← Off the Radar, Special Operations Training Detachment
Off the Radar, Special Operations Training Detachment
Insight from a Burro Alumunus Pt. 2 (Reupload)
00:28:50
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- [00:01]
A
Special Operations Training Detachment SOT D West Burrow Team coming at you from ntc. Off the radar. This is off the radar. I'm your host, Captain Connor Mang, an observer coach trainer for Special Operations at the National Training Center. Welcome to part two of our discussion with Captain Weston Rich. In this episode we'll continue to discuss his opinions on Arsof and Lisco and he'll wrap up with his final thoughts of his time here at Burrow Team. One thing that we had, we kind of talked about beforehand and I wanted to kind of get your opinion was so you've seen rotations at jrtc, at ntc, you've seen it from an OCT side of or an OCT's lens. You've seen it from a planning lens. What do you think? And I know this is probably going to be really hard to answer, but what do you think is, is the biggest takeaway that you're going to bring when you go back to the regiment? Like you had said, as a debt or as a, as a company commander, you know, I think or, or an operations officer, whatever your next assignment is at SF Regiment? What do you think being here you're going to take forward?
- [01:20]
B
I mean the, the short answer is mission command and like command guidance really trying to understand how to forecast what the future looks like. And at at NTC we, you know, coach 72 hours and I, I would say good detachments are doing their best to do that and they understand that maybe higher up is going to squash that because something else important happens. But the AOB gets a lot of that coaching and gets a lot of the fruits of the, the role player in role coaching and the borough commander and, and sergeant major coaching and mentorship as well on what's your current state, what is your end state and how are we going to get there and what's today look like, what's tomorrow look like? And trying to, I'm saying it that way but really, you know, you, you always try to backwards plan and then trying to take that message, whatever that idea is and make it as simple and short as possible with as much density and squish out ambiguity as Kelly Smith would talk about, which fantastic episode about AOBs building AOBs earlier in the series with him and blanking on the other gentleman's name right now, which is a bit embarrassing anyways, trying to just distill command guidance to allow downtrace units as much freedom of maneuver where they understand the end state and the, you know, the time horizon and they, they go out and they do the great Things that they need to do with the commander's intent and then they're able to, you know, report back and they're able to adjust as the scenario develops. I think that's the biggest thing. I think it's one of the hardest things to train on. I think it's one of the things that through training that I've been through, through the Q Force, through Ranger school and stuff, it's. It's difficult to get that forecasting mentality because in a training environment, you know, it's a lot more like situational training exercise. Sticks lanes typically, oh, we know that there's however big of an enemy force over there and we're going to do all these steps and we're going to execute the principles of patrolling and then we're going to go do the, the raid, the recon, the ambush, the whatever that we're going to do and we're going to be successful because it's training and we want to succeed. Whereas a combat training center, because it's this, the scenario continues and the enemy is rethinking and there's not, you know, there's not pauses like there are in. When you're doing sticks lanes, then it allows or it, it requires you to try and understand that realism and forecast operations beyond the immediate and think about series is and sequences and those things where, okay, if I maneuver two teams over into that sector, then I'm leaving this other sector vulnerable with one team. And if the enemy figures that out, what are they going to do? So you're always kind of like in the point where you have to make incremental decisions while still war gaming. Easier said than done. Easier to see as an observer, coach, trainer, where you're detached from the situation. And that was one thing. Especially with like guest ocs. When they came in, we tried to coach them on like, hey, one, you're gonna know the back side story, so you're not going to understand why they're making the decisions they're making when you know what we're trying to guide them towards. But two, you're also not involved in the, you know, in the training. You're observing the training. So it's much easier to have a, you know, calm. I'm well rested, I'm well fed, I can think through more things clearly. You know, that's the benefit of being the observer and getting the rotation after rotation exposure. Whereas like, you know, when you're the training unit, this is your one and done training cycle and you have all the environmental factors. How well, you slept how well you ate? Is it cold? Is it hot? You know, all those things. Is the commander putting a bunch of pressure on me for something I don't understand right now because I don't have the information? And the advantages for the observer is that you, you understand the scenario and you get to experience that detached, you know, multiple times. So you actually get way more learning being an observer than, than you do as the training unit, in my opinion. So, yeah, just trying to work out command guidance commander's intent and allow detachments to have as much freedom as possible while they're executing within that intent.
