B (8:58)

And it also indirectly opposes the blockade

A (9:01)

without directly naming the U.S. what if

B (9:04)

China starts escorting some of its ships? They've got a big base in Djibouti, not that far away. They could do that. And then you're into a whole different ballgame where you've got a standoff not between Iran and the US but between

A (9:17)

the US and China.

B (9:18)

So look, whichever way this pans out, there are two big risks here. One is that it drives up oil and gas prices yet again. And secondly, there is the risk that the ceasefire will simply collapse and full scale war will break out again between the US and Iran.

A (9:34)

So when I ask people in the American government about China, where's China? It's opaque to most of them too. The people I've talked to since the blockade started, it seems like if China wants this war to end, reports that they are helping Iran, they could stop helping Iran and tell them to end the war. But we don't know if they'll do that. So that's one, one black box, that's one mystery. And then you've got Iran itself. What we hear there's an Internet blackout there. Okay, so what are ordinary Iranians seeing? What are government officials seeing? What's going on with the information war in Iran? The US and Israel have operations, some of which we don't see, to try to impact what we call the hearts and minds of the Iranian people. But we know the Iranian government. Whatever degradation of their abilities has taken place, whatever medieval culture they have there, ladies and gentlemen, the Iranians have game on social media, they have game on AI videos. They have found a way through tart tweets through, through these AI videos, they found a way to, at a minimum, project confidence, project a lack of respect for the United States and for the President of the United States that I Don't know who's seeing it in Iran, but I know he's seeing it in the west. And people are seeing it and saying, huh, these didn't look like a bunch of people about to fold. I want to show you two of the videos. I sit around and watch them all day. I find them so fascinating how cleverly they're made. And they're almost. They're almost like an episode of 30 Rock where I have to. I have to watch the whole thing again, because embedded in these is so much cleverness. And again, I'm not rooting for the Iranians. I'm not trying to give them a Webby Award. I'm just telling you that these things are brilliant and, and they're a manifestation of a sophistication about the United States that you wouldn't necessarily imagine the Iranians have. And they also reflect a fighting spirit and a confidence, as I said, but also a full fledged strategy. But these are not people who are trying to. These are people who are trying to project strength, project confidence, project a fighting spirit that they ain't giving up. So again, I could show you 100 of them. We could do a special episode as like a, like a film festival, but just want to show you two. First of all, they love doing parodies using Western characters. The Minions. I'm not the biggest Minions fan in the world, in all honesty. I don't really understand the semiotics of the Minions. I don't understand what the Minions are all about, but I know they're compelling characters. So here's. Here's an Iranian parody video created by Persia Boy. It's meant to mock the naval blockade. If you're watching, if you're listening on the podcast version, I'll explain a little bit more about what it looks like. But just imagine a lot of minion activity. S5, please. That's minion. Donald Trump on a raft. And I won't give away the ending, but just the Iranians are basically in there. A lot of their videos, they just mock the United States and mock the kind of. The weakness of the United States and the ill, ill planned efforts of the United States to try to win this war. Here's another one. This one another thing. They've done the same maker allegedly use of video. And again, incredibly compelling, incredibly sophisticated. This is Iranian propaganda video called The Hormuz hustle. S6, please.

C (13:45)

Now they want to blockade the straight.

B (13:51)

You wanna blockade us?

A (13:53)

We already run the muscle blockade.

B (13:55)

Our blockade. Go ahead, try your luck.

A (13:58)

You scared? Come close.

C (14:00)

Keep running. What?

A (14:01)

The talks fell apart. Now you screaming blockade, but we already control the flow. We set the rate, every ship pace. Tolo stays away from the gate.

C (14:12)

You threaten to stop us, boy, you're way too late. Gas prices rising, your allies in panic

A (14:19)

mode while we sit back laughing.

B (14:21)

Y' all digging your own hole.

A (14:23)

You talk real big, but your navy stays far.

C (14:27)

Scared of our minds.

A (14:28)

And missiles.

C (14:29)

That's who you are.

A (14:31)

Was hustle. Homeless hustle.

B (14:34)

You want to blockade us? We already run the muscle.

A (14:39)

