One More Rep! A Discussion with Civil Affairs Leadership

Summary

Off the Radar – Special Operations Training Detachment
Episode Title: One More Rep! A Discussion with Civil Affairs Leadership
Date: April 23, 2026
Host: Captain Connor Mang (Off the Radar, Burro Team)
Guests: Bravo 96 (Civil Affairs Company Leadership)

• 1SG Charles Munson
• CPT Ed (Commander)
• CPT Tim (Ops, outgoing to Kyrgyzstan)

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Overview

This episode features an in-depth roundtable with the new command team of Bravo 96, a CENTCOM-aligned Civil Affairs (CA) company under the 95th Civil Affairs Brigade. The discussion recaps their recent National Training Center (NTC) rotation, highlighting the shifting demands of large-scale combat operations (LISCO) for Army Special Operations Forces, new training evolutions, integration with Special Forces and conventional units, and the evolution of CA “lethality” in the modern battlefield. The conversation emphasizes lessons learned, the critical role of Civil Knowledge Integration (CKI), the value of realistic stress-testing at NTC, and the imperative to adapt quickly for large-scale, multi-domain conflict.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Introductions & Unit Context

[00:27–02:14]

• The 96th is one of the battalions within 95th Civil Affairs Brigade, aligned with CENTCOM, responsible for a diverse set of missions (Arabian Peninsula, Levant/Syria, Central Asia).
• All leaders have extensive SOF and CA experience, including time in Syria, Nepal, Bangladesh, and have held various command/staff roles.

Quote:
“The mission set for CENTCOM right now is pretty diverse…very tough to train, very difficult to make a training plan that covers all six teams, all the baseline lethality tasks.”
– CPT Ed (Commander), [02:38]

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2. Evolving Civil Affairs Training: From Home Station to the NTC

[02:38–06:37]

• CA teams face challenges replicating the modern threat at home station; the NTC offers dynamic, “unknown answer” scenarios.
• Emphasis on balancing SOF/CA-specific tasks with “big Army” lethality fundamentals (shoot, move, communicate, medicate).
• Exposure at NTC forces adaptation to LISCO problem sets and genuine ambiguity.

Quote:
“There was not a single day where I knew the answer to the problem at all.”
– CPT Ed (Commander), [05:13]

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3. Comparing CA Battalion Cultures (96th vs. 97th)

[07:31–10:30]

• First Sergeant Munson notes increased focus in 96th on baseline lethality and integration vs. prior “SIMC/engagement-focused” missions in 97th.
• Training has grown more robust, especially live fire and multi-team integration; scenario realism at NTC is exponentially higher than five years ago.
• Integration with Special Forces ODA/AOB is a key improvement area.

Quote:
“This experience that we just had is a thousand times better than what we had like five years ago.”
– 1SG Munson, [09:41]

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4. Scenario Evolution: CA Directly OPCON to AOB

[11:24–17:23]

• Recent scenario changes at NTC placed CA HQs directly under Special Forces AOB, mirroring real-world Syria and CENTCOM deployments.
• Success driven by early, proactive integration; LTP (Leaders Training Program) is a force multiplier (“LTP is where success starts”).
• Strong recommend: Send the right leaders to LTP (S4, TIM/LNO, First Sergeant, commo rep).

Quote:
“If the first time you're shaking the AOB company commander's hand is at, you know, rsoi, you probably, probably wrong.”
– CPT Ed (Commander), [14:23]

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5. CKI (Civil Knowledge Integration) as CA’s “Weapon System”

[17:37–24:18]

• CKI is central: teams collect, HQ analyzes and fuses; output supports both SOF and conventional targeting, planning, and force protection.
• Used analog and digital products for intelligence sharing (need to further refine analog SOP).
• LNOs/liaisons are critical for real-time information flow and making CA knowledge actionable at multiple HQ echelons.

Quote:
“MCS COP I would say was...the platform for everyone. But building an SOP and having everyone know what that is—not just your key networks but also for medical [makes the difference].”
– 1SG Munson, [19:41]

“The CKI cell...is now inputted to every single working group—whether it’s targeting, intel, FOOOPS…We’re not just siloing information.”
– CPT Ed (Commander), [20:53]

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6. Lessons Learned: The Value (and Structure) of LNO Packages

[24:18–34:13]

• Effective LNO teams are small and skilled, not large; quality > quantity.
• Emphasis on real integration—not just “advocating for CA” but creating true shared understanding and flow of civil info to maneuver/tactical HQs.
• LNO's value comes from understanding SOF and conventional perspectives, enabling targeting and planning with CA-generated intelligence.

Quote:
“If you put, you know, kind of garbage into your higher headquarters, you’re going to get garbage back out.”
– CPT Connor Mang (Host), [36:20]

“In civil affairs, relationships are our bread and butter...building that relationship and that trust with the units that you’re going to operate with prior to [deployment] can’t be undervalued.”
– CPT Tim, [16:43]

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7. Multi-Domain Effects & Signature Management

[38:12–46:57]

• NTC presents dense multi-domain threat: enemy UAS, jamming, comms blackouts, kinetic and non-kinetic strikes.
• Comms “P.A.C.E.” (Primary, Alternate, Contingency, Emergency) plans, learning to accept missed comms windows as routine in LISCO.
• Need for disciplined electromagnetic and physical signature management—limiting visibility to enemy sensors, physically and digitally.
• Use of TPT and integration with PSYOP, SF, and CA to “create convergence windows” for deep effects.