- [06:44]
A
Yeah, something the, the COG said to us. The new COG just kind of assumed command here within the last month, I believe something he said to us. And I think people can, you know, agree or disagree, but he said, you know, I like to think that the brigade combat team that leaves here after rotation should be the most lethal and best trained brigade combat team in the world, in theory, because they've just gone through some of the hardest training the army provides for a unit that size. And like you said, with the most complex variables where they're stressing every system and being able to make decisions that they would be making in a combat environment. I think that that does to, to an extent also trickle down to the SOFA rotational units, the sidets, the, the civil affairs companies, and then the ODAs. I think a lot of people don't understand that failure here is acceptable because units fail here all the time. Obviously as a whole, your rotation shouldn't be a failure, but it's not. It's not, it's not a uncommon thing for entire brigades to get recocked for a defense, you know, for their defense phase or, hey, we're going to recock you on your attack and you know, seizure of X key terrain because, you know, the way you guys conduct it was fine, but we, we think that there's, there's the opportunity to do better. There's the opportunity for your maneuver units to potentially gain more insight and learn more. And I think that happens here a lot. I think we don't see as much pausing. Like you said, rotational units for the soft side don't get sobeys, the suspension of battlefield effects. So, you know, for people who are listening during a rotation, about halfway through, sometimes every third of of the rotation, they'll do a SoBE and they'll kind of pause the RTU to allow them to kind of recock. They'll do some larger AARs with deliberate discussion on, hey, how, what was RSNO os RSNOI up to this point and then from this point to the end of this phase. Soft doesn't do that. We don't, we don't really generally conduct sobeys. The, the RTU is continually operating. There are some restraints that they have. They can't just move around the box during sobeys when the conventional forces paused. But that's deliberate because they don't get a break in a. If they were to go into a theater, into a combat environment, there is no break. Um, so the intel picture is constantly needing to be updated. Supply and logistics are, are not paused. You're not getting to go back to the AOB to get water in class one and class five. So it's, it's a constant problem they're trying to solve. Like you said, for the 10 to 14 days they're out here. And I think that a lot of units, they come out here and see that. And I don't say they struggle with it, but they, they struggle with the mentality of like, it's okay to, to, to make mistakes and to fail because this is where we want it to happen. This is where if you're going to fail, this is where it's okay because, you know, nobody's going to be hurt, nobody's going to be injured, no one's going to die. You're going to learn, hey, this is not the correct way for me to mission command these ODAs or this is not the correct way as a, as a cat for me to conduct movement to a kle or this is not the correct way for me to, to conduct a messaging campaign as a side ed or to conduct mil deck, whatever it is that, that a soft RTU is doing. You're learning, right? So I think that's something I've seen is that, that kind of acceptance that it's okay. And I know we hate to say failure, but that's essentially what it is. You know, we were given a task and we weren't able to do it. Whether we didn't make that time hack because the terrain restricted us more than we had anticipated, or like you said, consumption rates of fuel and water, things like that, that we didn't take into account because, you know, the enemy and the environment get a vote out here. Any comments on that or kind of your thoughts on kind of what I just kind of explained?
- [10:47]
B
Yeah, no, I 100% agree. I think it's okay to fail or to make mistakes. The important thing is your approach, your attitude. You should show up and Pretend like, okay, I'm deploying to Denovia, Fortuny, wherever made up country, the rotation has you going and treat it real. And if you have that mentality that this is real, it's not training, you're going to perform better, you might still make mistakes, but you will have a much better approach. And same with the coaching that you're receiving. Well, this doesn't go with my experience or this doesn't go with my, you know, current way that I see things. Try it, whatever. You know, the people that are coaching you have seen multiple rotations and if they're the civilian, if they're the retired soft role players, they have decades of experience across a wide range of geographic, you know, geographic combatant commands and time frames. You know, Some are pre 911 where they were focused on air, land battle and other things prior to the global war on terror. All of their experience is not just counterterrorism, counterinsurgency. And those lessons learned are not to be forgotten either. And things from unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency and the like can be applied to large scale conflict. If you do large scale conflict poorly, you will have an insurgency. And that is a horrible, you know, outcome to have. And you're not going to do anybody, especially the soft folks, any favor because then all three tribes are going to have a lot of work to deal with in a different way. If it, if you've degraded the uniform force so much that now the conventional units, you know, conventional force on force, basically battle's over, but then it devolves into an insurgency. You know, we're back to where we were in global war on terror. But yeah, I think mental attitude is huge and you do everything you can. Given the situation. You might, you probably will have a lack of information, a feeling that you don't have enough time and you know, maybe you slept poorly or some other things or, you know, whatever the case is, don't