So again, there's countless of these. They make fun of the president. They make fun of the United States. They project strength. But to what end? Right? I think that the Iranians need to. Until they're ready to cave. Unless they're ready to cave and surrender. They need to use every tool at their disposal. This war, we've talked about it from the drone point of view, is the first drone war. Like this. Russia, Ukraine, of course, the drone war as well. But this is the first one involving the United States. And it's. And it's. It's the first AI war. And the AI applies to the drones and a lot of the military hardware, but the AI also applies to these information wars. And just as we've seen, there's disparities in the. In the United States and the business side, the personal side, who's using AI and who's not there is in the military realm as well. And it's quite clear the Iranians are using AI to make these videos. Maybe they're using AI to distribute them. Maybe they're using AI to communicate in a sophisticated, ongoing way with their own people. But my main point is a point of confusion, which is there's no way to measure this. There's no way to quantify it. There's no way to track it in a systematic way. I see what comes across my Twitter feed. I see what people send me. But understanding this is a mammoth project, and I don't see anybody doing it. You saw this in 2016 when it was clear that the Russians and others. But primary focus was on the Russians were trying to interfere with the American election. Okay, There were efforts to track that. They weren't. They weren't that great. But there was a plan, there was funding. There were sophisticated people who primarily were focused on X and on Facebook to track that. Now you've got a proliferation of platforms. You know, what is Iran doing on TikTok? I'd love to know. And there's some academics who try to do it, but. And the American government tries to keep up with it. But the point of the basis of the confusion to a large extent is there's just too much. There's just, there's too much to track. And then, okay, you see a piece of video, like some of the stuff we just showed you here. What's the impact of it? Who's watching it? What impact is it having on them? Whether it's an Iranian audience, an American audience, whatever it is, that's, that's the game is, is not how many videos can you produce and how, how funny does Mark Halperin think they are or effective. It's how are they actually influencing the world? What is Iran doing to keep the people there either tamped down from protesting or maybe even, as some have speculated, enthusiastic about the government again, or at least resigned to the government again because they're upset about the way the United States has attacked. They may be upset about some of the rhetoric of Donald Trump. That process, that project of finding all this communication stuff and then trying to measure its impact, that's what we need to be doing. But it's impossible to do right now. There's too much of it. It's showing up in places unpredictable, hard to know whose stuff is, who's. Who's making some of these things. This is the future, ladies and gentlemen, of warfare. It's the future of information warfare. And it's the present, not just the future. And we are way behind. I'm behind, but I know from talking to people in the government that they're behind. And I know that from having conversations about specific things. But also I just know they don't see everything because I'll ask them about something. Not some, not some minions video, but something significant. It's hard to keep up. And the warfare is about not just algorithms anymore. Now it's about AI powered algorithms, the capacity to see what's out there and then try to measure the impact. We'll keep at it. But this is for a journalist, for a government, for a business, for an organization of any sort is a hard thing to do. It's a hard thing to stay ahead. And the Iranians, I just, I wish, I wish I could embed there. I wish I could, my clone could embed there. I don't want to go myself, but I wish there was a way to systematically monitor what they're doing and to be, be be aware of the government's role in this. Because, because Through a Glass Darkly, as with all things in Iran right now, but this is a super sophisticated operation. Doesn't hit 100% of the time. But these videos, the tweets, the psyops, all connected to sustaining the impression for domestic and foreign consumption that the Iranians are in this fight. And while I continue to hear from people who say the war is over, the US has won, continue to hear from people, the war is over, the US has lost. It's going on. It's going on in the Strait of Hormuz. It's going on in potential negotiations. It could be going on if the ceasefire ends in Israel and the Gulf states and Iran again. But until this thing is truly won, decisively won, clearly won by somebody, this information warfare stuff is just massive. It's a fascinating and important story and it's one of the hardest ones I can remember ever covering. All right, that's it for my reported monologue today. Let me know what you think. If you're curious if I'm curious for you to share your take, drop me a line with all your reactions to the information warfare and the Iranian propaganda video. Send me an email nextup halperinmail.com that's next up. Halperin gmail.com you can always subscribe to the full episodes here and bonus content that we put on our YouTube channel. Watch every episode. We watch it more than once. If you want behind the scenes stuff there is too as well. It's all waiting for you@YouTube.com NextUp Halperin on YouTube. And then some of you prefer the podcast version where you miss the the Minions, at least the Minions visuals. But if you do like the podcast, you can go to Next up Halpern on whatever podcast platform you like. Make sure you hit automatic downloads, have that enabled so you get everything right away. And we do episodes Tuesdays and Thursdays. But there's bonus content you will not want to miss. So please subscribe today and tell all your friends. All right, quick break. Now when we come back, we're going to talk to someone who grew up in Iran and is now a professor in the United States who studies it. And I think you'll find understands a lot of what's going on in Iran better than most people you hear talking about it these days. Vali Nasser joins us. He's next up. Let me ask you something. Do you own physical gold? Most people do not. And given the current state of the world, that's something worth thinking about. Acre Gold makes it simple. You pick a plan that fits your budget, make monthly payments, and when you've accumulated enough, they ship you a beautifully designed 24 karat Swiss gold bar gold is now up 70% year over year, and central banks are still buying it at record levels. Smart money has been moving into hard assets for good reason. Ager Gold has had subscribers stacking consistently for six years now because once you hold it in your hand, you understand the difference between owning something real versus a number on a screen. Right now, they're giving away over 18 grams of gold in their acre declassified sweepstakes. Enter for free and subscribe to Gold@getacregold.com Mark right now, check it out at getacregold.com Mark all right, next up and joining me now, Vali Nasser, professor of Middle east studies and International affairs at Johns Hopkins University. He served as an advisor in the State Department under President Obama. Professor, welcome and thank you for being here.

B (22:39)

Good to be with you. Thanks for inviting me.

A (22:41)

Let me make sure I have my facts right. You were born in Iran and lived there till you were 16, is that correct?

B (22:46)

A little bit older, 17, 18, but.

A (22:50)

And have you been back since?

B (22:51)

No. No. I mean, actually, about 30 years ago, yeah.

A (22:55)

Okay. And do you have, do you have relatives who live there now?

B (22:58)

No, all the old relatives have passed away. I have some colleagues and friends that I've met internationally, and they go back and forth, academics and the like.

A (23:10)

How would you feel about the prospect if there was a different type of government in Iran and more of an open society? How would you feel emotionally, personally, about the prospect of being able to go back?

B (23:22)

I think every Iranian wants a different Iran. 1 majority of Iranians want a country that is integrated into the world economy, that's open and that's prosperous, that they and the countries able to realize the full potential that Iran has.

A (23:41)

So wasn't that long ago when Iranians were in the street in vast numbers and vast numbers were killed, and the working assumption is that that impacted the American government's decision to conduct this operation. It impacts the Iranian regime, obviously. And the big mystery here is the interconnection, I think, for so many people, for Trump administration strategists and for analysts like you is what's the relationship now between the people of Iran, who feel, as I think you've correctly characterized, and the government? How would you characterize the government's, how their conduct is impacted by the people of the country?

