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A
Special Operations Training Detachment SOT D West Burrow team coming at you from ntc. Off the radar.
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B
This is off the radar. I'm your host, Captain Connor Mang, an observer coach trainer for Special Operations at the National Training Center. All right, welcome back. Today, it's been long awaited. We finally got him here. Me and Keegan are super excited.
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A
Make it sound like I'm ducking you guys. No, sir, I'm not at all.
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B
We have Lieutenant Colonel Gonzalez. I'm not gonna waste any time, sir. Welcome to the podcast. Introduce yourself for us. Tell the people who you are and how you came to be on this year. Great day with us.
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A
You can always count on your captains to keep you honest. Right? So for the record, I haven't been ducking you guys on the podcast. I wanted to make sure that when I came on, I brought enough insight from having been here through several rotations. Right. Having had the opportunity to talk to our leadership, that it was productive and it was not just the kind of ramblings of a former battalion commander from 7th Group, right? But yeah, Lieutenant Colonel Dan Gonzales, native of Brooklyn, New York, joined the army right after 9 11. At the time, I remember being kind of really concerned that the war was going to end by the time I got through training. And as it turned out, that was not something I needed to worry about very much. So I think I learned a lesson there about trying to predict the future too much. Spent my time as a company grade officer as an infantryman in the 82nd Airborne. Did a couple of combat tours to Iraq there, then did the selection thing, went to 7th Group, was an ODA commander there, field grade officer there. Commanded multiple companies, I think three. Did two combat tours to Afghanistan as part of seventh Group, then did a kind of a DC broadening tour. And I think I've been to the CTC for an SF officer, you know, who kind of grew up during the GWAC quite, quite a lot. I was in AGOC and then was rotational unit at JRTC when I was an infantryman. And then when I shifted over to Special Forces, I was an ODA commander and an AOB commander here at ntc. So I really had kind of an interesting privilege in watching the CTC kind of evolve. Like the first time I was here, it was all like coin and we're doing key leadership engagements and react to IED and some of those kind of really specific GWAT tasks. And obviously, you know, now as we're get ready to, you know, the whole army has kind of shifted gears to this Prepare for large scale combat. And you know, we as USASAK and arsoft have done that as well. It's been really cool over time watching it evolve. Most recently I was the battalion commander for 1st Battalion 7th Group. Did that for a couple years and been in S.A.T. d since June.
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B
Outstanding. Outstanding. And then just everybody who's listening. So Sa D is comprised of two AOBs. One at JRTC, one here at NTC. We call them AOB east and AOB West. You work at AOB East? Correct, sir, down at.
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A
Yeah, I wouldn't say I work at AOB East. I do work at Fort Polk. That's where the Sati headquarters is located. It's interesting that we call them AOBs. They're not really AOBs, but they are like the collection of OCTs we have, right. That do the work. So there is a section of OCT that we have at Fort Polk that primarily handles all the business at jrtc. And then obviously, you know, you guys are here, you do all the stuff here at the National Training Center. So it is interesting kind of owning both organizations. I think we have a unique perspective on kind of both ctc. Right. They're the same. They're training the army to do the same thing. And they're, they're also very different. Right. They each have their own kind of distinct identity forced on them by, you know, the kinds of units that are coming through. Obviously a JRTC very much kind of airborne, light infantry focus. And out here at NTC much more armored, mechanized. The terrain vastly different here at NTC than it is at jrtc. They both suck. I think if you're a rotational training unit, they both offer their own unique challenges. Neither is easy. But it is really cool getting this perspective where I get to spend some time at JROTC and then kind of hop across the country, spend some time at NTC and see how our units are kind of getting at both those problem sets.
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B
Yes.
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C
I think we are the only organization that splits both CTCs. So I mean, that way you have a very unique perspective to bring.
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A
Yeah, no, I think that's true. And it is always something. Whenever I talk to the like the leadership of JRTC or ntc, they're like, you have to go out to NTC soon. Right. Because for them it's like very contained. Right. That's just the way that they do it. And there's a lot of strengths and benefits to that. But I do think having a single organization for RSOF that is focused on both does help us keep our contributions kind of in line with our doctrine and with what our leadership kind of wants to see from us when we support large scale combat operations. So there's a lot of good to be had there I think. Right. It's not just the OCTs. There's planned sections at each place. The headquarters element for SAT D is fairly, it's small, it's much smaller than what I was used to coming from a special forces battalion. But I think generally we have what we need and we're able to kind of, you know, work hand in hand with the two operations groups at JRRTC and NTC to get done what we need. And frankly I think that's important because without those operations groups like we would have to completely change. Right. How this worked. So like you guys are super well integrated here. Right. With NTC and I appreciate that and I know at JRTC we, the guys over there do a pretty good job as well.
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C
Yes sir.
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B
And the SAT D's enterprise falls directly under usasox. I know we say first SFC is usually our primary customer for training and coming to the CTZs, but we fall directly under USASOC.
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C
That's correct, sir.
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A
Yeah, that's correct. Right. So we like I report directly the USAC G3 instead of the CG. Lt. Gen. Ferguson, what I would say is the way CTC rotations work generally. Right. Like is the division commander usually is the senior trainer. Right. And for us that's first sfc. And the majority of the units that we train, obviously we get the 75th range regiment come through sometimes. So that's kind of a different bag with that. But the vast majority of our rotations are SFCA psyop at a first sfc and in his role as the division level commander. Right. General Wertham sets the training objectives and the expectation and I think gives, gives specific guidance as to what he wants to see in exercise design and what we're, what we're getting at while we're out here. From the USASAK perspective, when you have zoom up to that next upper echelon, I do think it's a lot more focused on the broader questions of like not, not how is a specific rotation going to go, but how do we as arsoft support the army in large scale combat?
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B
Right.
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What are the trends that we're seeing from the army divisions and brigades as they come through the CTC and then, and how does that fit? Like are we redundant? Are we where we need to be? Right. So I do think it's when you think about ustoc's man train equipment. We have a responsibility there as well. But it's different than the specifics of exercise design and things like that that first SFC is more heavily involved in.
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C
Yes, sir.
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B
You unpacked a lot there, which we're going to talk about a little later. I want to get your. Your opinion. And when you took command of SAAT D, your background, your experiences, like you'd kind of explained, kind of created your command vision for this unit. Can you talk to us a little bit about where you wanted to see Saat D go by the time you're. You're done here and in the future, after you're gone, as far as, you know, training, not only just the RTUs that come through, but ourselves as OCTs and the members of Saudi and then kind of what your vision is.
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A
Yeah, yeah, absolutely. I think, like, we'll talk about the vision here in a sec. I think first, getting the assignment to come here as Saadi, coming out of a battalion, right. There's a lot of jobs you could kind of get in the army, and this is definitely one of the better ones because I get to spend time with, right. Like captains like yourselves.
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B
Right.