Quote:
“The biggest change...is the really regimented discipline of the electromagnetic signature and managing that. There’s certain mitigation measures...but if you’re reacting to enemy UAS, it’s almost too late.”
– CPT Tim, [41:48]

“Long gone are the days...of us assuming we can’t be observed. It’s not always going to be a guy on a hill with binoculars. It’s probably going to be something you can’t see or even detect.”
– CPT Connor Mang (Host), [43:06]

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8. Command & Mission Command

[45:09–47:37]

• Acceptance that decentralized execution is necessary: leaders may not speak with teams daily but must trust subordinate initiative aligned with commander’s intent.
• Sustained integration (e.g., log stat, shared comms windows, “green, green, green” = good but still report, never assume).
• Benefits of doctrinal and “cultural” alignment with supported AOB and other SOF/conventional partners—critical for LISCO.

Quote:
“As far as an ops end, it’s okay for teams to go black, to miss comms windows—because we’re giving them guidance…they know the plan.”
– 1SG Munson, [39:02]

“When you have that shared understanding on the comms windows…that enables, especially in a LISCO situation, if one element is offline for a period of time, everyone else knows what that comms and those contingencies are.”
– CPT Tim, [46:56]

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Memorable Quotes & Moments

• “There was not a single day where I knew the answer to the problem at all.” – CPT Ed, [05:13]
• “LTP is where success starts.” – CPT Connor Mang, [13:58]
• “MCS COP...was our key platform. But building an SOP and having everyone know what that is—not just your key networks but also for medical.” – 1SG Munson, [19:41]
• “It’s not so much what you’re sending over there, it’s the quality and the understanding from those individuals, even if it’s just two…that person understands the SODIF’s intent.” – CPT Connor Mang, [25:41]
• “If you put garbage into your higher headquarters, you’re going to get garbage back out.” – CPT Connor Mang, [36:20]
• “In civil affairs, relationships are our bread and butter...building that relationship and trust...can’t be undervalued.” – CPT Tim, [16:43]
• “If you’re reacting to enemy UAS, it’s almost too late.” – CPT Tim, [41:48]
• “Long gone are the days...of us assuming we can’t be observed. It’s probably going to be something you can’t see or even detect.” – CPT Connor Mang, [43:06]

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Important Timestamps

• 00:27 – Guest introductions and SOF/CA backgrounds
• 02:38 – CA company mission overview for CENTCOM
• 05:13 – Challenge of ambiguity and realistic problem sets at NTC
• 09:41 – Comparison of 97th vs. 96th CA battalion cultures and training
• 13:58 – LTP (Leaders Training Program) advice and value
• 19:41 – CKI and CA company-level fusion process
• 24:43 – LNO package design and best practices
• 38:12 – Multi-domain threat environment & adapting to UAS/jamming
• 45:09 – Acceptance and execution of decentralized operations/mission command
• 47:37 – Criticality of integrated comms and mission command during LISCO

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Tone & Style

The conversation is candid, self-reflective, and tactical, mixing practical lessons with professional humility and a frank acknowledgment that current and future conflicts demand more creativity, integration, and adaptability from SOF and CA teams than ever before. The leadership demonstrates openness to learning, the necessity of robust partner integration, and an understanding that solutions—and “one more rep”—are never final.

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End of Part One. For further details on RMTS and Bravo 96’s takeaways, tune in to Part Two.

Transcript

[A]

Special Operations Training Detachment, SOT D West Burrow team coming at you from ntc. Off the Radar. This is off the Radar. I'm your host, Captain Connor Mang, an observer coach trainer for Special Operations at

[B]

the National Training Center.

[A]

All right, so welcome back to off the Radar. Today we have three people here in the studio, and they just finished the rotation. So 2606, November, and this is our first CA episode we've had in quite some time. So I'm just going to let them introduce themselves, go around the room. If you could just tell me kind of your name, your position in the unit that you're here with, and your background and SOF experience.

[B]

All right. Hello, everyone. Charles Munson, first sergeant for Bravo 96. So I graduated CAQC 2014, was an S9 in Hawaii, also did a rotation in Simc, Nepal, Syria, and I did a J set in Bangladesh.

[C]

Nice. Ed. I am currently the commander of Bravo 96. I started out my time in the 96 as an AS3, and then I headed over to Fox 96, where I was a team leader in Syria. And then I was the HAC commander for a bit, which was great fun. And then I headed out to Cass, which was some good family time, which was very needed after hhc. And then I went to Naval War College, and now I'm here at the 96 as a. As an 04.

[D]

I'm Tim. I'm a captain in our opsen. Prior to coming to Bravo, I was actually in Charlie Company. At 96. I deployed as team Commander in Syria as well. Did a rotation out there, and then upon my return moved over to Bravo. And I've been working in the ops end and also preparing for my own forthcoming deployment where I'll be softly in Kyrgyzstan.

[A]

Great. That's awesome. And so anybody who's listening may not know that 96th is one of the battalions within the 95th.

[C]

Correct.

[A]

That's CENTCOM aligned. Yep, yep, yep. So a lot of. Lot of CENTCOM missions. And I just wanted to talk very quickly, sir. And first aren't like, can you give me a very. Just brief description like, Bravo's 96 mission? I know you guys are kind of in the infancy as a command team, but kind of, what do you guys see for the company?

[C]

Yeah. So full disclosure, brand new commander. So coming straight, they just wrapped up Team Xeval, and then we came to NTC for. For the company Xeval. Now, the. The mission set for CENTCOM right now is pretty diverse with everything going on in the world. You have everything from the Arabian Peninsula, which is very different from the Levant. Levant, you mainly have, you know, your Syria missions that, you know, you see on TV and things like that. And then you also have the Central Asian states. So very diverse mission set. It's very tough to train, very difficult to make a training plan that covers all six teams, all the baseline lethality tasks, all of the, all the things that 95th says we need to do, but then also those more realistic type trainings that may be more specific to some of the things that they're going to do, whether it's in the casa, the Levant or the ap. And I think firstarm's been around a little longer than I have and he might be able to cover how they, how they went about that.