use those as an excuse. Do your best to plan with the constraints that you have and execute as aggressively as you can inappropriately. You know, not every, you know, civil reconnaissance, for example, doesn't require outward aggression, but you can have violence of action in a different way during the civil reconnaissance. And you could apply that to all three tribes. And then I would say like each soft drive has this. You have your, your tactical job based on your mos, and you have your staff functionality which is also related to your mos. But then you're also an advisor. Regardless of if you're SFCA or siop, you're Going to be advising somebody and that person can have the US army uniform on, they can have your partner nation uniform on. They could be an NGO or a host nation government or something. They could be anybody. So all three soft tribes kind of have those three bins that each soldier has to be able to operate within and understand based on your operational environment. Those things might look radically different depending on what side of the forward line of troops you're in or on rather. Because one of the big takeaways that I had from observing Special Forces operational detachments was, was that idea that like we're used to through small unit tactics, Ranger school and other things you're used to like, okay, I did bait planning, I did my military decision making process, I'm going to the field and I'm going to stop with the MDMP and I'm going to do troop leading procedures and that's going to guide me through. And you have to maintain a mix, I would say, of both of those planning processes throughout the rotation to be successful because and I mentioned it before, like, you need to be forecasting events so that you're prepared for changes in the environment, the battle, the battle space and stuff. And if you're just going well for trooping procedures, I received the mission. You're going to be sitting there waiting for hire to give you instructions or to somehow, somehow get instructions where if you're forecasting, you're thinking through co development, co comparison, co decision war gaming kind of scenario. Like using that methodology, you're going to be able to assist your commander and the conventional force, you know, in getting to the right space and time to have effects that are beyond, you know, you can, you can destroy a radar dish and depending on the time that you destroy it, it can be immensely helpful or it can just be, you just put a target on your back because nothing was going on, it didn't help friendly maneuver. But now the enemy is going to hunt you down. And that's something that's really the purpose in my opinion. From my perspective, the training like at the detachment level is to like get the detachment leadership. I know you know how to plan a mission. I know you can do the MDMP steps or the TLP steps and you can set a patrol base and you can advise this partner force, but you got to manage all of that while there's a whole simulated conflict going on around you. So you have to be able to jump between tactical and, for lack of a better word, staff functionality and advising throughout the day, multiple times a day. Because even regardless of your, your mos, you could be the junior engineer sergeant on the detachment and you could have a great idea and you could be like, I was tracking our, our consumption of water and it, it's way beyond what we predicted and we're going to be out of water in 24 hours and we need to do something about it or gas or whatever. And if somebody's not on top of those things, then you could have the best patrol base, defense and set up outer security and defense in depth and have early warning from networks and stuff. But if you're going to run out of supply and you can't get it brought to you, you're going to have to move and that's all going to have to change. So everybody on the team, regardless of the tribe, you got to be proficient at your MOS tactical level and staff level and be able to advise up your chain of command and across to your partner force. And some people are just like, they show up and they want to camp in the desert or the woods and go strike things and then, you know, be like, okay, well we, we showed that we do close quarter battle and direct action really well. So can we go back to the barracks and plan another mission? And it's like, no, that's not, that's not what this is about. We want to continue evolving the scenario and you're going to be in a contested or degraded kind of environment, whether that's logistically, communications, whatever, and you're behind the enemy lines. You're, you know, well in front of the forward line of troops. It was a great risk to put you there and to pull you out is a big risk. So it needs to make sense operationally when, if you're going to maneuver.
- [19:12]
A
Appreciate it. Weston, thank you for that insight. I, I think it's very clear and evident just based on your time here, it's made you a very broad or more broad soft officer. I'm really impressed just kind of with your, your knowledge about civil affairs and psyops and just, it's, it's good to see that, you know, after spending time here, this is kind of the end product that you're going to have a better appreciation for mission command, a better appreciation for soft and conventional force integration, and just a better understanding of the capabilities that all three soft tribes offer wrapping up here. I, I, you know, I really appreciate your insight. If you get chance for those that are listening, go back and, and kind of take time to, to listen to anything Wes has recorded in the past, any topic that you could think of there's probably an episode for it, everything from medical to liaison officers to fires and aob. So there's really something there for every echelon of SOF and and Weston's put a lot of time and effort into this this podcast. We really appreciate that. Is there anything you got final comments for for any prospective RTUs or borough alumni or current Borough team or just, you know, your time here and anything. Kind of your parting words.