B (24:24)

I mean, in many ways, we arrived at this war right after a massive uprising in Iran that was suppressing quite brutally. And at that point in time, it looked like the most important thing about Iran was the political division, the division in the politics of the country between the people and the ruling regime, that the regime was isolated, that had lost its legitimacy, that was now governing only by brute force and violence. And perhaps President Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu calculated that if they attacked the Islamic Republic at this time, it would collapse quickly, collapse partly because its base had been very narrowed, and then also that the population may rise up in rebellion. And that didn't happen. And I think that was based on a false assumption that Iranians would rebel in the middle of a war in support of an invading force, when bombs are falling over their heads and they have to worry about their own security, and there's no possibility of actually organizing in a proper way to wage a political battle. And then also because it became very clear to the Iranians that the war was not a clean act of liberation on the part of us And Israel, that increasingly they were the subject of the bombs, that their neighborhoods, universities, hospitals, health institutes were being targeted. President Trump threatened that he would arm separatists in Iran to break up the country. Then he said he's going to send Iran back to the Stone Age and that Iranian civilization was about to die. And so more and more Iranians began to see the war actually as being waged against their country, not against their government. And the priority became surviving the war rather than waging a political campaign against the government. So perhaps politics will return to Iran once the guns fall silent, once you return to some kind of at least a security normalcy. But I think the assumption on the part of Tel Aviv and Washington that the war itself would sort of recruit the Iranian public as an ally in waging a war against the Islamic Republic was based on false assumptions.

A (26:43)

So much you said, I want to break down. Let's start with this. To be fair, I think the President said in announcing the initiation of the conflict that. That the Iranian people should wait until the war ended before they rose up, that he didn't. He didn't want them to do it or didn't think they should do it during the war itself. And although we're in a ceasefire, it's a tenuous ceasefire. So isn't it possible that. That if. If. If the President does have a plan, that. That it's. That it hasn't been. That phase of it has not been initiated yet?

B (27:13)

Well, I mean, we really don't know what his plans were, because, in fact, he didn't even explain to the American public what the objectives of the war was and why was he waging it and why was it necessary to do it. In February, one could argue that if he actually had left Islamic Republic alone after that massive uprising in January was much more likely to fall than actually waging war against it did. After the war, he came up with all kinds of reasons why the war was being waged, including, this was payback for 47 years of Iranian behavior towards the US it was for the nuclear program. It was to liberate Iranians. But it wasn't just a single sentence. First of all, he contradicted himself quite a bit during the uprising. He said he was going to invade Iran, that the United States was locked and loaded to support the Iranian people, to take over their government. And then there was enormous amount of material that was put out by exile television stations, social media campaigns, much of which was actually backed by the United States and Israel as well, which gave the Iranians an impression that this was an easy, quick, surgical war against the Islamic Republic, after which all the instruments of repression in Iran would be gone and the Iranians would be in a position to take their government back. And I still don't know what President Trump really thinks about this. At times he says, no, no, no, I just want a Venezuela scenario in which a different face of the Islamic Republic would come to the fore and would take over at another time. It sounds like he wants the Islamic Republic as a whole to be gone, but the messaging that was coming to the Iranian public from Israel and the US Very clearly gave at least a segment of him a sense that this war was going to build upon the uprising of January in order to bring about a completely new order in Iran. And 40 days in, that hasn't happened. We've ended up in a situation that, on the one hand, President Trump is threatening a massive war on the state itself, on society, power stations, annihilation, et cetera. And on the other hand, he's going to Islamabad to actually sign a deal which would be with this exact regime that's in power. He's trying to sort of put the best face on it by saying, or somehow I brought about regime change in Iran. And the guys who are in power are actually much more pragmatic and better than the ones that were killed at the early set of the war. And that's not believable to the Iranian public, because they know the people who are in charge, and they know that the people who are in charge are far more hawkish than the ones that actually were killed.

A (29:53)

Okay, again, want to drill down on so many things. Let's start here. You've several times characterized how the Iranian people feel particularly about the feeling that the war is targeting them as opposed to the government. And I'm not challenging that as being accurate. I'm asking this, how do you know? How are you able to have a sense of what public opinion is in Iran now?

B (30:13)

We don't have a. We don't. You're absolutely correct. We don't know 100% what the sense is. But, you know, periodically you get to talk to people if they have Starlink or they have managed to come out of Iran. And you also gauge the public debate that's happening, and it's available on YouTube, on media, et cetera. The same kinds of voices that four months ago were talking about absolutely imminent collapse of the Islamic Republic, that there's no way in which they would have anything to do with it, are singing a very different tune. Not that they like the Islamic Republic, but right now the priority of changing the regime has become complicated with priority of survival that there's a lot more concern about where are we going to end up after this war? What's going to happen to us? What's going to happen to our universities? As a political campaign goes, if the removal of the Islamic Republic was a political campaign for a lot of Iranians, it's become much more confounded and complicated. There's not a single issue campaign anymore that these guys need to go, these guys need to go has become now complicated with other sets of things like what's going to happen to the country? At what price should these guys go? Am I willing to pay the entire price? The ranks of people who were in January all together against the Islamic Republic has been divided along these kinds of priorities. This picture mark may change very quickly once the war is done. I mean, let's not forget the massive uprising of January happened six months after the June war, during which Prime Minister Netanyahu invited the Iranian public to take over their government. They didn't. Then they did six months after the guns fell silent. So three months from now, two months from now, once the war is done, we don't know. And I don't think that the Islamic Republic is in any means clear with its population in terms of what happened in January, the massacre, the economic problems, political problems that have been alienating a lot of Iranians and demanding a change in the regime.

