prevented that invasion.”
— Boris Johnson ([10:03])

“He said, absolutely not, we're staying. Just get us the weapons that we need.”
— Boris Johnson on first post-invasion call with Zelenskyy ([06:49])

“But if you're in Kyiv, then this feels like incrementalism. It feels like it's too slow and it's deeply frustrating.”
— Sir Tony Radakin ([13:18])

“We've always delayed needlessly...Just enough to stop them from losing, but not enough to help them bring the war to a successful conclusion for Ukraine.”
— Boris Johnson ([14:01])

“You need to flip a switch in Putin's brain...to show that we're willing to give the Ukrainians the military support.”
— Boris Johnson ([16:25])

“Why not do it now? There's no logical reason that I can see why we shouldn't send some peaceful ground forces...to show our support.”
— Boris Johnson ([18:01])

“The person who benefits from that nervousness is Putin.”
— Boris Johnson ([19:12])

“It's utterly pivotal...he’s been incredible.”
— Sir Tony Radakin on Zelenskyy ([19:28])

“The way to end this thing is finally, psychologically to convince Putin that he made a strategic category error in thinking that he could simply reabsorb Ukraine into the Soviet empire. That has failed.”
— Boris Johnson ([24:56])

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [02:00]-[02:55] — Night of the Invasion Recollections
• [04:11]-[04:51] — Interactions with Putin and Early Diplomacy
• [06:38]-[09:04] — Whitehall Debates and Ukrainian Response
• [10:03]-[11:28] — The Regrets of 2014 and Western Ambiguity
• [13:18]-[14:01] — Incrementalism in Western Military Aid
• [16:25]-[18:01] — Advocating for Bolder Action, Boots on the Ground Proposal
• [19:28]-[20:29] — Zelenskyy's Leadership and Pivotal Ukrainian Resistance
• [22:09]-[24:56] — On Concessions and the Difficulty of Bringing Putin to the Table
• [25:21]-[27:17] — Defence Spending and UK's Role within NATO

Conclusion

This Newscast episode offers a frank, behind-the-scenes look at how key British leaders experienced the onset of the Ukraine war and how their thinking—and criticisms—have evolved over four years. Johnson and Radakin agree that Western caution has cost dearly and passionately call for bolder support to help Ukraine end the conflict on its own terms. Both are critical of incremental approaches, warn the UK not to shirk its leadership within NATO, and single out the importance of facing political realities in both Europe and Russia. Above all, they reassert the need for unity, clarity, and a willingness to confront uncomfortable truths on Ukraine as the war grinds on.