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All our octs that are out there. I get to spend time driving around in the desert talking to ODAs and CA teams and PSYOP and finding guys in a swamp in the middle of the patrol base out in Louisiana, check on them, see how they're doing. Like, I'm really involved in training in this job, right. And I think I just personally find that a lot more satisfying. And I've had the privilege of following, like, quite a few, I think, exceptional leaders here in SAT D. Right. So when we talk the vision, I don't think it's. It's. It's not at all. Hey, we got to change things. We're going to change a whole bunch because of, you know, me coming in and seeing that we're off the mark. I don't think that's true. I do think it's more of a question of, like, as the army evolves and as our leadership expectations of us evolve. Right. How are we evolving with that and where are we kind of driving? So when we talk about the vision, I'm going to kind of break it down a little bit, you know, like, this might go along, I don't know. But we'll break it down into three kind of broad categories. I think the why, super important. Right. So we'll talk about that. The how, which. Which is we've kind of touched on Some things there, but we'll break that out and then, and then kind of importantly, I think we'll talk about like the who we are, right? So for the why, I think SAT D exists here to help arse off train, right? To train arse off for large scale combat against a peer in support of army brigades and divisions. And I, and I think it's that easy, right? I think this is one of the only places where, where, where you can do that, right? And some of that comes from the uniqueness of the CTCs, right?
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B
So
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A
both NTC and JRTC, right, like obviously come after the Vietnam War, right? We learn a lot of lessons from that. I think really good book that I read at General Ferguson's recommendation, that was Prodigal Soldiers, I forget the author, but you know, we can like look that up. You'll see it. It's about the generation of officers and non commissioned officers who grew up learning the lessons of the Vietnam War. And one of the big things that they come out with was this need to train units collectively in an environment where you don't control all the variables, right? That's kind of how I think about it. But I think, right, when you think about home station training, what happens there, especially in rsof, right, it's like our folks are very used to planning their own training and executing their own training, right? So you'll plan this great raid, say, and you'll know exactly where all the op for at and you'll have a list of contingencies that you want to do and you'll execute your training and you all high five. And it is good training, right? I'm not, I'm not trying to knock it. I also think it's fundamentally insufficient, right, because when we think about war and the environment we're going to face in war, right, that's an environment where we do not control all the variables, right? So when you come to a ctc, what you get is an environment where you don't necessarily know the terrain, you're not familiar with it. It's not your home station training type thing. You've got a higher headquarters that is levying requirements on you and doing these different kind of things. It's giving you directed tasks in support of a larger campaign which you may or may not be able to replicate at home station. And then probably the most critical part, right, is that there is a free thinking, dynamic enemy out there on the battlefield who gets a vote. And I think that is sometimes where we've come up most short in home station. Training, right. Because we can have all these SOPs, we can have all these TTPS, but if we haven't validated and tested those against an enemy who's actively trying to kill and defeat us, we haven't taken it as far as it probably needs to go. So I think the CTCS just provide a fantastic venue to do all that. And then I mean, maybe selfish plug. The other thing that you get at the CTCs, right, is the OCTs, right. So at your home station training, you grade your own work. Right. And I don't know of any kind of rigorous championship team or academic program or what have you. Right. Business that primarily grades its own work, right. You want to be graded by external entity, so you get a expert and unbiased look.
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C
Yeah.
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A
So here, and obviously at GRTC, right, we've got a bunch of OCTs who see this rotation to rotation, right. They're all hand selected, like they've all performed well in these jobs that they're going to be looking at you in when you come as a rotational training unit and they can offer you that feedback, hey, this might work, this might not work. But I do think that that's a critical aspect of what we've brought here.
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B
Yeah, I think a piece that, like you said with the external lens also is it comes from a place of doctrine. And I, I know from my own experiences when we're conducting home station training within company or battalions, we don't always focus on the doctrinal answer to the way that the army is telling us we should conduct operations. And here, that is the baseline of how we, we give feedback as octs is. It has to be nested within doctrine and not so much our experiences personally. So I think that's a, that's another good piece. But I really appreciate that, sir. You talked a little bit about the why and the how and yeah, I
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A
think to break the how out a little, you hit on like the first thing I kind of wanted to talk about for the how on this doctrine piece, right. If you're out there and you're a member of RSoft and you haven't read FM305, Chapter 5, like I encourage you to do that because that is what all our scenario design is based off of and it's very clear that we are not here. When we Talked about getting OurSoft ready to go to war against a peer in support of the army, we didn't necessarily talk about preparing OurSoft for its next campaigning mission. That's not really what we've been placed here to do so. That chapter forms the basis of how we've set this up. Right. In terms of what we actually focus on when we're here for that how piece. I think it's got to be the fundamentals of close combat and war as we've understood them for a long time. And that's not to say that the character of war isn't evolving as we go, but there are certain key lessons that I do think have proven important. Right. And kind of timeless so far in at least the past 100, 150 years or so. Mission planning, right? The operations process, your ability to conduct infiltration tactics and maneuver and live fire, your shoot, move, communicate, sustain. Right. Protect. If you're a headquarters, your ability to kind of think and operate across the breadth of all the warfighting functions, like that's really what we're looking for. The exercise and the training is useful insofar as it lets us get at those things, right? At those kind of fundamental tasks. Does that make sense?
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C
Yes, sir.
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B
Yeah. No, that's really good. And from my standpoint, I don't know, Keegan, you probably would agree with the other side of it. Being a member of sati, you get a lot of professional development in your craft, as well as the other RSOF tribes. As a CA officer, I've seen it, got a lot more exposure to ODAs and how AOBs plan and operate and understand the capabilities of a TPT or a cited, which, I mean, I just frankly wouldn't have gotten anywhere else during my broadening time as a captain. So that's been phenomenal. As a member of SAAT D, I
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A
think you hit on something really important because I hope that you, as an oct, are not the only one who's getting some of this broadening.
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B
Right.
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A
Like, one of the things that you get here at the CTC that you don't get at home station training, is we replicate this larger campaign. So if you've got an ODA out there on the battlefield, or a CAT or a side AT or a Ranger platoon, you're not out there alone. And the whole battle is not pretend. There are actual. There's an actual brigade out there fighting an actual opposing force, and the battlefield is dynamic. Right. And I think from our muscle memory, from the gwat, right, as sof, we built a lot of, like, we're used to being the kind of the main effort, right. And we're used to operating on our. On our own. We didn't necessarily need to know everything about the larger campaign and the adjacent units, like I didn't, I didn't. As an ODA commander, I was very focused on my own village stability operation that I was doing and everything that was involved in that out here in this environment, you have to understand the broader campaign and how it's going and be able to assess it. Right. Like is the brigade in the defense or the offense? Especially if you're out there in the deep, what's the status of friendly fires? What does the enemy order of battle look like, where you're at? What things from the, you know, the high payoff target list do you actually expect to see in front of you? These are all dynamic things that the CTC presents you that I don't think you necessarily get anywhere else. And you get to see how everyone, SF Rangers, CA psyop. Right. How they all kind of act and operate in that environment. Something that we've touched on a little, we talked a little bit about the fundamentals. I also think that the CTCs provide a very robust training menu for us to train kind of some of these emerging multi domain stuff. Right. So I think the time and expectation that we maybe had, right. Like the time when an ODA or a small unit would be on a battlefield not under aerial threat is over. It's gone forever. Right. I think in every next conflict that we have, we will kill people with UAS and we will be under threat from uas. And it's not just that. Right. It's the electromagnetic spectrum, it's the cyber and kind of space aspects of this. Right. Every future battlefield we can expect, I think, to be contested in these domains. And this gives us the opportunity to kind of think about those things holistically with the entire team that we bring in.