A (32:29)

I want again question a premise of yours. Respectfully, you said it's obvious that the new regime is more hardline than those they replaced. I don't know that. And I'll just give one data point. They were willing to spend 20 hours with three Americans in a, in a meetings in Islamabad. If the news reports are accurate, they're open to negotiations. I don't know that the old regime would have done that. So is it possible that, that whoever we see through the glass darkly here, but is it possible that whoever is going to make decisions about how to end the war from the Iranian side are in fact more willing to accommodate the United States than the previous government? Is that in your mind at least possible?

B (33:12)

No, no, that's actually an excellent point, Mark. That's exactly where it is that these guys, we've seen them in the war, are willing to be far more risk taking and aggressive, like attacking Iran's neighbors that maybe the former supreme leader wouldn't have done. Or let's say attacking Qatar, which was actually a country that was closest to the, among all the GCC other than Oman was closest to Iran to attack its gas fields and take much riskier behavior in war. But at the same time, when it comes to the negotiating table, they are more forward leaning. The old supreme leader, the one that was killed, followed a policy that in Iran was known as no war and no negotiations, basically wanting to maintain a middle ground. These guys are something like what you said, more war and more negotiations. They're willing to be much more aggressive in battle, but also they're much more likely to come to the table and willingly negotiate. Then there's the other side of it. Many of the people that have risen to the top jobs after the killing of their predecessors have actually much more of a history of repression and violence in Iran against the population. The current National Security Advisor in Iran is known in Iran as to be among the most hawkish and extremist of all the Revolutionary Guard commanders that have served that he was involved in suppression of students in 1999, in suppression of the green movement in 2009. So he has a record domestically in terms of how he's behaved. So if he went by that record, Iranians watching them don't see these people as any better, in fact, perhaps worse than the guys who were there before. But being pragmatic on cutting a deal with the US goes hand in hand with being also much more aggressive. So if you're sitting in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, you might say that actually could be a worse scenario because these people are clearly more willing to cut a deal with the US but they're also much more likely to be aggressive with us than their predecessors were. And if you're the Iranian public, you say, yes, they're willing to cut a deal in Islamabad. But these are also the people who are guilty of some of the worst violence against the population in the past. So it's both of it is there. So it's not regime change. Allah. We've brought moderates to the power. We've just brought a different face that is both simultaneously more aggressive but more willing to cut a deal.

A (35:51)

It seems that the story as old as time, the economy is the biggest issue. It's what put people out in the streets previously and caused them to really put their lives on the line. It can't be good. This war can't be good for the Iranian economy. Not just their ability to sell oil, although there's some indication that they've made more there. But the infrastructure is destroyed. Banking, commerce, it's all been seriously, if not eliminated, destroyed. So what do you know about the state of the Iranian economy and the extent to which that would motivate more uprisings and the government to feel like they had to make a deal, since one of the things President Trump is offering is economic rehabilitation.

B (36:38)

You're absolutely correct. The state of Iran's economy before the war started was really, really dire. I mean, inflation was out of control. Food inflation over a year had been around 70, 80%. The rial had collapsed completely. That brought people into the streets, not just to protest economic conditions, but basically saying, you guys have obviously brought this on us. You can't fix it. You need to go now. That has now been aggravated by also damage to Iran's infrastructure to the tune of several hundred billion dollars. And some key industries like petrochemicals and steel industry have been damaged, which then affects other industries that rely on them for their raw materials. And as a result, there's going to be a much greater number of Iranians who are going to go unemployed as manufacturing grounds to a halt, and Iran doesn't have the money to rebuild, let alone pump money into the lives of the people. That's one reason why Iran is basically so adamant on a much bigger deal with the U.S. in other words, they don't just want a ceasefire deal in which they're back in the same box they were before. In other words, still under maximum pressure, sanctions, and unable to feed their people. That's why they're asking for taking tolls of ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz as a way of generating revenue. So they're more forward leaning on the deal. Exactly. Because they know that if this war ends, the moment of nationalism and rally to the flag is over. The economy is still under maximum pressure. Sanctions and now severely damaged, that they won't be able to govern the country. And so they're being more aggressive to force the United States to cut a bigger deal with them. And so they're willing to come to the table, but they're also asking for going big for big, if you would.

A (38:44)

You've expressed some criticisms of how, and critiques of how the President and the administration have conducted the war in terms of rhetoric and clarity. And those are views shared by tens of millions of people. They're not outliers at all. And I know there's always a tendency or impulse to go backwards, but let's just go forward. From the President. The President calls you and says, I saw you on with Mark Halpern. I think you really understand your country. Please come sit in the White House with my national security team and develop the plan going forward. What would be the tenets of your plan of how to proceed from where we are now?

B (39:20)

I mean, ultimately, there are some, some realities the President has to accept. One is that he's not going to get the maximal, maximal aims that he put forward when he started this war. The Iranians, because of everything that you just mentioned, their back is to the wall with their own people. The economy is shattered, They've come this far, they're not going to throw in the towel easily. And they're willing to fight to the end. And for them, it's a test of endurance. They may be willing to eat grass until the US Basically is exhausted economically and otherwise with this war. So they're willing to accept enormous amount of pain in order to get a result. And so the President basically has to take into this consideration this is a different enemy that is encounter, is a different adversary that he's used to. And ultimately he either has to be willing to escalate with Iran into a major war that he doesn't seem to, doesn't want or risk a much greater damage to the global economy before he can get his way. Or he has to be willing to cut a deal and the deal does not mean surrender. So it means that he has to actually be willing to give certain things and then get, get things for it. So far, President Trump's approach has been surrender. In other words, even J.D. vance said on, on his way out, they don't accept our terms. That almost means that like, and the President later on, I think, told Fox News, I don't want 90%, I don't want 95%, I want 100%. And I think the realization has to be that he's not going to get 100% unless he's willing to bear the cost of getting there as well, if that's actually even possible. So he has to actually really look for a deal, not a surrender at this stage.

