Odd Lots Podcast Summary

Episode: Michael Froman on the New 'Polyamorous' Global Trading System
Hosts: Joe Weisenthal and Tracy Alloway
Guest: Michael Froman, President of the Council on Foreign Relations & Former US Trade Representative (2013-2017)
Date: September 20, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode explores the dramatic transformation of the global trading system, particularly in the wake of escalating US-China trade tensions and the rise of protectionism. Joe and Tracy interview Michael Froman––a key player in pre-Trump trade policy––to discuss what has changed, what is left of the old multilateral rules-based order, and how emerging “polyamorous” (multi-aligned rather than bi- or uni-polar) global trading relationships are shaping the future. The conversation ranges from the effectiveness of past trade agreements to the prospects for global cooperation in a world where countries are striking a new balance between economic and strategic concerns.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Changing Face of Global Trade

• The hosts open with observations on how the global economy has changed since the most recent trade ruptures, with noticeable but not catastrophic disruptions for consumers and businesses.
  • Example: Tracy's delayed auction item from the Netherlands due to new tariffs and customs uncertainties (02:15).
• Both hosts reflect that a “return” to pre-2016 US-China relations seems unlikely, emphasizing the bipartisan and now “durable trend” towards a more protectionist and decoupled trading system (03:09).

2. Role of the US Trade Representative & the Old Era

Michael Froman describes USTRA’s unique challenges and the way past negotiations functioned:

• Negotiations involved setting agendas, driving rules-based standards, and dealing with the complexities of industries (e.g., 500 uses for a milk molecule) (04:45-05:44).
• The US led by raising global standards to level the playing field for high-wage, highly-regulated economies (06:20).
• Past practice was "rules, not just rates"—targeting labor, environment, services, not just tariffs.

“It was the way the US brought other countries along to adopt high standard rules across one sector or one subject matter or another.” — Michael Froman (06:12)

3. Erosion of Multilateralism and the WTO

• Froman: The WTO and the rules-based system were already under stress before Trump; Trump merely finalized a long decline (07:42).
• Tracy pushes on whether these rules ever worked for everyone—citing persistent complaints about cheating and blame-shifting (08:20).
• Froman points out that “most countries follow most rules most of the time,” but China’s rise changed the balance:
  • China embraced openness only so far; Xi’s policies reversed this and now, “it’s following a fundamentally different set of rules” (09:58).
• Enforcement at the WTO is slow and often ineffective—China sometimes delayed implementation until US industries evaporated (15:52).

4. Carrots, Sticks, and Trade Agreements

• Obama-era approach combined legal enforcement (filing WTO cases, especially against China) with positive incentives—TPP as an example:
  • Smaller countries raised labor/environmental standards in exchange for better access, especially to the Japanese market, not just the US (16:12-17:32).

5. Inflection Points and Structural Change

• Critical moments of realization:
  • Doha Round collapse (2009) showed misfit of old rules with China’s rise (18:13-21:34).
  • Failure of 2016 Environmental Goods Agreement negotiations over bicycles as a microcosm of broader disagreement (21:34).
  • Even pre-Trump, US saw that the global system would not work as envisioned—tried (with little success) to persuade China that its own prosperity depended on a benign international system.

6. Biden’s Continuity and Tariff Challenges

• Biden administration continued and broadened many of Trump’s trade policies, unable or unwilling to remove “easy to put on, hard to take off” tariffs, even on non-strategic products (22:55).
  • Who suffers? Low-income Americans pay more for everyday essentials due to blanket tariffs (24:22).
• “Tariffs are easy to put on and hard to take off, because once they’re on, there are constituencies that are supportive of them.”—Froman (23:12)

7. The "Polyamorous" Global Order

• With both the US and China setting their own rules, others are left to “choose a lane” or balance multiple partners (24:58).
• Globalization continues—but now through fragmented, overlapping agreements (European & African free trade deals, for example).
  • Robert Kaplan: “It’s the US that has exempted itself” (29:40).
  • But, large countries like India or Brazil are wary of China as much as the US, fearing the dumping of Chinese industrial oversupply.

“It’s not multipolarity… It’s like polyamorous life. India is the archetypal example: aligned with the US for some things, Russia for oil, Iran for oil, and they love/hate China depending on the day.” — Michael Froman (31:12)

8. Middle Powers and Alliance Complexity

• The emerging world order is about “multi-alignment,” not non-alignment.
• Success relies on “coalitions of the willing”—temporary, issue-specific alliances—requiring leadership and complex coordination (32:21, 33:33).
• China is adept at forming these flexible coalitions (BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organization); the US needs to match this agility.

