The AI race is really an electro-industrial race

Summary

Open Circuit – “The AI race is really an electro-industrial race”

Podcast: Open Circuit
Host: Latitude Media (Stephen Lacy, with Kathryn Hamilton and Jigar Shah)
Date: October 24, 2025

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Episode Overview

This episode unpacks the notion that the current AI “arms race” between the US and China is fundamentally more about control over the electro-industrial stack—the foundational materials, manufacturing systems, and infrastructure that underpin not just artificial intelligence, but the entire future of energy, transportation, and tech. The hosts explore the shifting economic and geopolitical landscape, analyzing recent mineral export restrictions, domestic policy responses, the intertwined fates of advanced tech and energy, and the broader implications of China’s integrated electrostate model compared to US fragmentation.

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Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. From Chip War to Mineral War: The New Front Line (09:00–17:30)

• Context: US has tried to block China’s access to AI chips. China counters with restrictions on exports of rare earths and critical minerals (graphite, gallium, germanium, etc.), which are essential to electronics, batteries, clean energy, and more.
• Potential Impact: These minerals are a tiny fraction of end-product cost, but their disruption can stall massive industries. New trade rules mean foreign companies need China’s license to buy or process them.
• US Reaction: US threatens new tariffs in retaliation, fearing it may not be able to diversify supply chains fast enough.

Notable Quotes:

• "China overplayed their hand and I think it's uncharacteristic of China to be so stupid. But they are, I think."
  – Jigar Shah [10:39]
• "Rare earths are not rare, they just are unprofitable to process. And China has made them unprofitable to process... so now, everybody is going to process rare earths, because it just doesn't matter."
  – Jigar Shah [10:45]

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2. How Exposed is the US (and Clean Energy) to Mineral Supply Disruptions? (12:15–17:30)

• Supply Chain Reality: China mines ~70%, processes 85–90%, and produces >90% of magnets globally.
• Industry on Edge: Companies reliant on Chinese magnets/materials are scrambling, stuck with complicated export forms and restrictions, and nervous about supply continuity.
• Need for Infrastructure: US must simultaneously develop mining/refining, processing, AND recycling if it hopes to seriously compete or be resilient.

Notable Quotes:

• "It’s going to take a couple of decades to actually put all of this infrastructure into place."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [15:47]
• "We cannot forget about recycling and reprocessing because we could use that to great effect too."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [15:58]

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3. US Policy: Strategy or Whack-a-Mole? (17:14–21:45)

• Mixed Signals from Washington: Active investment and stockpiling from Defense; DOE grants under pressure from political churn.
• Fragmented Approach: No industrial systems plan; reactions often politicized and short-term, not cohesive.
• Comparison to China: China’s advantage comes from systematic, long-term, vertically integrated planning and execution.

Notable Quotes:

• "Are you saying that they're winging it, Catherine?"
  – Jigar Shah [18:09]
• "If we somehow combine some of the urgency that the Trump administration is acting with and some of the philosophical thinking that the Biden administration have, maybe we would get somewhere that made sense. But right now they’re just going at it haphazardly."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [18:15]

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4. The Refining & Recycling Bottleneck (21:56–25:58)

• Mining Development Lags: Mining projects take years/decades; refining capacity is a shakier, nearer-term bottleneck.
• Urban Mining Potential: Companies like Redwood Materials and Li-Cycle offer hope in battery recycling and urban mining—and demonstrate strong US tech, but need policy and guaranteed feedstock & offtake to scale.
• Lessons from Europe: Extended producer responsibility in the EU ensures a steady recycling stream, which the US lacks.

Notable Quotes:

• "We have far better technology than the Chinese have in this area…but unless the minerals were at a 10% discount to China, people were continuing to buy from China."
  – Jigar Shah [22:51]
• "You need the integration of the feedstock with the technology and the offtake to make it all work."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [24:47]

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5. The “Electric Stack”: Understanding the New Age of Industrial Power (28:18–36:00)

• What is the Electric Stack?
  Lithium-ion batteries (heart), magnets and electric motors (muscles), power electronics (nervous system), and embedded compute (brains)—AI needs all four layers.
• Why it Matters: Everything—from phones and cars to grids and defense systems—relies on these components. The transition from hydrocarbons to electromagnetic systems offers efficiency, control, and durability.
• China’s Lead: China has become the world’s first true “electrostate,” mastering not just production of components, but their integration, mutual reinforcement, and scale.