A (41:08)

What are things you love about Iranian culture?

B (41:12)

I mean, you know, it's a very ancient culture. It's the culture that is steeped in arts, in cuisine, in all the fine things that we associate with other great civilizations. It's a country that also has suffered enormously and it's not playing the role that it should be playing on the world stage. And what is sustained Iran thus far is actually its culture. It's not its politics. It's not a regime or it's not a particular political line. It's actually the resilience of the people come from the civilizational depth that there is. And so you admire it at this point in time that this is a country that sort of relies on a millennia of history and the strength of its literature, culture, arts in order to sustain it and define it. I think that's the most beautiful part about it.

A (41:58)

Well said. Lovely. And I say to all of our guests who've grew up or spent time in Iran and haven't been able to go back, I look forward to the day you can go back. And I hope I can go with you.

B (42:08)

And you as well. Exactly. I think we all wish that that turning point will happen for Iran.

A (42:13)

Yeah. Professor, thank you. Very grateful to you for joining. For people who want to follow your work, where can they go?

B (42:19)

I post everything on X Valleynassar or on other social media outlets as well. That's the best place.

A (42:27)

Okay, thank you very much. Very grateful to you for making time.

B (42:30)

Thank you.

A (42:31)

All right, next up, we're going to talk more about the politics and geopolitics of all this with Mike Pence's former chief of staff when he was Vice president. Mark Short joins us. He's next up. Did you know that high blood pressure is the number one risk factor for mortality? One in two adults has it. That means there's a 5050 chance you are walking time bomb. But here's some good news. You can take control of your blood pressure naturally without relying on Big Pharma. 120 Life is a Blend of great tasting super fruit juices that have been shown to help lower blood pressure. It's backed by hundreds of doctors and trusted by thousands of people who've seen measurable results. Here's the very best part. It's completely risk free. Try 120Life for two weeks. And if you don't see a difference in your numbers, you get your money back. Go to 120life.com, that's 120-life.com and use my code nextup to save 20% and get free shipping. This is serious. This is your life we're talking about. 120 life can help. All right, next up and joining me now, the great Mark Short, former chief of staff to Vice President Mike Pence. And he's on TV a lot because he talks about sense and he understands MAGA and he understands old fashioned Republican Party and there's not too many people who do both. Mark, welcome and thank you for being here.

C (43:56)

Thanks for having me, Mark. I appreciate it. Needs you Wi fi talk sense.

A (44:01)

Some of the people in my business are saying that the president's coalition is shattered between the war and Epstein and Save America act, that the Republican coalition is in tatters. Now. I don't see that in the data. What's your view of that issue?

C (44:21)

I think your view of the data is right. I think that the most the coalition, I think has come to support the president personally. And it's less of a coalition about a certain set of ideas. And so I think there's certain influencers who want to grasp on the whole certain ideas and proclaim that they're the ones that are the official articulators of what MAGA stands for. But I don't think that's been the case. I think the case is that the coalition is still solidly behind the president. But having said that, Mark, I do think that they are at a weak point right now. I think that here it is coming up on April 15th and the White House should be celebrating the passage of their one big beautiful bill and the reality that is their biggest legislative achievement. And more Americans are getting larger refunds and more Americans are getting refunds. And instead we're talking about tweets about the Pope or blasphemous tweets featuring Jesus or instead, you know, we're talking about ways that the war has gone awry. And so I do think that they're off message at the moment, but I don't think that his coalition is in tab.

A (45:25)

He's been off message for 12 years and obviously he's had some political success and some failure. You talk about Republicans running races, Mike Rogers running for Senate in Michigan or Mr. Whatley running in North Carolina. If you're working with them, what are the costs to them of the president being off message? Aren't they running their own ads, doing their own debates. Does it really matter if the president's off message to them?

C (45:54)

Oh, I think it matters a lot. I think in midterm elections, particularly when there's one party in control, voters are looking to send a signal. And I think the voters are gonna be looking to send a signal that whether or not they like or dislike their particular member, it's sending a signal to the president to change course. And so I think that it does matter a lot. I think that it's gonna be where we sit right now is I think it's be a pretty ugly midterm for Republicans. I think that's a difficult thing for them to overcome. There are other challenges we've seen. There's a lot of voters who come out only for Donald Trump, and if not come out in midterm elections. And so I think that's gonna be difficult is how do you motivate those voters who perhaps are feeling a little less motivated this moment?

A (46:34)

People who know me know I'm not asking this question out of glee, just looking for truth and facts. You're one of several smart Republicans I know who say this is going to be an ugly midterm for Republicans. What are the contours of that? How ugly could it be? How many seats could be lost in the House? How many could be lost in the Senate right now, knowing that things could change?

C (46:56)

Well, I actually think that in the House, it will not be as bad as 2018 or even as for the Democrats, as you saw certainly in 2010, when there were 63 Republicans swept into office. The reality, as you know, is that is that the seats are drawn so tightly today that they're largely gerrymandered for both Republicans and Democrats. So the number of swing seats in the House is much smaller. I think it's probably about 20. But I also think that the Senate is in jeopardy. I think there's been this sense that there's this wall for Republicans in this midterm cycle in the Senate that Democrats are running in our states, and it'd be difficult for them to overcome. But I think that that's a false comfort. I think the reality is that the Senate is very much in play. And I think some of the surprises you might see are actually in the heartland, the Midwest, where people think these are largely safe Republican seats. But if there's anybody that's been hurt more by the trade agenda, it's the farmers of America. And, you know, while they've been largely in Trump's corner, they're not always been reliably Republican voters.