[B]

So definitely as far as lethality, shoot, move, communicate, medicate, that's definitely a big thing. But we are focused now on the CA lethality tasks and also kind of like looking at the really a SIMC mindset, especially for the casa. But now what's going on, current events, things are changing. We don't know how it's going to look by the time we deploy. So we're just trying to be flexible with it and also maintaining our CA lethality tasks and our basic normal, like your big army lethality tasks for survivability and things like that. So I think this rotation definitely opened our eyes to the LISCO fight. We were definitely open our eyes to the opsend and also the two teams that also participated in RMT and was in this rotation. So like looking at it while this was going on, I was looking at like, I really wish the other, the other four teams were here to kind of see that as well. Because we also have a team right now with the Levant. It'll be Levant doing their pmt. And then we have three other teams that are with the, I would say AP in the cost of state. So like their PMT is going on with their battalion 5th group. So, but, but the other two teams that are going in that went to and went, went into the box definitely saw the real LISCO fight instead of really like just their mission assigned. Yeah, PMT instead of like mission designed.

[C]

And that's something that we just can't replicate. We tried to replicate during the xvl and I think it all just comes down to when you, when we create a training exercise at battalion, usually if you do, if you do enough research, you're going to find the solution to maybe the problem that's in front of you here at least. Maybe, maybe I can't speak for the teams and maybe I can't speak for First Arm, but, or for Tim, but like there was not a single day where I knew the answer to the problem at all.

[A]

That's what we want. No, as an oc, that makes me feel good that we're presenting you guys with a problem set, right? That is the whole goal when you guys come here is to expose you to things, threats, problems, dilemmas that you're not gonna be able to simulate at home station. So I think that's the fact that you guys have acknowledged that it's good, right? And I hope that that's kind of like a beacon for other units to start saying, hey, maybe there's something to the CTC thing where, you know, you plan home station training. And I think we talked about it the other day, like, you know, you're going to know where Most of the OP4 is, you're going to know the timelines and the objectives of what you want to get from the training. But out here, I mean, Black Horse has kind of free maneuver to do what they want. They're a free thinking enemy. And what you do and the inputs you put into the scenario are going to have who knows the. Sometimes we at XCON don't even know the outputs immediately. So it's good you guys recognize that.

[C]

And one more thing I think for when it comes to the teams, right, we covered that, but for, for the headquarters and the, the, the operations center will be at a one star staff. And so I think it was good to get out here to NTC because as I was talking about like problem solving, like things that you had to go and search, you had to find the answer and the answer wasn't always there. You had to come up with something, come up with some assumptions and then plan the best you can. And I think, I think that was going to be, I think that's good for going where we're going because we're going to be on a much different planning horizon. We're not going to be at 48 hours, 72 hours. We're going to be more looking forward, probably months, maybe years within that one star campaign plan. And so I think it's a good rep for the ops in to start working with some squishy problems and then also just integrate with people that are different than you, which is exactly what we're going to be doing at.

[A]

That's awesome. First Arn, you mentioned you spent some time in the 97th, which is the Indo PACOM aligned battalion Not. Not a huge relevancy to kind of our discussion, but I think maybe you could lean into kind of some of the differences you've seen and like. Like major or like the commander kind of alluded to. You've been around for a while. You've seen some major transformations in the brigade and some which we'll talk about later on. We're always modernizing. What do you think from your time in the 96th, spending time in the 97th, kind of like different mission sets, different cultures? Any thoughts on that?

[B]

Yeah, definitely. Well, when I was growing up in the 97th, UAS wasn't a big thing. Like, it was big, but the threat wasn't as big as it is now. So I think really focusing on that and like, just. I grew up in a SIMC. It was not a SimCity battalion, but it was all SIMC missions. And then coming to the 96th, I was like, oh, we have to do our basic lethality tasks. We had convoy, live fire, dismounted live fire. That was a requirement in the 96th, whereas the 97th, that wasn't a requirement. It was at least a dismount of live fire. And then I think seeing the 96 kind of transition over to more of a CA lethality. So I think the brigade gave us guidance like, hey, here's how we are. Our lethality as a civil affairs company, as a civil affairs team. And I think now it's more honed in on like, CKI, our lethality tasks, like providing CNDE to our partners, to the AOB or SODIF. And I feel like in the 97th, when I was there, it was just SIMC focused, but not as much as like the basic shoot, move, communicate, lethality tasks. And I did do an NTC rotation when I was in the 97th. And I will say, like, this experience that we just had is a thousand times better than what we had like five years ago. And I will say that the rmts now are a lot better. And also, like, just in the box itself, like, just having that experience to go in the box and the integration with the AOB that we had on this rotation was really good, for sure.

[C]

How much integration did you get on that last rotation?

[B]

Not a lot of integration.

[C]

Yeah, I think that's kind of the key where, like, we talk about all these things and I. I think even, you know, my time in the 96 and 2018, 20, 19, 2020 is like, we were doing some of the same things, maybe not as hyper focused. Yeah, there was not as much going out and like, Just talking about how do I integrate this thing, this piece of information, this report. And now it's, you know, we're. And like at the time it was just like single singular individuals becoming be getting creative and just going and finding people rather than like us trying to write it down and figure out how to do it. And so I think, I think that's kind of where our lethality comes from, is just getting the information out there and making sure the right people have it.

[A]

Yeah. And that speaks a lot to our soft plan section. Since I've been here in just the time for like about a year, they've really invested in expanding the scenario, building out the role player Personas and networks that you guys can come here to develop because it's just phenomenal training value for you guys. And there's not a surface level scenario put in front of you where you can dig a little deeper and do some things off site. Like you talking about the rmts and some of the other coordination pieces we'll talk about in a second. But that's good to hear. So we'll switch gears a little bit. Like I'd mentioned earlier, you guys just finished your rotation, so congratulations, you guys survived. And I wanted to. Yeah, we got a, we got a I survived NTC shirt here. So I wanted to talk your experiences.

