Odd Lots Podcast: "Graham Allison on the Risks of a US-China War"

Date: November 27, 2025
Hosts: Joe Weisenthal & Tracy Alloway
Guest: Professor Graham Allison (Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University)

Episode Overview

This episode delves into the escalating geopolitical tensions between the United States and China with Professor Graham Allison, renowned for coining the term “Thucydides Trap.” The conversation explores historical analogies to great power conflict—especially the risk that the U.S.-China rivalry could slide into war—and assesses whether history is destiny or if conflict can be avoided. Allison draws on lessons from ancient Greece to the Cold War, unpacks misconceptions about China’s ambitions, reflects on recent events, and considers possible stabilizers in the modern global order.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The "Thucydides Trap" Explained

(04:17 - 09:01)

• Allison defines the "Thucydides Trap" as a historical pattern where a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, often resulting in war.
• He compares China’s meteoric rise to that of Athens in ancient Greece and America’s dominance to Sparta’s.
• Quote:
  “China is a meteoric rising power... Never before in history has a nation risen so far so fast on so many dimensions... The U.S. is a colossal ruling power. Never since Rome has a country been so powerful for such an amazing period.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [05:13]
• The dynamic leads to psychological discombobulation, misperception, and sometimes catastrophic conflict—“in about three-quarters of the cases, this ends up in war.”

2. Historical Analogies: Greece & World War I

(09:01 - 12:01)

• Explains how minor incidents (e.g., the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand) triggered massive wars due to underlying tensions.
• Allison highlights the role of third parties and accidents—small events can escalate rapidly amid rivalry.
• Quote:
  “So, misperceptions multiply, and the impact of third-party incidents or accidents is amplified... One thing leads to the other: you get a vicious cycle of misperceptions and miscalculations.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [10:44]

3. Why Has War Been Avoided So Far?

(12:01 - 15:22)

• For 80 years, there has been no great power war—“the longest period since Rome,” attributed partly to skillful statecraft and luck.
• Allison references the Cuban Missile Crisis as an instance where catastrophe was narrowly avoided due to “brilliant statecraft... and a great glob of grace and good fortune.”
• Out of 16 major historical cases, 12 ended in war, but 4 did not; the Cold War is cited as a non-violent rivalry model.
• Quote:
  “If it had ended in a nuclear war, we would have had a couple hundred million people killed. We wouldn’t be doing this interview.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [14:10]

4. Is China Analogous to the Soviet Union?

(18:03 - 21:44)

• Joe Weisenthal asks whether China, like the Soviet Union, seeks ideological expansion.
• Allison clarifies historical distinctions:
  • China is inwardly focused, historically thinking of itself as the “Middle Kingdom,” seeking respect but not missionary control.
  • Quote:
    “Americans and Chinese are very similar in that both have a superiority complex, but only one of us is a missionary… The other doesn’t think people are even good enough to be Chinese.”
    — Prof. Graham Allison [20:13]
  • Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore’s founder) predicted discomfort but also possibility for peaceful power-sharing.
• This distinction may reduce the risk of ideological confrontation but does not eliminate rivalry.

5. Economic Entanglement: Deterrent or "Grand Illusion"?

(21:44 - 26:57)

• Tracy asks about the belief that globalization and economic enmeshment might prevent war (“the great illusion” theory).
• Allison recalls pre-WWI optimism (Norman Angell, Carnegie) that proved disastrously wrong.
• Nowadays, the U.S. and China are economically interdependent, which serves as a stabilizer.
• President Trump’s “businessman view” offers optimism about competitive cooperation, though not without contradictions.
• Quote:
  “If both of the parties are searching for ways to cooperate, could this be a stabilizer?... I would say yes, it could.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [25:22]

6. Rising U.S. Hawkishness and Structural Dynamics

(26:57 - 28:45)

• Allison attributes increasing U.S. pessimism to structural factors (“Thucydidean story”) rather than mere politics.
• Changes in relative power shake the status quo and intensify mutual suspicion—historically normal, if alarming.
• Quote:
  “As the seesaw shifts, everybody’s perspective is impacted and they exaggerate. This is kind of like normal.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [28:06]

7. Is U.S.-China Tension Due to China’s Rise or U.S. Decline?

(32:31 - 37:04)