- [20:35]
B
Thank you Connor. I appreciate all those kind words. If you get the chance to be a observer coach trainer at Sat D, do it. I would say go to NTC over JRTC just because I'm biased. That's where I was. That's my experience. I think you get a little bit more freedom and more more responsibility if you're out at AOB west at NTC versus at jrtc. But again my perspective and my biases because that's where I was. I would say that working at Sat D absolutely helps you grow as a SOF operator and leader. Regardless of what tribe you come from. You get to learn and interact with the other ones way more than you ever did during the Q course or at your prospective group or brigade. I know I did. Like I learned so much from my fellow Team Burrow teammates regardless of their mos or soft tribe or anything. And Burrow is in my opinion the best cross functional team that you will ever find in usasoc because we have a team room that is truly integrated. You walk into the Burrow team room and an outsider is not going to be able to tell you that guy's civil affairs, that one's psychological operations and that one's Special Forces. They're going to have no idea because it's going to be 12 or so officers and NCOs that just understand how to interact and work together and help each other and better the organization and better all the regiments. Because they are so dedicated. They're going to be able to talk intelligently about Casiop or SF regardless of their their mos and they're going to be able to provide insights, you know, because we do have at times people observe units that they're not, you know, that's not their unit. Whether they're CASIOP or sf. They might end up observing Casiop or SF depending on the needs of the rotation and they're able to bring a unique perspective and understanding that's beneficial to their rotational training unit. And not only did I get the wonderful chance to broaden my understanding of psychological and civil affairs Operations. By working with some great officers and NCOs, I got to understand more about commo space, cyber intelligence and other things because everybody on Burrow is a true team player. Regardless of if they're an 18, 37, 38, you know, whatever they are, if they are military intelligence or a 25 series communicator or our 92 Yankee supply sergeant, everybody's a team player. Everybody wants to help out, everybody wants to learn and it's, it was a wonderful experience. It was a great place to work. I highly encourage anybody that is looking at what do I do after team time as a captain? What do I do as an NCO when it's time for do I go to SWIC or do I go somewhere else? Like you won't be, you won't go wrong if you pick SAT D because you're going to learn a lot, you're going to see a lot, you're going to have a predictable schedule that's going to afford you the opportunity to get out and do things. Because Irwin is great. It's a great place to work. It's also a great place to launch from and go sightseeing and do all the things that the western states have to offer. Lots of time at the beach. And I went skiing a bunch and my family loved it and we had the chance to, you know, work hard and play hard at the same time. So great place to be, great place to learn and I enjoyed my time immensely there, enjoyed being a huge part of this podcast and I hope that it continues to go beyond what it is and that you and the others that are participating now just take it and make it even better because I know you can. So I want to thank Micah Pop for really helping launch this thing. He's still there behind the scenes doing a bunch. I hope it doesn't die because it's a great thing for learning and I think that it's a way to, you know, hopefully avoid mistakes of the past and share, you know, what works and what doesn't work across, across the tribes, across the soft triad and, and across the army as a whole. Appreciate your time, Connor. Thank you.
- [25:27]
A
Of course. No, thank you for coming on and giving us your post borough opinion and kind of some of your, your wisdom that you've accrued over the last two years of being out here in the desert. Everybody's listening. Like I said again, another shameless plug. Please go back and kind of delve into what west kind of built off of and you know, hopefully the, the goal, like we talked about earlier is to continue to develop this and capture more lessons learned from the NTC and jrtc. But appreciate all the work you've put in for, for this, this program and we'll continue to, to keep touch base with you and we wish you luck out there in Pittsburgh with your program as you start school here and hopefully, hopefully you get to enjoy being a college student for a few, for, for a few calendar, calendar years and yeah, look forward to seeing you back in the regiment, hopefully.
- [26:24]
B
Yeah, I appreciate it, man. And yes, if you haven't heard any of the other, other episodes, go back, listen to those, write an email and you know, if you got an idea, hit up, hit up the podcast or, or search for Connor Mang or somebody from SAT D on Global and they can get you in touch with the right people.
- [26:49]
A
Last, last question. Favorite podcast. If somebody's going to go back and listen to one that you did, what's the one you'd recommend them go listen to? Could be just the guest or the topic. I know that's, that's a hard one.
- [27:00]
B
That's a hard question. Hard, hard question. They're all great. They're all different. The topics. I mean, I really liked the ones with the aob ones with Kelly Smith and I still can't remember his name, so this is embarrassing. I gotta look it up. There's four episodes. They're focused on AOBs and they're two group deputy commanders, former deputy commanders that are or that are retired role players. And they have a lot of insights, they have a lot of rotations and as being role players. I like the medical ones because Mo Bogart is, is so knowledgeable and it's, it's easy listening and enjoyable. They're just, there's so many. It's good, it's hard to choose.
- [27:50]
A
Yeah, I know, that's tough. Okay, that's good though. Thank you. That's. Yeah, that's a good starting point for anybody. If you're, if you're looking to get into the podcast, those are, Mo's a great guy to talk to for sure. So he's a, he's an easy guy to talk to. So.
- [28:04]
B
Yeah. Yeah.
- [28:05]
A
Okay. Well, hey man, I appreciate you. If you got nothing else, thank you for spending the time here. We got a lot of good knowledge and dialogue and I hope to hear from you soon.
- [28:17]
B
Yeah, appreciate it, man. Take care.
- [28:21]
A
If you are interested in being a guest on the off the Radar podcast or have a topic you'd like us to cover, please contact the off the radar team@offtheradar podcast teammail.com thank you for listening to off the Radar, where RSoft prepares for conflict. Like subscribe and share on your listening platform.