[B]

Right.

[A]

I think one of the valuable things for RTUs to come onto off the radar is speaking about what their expectations were coming here, what they actually saw during the scenario and how they're going to go back to home station, learn and grow from it. And the first piece I think is critical is we at SAAT D have we've changed the scenario a bit. I've seen rotations where CA headquarters come here and their own kind of unit of action. They're completely separated from the aob, that's the SF headquarters or the PSYOP headquarters. And they directly report to the sotiful. And then for you guys, you guys were directly reporting an OPCON and take on to the aob. So it's a little different flavor which, which implies some different things. So I wanted to hear kind of your thoughts on how you think it went. And I know as a as from a cultural standpoint from the 96, there were some reasons we did that and I think it suited you guys for your strength and what you guys do. Like you said, sir, going forward, what do you guys think? How did it go working through? And with the AOB?

[C]

I think I'll start with the culture of the 96. I think we're so historically we've been doing the Syrian mission now since 2016, 2017. Ish. Right after the fall of Bagoos. But because of that we're so even before soft integration, we, we have been pretty lockstep with fifth group because, you know, now normally our company, whether it's the OPSIN or the cmoc, usually they would send the formerly known as the op, the cmoc, down to Shaddadah or down to aob. They would hang out with aob. The command team would be at sodif and everybody would live under that SODIF mission statement. The AOB mission statement. And then the teams would be, you know, direct reporting units to the aob. Okay. I think because of that we're pretty lockstep. So when we got out here, you know, I think it was as early as ltp we started talking to, to the aob, starting to figure things out. Once post, post ltp, we sent one of our captains to their talk X. Which one can't. I'll, I'll put it out there. If you're going to do NTC, go to LTP, bring the right people. I'd say bring your S4 NCIC, bring your TIM. Your TIM needs to come. So your LNO and then definitely your first aren't. If you can bring a common rep, that would be great.

[A]

It's kind of a running joke on here on off the radar. I say it every episode that like LTP is where success starts. Yeah. And I truly believe that I don't have a big role in ltp, but you see the success of the units that really are like, hey, when we went to ltp or like if they even went and who they sent because they get here during RSOI and they're, it's clear like what they got from it, if they got anything. So that's good.

[C]

As the company commander, like if the first time you're shaking the AOB company commander's hand is at, you know, rsoi, you probably, probably wrong. Yeah. And like also it's like figuring out how to pay for NTC and things like that. When you go to ltp, the guy who pays for NTC will be there and you can talk to him and then be like, oh, this all makes sense now. Okay, cool. And I don't even think we fully understood it even after ltp, but like go to ltv, you're going to get good stuff out of it. Even if it's just figuring out where you're going to sleep or what you're

[B]

going to do the leaders training program. So like also ltp, I just wanted to say the acronym just so anyone has a question. But like LTP definitely listen to your coaches. We had some really good coaches that coached that was in an AOB before and like really gets your mind thinking on what an AOB does. The war fighting functions, but not just that. The rtu, the brigade that you're supporting, reaching out to them. Who's used to kpop, who's the. Who's your PSYOP guys? The maneuver battalions going to their meetings, a lot of their working groups. And I think you'll be very, very successful going forward. And then sending. We sent our opsend Chief Camdom also to 2nd Battalions Alpha 2.5CPX, which then we were able to get war fighting products. How does our talk look like our mobile talk?

[C]

Camel nets.

[B]

Yeah, Camo nets. What are we missing? What do we need to ask R4s R6 as far as our commo pace, which is a big deal. So really that's right there, I think is integration right there. That's when it started that way when we came to the box, we literally went to Softruba and we already knew what the task was prior to work. And just putting out that and making sure that.

[C]

I think LTP allowed us to like visualize what it was gonna look like.

[A]

Textbook preparation. Yeah.

[C]

No, don't be wrong. It ended up not necessarily looking like what exactly I visualized out post ltp, but at least I had an idea. Maybe like a 50% solution, which is better than a 0% solution. So. Yeah.

[A]

And the key is I hope you guys maintain that, you know, as you guys, even if you don't go forward with that exact unit, maintaining that relationship because that'll continue to build your. Your integration. And I'm sure you guys seen like just that communication with.

[C]

With a.

[A]

With a unit that you guys work pretty closely with.

[D]

Absolutely. And I think, you know, it. It sounds basic, but in civil affairs, relationships are our bread and butter and building that relationship and that trust with the units that you're going to operate with prior to. Yeah, I don't think can be undervalued. Um, and in the 96, we have the benefit of habitually deploying with these elements our. Our other, you know, sister tribes within SOF from fifth group. And so a lot of that baseline sort of just trust and partnership is already there. And being at LTP just enabled us to really start on the right foot from. From day one here when we came for the rotation.

[C]

Yeah. We showed up to RSO and I and we're like working almost right away. They had a spot for us in the, in the talk. Like I know people talk about that all the time, right? Like you have to fight for something. But that was we, that was early established and it was pretty easy to get in once we got here.

[A]

So yeah, that's great when we talk. So first, aren't you kind of mentioned lethality and we are kind of redefining what that means for Civil affairs currently as a regiment. So lethality here at NTC can sometimes mean, you know, your big five. How well do you guys manage your signature? How well are you guys coordinating with other units for direct fire control measures, things like that, that are on the ground, very tactical in nature, which is good feedback because again, there's not a place like it unless you're going to JRTC or NTC where you're going to get that kind of experience. Lethality for civil affairs, we're learning is more civil affairs doing civil affairs, so doing cao. One of the big key things is the CKI piece, the Civil Knowledge integration. And I think from the moment you guys got here, we saw that that was a priority for you, sir. And your CKI sell at the company, I think excelled. And I have my own thoughts, but I kind of want to hear what you guys coming into this, what your priorities were and how you saw CKI being used kind of as your primary, I don't say primary weapon system, but that's kind of what I kind of see it as your primary weapon system for the Civil affairs company.