A (48:02)

And so are you talking about there? You talking about Iowa and Nebraska? Is that what you're talking about there?

C (48:07)

Iowa, Nebraska? I think, you know, this one is more considered Rust Belt, but certainly I think Ohio, you know, is in play. So, yes, those are the ones I'm thinking about now.

A (48:15)

You know, everyone who comes on here who tells me the Senate's in play has to run the Halperin gauntlet. Six plus one. So you think Democrats are going to beat Susan Collins?

C (48:24)

You know, that's ones I go against the grain there. I think she always finds a way to win. And I would imagine what you'll see, Mark, in these coming months is there'll be a couple key votes where she goes against the administration in a prominent way and probably even draws the attention of the White House in ways to help her politically.

A (48:42)

All right, so if you can't beat Susan Collins, here's what you got to do. You got to be Jon Ossoff. You think they're going to be Jon Ossoff?

C (48:50)

No, I think that for us, that was, I think, our chance to recruit, you know, Brian Kemp. And failing that, I think it's a lot harder in Georgia right now.

A (48:58)

All right, so they keep that one. Do you think they keep Michigan even though Mike Rogers is a good candidate? We don't know who the Democrats will nominate yet.

C (49:04)

I think Mike Rogers is a good candidate, but it looks like in Michigan, again, the years that we've won is when Trump is on top of the ticket. I don't think we found a way to win when Trump is not on top of the ticket. And, and Michigan. So I think that's going to be heavy lift. Yes.

A (49:16)

All right, so Democrats keep Georgia, they keep Mission. What about New Hampshire? John Sununu, do you think is the best candidate?

C (49:22)

We could have recruited that race, but I still think that's an uphill climb.

A (49:25)

All right, so they keep, they keep their three. Then again, you're saying Susan Collins win. So Roy Cooper wins in North Carolina. And, and you already mentioned Ohio. So that's, that's, that's some of the pickups they need. But if they don't get Susan Collins, they need two more. So now we got to find your two in Iowa, Nebraska, Texas and Alaska, which are the two.

C (49:49)

Well, I think that it's one of those that if there's a wave that goes Democrats favor, and I think that they're in play. I still feel like you often need not just a bad cycle, but you actually need your candidate to really stumble. And I don't see that happening with Dan Sullivan. But, you know, is it in play? Yeah. Is, is, is, are there a couple Midwest states in play? Yes, and I think we always sit here seven months out and there's going to be a surprise somewhere. And so if the tide is in their favor, there's probably one that's, you know, that's not on the board yet for us, Mark, that, that ends up coming up. So do I think that the Senate is in play? Yeah, I do.

A (50:26)

What do you think of this national convention that your party's planning to have? Good idea, bad idea?

C (50:31)

I don't know that it matters a ton. I think if you end up having disagreements, it'll turn into a bad idea. But, but I don't really know that it's going to matter because I think it's going to be focused on Trump. And again, while voters will be turning on the Democrat side to vote against Trump, Republicans will not be turning out to vote for him. He's not going to be on the ballot. So I think it's kind of a wash. Yeah.

A (50:54)

All right. We've been talking about the war for a lot of the program, and I want to talk to you about that. The history of both parties in terms of foreign policy is just all, it's all a big jumble now in terms of who's the national security Party. But the president does enjoy with some voters a reputation for strength. The Democratic Party is basically just dumped on the war the entire time. If this ends well, and it could with a negotiated settlement that achieves a lot of the objectives the President set out, is it possible that that and gas prices come down because, because of the end of the hostilities. Is that, is that a net plus or major net plus for Republicans?

C (51:33)

Absolutely, Mark. I think few, not enough people are talking about this. If, if actually there's transformational change in Iran, it could change the Middle east for generations to come.

A (51:41)

Yeah.

C (51:42)

It'll be a huge accomplishment for the Trump administration. And as you've seen, there's, there's a different sort of alliance now where you have Middle Eastern Arab countries wanting us to go farther, wanting to partner with us. And so this is a historic moment, and it could have generational changes. Having said that, I think it could be a huge boon for Republicans into the future. I still think it's going to be a difficult midterm cycle because I think the dominant issues are going to be about affordability and the economy. And the reality is that jobs continue to weaken. I think GDP has been slow and it's hard to see how oil prices are not going to stay elevated for a while. And so I think affordability is going to continue to be a driver. So I think long term, it's absolutely huge for Republicans. I think the Democrats look weak again, if they're on the wrong side of this for history. But in the midterms, I'm not so sure it'll catch up by then.

A (52:34)

Affordability has a lot of dimensions to it. And obviously gas prices is a big one. Food is a big one, Housing is a big one. The administration wants to talk about the One big beautiful Bill act, but what would you say they've done to address affordability if you wanted to give them robust credit? What has the Trump administration done to address affordability?

C (52:57)

Well, again, I do think that they should be partnering this with one big beautiful bill because more Americans are getting refunds and have a lower tax burden. But I think, I mean, I've been a critic of this trade policy. I think it's significantly different than the first administration. I think for a lot of people it's like, well, I mean, the president's saying the same things and that's true. His rhetoric is largely the same. But the first administration tariffs are really targeted toward China and this now you have a global war on trade. And I think that the ones, not only are there higher prices, but again, in the heartland of America, many farmers can't even sell their product because of this. And so I think that's the biggest challenge. And I think there's a lot of people in the media to say, well, but, you know, it's 3.3%. It's not like it's 9% as it was in Biden. That's true. But when you measure that, it's 3.3% above last year. So it's not as if, it's not as if it's going down. It's like it's gone from nine down. It's actually still rising. And I think that's a, that's a big challenge for a lot of Americans.