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C
Yes, sir. And I think more than just our roles for these different tribes, you get to see the expectations from the conventional brigade and what we can actually provide. And there is a little gap in there. I think that.
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A
Yeah, what gap do you see?
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C
There's many. But I think that we have been selling ourselves like, hey, we can do this, we can do this. We can infill this far. We can provide this many targets for prosecution through himars or what have you. And in some cases we can. I think in some cases we're seeing like we are not really ready for doing all this. But you know, coming up on a year now, sir, I want to know, like, what trends are you seeing, you know, good and bad for, for the regiment?
- [18:52]
A
Yeah, I think one of the guy, one of the, one of the officers at east has got a has got a saying which I'm just going to blatantly rip off without. Without naming him here. Right. But one of the things I love about being at Saudi is that we do not have the. The comfort of ignoring the Seidou gap. Right? So we say we can do all this stuff. And I think those are important things that the nation needs. Needs us to do in combat. Right. Building the expertise and the ability to do that is hard. Right. Because war is hard, especially on a contested environment. So I really appreciate you bringing that up. I completely agree. That is, it is a. It is a challenge out here in terms of what strengths kind of like general trends that I've noticed. Right. Like, and I want to caveat all this by saying, like this. The CTCs are hard.
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C
They're tough. They're.
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A
They're going to be tough. And you can't win. You don't come here to win. Nobody can win the CTC, right. If you come here on a 0 to 10 scale, if you show up here at a 9, we're going to try to drive it to an 1112, right? Because it's our job to help you leave the best possible version of yourself when you get here, you know, but when you leave here, because that's what we owe you. And if you come up here and, you know, you just, you're at the beginning of, say, in Amber one and the whole team just came together and we're, we're trying to work through it. We're gonna, we're gonna help you do that too, because that's our job. But all these challenges are hard, and I don't think necessarily they're winnable in every case. I think some of the trends that I've seen have to do with some of this muscle memory from the g. What that we're used to. Right. So I'll start off with the kind of task organization, right? Like, I'm very used to, and I think a lot of us were very used to during the gwat, right? When we talk about enablers, right? Like all these folks that get attached because they provide a critical capability, right. What we used to see was like, well, I've got these enablers and I've got these, these units that are out there working for me and I love all my children. So I'm just going to go ahead and divvy them up equally and everyone gets some enablers and then we go do that. And there wasn't necessarily, I think, a strong focus on, like, the battlefield framework, on who's actually Our main effort and how are we weighting them. Right. And I think we still see some of that today. Right. If you, if you've got enabler, so you've got a UAS detachment, right. Is that capability actually best spent by dividing it up and giving every single one of your maneuver elements a single UAS guy, or does the battlefield provide you an opportunity to take that UAS detachment and put it someplace where you can actually mass effects in support of the division of brigade? I'm not saying there's a, there's a positive, great, definite answer to that, but I do think, you know, it does. It's not something that we reflexively think about. And to go back to your earlier point about doctrine, like those steps are in there in course of action development. Right. Like how we task organize. If you're going to conduct a long range dismounted infiltration through a flot behind enemy lines, are we going to bring the vehicle mechanic? I'm not saying that we don't, but we need to take a hard look at who we're bringing and why. And I think during the GWAT for a lot of years, it was just more is better and we really have to task organize for purpose, I would argue. And then to wait our main effort. I think that's the first one going on a little bit. I do think this question about future operations and planning horizons, right. This gets into like I remember and I think a lot of us were in a situation where like hey, UNIT is in contact Iraq or Afghanistan, what happens? It calls up on the radio and its higher headquarters cuts its assets. Cut it, cut it assets, right? Like whether it's CAS or UAS or isr, whatever it is, right. Like they're, they're figuring out okay, we've got these folks in a dangerous position, how do we support them right now that was possible for a lot of reasons. When you look at how the army has modernized over time and how we're going to fight in how it intends to fight in large scale combat, a lot of those assets are controlled at higher echelons and not only are they controlled at like the division or core level, but they are also contested throughout. So they're the, that division, brigade has this added responsibility to protect it. Right. So what that forces us to do is to get out of this focus on current operations. It's not that current operations aren't important, right. But in a, in a future battlefield, how can you as the higher headquarters actually best help your subordinate elements, especially if they're in the core in Division deep. Right. Which is what we're training for here. I think General Wertham at a previous rotation, like I'm just gonna. The way he said it, I think works best. The commander's primary role in this kind of fight is to anticipate. Right. And the reason for that is because we gotta get to that outer edge of the ATO cycle. Because then ODA gets in contact in the division deep tomorrow. What can you as an AOP or SOT of commander do to help them? I don't know that you can do a lot once they're in contact, but maybe in three or four days from now. Right. Like if you're planning, if you've got a 96, 120 hour planning cycle, if you're working through your higher headquarters, you've got that ability to anticipate where they're going to be in three or four days and what our most likely contingencies are and then work through to get those assets locked in to help them in the future. Right. So that's kind of a different and frankly more challenging problem than on, like at least I know that I faced in the past. So I think this question of foo ops is definitely, is definitely critical when we talk about the multi domain capabilities that. Right. There's a lot of transformation efforts going around right now, not just in usasoc but in the army at large. Right. We've got ew, we've got uas, we've got all this stuff. Where does it fit in your collective training cycle? Right. Because sometimes what we see is folks show up and the first time they use these capabilities is here at the CTC and they're going to learn a ton. It's going to be great. But the earlier you can integrate those things in your collective training, the more prepared you're going to be to show up to understand what that capability is, how it's employed, how you can best use it to gain a position of advantage and most critically, how to synchronize it in space and time with everything else you have going on. Right. Like the synchronization question I think, I think is critical. I talked a lot on those three. I'll pause there if you guys got any. Got anything on that?
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C
No, I mean we're still seeing it at the, at the team level where they get enablers or this, this fancy widget right before they're about to go into the bind. They met some of these guys when they were in their planning cycle here last week and there were. So there's no, not yet. I think we can try and push the regiment to get there. Really like our stuff, but we're still, I think, playing that catch up game
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B
where
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C
everything's so busy, steady state. You know, the group is probably very focused on their campaign plan, their missions that they have to send these teams out the door for and taking care of all their 351 tasks. And so we come to the CTCS and they're still. And I think this will be the truth when we, if LISCO happens, you just kind of have to react and use what we have without having like a PMT to get everyone on the same page.
- [26:11]
A
Yeah, I think that's a really good point. I forget who brought it up at the previous rotation, but someone mentioned this, like, I think we can make a fair assumption that when folks deploy to the next large scale combat operation, whatever that is, they're going to get off the plane or off the boat or whatever it is and someone is going to hand them a box of new stuff. Yeah, I think that is going to happen. So I don't think it's necessarily our job either here or at the groups to make sure that they're like laser focused, perfectly trained on a specific system. Right. I do think, whether that's a UAS or a piece of EW equipment or whatever it is, I do think that we do have a broader responsibility to make sure that they're training these things as domains and they understand the considerations involved. Right. Because if you understand how to employ uas, the where you would fit that into your tripling procedures or your MDMP or like kind of the, the full aspects of the phasing and operation and if you get a new system, you're already in a mental headspace where you're prepared to adapt to that on the fly. But if we're in a place and you know, sometimes we see this, I would say with the electromagnetic spectrum, if you're a place where you've never considered your unit's footprint in the electromagnetic spectrum, you've never characterized the environment electromagnetic spectrum and you've never looked at what the enemy looks like in it, you're behind the power curves. We're not really talking about a specific piece of equipment, we're talking about it as planning considerations. Right. The equipment itself will come later and we'll work it in. Right. But the fundamental planning aspect of it. Right. And the familiarization with those considerations I think is critical.