Notable Quotes:

• "America is systematically overemphasizing the role AI will play in the future and underestimating the role electrification will play."
  – Paraphrased from Packy McCormick and Sam D’Amico, summarized by Stephen Lacy [28:18]
• "Magnets and motors are in everything. And that's just one piece of the electric stack. AI needs all of it."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [30:10]

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6. US Industrial Blind Spots vs. China’s Model (36:00–42:57)

• China’s Playbook:

  • Patient, vertically and horizontally integrated ecosystems
  • Iteration and scale, not just IP theft or cheap labor
  • Synergies: companies like BYD can make cars, batteries, solar systems, electronics in one place
  • Copies and innovates, often convincing US/EU firms to build domestically and then rapidly localizing

• US Challenge:

  • Fragmented manufacturing base, missing the benefits of integration and feedback
  • Struggles to coordinate policy, protect IP, or incentivize domestic scale against subsidized Chinese competition

Notable Quotes:

• "China’s industrial base is like one continuous machine with energy, manufacturing, logistics all integrated, while ours is very fragmented."
  – Stephen Lacy [39:10]
• "We are greenwashing China. And I don't understand it exactly... all of that is illegal. I don't think anyone is talking about the IP theft anymore. No one is talking about human rights abuses anymore. And we're all just saying, but look how awesome the results of all those human rights abuses and IP theft are."
  – Jigar Shah [40:25]

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7. Policy, Competition, and the Path Forward (42:57–47:50)

• Western Values: US and allies want to avoid China’s mistakes—environmental harm, overdevelopment, suppression of rights—but this means higher costs and slower response.
• Policy Needed: In the US, effective policy must close the innovation-to-scale gap, support recycling, and encourage partnerships and integration WITHOUT mirroring China’s flaws.

Notable Quotes:

• "We want to have clean air and clean water and land that we can use… we need policy, right?"
  – Kathryn Hamilton [43:22]
• "I think for a lot of our tenure we were getting to 70% of [electricity demand] growth or 80%... but now we're at fully 100%. I don't think that China is way far ahead of us… but it is very clear that China picked up on this trend before everybody else did."
  – Jigar Shah [33:00]

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8. The Myth of US Energy/Industrial Decline? (47:50–54:55)

• The “Electric Slide” Essay: Argues the US is misallocating resources to ideas and “intelligence” over actionable industrial muscle.
• Hosts’ Rebuttal: While the US has work to do, it’s not as if meeting energy or AI load is impossible, and the US retains major strengths in technology, innovation, and potential for collaboration.

Notable Quotes:

• "The notion that the United States has ever failed to meet its electricity supply is ridiculous. Like, we've never failed and we won't fail this time."
  – Jigar Shah [50:21]
• "America’s greatest strength, which is its innovation culture, has been decoupled from its capacity to manufacture and deploy at scale."
  – Paraphrased from Electric Slide by Stephen Lacy [49:13]
• "I see a lot of other countries trying to look internally… I do think that there's a huge amount of hope here that we're not lost to China."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [52:59]

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Memorable Moments & Quotes

• On the “systemic” nature of the race:
  "This isn't just a chip war or a mineral war. It's a systems war."
  – Stephen Lacy [28:18]

• On integrating recycling into the stack:
  "You can have all of the great technology in the world… [but] they need a guaranteed feedstock to be able to put in there, because then you actually get minerals that are at full value."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [24:47]

• On the competitiveness of US tech:
  "All the next breakthroughs are still being invented in the United States… getting to a thousand, you know, units of density for lithium-ion batteries is things that we can do and China can't do."
  – Jigar Shah [31:40]