A (53:56)

Yeah. What are people, what are the, what are things that people buy in the short household that gives you sticker shock these days?

C (54:03)

Well, you know, at this point, my kids are pretty old, and so they're, they're all driving. And so there's a lot of, there's a lot of gas prices, but certainly it's food prices, beef prices, chicken prices. It's a lot of, a lot of grocery prices are up, too.

A (54:17)

And again, if you were helping the administration, what would you say about that? Now?

C (54:22)

I think you need to open markets. I think if you're opening markets, you're allowing more trade, those prices will come down. I think that's the natural supply and demand. But if you're basically limiting what that supply is, then I think if you're not impacting demand, prices are going to go up and you don't want to impact demand on the negative side. So I think that's what they need to be doing is going back to the free market policies they champion in the first administration.

A (54:47)

The coalition relationships with Europe and Asia are different under this president. Are they different in a way that's deleterious to the interests of the United States, or is this just kind of tough love, hard change and it'll all end up fine?

C (55:03)

The relationship with Europe, I think, is needed to be reset for quite some time. In some cases, I think it probably is healthy. In some cases, I think when you don't see them supporting us in the Middle east right now, I think that is damaging. So I think from a national security perspective, there's challenges, but I'd say on the cost of living, I think it's an Asia challenge. Mark, Again, the first administration, when we focused tariffs on China, we actually partnered to try to strike bigger trade deals with Japan and South Korea. The president's rhetoric has been pretty, is pretty universal toward Asian nations, has actually been pretty critical of South Korea, particularly the fact that we still have troops there. And so they've assessed significant tariffs on across all of Asia. And I do think that impacts a lot of the goods that are imported in the United States.

A (55:52)

Let's do a little politics. I'm going to ask you about presidential politics in an unorthodox way. Name the three Republicans you think who are most likely to someday be president.

C (56:06)

I'd say, I'd say that Rubio is probably on top of that list. But I think, Mark, it's going to be governors that are going to rise up in a new generation.

A (56:20)

Which ones you have your eyes on?

C (56:21)

Well, I think it's probably going to be ones that are down the road, honestly, that are not on the, on the stage yet. I'm not.

A (56:27)

Governor's not yet born.

C (56:28)

No, not necessarily not born. They may not be in the governor's office yet. I think it's going to be a while before we actually take back the White House. Mark. I think that the tendency, as much as Donald Trump consumes all the action, I think it makes it difficult to succeed. That kind of a president on our side.

A (56:47)

So without knowing the nominees, you make the Democrats the favorite in 28.

C (56:51)

I do, I do.

A (56:53)

Which Democrats do you think can win 270 electoral votes?

C (56:57)

You know, I think that probably there would be sort of a similar scenario to, let's say a 76, when you find somebody who's able to strike a chord that is more moderate and more Southern. That's a small number for Democrats today, I get, but I think that's probably what you're looking at.

A (57:17)

And you make Democrats the favorite in 32, not knowing who wins in 20?

C (57:20)

No, I'd say in 28, because I think that the Democrat Congress is going to continue to be pretty far left and drive their policies left, and there could be time for Republicans to have a comeback in 2032. And again, I'm not saying that this is destiny, Mark. I'm saying. You're saying, do you think I consider the favorites? Yeah, I'd put them on as the favorites, but if they nominate a Bernie Sanders clone, then I think you're going to find Republicans a better standing.

A (57:45)

Yeah, my big thing now, Bernie. Bernie's gonna run and be the nominee. What do you think of that?

C (57:52)

I sort of feel that after octogenarians, the last two presidents, I'm not sure that's where the electorate's gonna be come 2020.

A (58:01)

Yeah, I, I agree with you, but, you know, you know, the last line in the movie Some Like It Hot, tell me nobody's perfect. You know, being an octogenarian is certainly not what you put on. On the list if you're designing a perfect candidate. But if you're just talking about who could, who could win the votes. I think I've said this many times. I think he would have won twice had he not been cheated out of the nomination in 16 and 20. I don't think the party's moderated since 20, and he just couldn't run in 24 because there was an incumbent. When I asked you about the three most likely Republicans to someday be president, you didn't mention the current vice president. Was that just a slip of the. Of the mind or you don't think he's going to get it in the top three because you chose over him unnamed future governors?

C (58:47)

Yes, I did.

A (58:48)

Yeah. You know, what's, what's the, what's the problems that you see there?

C (58:52)

Well, I don't think that the president sets his vice presidents up for succession very well, Mark.

A (58:59)

This president or all this president.

C (59:01)

This president.

A (59:01)

Yeah. And I mean, I mean, it's A sample space of 1, you'd have a strong argument for sure.

C (59:08)

I think that. I think that JD found a pathway in the ascendant isolationist new right. But I think that when you decide that you're going to run in 2032, you're going to be on a. On a platform in which you have to more or less agree with everything the president did. Because if you don't, if you say, well, that was Trump, I'm my own

A (59:34)

man, you know, President, you said 32, but did you mean 28?

C (59:38)

28. Sorry. The president is going to criticize any distancing you have that's unique for Republicans in 28. Unlike others that have stepped off the stage, I don't see that happening with Donald Trump. And so if there's an attempt to distance yourself, you're gonna be in trouble. And if you try to be a clone, I think. I don't think you can clone Donald Trump. I don't think somebody else can emulate that. And so I think that's going to be a really difficult pathway.