- [27:42]
C
Yes, sir. That's probably the best way to deal with that.
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B
I think the other portion, like you said earlier, sir, with like, we can't deny the say, do gap, right, is like, here you're gonna be faced with, with some of the things you're talking about, some of the EMS challenges or like, cyber space, where, like, whether you, whether you're prepared for it, whether you thought about it, whether you have it in your, your training cycle, you're gonna, you're gonna experience it here. And I think that cues a lot of RTUs in to like, hey, where can I fit this into my white space if I have time for training? Where, like, hey, oh, I didn't think about how do we counter UAS as a civil affairs team, or how do we. How do we develop analog products because we can't, you know, use digital when we're being jammed or things like that that, like, they're going to see here and that maybe they don't take into account. You said something when you first got here, I remember the first time you came and you said something about CTCs really emphasize mission command as well, where, like, we have to be okay with ODA's and other units of action, like going out and like, not having comms and just understanding commander's intent and then just executing and you may not talk to them for quite a bit of time. And when you said that, I was like, oh, man, that's. That's scary to think of as, you know, I'm not a commander yet. But just thinking about that, that's puts me at it, you know, a little bit uneasy. But now seeing it at rotation after rotation, like, it takes some discipline, initiative to really gather that, grasp that there's.
- [29:12]
A
I don't know, I feel like I've done so much learning in this past year on this topic, especially of command and control. I feel like when I was in battalion, we were talking about getting ready, you know, one of our sister battalions was talking about coming to their ctc. I remember the lesson that they kind of took being, hey, if you emit, you die, and that's it. Right? And I think we've overlearned that lesson to a certain degree. Right. Because something that I have learned here is if the nation is going to go through all the trouble of putting these forces in the periphery or in the deep, right, at great risk and cost, it's got to be adaptive to the. A changing battlefield environment. Right? And there's a couple of key aspects to that. The first is, I think we touched on a little bit earlier, but, like, like, our leaders need to be tracking the campaign, like, how they fit into the broader campaign. It's not optional, it's a requirement. Because that is gonna change your understanding. Like even if you understand the commander's intent, you gotta understand how the friendly fight's going. You gotta understand the enemy disposition, order, battle and how they fight. So you as a leader, if you're out there, can interpret the commander's intent in the tactical and operational context that you find yourself and then put yourself at a place where you can actually, you know, be at a position of relative advantage and contribute to that joint fight. You're not just out there, right, committing random acts of soft, but you're out there provide the joint force a marked advantage. And to do that you need to understand what the joint force is trying to do. Right. Like, so I think this is related to the question we see this all the time, right? Communications plans, like when do I communicate? Right. And I think there was a time where it's like, oh, we'll just go back to kind of Vietnam and we'll do HF comms and that'll be it on a large scale battlefield. I think our planning assumption, right is that there's going to be dynamic moments of the battle regardless when that is right. Like division will go on the offense or we'll be on the defense or different things will be going on. And we have to think deeper about our comms pace.
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B
Right?
- [31:17]
A
The old days of the 18 echo sitting in the room and just generating the comms pace because that's what the ODA is comfortable with. Like those that cannot continue. Right. That communications pace plan is a commander's risk decision and is related to this question of like procedural and positive control. Right. So there might be times when we want procedural control, right. I would say as extended infiltration into the deep is probably one of those where the most important thing you're doing during that infiltration is getting where you need to be and surviving. Right? So we want to talk as little as we need to because I want you to assume no risk. But if we're supporting a joint forcible entry or an armored division in the attack and the battlefield is getting crowded and the adversary is reacting, right. And there's things that we can do to offer a mark advantage. I have to think our planning assumptions that we're going to assume more risk and if we're going to assume more risk to put our forces in that proper position, they need to be able to come up on communications so they can, like you as the commander, can then take them. And now there's A moment where I've got physical control of you, not just positive. I'm like, hey, this key piece of equipment on the enemy HPTL is now here and it's time sensitive and it's mobile and I need you to be able to go get it. I can't afford to wait till tomorrow to talk to you. So it'll be gone, right? That window of opportunity is over. And that's a super hard problem. I'm learning something every rotation, watching guys struggle with that.
- [32:40]
C
We got to adapt to these discrete events, the plan, right? So like you said, not talking on the way in, and then Maybe you've got three or four comms, windows in a single day to support the JFE,
- [32:53]
A
or maybe 12 hours for a JFE, you just come live on comms. Yeah, right. It comes to this. We're struggling with the adversary's peer, like the adversary's capability, if they're a peer, right? With us in the electromagnetic spectrum. Because what we're not used to is like we're used to our comms being completely protected. We're used to our rear areas being completely protected, right? But our ODAS are not used to being able to be targeted in this way, right? By someone who can collect on us from space, from the electromagnetic spectrum, from. From all those things that we can do, frankly. And so when you don't know, everything kind of seems right. The enemy seems like he's 10ft tall, but he's not. He's just another human, just like us. He's got limited resources, right? They're capable and they're capable resources for sure, but they're limited. They will also be contested. We can make that assumption. They're fallible humans, right? I think the way Matt puts it, I really like, right, about this, this collection thing, like, can you be sensed, right? That's what it's really a threefold thing. Can you be sensed? That's one thing, right? If you're emitting and someone can pick up, pick up on you in the spectrum, are you. Interesting, right? Because until all of this is completely automated, like, you've got to stand. Just because your signal stands out, can be picked up doesn't mean it stands out from the rest of the noise of the electromagnetic spectrum that's out there, right? So the more you understand both those things, the more you can kind of operate inside that noise floor so that you're not interesting. And even then, if you've got to assume that risk and you're interesting, right? Like you're an HF signal Where there should be no HF signals. Right. Can you be targeted?
- [34:28]
C
Yeah.
- [34:28]
B
Right.
- [34:29]
A
And that there's things we can do there too. Right. Every communication should be in operation. Obviously, we don't want folks making comms from the patrol base from their mss. Right. That there's moving right after you make communications. There's things units can do in spite of the adversary's capability to collect and target us. Right. I'd encourage everyone to think about them as fallible humans. We're not really trying to beat the system. We're trying to beat the human operator that's somewhere in the loop. Right. Like the war is still a human endeavor.
- [34:57]
C
Yes, sir.
- [34:58]
B
Do you see, and we spoke a lot about some of the trends you're seeing. Do we see any kind of curious, like, differences from your time at NTC versus jrtc? Are there prevailing things that you're seeing at one CTC that aren't happening in another or vice versa? Because I think that's indicative of maybe the way we're creating the scenario and then more important, like how we're giving feedback. So I don't know if you're seeing anything that's more prevalent at one or the other.