• On China’s ecosystem:
  "They have had a long time to do it. I don't think they're the only ones who can do it. And in fact, Tesla is a good case study for that..."
  – Kathryn Hamilton [34:49]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• 00:48–04:28: Opening banter & introductions
• 09:00–10:38: US-Chinese mineral trade war, rare earth leverage
• 10:39–12:17: Jigar’s hot take: China overplayed on minerals, global diversification inevitable
• 12:22–14:04: Clean energy exposure & processing dependency
• 15:42–17:45: The slow, costly challenge of supply chain and recycling infrastructure
• 17:45–21:55: US policy—lack of strategy, political churn, reliance on grants
• 21:56–25:58: Refining, recycling, and “urban mining”
• 28:18–36:00: The ‘electric stack’—explaining & contextualizing China’s dominance
• 36:50–42:57: China’s industrial integration vs. US fragmentation
• 42:57–47:50: Policy solutions, competing on values, cost, and innovation
• 47:50–54:55: AI, energy, the “Electric Slide” thesis, and where US innovation fits

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Episode in a Nutshell

While the headlines focus on semiconductor chips and AI, the true contest shaping global power is over the entire “electric stack”—the minerals, manufacturing, recycling, and infrastructure systems that enable both intelligence and clean energy. China recognized this early, building a formidable, integrated ecosystem. The US, meanwhile, risks falling behind not in ideas, but in scalable, resilient industrial muscle—unless it unites its fragmented efforts and closes policy, financing, and supply chain gaps. Still, the next several decades are unwritten: innovation, reform, and investment choices made now will determine who commands the electro-industrial future.

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Recommended Reading:

• “The Electric Slide” by Packy McCormick & Sam D’Amico
• Reports from Ember and Noah Smith on electrotech dominance
• Essays from Andreessen Horowitz on electric stack economics

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Tone: Thoughtful, candid, slightly irreverent, always grounded in deep industry experience.

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For those who haven’t listened:
This episode is essentially an urgent call to understand that the AI “race” is inextricably linked to the broader—and arguably more consequential—battle for control over the nuts-and-bolts of the modern economy: energy, minerals, electrification, and manufacturing. The hosts challenge easy narratives, recognize the risks of China’s “success,” and make clear that winning the future depends on much more than clever code.

Transcript

[A]

Latitude Media, covering the new frontiers of the energy transition.

[B]

Catherine, is that a Darth Vader bobblehead behind you?

[C]

Oh, my gosh. There's a Darth Vader bobblehead. And there's also a Pope Francis bobblehead. Because this is what happens when you With a young person who has lots of different priorities.

[B]

So I take it you're not in your office right now recording?

[C]

No, I'm not. I'm in my kid's room. It was the best place for me to be today considering the number of people that are in my house.

[B]

Jigger. I finally get to see out the window what you look at every time we record. It's a nice view.

[D]

It is. It's slightly suboptimal, though, because it's weird. Like, I think once a week or twice a month, my neighbor has somebody who's using a gas powered leaf blower. And so then, like, if I have, like, a keynote address, like, on that moment, then, like, it comes through hard.

[B]

Motorized lawn equipment. I think we need to get all podcasters. There's enough podcasters in the world now that, like, we can unite and create a coalition against motorized lawn equipment.

[D]

We've already banned it, I think, in, like, 144 jurisdictions, right?

[B]

Is it that much?

[D]

Oh, yeah, yeah. It's like. It's a thing people, like, really hate. Gas powered leapers.

[C]

Everything we have is electric. Like, my. Our shop is like the movie Coma where all these things are being charged. It was. It's just like batteries everywhere, everywhere. Because of all of the lawn equipment we have that's all electric.

[B]

Well, if you walk by my house, you'll see me with a little push mower that, like, squeaks.

[D]

Oh, just the physical push mower.

[C]

You might as well just chew your girl.

[D]

Yeah. Get goats. What are you doing? Get goats like the rest of us.