“In retrospect, the Cold War was very simple… This is much more complicated.” — Froman (32:48)

9. Reshoring, Friend-shoring, and Inefficiency

• There’s a real danger of global redundancy: every country wants its own strategically essential industries (semiconductors, batteries, etc.)—leading to a costlier, less efficient world, but possibly one with more resilience (35:38-36:51).
• The tension: maximizing efficiency (dependency on China) vs. diversifying for security.

10. Trade, National Security, and the "Small Yard, High Fence"

• The US is moving from separating trade and national security to “economic security.”
• The danger is ever-widening controls and a shrinking scope for free trade.
• Critical issue: Can/should the US rely on allies (“friend-shoring”) for key inputs and products (pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding, rare earths, etc.), or insist on making everything at home? (37:19-41:22)

11. The Convergence Paradox—US as China?

• US policy is increasingly interventionist—embracing industrial policy and protectionism, much as China has done for years.

“Rather than them becoming more like us, we have become more like them. And…we’re now competing with them on their playing field under their set of rules.” — Froman (41:56-42:08)

12. What Can Be Learned? The Limits and Dangers

• China’s industrial policy is not universally successful—it has resulted in huge resource waste.
• Yet, the US seems to be relying mainly on tariffs rather than a multifaceted state support model.

“We know what the costs of tariffs are, and we’re taking a gamble… whether tariffs alone are going to remanufacture the United States economy.” — Froman (46:28)

• Real risks: poor US industrial policy execution; trying to do too much domestically, not outsourcing to or cooperating with allies; and risking inefficient, unsustainable self-reliance (47:29).

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the new world order:

  “It’s really more akin to polyamorous life… India loves the United States… They love Russia for oil, for arms… They love Iran for oil… And they love and they hate [China] depending on the day… So I think India is archetypal of trying to play these relationships.” — Michael Froman (31:12)

• On the failure of trade enforcement:

  “By the time the fix was implemented, the relevant industry in the United States or elsewhere was gone… cold comfort.” — Michael Froman (16:15)

• On tariffs’ political durability:

  “Tariffs are easy to put on and hard to take off, because once they’re on, there are constituencies that are supportive of them.” — Michael Froman (23:12)

• On the US learning from China:

  “We always thought… by bringing China into the international system, we would become more alike. Now our view was they would become more like us… Rather than them becoming more like us, we have become more like them.” — Michael Froman (41:56)

• On the complexity of the current global order:

  “In retrospect, the Cold War was very simple. It was black and white… This is much more complicated.” — Michael Froman (32:48)

• Humorous intro to “polyamorous world order”:

  “India is the perfect episode title.” — Tracy Alloway (31:21)

• On Tradle and global economic complexity:

  “I don’t always get it right, but it’s a good reminder of just how complex certain economies are.” — Michael Froman (48:37)

Timestamps for Core Segments

• Overview of post-Trade War changes: 01:49–03:09
• What does the US Trade Rep do? 04:40–05:44
• Rules-based system evolution & WTO’s decline: 07:42–09:58
• China’s impact and WTO enforcement limits: 14:15–16:15
• Obama administration’s trade strategies: 15:28–17:32
• Critical moments (Doha collapse, environmental goods): 18:13–22:32
• Shift from Trump to Biden and entrenched tariffs: 22:55–24:42
• State of the global system – mercantilism, fragmentation: 24:58–26:32
• Globalization shifts to polyamory: 29:40–32:16
• Small alliances, multi-alignment, and US/China coalitions: 33:07–34:34
• Reshoring, cost/efficiency trade-offs: 35:38–36:51
• Economic security and “small yard, high fence”: 37:19–39:47
• Friend-shoring vs. reshoring; administration challenges: 39:48–41:22
• US adopting Chinese-style intervention: 41:30–42:08
• Risks and limits of tariffs & US industrial policy: 45:29–46:28
• What could break the system (“left tail risk”): 47:07–48:27
• Wrap-up and lighter moments (Tradle, dairy farmer): 48:33–49:01

Conclusion: The Polyamorous Trade System

Michael Froman, reflecting on his experience and current analysis, argues that the old, neat world of US-led globalization and rules-based systems is gone. The present is messier: countries build flexible, interest-driven alignments rather than strict blocs, even as the US and China abandon old rulebooks. Globalization hasn’t disappeared, but now it’s a “polyamorous” world—more dynamic, fragmented, and contingent than before.

“One thing you can say about polyamorous relationships is they tend to come with a lot of drama. Right? So definitely feels like we're going to have more instability, or at least more things in flux, more volatility.” — Tracy Alloway (50:02)

Listen for nuanced insights on global economic power, polyamorous international relationships, and the enduring challenge of building a durable, cooperative trade order in a divided world.