- [35:24]
A
Yeah, that's a good question. I would argue that the way our units have been performing is largely the same. Honestly, at both CTCs now, it's different. Right. We talked earlier. The adversary is different, the terrain is different. Right. Obviously, at ntc, there's a lot more kind of mounted stuff. At jrtc, it's a lot more dismounted. I think, generally speaking, what I'd like to see as we go forward. Right. Like during the gwat, we got very comfortable with the art of war. Right. We're both science and art. We got very comfortable with the art. We built a lot of artists. It's time for us to really neck down on the science. And something I always appreciated, NTC especially, is if you've ever seen an armored brigade in the attack, there's a lot of science behind that in terms of classes of supply and protection and fires. And I haven't spent my adult life putting that together, but being out here a few times, I have nothing but the utmost respect for the, you know, group of professionals that know how to set up a cavalry screen. Right. Know how to employ fires in that way. Because that, frankly, is just not my area of expertise. I argue. Jarrett, you see, that's true as well. Right? Like an airborne brigade jumping in to seize an A pod. Right. Is there's. There's a lot of science behind that. And this is an opportunity for us to kind of work through kind of the science and the math of war to a certain degree. And the more we develop expertise in the science of how this works, the better we'll be at applying the art, if that makes sense.
- [36:56]
B
Yes, sir.
- [36:57]
C
One of the. One of the things that I've noticed, I think, is a limitation for both CTC is, is duration. Right. So, you know, we have this relatively short period of time. It's long. You know, 10 days is tough, but, you know, a team can go out there here, mounted, and they can carry enough supplies to last the whole time. And, you know, they. They could push themselves pretty hard for 10 days. But. But are we really showing ourselves the
- [37:25]
B
truth of, like, how do.
- [37:26]
C
How do we actually logistically support that and how do they manage rest actually, for people who are trying to accomplish these missions out there?
- [37:36]
A
Sounds like you think the answer is no.
- [37:38]
C
An extended duration. I don't know how we replicate that, but I see it as a problem. I don't know if you've got any insight on that.
- [37:49]
A
Operating for a long time in a denied environment.
- [37:51]
C
Yeah.
- [37:53]
A
There are. I don't want to say compromises, but there are realities, obviously, that we've got to contend with at the ctc, right. They're both in the continental United States. They both have geographic boundaries. Right. There's limitations on what we can do. I guess I would offer that the limitations that we are seeing as units come through. Right. Like, we still. These are still things we can work.
- [38:21]
B
Right.
- [38:21]
A
NTC is a great environment, specifically in training, the realistic distances involved. Right. Because the box, the training environment out here is just so massive. Right. That you can really train some of these kind of logistics and sustainment considerations. Right. And extended infiltration and things like that. I do think, as we go forward. Right. I remember when I came through as an AOB commander, and basically the way that training was conducted was like an ODA had a raid every night. Right. And whether that was realistic or not, that. That's what they just went out there and they hit a target every night and they got better as time went on. And that was. That was good for what we were training for at the time. Right. I know some of our leaders have proposed, like, an alternative model or like, hey, maybe. Maybe your entire rotation is spent in infiltration and then to hit one target, right?
- [39:10]
C
Yeah.
- [39:11]
A
Yeah. And then I think if you're. If you're looking at some of the best practices, what's occurring out of the current operating environments, right. From Some of our allies, like a special operation, really takes a lot of planning and emphasis. Right. So I do think this is something that we can look at as we go forward.
- [39:30]
B
Right.
- [39:30]
A
Like, what are we really trying to get reps at? And reps, they need to be quality reps. Right. To your point. Right. So if we're not challenging them on this logistics tail. Right. Then I think that's something we can work. But there's parts in the scenario, I think that at both places, frankly, that maybe work against us in that regard. Right. Like our Youssef caches and stuff like that, which sometimes is an easy button. Right. Which I know we've done a lot to restrict. Right. In recent years, but maybe could still do more to really get them that kind of challenging look while they're out there.
- [40:07]
C
Yeah. I think to your point earlier, I think we can do it. We'll figure it out. But I think if we don't figure it out now, we're going to learn these lessons in blood in the future.
- [40:16]
A
Yeah. Violent agreement with you.
- [40:18]
C
Yeah, absolutely. Okay. Shifting gears a little bit.
- [40:20]
A
Sure.
- [40:21]
C
This year at both CTCs, we're kind of rolling out this new report card system, which I understand is we're trying to gather data for people up on high to show them, hey, these are actual quantitative things that we see. Well, what are your thoughts on this?
- [40:38]
A
I reject your phrasing a little bit about gathering this data for people up on high, but I'm really glad you brought this up. Right. And historically, it's not a thing that we've done. Right. Like when I was an aob, an ODA commander, the OCT was like, hey, just good job, or maybe you need to work on these things. You did this horribly, whatever it was. Right. And then I went on and we have resisted doing that, I think, as an organization, because we wanted to preserve our ability to. To coach and mentor folks as they come through. Right. And I think that is important. Right. And OCT is not here to be your adversary. Right. And oct, like, we can't set up that dynamic. And oct, the reason we all take this job is because we have a personal investment in sending you back to your unit and to your next deployment until the next war, if that's what happens. The best version of yourself that we can. That's why we're all here. Right. But there were some challenges involved with not having kind of a routine assessment and not being quantifiable. Right. And specifically. Right. I know, like, General Wortham is the one for Special Forces Command. Right. Who drove A lot of this earlier in the year, right? Or early late last year, I guess. How are we improving over time? Right? Because I've been to a bunch of CTC briefs where the things that folks could use some work at were the same year after year after year. Until your guys earlier point. Right. Some of that like that's going to be the case because, because war is hard, right? And sometimes pretend war is even harder. But we should see improvement. Like we care about this profession and if we care about the units that we're here to help, we should be driving improvement over time. But part of that has got to start with seeing ourselves, right? So like I think we've done a very good job as OCTs with RT with rotational training units, right, with the RTU, helping them see themselves while they're here. But we got to help the enterprise broadly see itself, see how it's doing by doctrine, by war fighting function, by to your guys point, by what we said we want, we, we, what we're telling the army we can do, right. We gotta be able to measure that in some kind of way. The intent is absolutely not. And I've lost track of how many times like this has been emphasized by our leadership. It's not a report card, right. On you as a human being or on your unit. That's not how it's going to be used. But we have to see next year like we've got to aggregate the data. We've got to be able to tell commanders, group, brigade and regimental leadership across the formation, hey, here are the trends. And it's not isolated to one rotation, right. But these are where our folks are challenged in command and control. These are where they're challenged in movement maneuver. Right? So they, the leadership who owns the training management, right. And the readiness as they're conducting their Amber 1 and Amber 2 training can put the proper emphasis on that and we're providing good data. So I think that's really what it's for. I have seen some really good stuff especially out here at ntc, right. So watching the AOB command, watching the AOB Senior oct, go to the AOB commander and lay out, hey, this is where you're at right now, right? In, in a very non confrontational way. But like this is, this is just honestly where we see you, this is where we see your subordinate units and doing that with enough time left in the training exercise where they're able to continue to improve. Right. I think that's a benefit. That's something I desperately wish I could have gotten as an AOB commander. Right, because, like, as a commander of any echelon, you want that external feedback. You want to be able to see yourself so you can actually improve over time.
- [44:11]
B
Yes, sir. No, I. This is the first rotation for myself in the CA foxhole that we're providing. Kind of like a mid rotation grade.