• Allison: In Chinese political narratives, China’s rise is inexorable, U.S. decline is irreversible.
• Chinese officials (e.g. Wang Huning) analyze U.S. vulnerabilities—inequality, political polarization, and social contradictions—influencing their strategic outlook.
• Allison describes the U.S. as “a kaleidoscope of contradictions... remarkably resilient,” yet acknowledges that from China’s perspective, U.S. society appears chaotic.
• Quote:
  “A reasonable person could look at the country today and say, this looks pretty strange.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [37:04]

8. Prospects for the Near Future & 2025 Events

(38:01 - 41:06)

• Much of the trajectory is “baked into the structure.” As China grows, U.S. discomfort and blame will increase.
• Allison surprisingly finds a “silver lining” with Trump: both he and (to some extent) Biden grasp the dangers of nuclear war, and Trump respects Xi and seeks a cooperative relationship, albeit for complex reasons.
• Quote:
  “Will the Thucydides rivalry continue?... Yes. But if survival depends on cooperation so we don’t have nuclear war... could we find some [balancing mechanism]? I think there is.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [40:33]

9. Supply Chains, Mutual Dependence, and Strategic Vulnerabilities

(41:10 - 48:05)

• Concrete example: the U.S. is critically dependent on China for rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and more.
• Although politicians call for domestic production or “independence,” practical disentanglement is slow—mutual economic dependence likely persists.
• Allison: “I'm almost ready to accept ... we're going to be inextricably entangled in supply chains and economics, in which case some version of mutual deterrence ... may be where we end up.” [47:35]

10. What Could Actually Trigger War?

(42:00 - 45:18)

• Allison downplays most “China threat” headlines as hype.
• High danger lies in:
  • Third parties taking provocative risks (esp. Taiwan’s leadership).
  • Accidents or collisions (planes, ships) escalating unintentionally, as nearly occurred with a U.S. spy plane in 2001.
• Emphasizes the need for leader-level communication channels and “circuit breakers” to prevent escalation.
• Quote:
  “Where you find danger is where there are third parties whose initiative might … produce a set of reactions. The leading candidate: Taiwan...”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [43:24]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the American mindset:
  “My wife says about me, wash the cosmetics off my chest and it says, USA is number one… That’s our identity.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [07:15]

• On good statecraft:
  “We came very, very close to absolute disaster [in the Cuban Missile Crisis], but it was ultimately averted by the individual actions of human beings.”
  — Tracy Alloway [51:48]

• On China’s ambitions:
  “[China] doesn’t want you to rule your country the way Chinese do. They just want you to have respect. They want to be in their own domain.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [20:13]

• On supply chain dependence:
  “For the US, rare earth magnets are required for almost everything... How would we allow ourselves to be dependent on China? Because that gives them something… they can be coercive.”
  — Prof. Graham Allison [46:08]

Timestamps for Key Segments

• [04:17] – What is the Thucydides Trap?
• [09:01] – Lessons from Greece and World War I
• [12:34] – Why 80 years of great power peace?
• [14:10] – Cuban Missile Crisis as cautionary tale
• [18:03] – Is China’s strategy like the Soviet Union’s mission?
• [21:44] – Can economic entanglement prevent war?
• [26:57] – How U.S. elites became so pessimistic
• [32:31] – China’s rise vs. U.S. decline: competing narratives
• [38:01] – 2025 events and what has surprised Allison
• [41:10] – Rare earths and mutual dependencies
• [42:00] – What real warning signs should we watch for?
• [45:58] – On efforts to "re-shore" manufacturing and defense
• [48:05] – Closing reflections and gratitude

Summary Tone and Takeaways

• The discussion is wide-ranging, historically literate, and laced with dry humor.
• Allison’s tone is both cautionary and pragmatic: while structural rivalries are dangerous, outright war is not inevitable if statecraft is careful and channels of communication are maintained.
• The tension between structure (the “trap”) and agency (the decisions of individuals and leaders) is a central theme.
• The hosts reflect at the end on the abstractness of international relations theory versus the concrete, personal choices that shape history.

Best for Listeners Who:

• Want a clear, engaging explanation of the Thucydides Trap.
• Are interested in the latest thinking on U.S.-China relations, especially from a seasoned academic with high-level policy access.
• Appreciate historical analogies and practical insights into how war CAN be avoided, even under intense structural pressure.

For further information, see Graham Allison’s book "Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?"