A (60:05)

Yeah, I hear you in the abstract, but it seems to me it's a binary thing. Either Trump will endorse his vice president or he won't. And if he's endorsed him but still criticizes him, I think that's probably, to me, that's, that's more survivable. And if he doesn't endorse him, I think it's, it's, it's going to be difficult for him.

C (60:21)

I, I have a. I think it'll be difficult for the president to endorse. I think he's more likely to want to see how it plays out and step back. I think that. So I'm not sure there will be an endorsement.

A (60:33)

Huh. I still think there will be. Maybe I'm wrong, but. And if there isn't, I don't think Vance would run. I think it'd just be too embarrassing. Now, if you look at the history, presidents have not endorsed their vice presidents in competitive primaries. Bill Clinton didn't. George Ronald Reagan didn't. Barack Obama went even further and kept his vice president out of the race.

C (60:55)

Yeah, I don't, I don't want to try to play psychoanalyst too much. I just think it is different. I'm not as convinced that the president wants to see a successor to the mantle of maga, because I think he views that as somehow diminishing him.

A (61:08)

Yeah.

C (61:09)

That he's maga. And if somebody else can be maga, then it means it's less Important for him. And so I don't see him putting the same effort into the argument that says, hey, you should help support a successor. It'll cement your legacy. I don't think it's a Reagan supporting Bush. I think it's going to be much more of a hands off approach from Trump to whomever is the nominee.

A (61:28)

Yeah, Reagan. Reagan not only didn't endorse Bush before the primary, but after Bush had effectively secured it. When Reagan endorsed him, he pronounced his name George Bosh. So anything but an endorsement.

C (61:41)

There were a lot of, there were a lot of Reagan partners who were on the Bush campaign. There are a lot of Reagan cabinets who were there. There are a lot of Reagan. Did after the convention support Bush bully? I'm saying I don't necessarily see that same snare playing out.

A (61:55)

Yeah, after the conventions anybody could, anybody can do it. Is there any movement going on in your wing of the party to see if the post Trump, not just the presidential nominee but the party itself, could go back to a more of a pence Romney Bush party? Is there an organized effort like that or are you all just sitting around waiting to see what organically happens?

C (62:17)

Well, I'd probably reject that analogy, Mark. I mean, when Mike was in Congress, he was the biggest thorn in the side of the Bush administration. He was the one leading the Republican Study Committee, which was the precursor of the Freedom Caucus, opposing the big spending of the Bush administration where there was no Child Left behind, whether or not it was cash for clunkers when I was the Wall street bailout, all the big programs that the Bush administration supported, that's how Mike came up. So I don't really.

A (62:43)

Well, all true, except if you went issue by issue, he'd still be closer to Bush and Romney than he is to Trump. I would say.

C (62:53)

I'd say that there's a stylistic difference in a lot of ways more so than necessarily a policy difference on many issues. But you know, so I don't know that I say, I don't say it's the Romney Bush Pence wing. I think there is.

A (63:07)

I just said that, Mark, to get under your skin.

C (63:09)

Well, thank you. I do think that there is a yearning to get back to conservative principles. I think there are a lot of people who looked at the first Trump administration and, and hailed it as a significant conservative success and they assumed the second administration would be similar on policy. And I think they've been sort of disheartened looking and saying, you know, I didn't really sign up for state owned enterprises. I Thought that was the Bernie Sanders model. I didn't sign up for credit card caps. You know, I thought that was the left wing model of the Democrat Party. And so I think there's a lot of policies they've been surprised about that have pushed in Trump 2.0, and they're yearning to get back to the limited government policies of conservatives.

A (63:54)

Even though I said it to get under your skin, if I did a chart of Trump policies and Mike Pence opposes and Pence policies that Trump opposes, Bush and Romney would be with Pence almost the whole time. I'm going to make the chart for you.

C (64:09)

Well, I'd make a chart for you that would compare Trump 1.0 versus Trump 2.0.

A (64:13)

Sure.

C (64:14)

And I think where Pence was in Trump 1.0, you'd see it pretty strong alignment as opposed to what you see in Trump 2.0.

A (64:21)

100%. But I live in the present, not the past. So I'm all about Trump 2.0. Lastly, this tax week, does the Short family pay too much in taxes, too little, or just the right amount, do you think?

C (64:33)

I think almost all Americans pay too much, Mark. I think that what we, we, we, you know, we do not face a revenue problem. Revenue for the government continues to go up. It's just, it's not keeping pace with the spending and the, the trajectory that it's on and particularly driven by entitlements. And there's actually nobody who's actually on the national stage looking to say what are we going to actually do to stop $39 trillion in debt that's growing out, that's growing in an enormous pace. And actually the Trump 2.0 has had spending that's even greater than the Biden administration.

A (65:02)

Yeah. It's a crazy thing. You think somebody would talk about it if you do. Bill Cassidy's talked about it to try to figure out a way to deal with Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, Security. But it's kind of crazy. It's always been insufficiently represented on the national town square, but now it's completely absent. It just, it's just not even hard.

C (65:20)

It's hard. It's a hard thing to tackle politically and it probably won't be tackled until there's actually a debt crisis. And, but you know, when you have interest rates have been high and elevated for the last few years, perhaps there's more Americans willing to have that conversation.

A (65:33)

Maybe, Maybe. Mark Short, always love having you on. Very great.

C (65:37)

Thanks, Mark. Good talk to you.

A (65:38)

Appreciate it. Happy tax week. All right. That's it for today's program. We'll be back on Thursday, another brand new episode. You can always tell everybody you know to be nexters, to sign up to be part of NextUp right here. Subscribe to NextUp on YouTube and wherever you get your podcasts. And again, share it with your friends so they know what you know, which is what's always coming. Next up.