- [44:21]
A
How'd it go?
- [44:22]
B
I think it went well. Right. And I think you kind of hit it spot on. Like, we. It's a progression tool. It's not a tool to assess, you know, Mets, it's not a tool to assess whether you're validated for deployment. It's none of that.
- [44:34]
C
It's.
- [44:34]
B
We have. We owe the operational force data, like, quantitative data, not a. Not a narrative at the end of, oh, your warfighting functions were good or bad data saying, hey, whether it's an ODA metrics on, you know, distance, time for infill, or like, how effective you were for calling for fire. So we can show progression throughout. Like you said, sir, for me, it went very well because I think the RTU that we have currently, like you said, saw it not as a attack or an affront on them personally or as their. Their unit, but more like, okay, hey, yeah.
- [45:07]
A
Which speaks to their own maturity.
- [45:08]
C
Right.
- [45:08]
B
Then that's. And that's the thing, sir. I think it's a messaging piece. I've said this to the CA field team. It's a messaging piece on our part as OCTs when RTUs get here, whether it's at LTP or when they arrive for RS. And I, like this is. We can call it a report card, but really what we're doing here is we're trying to track progression. So you are a small piece in a larger scheme of reporting. So don't take it as you failed if you left here with a C. Take it as you know, hey, let me look at what was the graded. How are we doing before I got here? You know, and then keep in touch with, like, how are we doing after I left? Right. Is my regimen getting better at the things that maybe we struggled with and that you should see that as success, Right? Not take it as personal, like, well, my company stunk on ice at this. It's. No, we as a regiment are getting better. We as a group are getting better at this. Or, hey, we're not. We're not meeting the mark because whatever reason, and I think that's where we owe them that answer.
- [46:02]
A
But, yeah, I think this is like, fundamentally tied into the purpose of SAAD D existing.
- [46:07]
B
Yes, sir.
- [46:07]
A
Right. If we're here to prepare Usasak and Arsal forces to go into large scale combat against a peer. Well, we don't train all of Usasak in a single shot, right? We train BITS as it come through. We train companies and battalions right, as they come through for their own training. But if we can't touch the entire Enterprise in a year, then how are we helping it get better over time, right? Like, we can't do it. I don't think we have the time or the luxury to try to do it one ODA at a time. Like, we have to take every possible tool we can to help the entire Enterprise get better over time to include everyone that doesn't have the privilege of coming to a CTC this year.
- [46:45]
C
Yes, sir.
- [46:45]
B
Especially I think, with how rapidly the world is advancing. The army is modernizing, and our adversaries are kind of following suitcases. You know, if we, if we waited, like you said, to evaluate every ODA or every CA team, I mean, we'd be behind the power curve within months, not years. It's. That's how quickly we're moving forward with technology, equipment and tactics.
- [47:08]
A
Yeah. The thing I don't want to say that keeps me awake at night, but the thing that concerns me the most in our training management is time, right? Having come off a battalion and now coming over here, right? Because I think there was this false dichotomy. I think when I, when I came into battalion command, right? Like, there was like these two schools of thought I heard from different people, right? Which is like, hey, we're going to go to this, like, video game robot war and it's all just going to be drones and, and all this stuff, or vice versa. Like, hey, we just need to make the best Ranger squad from like 1994, right? Like, as long as we do that, it'll be able to operate in any environment. And I think the hard truth is that, like, we can't afford to do either of those things, right? Like, we can't predict the adversary and the operational environment and the war. And historically, if you look, we actually have a fairly bad track record at predicting, right? So we have to make planning assumptions.
- [47:57]
B
Yes, sir.
- [47:58]
A
And I think that gives our leaders a problem, right? Frankly, at the, at the detachment and company and battalion level, where they need to make hard choices about what they're gonna prioritize because we haven't really taken a ton off the plate, right? If you, if you take all the things that I had on the plate to manage as an ODA commander, an ODA commander today in 2026 has got more. He just has more that he needs to train his unit on. Right. We've added things, but not taken anything away. Right. So how you manage that in your training management cycle. Right. And then we're doing lots of things in organization to get at providing more training time and things like that, but how you prioritize these skills for your folks and how you train this whole suite of tasks in as many training, you know, environments and events as you can. I think that that's one of the strengths of the CTC is that, like, you're not just going to train small unit tactics, but you're going to train UAS and all the rest of it. Because we're trying to replicate the battlefield environment that we expect to see as closely as we can.
- [48:55]
C
Yes, sir.
- [48:57]
B
One of the things we talked about earlier and you kind of just said it, you know what? We replicate the reality. I don't even say the harsh reality. That reality is there's a brigade combat team usually out there.
- [49:07]
A
Yeah.
- [49:07]
B
And that, you know, we talk about this, I think, almost every episode, that the buzzword of soft CFI3 interdependence, interoperability and interpretation. Yeah. And I'm pleasantly surprised. I think when I first got here, I was going to maybe pessimistic, pessimistically, think we were going to be very siloed. And I've been very impressed for the most part how much there's a desire to work together and to learn from each other, from the conventional force and arsof. And I think that goes to that interdependence piece of that. Those three I's, like, we need to need each other sometimes and we're gonna want to need each other. And that a lot of those lessons can be learned here because I think that's one of the biggest things we can't replicate at Home Station. We just can't.
- [49:56]
A
Yeah. I think this is one of the most positive lessons that we've learned in the gwat. Right. We're on the same battlefield.
- [50:02]
B
Yes, sir.
- [50:02]
A
We're fighting the same enemy. Like we're, we're going to win or lose together at the end of the day. And we're all in the army ultimately. Right. Like, like, like these, there's like a false dichotomy there that we're that were like completely separate off to our own thing.
- [50:15]
B
Right.
- [50:15]
A
We're, we're, we're all, we're all striving towards the same goal. And I think almost uniformly all the Kind of senior leaders, right. And older folks that I've met with a ton of GWA experience are just coming from a place of like, hey, adult to adult, right. Like, in a mature way, like, how do we have the best possible impact on the battlefield? Because this is about the mission. It's not about who's succeeding. Right. It's not about who's the main effort. Right. If that armor brigade combat team is the main effort, then we're gonna do everything we can as SAWF to facilitate their attack or their defense or whatever it is. If the nation's main effort that day is dropping a brigade of paratroopers into an unknown dz, then that's what we're gonna do, Right? So, yeah, I've also been pleasantly surprised. Right. I do think that the. The nature of it, right. Like how you integrate, right. That probably is related to the task organization conversation that we had earlier. Right. So when I came here as an AOB commander 10 years ago, right. The conventional wisdom, and I think, unfortunately, we're still in a place where we tell people this and we probably need to be more discerning is like one. It's on us to integrate, which I think it is. Right. That brigade combat team has got a problem in the close fight that they've got to win, so they're going to be laser focused on that. Right. So it's on us to integrate. And that's still true. But what that means is that you need to give, like, this enormous liaison package to the brigade specifically. Right. And I'm not saying that's definitely wrong in every case. I am saying that, like, we need to look, we need to think about these things more deeply. Right. So what kind of assets does the brigade have? And if you look at how the army has modernized over a few years, some of those things that used to be in a brigade during the gwat, right. As it needed to control a battle space and do things like that for fires, communications, isr, those have been pulled up to higher echelons. Right. So what's our natural point of integration? Right. I would argue based off what I've been seeing, it's probably closer to the division or the core based off our current operating construct. Which is not to say that you don't need to integrate with a brigade, because you absolutely do. But I do think that's probably for specific purposes. Right. If we've got folks in close proximity, if we're going to support them with a specific target or in the close or with a specific partner force or as something as simple as a link up or a passage of lines. Right? Those are things that we, you know, they need to be rehearsed, they need to be thought through. Liaison needs to be effectively integrated for those things. But I would encourage folks, before they come to a ccc to not just take like a cookie cutter answer to this question of soft CFI3 and what the right answer is, where I need to have people, but to kind of look at what you're tasked to do, right? What the brigade and division and Corps are tasked to do, and then plan to support that how you, how you would in real life, right? Like where, where can these people, these liaisons, or all these different packages that you got, where can they really help you? Where are your people best employed?
