Jeff Gundlach (12:11)
Apparently there were firms that had it at 100 a few weeks ago, a month ago, and it went to zero. Pardon me, A month ago. Yeah. But anyway, it's called Renovo or something like this. And the funny thing is the argument for private credit has always been a Sharpe ratio argument. At the center of it is that you get the same return or maybe a little better return than the public markets, but you have much lower volatility. Well, that's like saying that you have no risk in a CD you don't have any interest rate risk in a CD. If you buy a 5 year CD, the price never changes. Well, that's just because you don't market to market. Of course, a CD that you bought five years ago at 1.5% is not worth. You couldn't sell it at a par value. You're going to have to take a discount on it. But that's the private credit argument, what really happens. And this was really borrowed from private equity, which they use the Sharpe ratio argument there too. They say, well, you'll get the same return or maybe a little better return out of private equity than you will out of the S&P 500, but it's much lower volatility. So what happens is when the S&P 500 goes from 100 to 50, the private equity firms mark their positions down from 100 to 80. Now they're not worth 80. You couldn't sell them at 80, but that's where they get marked. And then when the market recovers back to 100 on the S&P 500, they mark their private equity up to 100. So lo and behold, both the S&P 500 and the private equity have a return of zero. But the volatility of the S&P 500 is more than double that of the private equity. So it's basically a sharper issue argument based upon the volatility being underreported that goes on in all of these so called private markets. Now it's very fascinating that this renovo in the article today, it basically said that they had a Chapter 7 filing and bankruptcy filing. And their assets, their liabilities were listed as being between 100 and $500 million. You check a box, you don't give a specific number. So there's ranges. And the range that their liabilities were in was between 100 and $500 million. Their assets were listed as less than $50,000. Less than $50,000. Are you trying to tell me that these big private equity firms and private credit firms with all of their resources aren't aware of that type of debt to equity ratio? That's obviously far into a bankrupt situation. So what's going on here that private equity firms had this marked a few weeks ago at 100 when it was obvious that their liabilities were vastly, vastly higher than their equity. That should have been marked down to, I don't know, 50, 25 1, but it's at 100. What's going on? It's like there's only one price for private there's only two prices for private credit appears, yeah, 100, that's it. And I heard an announcement made from these private equity people at that Bloomberg event. They're sort of like, as long as we believe that we're going to get paid back, we leave it at 100. Well, okay, but once you have 150 million plus dollars of liabilities and less than $50,000 of assets, it's pretty unlikely they're going to get paid back. The price should not be at 100, but that's what's going on. And so you have that Sharpe ratio argument. Then you have another argument for private credit which had been somewhat valid was just recent history. I mean performance. The five year performance of private credit a couple of years ago was definitely better than the five year performance. @ least reported performance of public credit. Private credit did better than public credit. So you had a trailing performance argument, which of course trailing performance is no guarantee of future results, which is stated on every single prospectus. But recently private credit is not outperforming, obviously with bonds going from 100 to zero in a matter of weeks. The public market has been performing better than the private market. And the most ridiculous argument of all for private credit has been private credit belongs in every portfolio because it lets you sleep at night, because it helps you ride out the volatility of your public credit. Again, that's just a repackaging of the volatility. If you don't market to market, there's no volatility. But if the price goes from 100 to zero in a matter of a few weeks, there's something untoward is going on. I'm very, very negative on those types of non transparent markets. It reminds me, I've been saying this for probably two years now, that the next big crisis in the financial markets is going to be private credit. It has the same trappings as subprime mortgage repackaging had back in 2006. Now it took a couple of years for it to totally unravel. So this stuff doesn't happen in a week or a year even. But I'm very negative on that. And so where we stand on fixed income is we don't like long term treasury bonds at all because we don't think people are going to want them during the next recession. The deficit is going to go up because it always goes up during a recession. The official deficit is about 6% of GDP. That's a level that was associated historically with the depths of recessions because of course it goes up during recessions. Well, when you go to a recession, the deficit goes up on average by, well, depends what, how long a time series you use. But if you go back for about 50 years, it goes up by about 4 or 5% of GDP. In more recent recessions, it's been a lot worse than that. We could argue, you could make the case somewhat plausibly that the global financial crisis was weird and that the COVID lockdown recession was weird. But during those, the deficit went up by about 8% of GDP on average. What happens if the deficit goes from 6% of GDP to, to 10% of GDP or 12% of GDP or 14% of GDP? All of those are possible. What happens is that you have to blow up the entire system because all the tax receipts would go to interest expense. We're already at a Large percentage, about 1.4, $1.5 trillion of the $7 trillion budget is now interest expense. Of course we have a $2 trillion budget deficit, so there's only $5 trillion of taxes and 30% of that is going to interest expense. And that is going to go higher. And as interest rates are still elevated from levels of five to seven to 12 years ago, the bonds that are rolling off have an average coupon for the next few years of a little bit below 3%, let's just call it 3%. That means that with fed funds at three and seven eighths and treasuries at four out to four and a half, that means that on average you're going to have higher interest expense on just rolling over the existing debt. And of course you're ladling on a couple trillion dollars in a non recessionary period. And so I did a thing at Grant's conference, Jim Grant had his 40th anniversary conference a couple years ago and I did the simplest, most succinct presentation I've ever given in my career. I just went through the interest expense problem using plausible assumptions on where the deficit's going. But the conclusion is, and this is an art and not a science, so there's a lot of assumptions that can be challenged, but putting it in a rather pessimistic light. So I don't say this is the base case, but by the year 2030, so five years from now, it's quite plausible that under the current tax system and the current borrowing regiment that we have 60% of all tax receipts going to interest expense. You can make it really, really draconian and say, what if interest rates go up to 9% on treasuries and what if the Budget deficit goes to 12% of GDP. And you make these kinds of pessimistic assumptions. Well, by around 2030, you would have 120% of tax receipts going to interest expense, which of course is impossible. So that means that something has to happen. And we're not talking about early in my career, people were saying we can't keep borrowing this money. That was under Reaganomics, which people thought was a bad idea because it was deficit spending. And they said, the way we're going, we're going to be broke. We'll be out of money in Social Security and other entitlement programs by 2050. And then 10 years later they moved it forward to 2040. So it was initially supposed to be like a 60 year problem, and then 10 years later it was a 40 year problem and then it was a 20 year problem and now it's like a 5 year problem, which means it's a problem in real time and something has to be done about this. So long term Treasuries look vulnerable to me. I still like short term Treasuries because I think the Fed is likely to cut interest rates and that definitionally leads to lower interest rates on say, five years into maturities.