[D]

Yeah.

[B]

So I think we literally finished our team validation, I would say two weeks prior to us coming out to ntc. So like that right there we saw like, okay, we need to refine our CKI or MCS cop. Building an MCS COP sop and that came from Battalion. And then we built our own in the company and then we the teams got that reps in and I was like, all right, now we're taking this and now we're going to apply it to the boxing ntc. And I think the big thing is, is that we had, I would say a really good robust MCS COP layer. And then we were tied in with the FOX in the aob and then we just continue continually refined. And not only the FOX was looking at our MCS COP layer, the other ODA team leaders were coming in and looking at it as well. But the only thing that I think that as far as like what we need to fix is our Analog or analog products. And that was an.

[A]

We got better, we got better way you guys did.

[C]

Yeah.

[B]

But I would say one more rep. Yes. MCS cop I would say was our key, I would say platform. It is the platform for everyone. But like building an SOP and having everyone kind of know what that is. Not just your key networks but also for like medical.

[C]

Right.

[B]

And I think we, you know that and then also lethality our commo pace and we could talk that later.

[C]

But yeah, and that was kind of my vision was that you know we're, we're taking in information from the teams. Right. And so kind of like they're the collectors, right. There's our sensors. They bring it into me. We put it through the CKI process Congogulator it comes out, we put it on the map. We put it on the civil network diagram. We put it, you know, maybe just some very easy analog products that allow us hey, last time seen, last time heard things like that. And then my vision was that we take that information and it's now inputted to every single working group. Whether it's the targeting working group, the intel working group, the fooops working group which, which happened. We started out with a lot of working groups beginning the rotation and then we eventually turned into like a hybrid working group where we're kind of talking everything.

[A]

Yeah.

[C]

And then I think the next piece was that that information needs to be inputted into the AOB targeting process. The sort of tigray process so that we can do things as an AOB but then also shared with some of our conventional folks so that not we're just not siloing information and we're trying to make. Because at the end of the day we're supporting the conventional forces. And so I think Tim was kind of our conduit for that. So I'll hand it off to him.

[D]

Yeah, sure. And my goal with working with the conventional brigade that was here in our operation for this we were having our special ops elements work at the division level. And then we had a brigade here in the box with us that I was attached to as a, as a liaison is, was kind of twofold. First it was taking the information from the CIMC element that had been operating in country prior to conflict. You know we don't always get to pick where our large scale conflicts will take place. But we were lucky enough in this mission set to have had a cimc, a civil Military support element working in that country prior to. And the way I saw it was that SIMC was only as good as that we could condense the information they had accumulated and make it make sense for the conventional brigade that was conducting their planning operations. So that was sort of one, one element of my priorities prior to the start of mission, really helping with their planning. And then second part was taking all the information as, as commander, first start we're talking about from our CKI cell and then even filtering that a little bit more and saying, okay, what of this is really relevant to a conventional force? What information in here is going to help the ground force commander either support his mission or reduce risk to his force or risk to his mission, especially when it came to enemy actions. Sigac, some of the weapon systems, we were starting them to see them utilize. And so that was my, my primary focus as a liaison. And I'm sure I could talk more about that.

[A]

Yeah, we will. We will for sure.

[C]

Sure.

[A]

You had something else to that.

[C]

I know. I think that's kind of what it comes down to. And with Tim, we're so we're making our transition brief. We're going to brief use of KPOC and maybe the, the CG on ground of the information we got and kind of treat it as like, hey, you know, we're, we're more focused on the, on the division deep. So here's all the information we have at this point. And one of the three things I saw was, hey, what critical infrastructure nodes can be of operational importance? So I was calling those like tier one infrastructure. Tier two is like stability, focus type things that are going to be more for just the region itself rather than the campaign at large. And then the next thing was like, what civil networks can create freedom of movement, maneuver for you now, like, here's you roll through a city, here's the person you need to talk with in like the first 25, 30 minutes.

[A]

That's good.

[C]

And then the next one was risk to force, risk admission. Because I think once you talk to those guys at the, at the CG level, really what they're going to care about is, hey, what risk do I have? What gaps do I have right now? Where do I need to make some good assumptions? And so I think Tim hit it right on the head.

[A]

So yeah, it's one of the things we constantly kind of evaluating here between SAT D and Ops group is the value of an lno, whether that's an LNO between two conventional forces. If there's. Or maybe a SOF unit and a conventional force. Tim, what was the package? Just for kind of context, what was the package that you Guys sent up to the brigade. Sure.

[D]

So what we landed on as an AOB was that we would have one exactly as you said, LNO package that would be myself as sort of soft CA representative and then one SF captain and commo nco.

[A]

Okay.

[D]

We wanted to have the capability to move and communicate independent of the brigade. We didn't want to be any type of a hindrance or, you know, hamper or take from them in terms of movement and comms capability. So. But we also wanted to be pretty trim. So I think just having those two personnel with, with one comms NCO was, you know, appropriate.

[A]

Yeah, no, that's, that's good. I. I think the misnomer. Well, not misnomer.

[C]

The.

[A]

The. The common misconception is that the more people we send over to the brigade, the better.

[C]

Right.