- [53:16]
B
Yes, sir. And I have it here, it's kind of written on the paper in our itinerary. How we can improve on this at Home Station. My, my understanding, right, is part of. We got to get back to, like you said, fundamentals. And some of that is we've got to be able to speak big army. We talk doctrine when we talk ops, graphics when we use analog products. Right. Because that helps us integrate a little more, especially with our liaison packages and that we've done episodes, we talk about LNOs. And I think it's something we're still persistently evaluating here at NTC is like, what is the effectiveness, right? Like at what echelon, what packages, who do we send? Are we sending, you know, certain capabilities versus others? It's a tough question that I think each rotation kind of learns a little bit more and we're chipping away at it, and I don't think there's a perfect answer. How do you feel for units, right. That you said kind of that are coming here, right. Whether you're leaving or you're still at Home Station, you haven't gotten here yet. How can they improve with that integration piece at Home Station in their training? Or just mentality, I guess, too.
- [54:21]
A
Yeah. I think the biggest way that we can get at this is by developing the relationships early. Right. Like, and by that I mean. Right. Like a unit CTC rotation should probably not be the first time that you work with them, if you're able. Right. And maybe you're not because of training time, deployments, whatever it is, but the, all of these units that come to a CTC have a robust train up before they come here. They do multiple command post exercises, they do multiple live fires. Right. They, they're bringing a rehearsed and validated. Sop out here, they're not just showing up at the beginning of a training cycle, right? And it was a. It was a major in the previous rotation at JRTC that said this and I really appreciated it. He said, hey, if you're not in the division sop, you're not real, right? You're not real to them. And by that I mean. What I mean is if we want the divisions and brigades that we're supporting to understand the value that we bring, then it's incumbent on us to get into their training cycle, right? And to make sure that they understand that and that it's built into their fighting products, right? Sometimes we show up late and we show up at the CTC rotation and we learn a lot, right? But we, but we, but we've done that a few times now, right? And what I would offer is if you show up to the CTC rotation and your conventional partner is saying, hey, we've really learned the value of having you out there, we're behind the power curve, right? Like, oh, like, we'll do good work and if that's all you get, that's all you get, right? But if you come up and your partner from a brigade or a division says, hey, we had you in our tax op, in our planning sop, and we have validated, right? We worked at this previous command post exercise together, and now we went to the CTC and we really rehearsed it and put it through a bunch of rigor against the dynamic opposing force in an unknown environment. Now we're probably getting to where we want to be in terms of working with our brigade and divisional counterparts.
- [56:21]
B
I think that goes and ties something to you said. Again, I look back at what you said when you first got here, like, right, we're not here to train units on their PMT for their CIMC mission or for their SIFRI mission. And that's, I think, a lot of that. There's scar tissue where we units have come here and say, well, we're doing this specific thing in this specific GCC that we're getting ready to go to. We really want to do it here. We have to shy away from that. And I think that ties into what you just said. Like, I don't know what the answer is and how the time permits, but if we're training for LISCO and it's not just at the ctc, then that's incumbent on us to make those connections outside of our time here, right? Because if this is all you're doing for lisco, you're kind of a little bit behind the power curve, I feel.
- [57:06]
A
Yeah. And I want to be like, we're not trying to be obstructionists here. Like if people have a training objective, obviously we want to facilitate that.
- [57:13]
B
Absolutely.
- [57:14]
A
Right. But it goes back to the why. Right. And it goes back to like, this is the only place we can train for large scale combat alongside brigades and divisions. So anything that we're doing that's taken away from that is frankly, we don't have the time. Right. And that's hard. I remember being a company of battalion commander and time, this question of time on training management and the training cycle. You know, there's never enough of it to train all the stuff you want to do. So they're good Americans for asking. I know why they're doing it. But. But ultimately, ultimately, like we have to be laser eyed, laser focused on what we are here to do. And I think what we're here to do is train, is train people for their worst day of ground combat. That's what we, we need to keep our eye on the prize.
- [58:00]
B
I think that transition us is, transitions us to a good point where we can see what are your thoughts? Like, is Arsoft based on your observation here at the ctcs, are we ready to fight in Lisco? And maybe not so much ready, but what do we need to do to be ready and what do we need to do to be, like you said, ready for that hardest day of combat?
- [58:23]
A
Yeah, that's a good question, I think, right. Something that we haven't touched on but I think is relevant. Right? Like, are we ready? I know that we're doing the right things, right. Our focus is in the right place. So a specific example of that, right? A couple specific examples of that, right? Like we'll talk fires and command relationships real quick. Right? For fires, right. Growing up during the gwat, I think, and now watching a lot of folks come through the ctc, I think they have like this expectation of fires where it's, I don't want to say it's like fast food, right? But like they order the fires and the fires come, right. Like it's on the hptl. And that HPTL is a, you know, binding contract signed in blood between you and the brigade or division commander. And if you see the thing on his, on that HPTL then. And you call in fire, you should get the fire. What we don't understand, right, because. And then folks don't always get the fires they want while they're out here, obviously. And I think sometimes they leave and they're like, oh, that was like a CTC ism. I should have got this fire. I don't understand why. So. And we can help them do better at this, and we will. Right. When talking to the fire supporter about it, like, there's a whole science of fires that we didn't necessarily need to contend with during the gwat. Right. The number one rule of which I believe is like, the first rule of your field artillery is to keep your fuel artillery alive.
- [59:40]
C
Yeah.
- [59:40]
A
Right. So the hptl, I think, is better thought of as like a wish list than an actual contract. Those are things that they want to kill. Right. But they don't. Probably don't have the resources, Right. In terms of munitions or platforms to kill everything on that HPTL every time it shows up. Right. So they've got. Now they have a. Like a prioritization issue. Right. There is target selection standards like target decay and other things that I don't like during the gwat, we didn't necessarily need to familiarize ourselves with. But if you're a fire supporter on the other end in an FTC somewhere absolutely matter, Right? Because if you're. You're going to shoot this hptl, you want to hit this thing, because what happens after you shoot this thing? You betrayed your position. Now you got to move, right. Because the adversary is out there contesting your fires through counter fire and things like that. Right. I'm sorry, yeah, no, go ahead.
- [60:31]
B
Major Song brought up something too, that was interesting about the threshold of violence. Right. That sometimes shooting at something right, when we see it or when we feel is advantageous, that's not always the best option. And the buzzword I've learned here is the convergence window of but.