[A]

If we have this, this awesome package of 20 dudes or even five guys with multiple different disciplines between Intel, Communications, Sof, we want all the warfighting functions represented over there. And I think you kind of hit it spot on that we're seeing more. So it's not so much what you're sending over there, it's the quality and the understanding from those individuals, even if it's just two or maybe even one, that that person understands the Sodus intent, understands your unit of actions intent and knows what your lane is over there. Right. And we talked about that very early on. Like, you know, the priority will shift as the scenario builds and the brigade starts to fight, right? And you'll start to see kind of some drop off and maybe you're feeling like, hey, maybe am I as relevant as I was two days ago? But that's good that you guys have noticed that. And it's something we're constantly kind of assessing. I think you guys hit it out of the park with this rotation with, with the LNO piece. And I've always kind of told RTUs, right, your LNO is there, and you. You kind of had on your sync matrix, sir, to help provide decision advantage. Right. Give the commanders on the ground that are getting ready to make decisions the most up to date and accurate civil information that's going to impact their, their operations and then also deconflict, because they have a lot of assets at their level that we just frankly did not have. We being you guys as the rtu. And so Tim's. Tim's job was really to kind of pull information from you guys, but then also push awareness down to you as well. As far as, like, disposition, hey, this is what's. What the brigade's looking at doing. And this is like chances of success for this versus this decision that they're getting ready to make. And I think as a commander, sir, you can kind of talk to this. How helpful was that for you guys to know? You guys had a man on the inside that understood your intent. But also, I don't even like saying advocating because I don't think that was the right word. I think more just creating shared understanding.

[C]

Yeah. And that's when. When we put Tim as the LNO to the brigade. I remember they gave us a task. They were like, hey, you're going to conduct a transition brief eventually with us. Kapok. The way I saw it is like, if I have an LNO who's wired tight, able to get the information out, we should never have to do a transition brief. Right. All of our information should be free flow. And by the time we start doing things with battlefield geometry, we should already be set up for success. So that was the way I saw it, and I think it worked that way. There are some scenarioisms and this and that. That may not let that happen, but that's how I viewed it. So, like, I think if you make sure you have the right guy, as they all know to the brigade, you're going to spend less time on the back end pushing information. Right. Like, if I can do it just midstream, we're good to go. But with that, you have to have like heavy comms package. You have to be able to talk to them at all times. They can't get bogged down with the brigade. Right. Like, they have to one, help the brigade, but also be able to do their own stuff. So I think there's a little bit of give and take there. And then I think one thing that we also did. Well, that wasn't exact. Well, it was kind of intentional. We talked about pushing some CA packs to the. So they had a forward command post and a rear command post. Rear command post was where all the sausage was made. So, like there was a heavier intel package. There was some. Some ops guys. And then the forward command post, they're really looking at 48, 72 hours. Right, Tim? Yeah. And so what ended up happening? So we were talking about sending guys in rcp. We ended up doing co analysis, co dev. And we said, no, hey, we're going to have more people in the AOB just to ensure for CKI we have the lno, we should be good. What ended up happening was we told our teams like, hey, we don't want you Coming back to AOB every night because we don't want AOB to be this big, like yard sale, basically. We don't. Yeah, we're already a mission missile cushion. We don't want to be like any more of a signature. So we had the teams kind of link in directly with that rear command post because that was where the BSA was at, where they're going to get all their sustainment. And so they were able to. I don't know how much CKI they were able to do. I know they were sharing information, but at the same time they were able to take information from the brigade that fed directly into our targeting process on multiple occasions. And it was really good. And so I think there needs. What I'm. I guess I'm trying to say is I think that we can still experiment there. We thought about experimenting there. We ended up going away from it, but with the teams like they were able to do it. And so I would say maybe going forward, especially dependent on where your CA company goes and is with an aob, I think you may be able to let a few guys off if you have the right people and go do some really good things.

[D]

Sure. And I mean, that's the benefit of being somewhere.

[C]

Yeah.

[D]

You know, like ntc, we can do that experimentation that we want to do so often but can't replicate in smaller training exercises. And I think, you know, we've talked a little bit about just sort of the culture of 96 or the culture of our company itself. I think within CA itself, we have a culture of wanting to be problem solvers.

[A]

Oh, yeah.

[D]

And being at the brigade, particularly during their RSOI as a liaison, I think was a really good opportunity to problem solve and try to assist in their planning as best I could. Coming with this package of knowledge from the SIMC that had been in country previously and then also kind of just working in with some of their captains and planners to make sure. Exactly like what we're talking about here from the operational side of things, that in the preparatory phase, we were taking in consideration all those civil considerations, but not just, you know, every civil consideration in the book. The civil considerations that really matter to their maneuver plan and their course of action.

[C]

And at the very least, as long as you're doing the right thing looking cool, you're going to at least be recruiting. So I think at the very least you might get a few CA officers or ncaa.

[D]

Yeah, absolutely. I picked up a lot of questions about CA at. At the water buffalo for sure.

[A]

So, yeah, I think the other piece of it that which you haven't really talked about, but it goes back to what first aren't said about us being in a Simsie mindset for the recent past. You being at the Brigade, Tim, I'm sure really exposed you and maybe refresh your memory of your time as a conventional pl. And I think you said you were field artillery before this, correct?

[C]

Correct.

[A]

So maybe that probably refreshed your memory on like, man, this is how a brigade fights like big army problems that we still as soft professionals need to be aware of. Like how to use ops, graphics, how to speak in army terms and not soft terms all the time. Because, you know, we don't practice LISCO a lot as a regiment or as SOF in general, in my opinion. So I'm sure you got an exposure and just kind of seeing like what a BSA is a huge entity that a lot of considerations that we as a CA company never have to think about and you know, like just the, just the concept of moving a brigade, you know, a couple kilometers through the battlefield is a huge undertaking compared to

[C]

what we do about that.

[D]

Yeah, so, yeah, absolutely. And, and just you know a little bit about me. Like you said, I was in field artillery and as my last position before I went into the civil affairs pipeline, I was the second brigade at 4 ID hhc, xo. So I had a pretty good look at brigade talk, ops and different ways you can set that up and how brigades either successfully or unsuccessfully integrate enablers. So do you think that was a good perspective to start with? But exactly like you said, you know, in software we're used to moving pretty quick with light packages, small footprint and that's not appropriate for this situation. You know, it's not possible. And every, you know, moving their. All these capabilities that the brigade has in their co ops, their plans, their A lock, getting all those entities doing a movement plan, jumping talk, synchronizing. It's a major emotional event and it, and it takes a lot of effort and a lot of coordination. So to be honest, a lot of my time for, for those portions of the event, I was just mostly trying to stay out of their way and, and let them do their thing. Yeah, I always, like I said, I wanted to be a help to them and not a hindrance. So.

[C]

And I think one thing to think of the LNO is because I think one thing I learned from, from NTC is perspective. Right. Because we get caught in our own little CA bubble and I have really just that perspective for a certain amount of time. Think of Your LNO as that guy who can give you the perspective of what the Brigade's going through and what the brigade needs. Right. So, like, living that, living with them, seeing what they're going through and then having them, like, maybe pitch back to you like, hey, our pole is going to take all day, man. You know, something like that. Just helping you with that perspective. So then you can make some assumptions when you're starting to plan whether it's at the AOB or the soda. So. Yeah, because like, they're the ones seeing it. Right?

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

So.

[D]

And at the perspective, same time, from the Brigade's perspective and in my daily, you know, briefs each morning with the brigade commander, it's great because they get to see the value of what ca, Civil knowledge integration, which is then fed into the targeting process, which is then actioned by aob, by ODA Assets Division Fires is doing for them in real time when it comes to taking enemy chess pieces off the chessboard, when it comes to taking those, you know, high priority enemy assets that are hindering the Brigade's forward momentum off the battlefield. And so I think that was valuable, too.

[A]

Let's switch gears a little bit. We actually did a really good episode, we being Weston Rich, the host before me, on LNOs. So if you, if you have time and you're listening, listen to the episode on LNOs. I think it was with a previous LNO as well. But it's good to hear perspective on each package that the RTU send because it's a little bit of a different experience, but it's always the same outcome, which is. That's an important piece of connective tissue to. To somebody who's taking up most of the battlefield out there. And if you just ignore it, and I think that's part of why we've mandated it for rtus now is like, you will provide an LNO package because I think before it was kind of foot stomping that you need to do this. Sometimes it was neglected. Sometimes, you know, that scene is a punishment. You send your guy up there that you don't want in your operations center because he's problem child or something. And. And it's.

[D]

That's why you sent me, right, sir?

[A]

No, that's real life lessons. I think I go back to what an old company commander used to tell me is if you put, you know, kind of garbage into your higher headquarters, you're going to get garbage back out.

[D]

Yeah.

[A]

So I think through time and sometimes harder lessons learned, RTUs have seen that the quality of that officer or NCO that you send up there is paramount to getting the results you want. Switching gears a little bit, multi domain effects. That's kind of one of the whiz bang words we use here at ntc, right? So we like to say that we were able to replicate things like jamming cyber space assets, comms blackouts and degradation, as well as just putting you in a semi contested or even denied environment where a lot UAS is a big one now too, where you guys probably don't see most of these things at home station. And so rightfully so we don't expect you guys to come here and be masters of like how to handle it. But I think it's good for rtus to see that because it kind of pings some, some brain cells to go, okay, this is something we haven't even thought about. How do we counter uas, right? And we go back to home station, go, is this something one? Is this something we're capable of doing with our equipment and training? And if so, are we just missing the mark on training or addressing it? I kind of wanted to get you guys thoughts because throughout the rotation I think you guys saw a huge gambit. Tim, I'm sure you did at the brigade. And then sir first iron, I'm sure you guys saw at the AOB being exposed to a lot of things and then the opposite was your ability to apply multi domain effects on the battlefield through your CKI and the targeting process. I know I just said a lot, but kind of your opinions on what you think as a recently completed rdu.

[B]

So I would say definitely our combo guy learned so much literally from the day that we set foot in soft Ruba to now. And I will say our pace, pace is a big thing. And we do know about the signature that you put out when you have different platforms that you're using. And I think he finally understood like, okay, this is, this is a big thing because we can't get blown out if we're not using the right pace or not the right platform. So really making that redundancy but also understanding as a first sergeant and as, as an opsen that it's okay for teams to go black to miss comms windows because we're giving them guidance, we're giving them basically implied tasks of things that you need to do and like it's okay if they miss a comms window. Like it's totally fine with that. And it felt kind of weird at times because I'm so used to constant communication.

[C]

Either voice, it's okay first, yeah, I'm

[B]

like, they missed the comms window. And I will say, I will say like, okay, yeah, it's fine. But we have our alternate. It was either attack or it was.

[C]

Yeah, sometimes.

[B]

But also like the, the UAS threat we had, we had the Titan with us and the ops in, but also the teams had the skyview and so that was another form of protection that they had. And then they were also using their TTPS or SOPs for counter UAS as well. But I will also say like really tying in with the TPT when it came to us pushing out multi domain effects. And I think that played a key role. And that's another thing about integration. Like having the TPT8 side at, you know, want to give them a quick little shout out to Captain Vardo and Sergeant Vincent. Like they really helped out a lot with that.

[C]

Yeah. At the, at our level it was trying to, you know, I'll say some buzzwords for a little bit. The trying to make convergence windows to make certain things happen.

[A]

Good one.

[B]

Yeah.