- [60:49]
A
Right, but that's.
- [60:50]
B
That goes back to what you said, like, understanding what is the division doing. Like, does this thing need to be destroyed right now or does it need to be destroyed when the division needs it to be destroyed?
- [60:57]
A
Absolutely. And whether we. Like, yeah, convergence. Doctrinal term. Great. Right. But I think the fundamental lesson is, like, synchronizing effects in support of the campaign plan.
- [61:07]
B
Yes, sir.
- [61:07]
A
Like, regardless of what our doctrine is, we're always going to have to do that in combat. Right. And in war. I know we touched on that earlier. Another interesting thing, I think, right. That we're working on here to get to your point about are we ready? I remember, right. It's this conversation about command relationships. And I remember, like, growing up during the G vod and like our comrade, we treated like, hey, we have our own soft chain of Command and like we only report through this soft chain of command and like that's it, right? Like it's two separate chains of command forever and always. And that was, that was just like sacred to us almost. I don't think that's true. Right. Anymore. I think we have to think outside the box and experiment with some of that. Right, right. So if you come to the CTC and you're a battalion, your ctc, your, your battalion, excuse me, will be under the tactical control of the conventional division because that's who it's here to support, right? So we're experimenting with stuff like that. And I think all that is good because I don't think we should take anything that we practiced over the past 20 or 30 years. I don't think we should immediately dismiss it, but I don't think we should automatically immediately accept it as good, right? Like this is the CTC's offer us the venue to try it. And I guess to your, to your broader question about, like, whether we're ready, like for large scale combat, I mean, we have the right people, right? And I think that is impressed upon me every single rotation, right. I think broadly speaking, assessment and selection are doing their job, right? For, for 18, 37, 38, whoever it is, right. Like, like I get out there and I get into the box and I get into the swamp. And like, we have the right Americans. They're aggressive, they're thinking through problems, they're refining plans through bottom up, bottom up, you know, initiative. They're doing, they're doing the things that we want them to do in combat, right? Where they have some of these kind of opportunities for improvement that we've talked about, right? That's like a leader problem. That's a problem of leader emphasis and training management, right? So we can and should continue to work on that. And I think that we are like, genuinely, I think they are, I think back to all the kind of partner force stuff I've done in my career, right. Whether that was in CENTCOM or southcom, right? And I can't think of another military force that sends its folks to a place like the National Training center at Fort Irwin in bad conditions. And is this hard on itself? Right. Like, I'll tell you what I have seen is a lot of canned exercises where everyone gets a high five on the back and if the exercise deviates at all, then that's not good, right? But like, if you think about the things that we've been talking about over the, you know, the course of this conversation, right? Assessing Ourselves figuring out what we can fix at home station. Right. I think we are genuinely harder on ourselves than like internally than anyone externally would be. And I think that's, that's important. Like that's the kind of organization that I want to serve in. Right. Where we're always striving to get better. I think that's what championship teams do. So no, I don't have any concerns about if we went to large scale combat. I do think that doesn't mean that we're not continuously striving to improve. Right. And get better as an organization. And frankly here, like here at SAT D. Right. Are we offering the best possible training product. Right. To folks as they come through here? Right. Like this should be the best training experience they have in a year. Yes sir, I know, I feel strongly about that. I know a lot of you guys do.
- [64:36]
B
No, I agree, I agree. That's my intent. Whether it's company or CAD or we're even cross pollinating into ODA and AOB is just we owe the RTU the best training scenario, the best feedback and realistic expectations. And like you said, if they're leaving here improving their sops and improving their tax op and going back and then implementing these things throughout the rest of their training, I think that's a success for us as Sat D. This has been really insightful for me, sir. I really appreciate the time. I wanted to give you the floor kind of one last time for, you know, wrap up your thoughts. We've talked a lot about a lot of things, but kind of see closing it out, anything, you know, for our broader audience that you'd like them to know?
- [65:27]
A
Yeah, I think, you know, we've talked about a lot. I'll let most of my comments and thoughts kind of stand from the conversation I would offer. Right. If you're out there and you're thinking about your next assignment and you're in a group or a brigade, right. Like here's the pitch. Like come to sati. Right, like come to be a part of this. Right. What we're doing is important and like you can't read a book about the Gulf War without there being a chapter in the beginning about the invention of the National Training center and why that was important, that built the armored forces that won that war. Right. I don't know what the next war, major war is going to be and I don't think anyone does, although I think we all have guesses. Right. Some of those guesses are probably better than others. I do know that when the history of that war is written, there will be a chapter somewhere in it about how arsof learned and adapted and how that contributed to success or failure. I know I care deeply about that, and I know a lot of the octs at both Fort Polk and Fort Irwin care deeply about that. And I would offer, like, come be a part of that. I think that's important. The other thing that I think it offers. Right. For anyone who's thinking about it is I can't think of another place that's better to master your craft. Oh, yeah, right.
- [66:38]
C
Like.
- [66:38]
A
Like you just spend all day thinking about war fighting and training and doctrine and. And all these critical things. There's a lot of jobs out there in the, in the service, and I would. I wouldn't denigrate any of them, but if you want to come get the reps and sets necessary to become a true master of your profession, this is the place to do it.
- [66:58]
B
Yes, sir. You also are going to gain just. I've gained a really larger appreciation for the, like, the sof enterprise. Just seeing a fifth group rotation versus a third group rotation versus a 20th group. Like, I'm just getting to see how everybody is doing things differently and whether it's success or failure, it's just. It gives me an appreciation, like you said, that we have the right people in the right places and they're really passionate about being rsoft soldiers. I think that's. To me, that's been the most fulfilling
- [67:31]
A
thing about being on bro team.
- [67:33]
B
Just getting to see everybody and how they do stuff and appreciating like, man, we have some awesome men and women in arsof.
- [67:40]
A
So, yeah, there's something. There's like a special energy whenever you go into the locker room of a championship team. Who am I cripping this from? Sergeant major Waldo said this once when he came down to a seventh group sat B.
- [67:52]
B
Right.
- [67:52]
A
But there's like a special energy when you go into the room of a championship team.
- [67:55]
C
There's.
- [67:57]
A
There's just something in the air. Right. And I always appreciate, especially coming out here to NTC and spending time with burrow because every time I go in that building you guys have and I see the culture that. That is present here and how much you guys care. It's very clear to me that you guys have that energy and that we're. We're doing everything we can to.
- [68:15]
C
To.
- [68:15]
A
To help get at our core mission here.
- [68:17]
B
Yes, sir. Well, I appreciate it. Thank you. I really do value that you took the time and sharing a lot of insightful kind of wisdom in your observations. It means a lot for us here on off the Radar. So thank you.
- [68:32]
A
No, I appreciate you, Connor, and thanks you and Micah and the whole team for taking the time out of your day. This is not something that any of us have made you do right. This is just something that you guys do because you genuinely care about and want to invest in the profession on your own time and with your own resources. And we genuinely can't thank you enough. I appreciate you guys.
- [68:50]
C
Thank you sir.
- [68:53]
B
If you are interested in being a guest on the off the Radar podcast or have a topic you'd like us to cover, please contact the off the Radar team@offtheradar podcastteammail.com thank you for listening to off the Radar, where RSoft prepares for conflict like subscribe and share on your listening platform.