[C]

Convergence windows. You know, as much as the scenario allowed us, we were able to use a couple of things, I won't get too specific into it, but we were able to leverage civil networks to enable a, a unit of action to have a certain type of effect on a certain type of thing. Deep into, I believe it was like the enemy's division rear. And so it's really looking at, at our level at the, at the AOB, at the, the ops end level, understanding the network, the capabilities that it can provide and then understanding where it's at in the battlefield, where it's at in the battlefield geometry and then understanding, okay, if I do this two hours before it allows somebody to do xyz. And so we were able to problem solve through that just by really focusing on the teams to really pare down exactly what we needed to know at the AOB level and then through some problem solving through MDMP understanding. Okay. Because it's really at the end of the day in our rear, heavily sensed, heavily jammed precision strike. Like that's crazy. At scale, precision strike at scale. And so if I can create a tiny window to allow things to happen that gives the commander decision advantage, is able to, you know, have some effects deep in the rear that would slow maybe some of that enemy freedom movement up towards the, up towards the flat. So we were able to do a couple times something like that. I think that's kind of what it's all about is just understanding what it can do and then how it Enables everybody else.

[A]

Yeah.

[D]

And I know initially, as you mentioned with some of the uas, the enemy UAS that's introduced here and just how in the real world, the utilization of enemy UAs has really escalated in the last three, four years. I think the biggest change that I've seen over my time in civil affairs, but even from my time as a fire support officer, is the really regimented discipline of the electromagnetic signature and managing that. Because if you're, you know, there's certain. There's certainly mitigation measures we can take, but if you're at the point where you're reacting to enemy UAs, it's almost too late. And what we're looking at more is managing our signature, being really disciplined about our comms windows. First Arm was talking about that. So that we're taking those opportunities for the enemy to detect our presence off the game table for them.

[A]

Yeah, for sure. I think we talked about at the very beginning, sir. Long gone are the days. And Colonel Gonzalez just said this on a recent episode we recorded. Long gone are the days of us, like, assuming we can't be observed.

[C]

Right?

[A]

It's not always going to be a guy on a hill with binoculars. It's probably going to be something you can't see or even detect that you're being detected. So to your point, Tim, some of it is right. We have to limit our signature digitally and physically. And the other portion of it, which I think you guys really did a good job of and understanding, was where do I rack up on my adversary's priorities?

[B]

Right?

[A]

And they have, they have ways that. Right. The enemy here has ways that they prioritize and say, hey, what are we going to go after? And so sometimes it's just about making it a little bit harder for them to determine how important are you guys and are you worth me sending a missile to blow you up?

[C]

Right? And that was one of our, like, our calculus on having the teams where they're at. Because if we make the AOB too big, okay, Next thing you know, we might be on the H pill for the enemy, for, for some type of C2 note. Hey, where do we put the AOB headquarters in the box? Are we going to be right, snugged up to the, to the brigade talk? Probably not, because that's going to become a missile cushion. So we need to have some standoff there. And then, you know, the team's like, hey, are you going to bed down at the rcp? Are you going to bed down at the bsa? I don't Know, Right. Yeah. Because like if there are only two to three trucks, you know, if they make the H pedal good for them, like that means they're having some battlefield effects. Right?

[A]

Yeah.

[C]

But you know, if they go to the bsa, like they're there, you know that. And really if you're behind the flat, you're seen 100% they know where you're at. Really what they're trying to do is figure out exactly what you are so that they can confirm, okay, this is the guy hit button, precision strike, you know. And so in our planning calculus, those were the types of things we're thinking about. So we had the teams kind of on a tether. Hey, you're not too far from aob, but you're also not too far from the bsa. So if you need to go get support, you can go get it. So.

[A]

Yeah, yeah. And I think first aren't you said it your guys almost maybe apprehension through comms and mission command is everything out here.

[B]

Right.

[A]

Like we just have to accept that we're not going to speak to units daily, maybe not even for extended a period of time. And we may not be able to support them with logistics and medical. And we just have to know that they understand the commander's intent and are going to go execute. Right. They're adaptable SOF operators that are going to get it done.

[C]

So I think there are times in the battle where you need to it's okay to miss windows, but then there's times where you can just radiate like hey, if it's important enough information that I need to get out now, don't be afraid, push it up and push

[B]

that also have like okay, you've missed three comms windows. Like what's going on? We're going to either look for you or yeah you know, figure out where your last location was or something. As far as the echo like the

[C]

emergency teams, just send up your log stat.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

Okay.

[B]

And that's another thing I want to say is log stat is very important.

[A]

The bane of every first iron.

[B]

I will say. Yeah. On your sit rope, just put it on there.

[A]

Yeah.

[B]

You know that that's one of my, one of my biggest concerns, especially missing comms windows. But like I need to know like what's your logs that look like are you either going to come to aob, but I told them if you're going to the rear command post, build those relationships and you can get log log stats from them or I'm sorry sustainment from them and make sure that you guys are good. And I was kind of empowering our team sergeant, empowering our NCOs, like, hey, look, that's, that's your, that's your priority as one of your priorities. And I think that was really good on this rotation, like, letting them know, like, understand the importance of the reason

[C]

they weren't sending their long setup is because they're green, green, green. But it's like, hey, man, I still need to know.

[B]

You still need to know. There's no assumptions here. So, you know, like, I need a confirmation. Yeah.

[D]

And I think everything that we've discussed in this last 10 minutes or so too, also really speaks to the benefits of the level of integration that we had with the aop.

[C]

Yeah.

[D]

Because when you have that shared understanding on the comms windows, on what we're going to break comms for on all these parameters, that enables, especially in a LISCO situation, if one element is offline for a period of time, everyone else knows, you know what, in that comms and in those contingencies is in place so that if someone else needs to take the fight for a little bit, they can. And so having that built in, I think was really beneficial. And being on the same page as the AOB and all the other detachments, soft detachments that were operating in the battle space was positive.

[C]

Hell, yeah.

[A]

This has been part one of our discussion with Bravo 96 CA Company. Tune in to part two of our discussion where we continue to talk RMTS and their takeaways from their rotation. If you are interested in being a guest on the off the Radar podcast or have a topic you'd like us to cover, please contact the off the radar [e-mail] thank you for listening to off the Radar, where RSoft prepares for conflict like subscribe and share on your listening platform.

[C]

Sam.