[B]

Yeah. From Latitude Media. This is open circuit. For years, the US has been blocking China's access to advanced AI chips that power everything from ChatGPT, missile guidance systems. And now Beijing is fighting back, cutting off exports of the minerals that make those chips possible. Rare earths, graphite, gallium, germanium. The invisible building blocks of modern computing, cars, and clean energy. At first glance, it looks like another round of the chip war. But if you zoom out, it's something deeper. A fight over who controls the electric stack, the materials, manufacturing, and infrastructure that make intelligence itself possible. So this week we're asking, is the AI war really an energy war? Are we fighting the wrong battle? Pouring money into intelligence while China builds the infrastructure that intelligence runs on open circuit is brought to you by Natural Power. For nearly two decades, Natural Power has provided engineering and consulting services for renewables projects across the US Natural Power supports clients in wind, solar and battery storage while with a focus on independent engineering, technical due diligence, energy estimation and developer support. With more than 245 gigawatts of project experience in North America and acceptance from major financiers, Natural Power is responsive, able to meet tight timelines and pragmatic. Natural Power works with you to understand, quantify and mitigate risks. Learn [e-mail] or click the link in.

[A]

The show notes in the U.S. a billion dollar disaster now strikes every three weeks on average. That's why Latitude Media and the Ad Hoc Group are launching the Power Resilience Forum taking place January 21st through 23rd in Houston, Texas. PRF 2026 will be the center of the conversation on resilience. Utilities, regulators, innovators and investors will all be in the room talking about how to keep the grid running in this new era of heat waves, wildfires and storms. Expect conversations on everything from AI driven solutions to new financing models that can actually get projects built. If you work on the grid or depend on it, this is the place to be. Join us in Houston in January for the 2026 Power Resilience Forum. Check out the agenda and [e-mail].

[B]

Hey everybody, welcome. I am Stephen Lacy. I'm the executive editor of Latitude Media. I am joined by Kathryn Hamilton and Jigar Shah. Catherine is the chair of 38 North Solutions. You were in Montreal this week. Did you solve your gopher problem before you left?

[C]

It turns out like gophers are not in Virginia.

[B]

So what was it?

[C]

So it's moles and they've been doing a lot of damage. And the thing is that all they're trying to do is eat worms and grubs and stuff. So, you know, worms and grubs are great, it's just that they also just tear up your lawn, just generally.

[B]

What was in Montreal?

[C]

Oh, I'm, I'm an advisor to mkb, which is a fund, a growth equity fund that invests in North America. Now they're looking, you know, more into Europe as well. It's a, it's a great fund and it's, it's, it's particularly nice because it is growth equity. They're looking at companies past that early stage that I spend a lot of my time working with. And so you're really into the place where people are starting to to scale. And that's a very fun place to be.

[B]

Chigarsha is an investor and former director of the DOE's loan program's office. Are you stockpiling germanium at your house now, Jigger?

[D]

Wait, are those flowers? No, I am not. But you know, it is something where you could just like a cup full of germanium, like to make the medicine go down. No, I think that cup full of germanium might be worth like $10 million or something. It's crazy.

[B]

Yeah. Forget castor oil. It's germanium. What's got you busy these days?

[D]

Well, you know, there's a lot going on, right? I mean, you know, I think that there's a lot of markets that are back, which is interesting. And so you're starting to see stock prices, you know, really go up in the clean tech sector. And so a lot of folks want to spac their companies or do other strategic things. So that's been interesting. But the other piece of this is that I think you're starting to see a real fight between the White House and Chris Wright on saving projects. And so that's been fascinating to watch and talk to a lot of the companies who are in the middle of those fights. I actually think Chris Wright's trying really hard to be thoughtful about which projects to save and which projects to actually support. And there are a lot of people at the White House that aren't having it.

[B]

So you mentioned Chris Wright. Politico had a story recently showing that there was tension inside the White House and that they felt like Chris Wright was moving too slowly to cancel grants and loan guarantees out of doe. I have also heard that that's kind of old news, that, like, there was initial frustration, but that some of that frustration has since gone away. What do you guys make of that story? Is it consistent with what you're hearing?

[C]

Yes. There's also a bunch of folks internal to DOE that are getting pushed out. There's just been a lot of churn. And I think it's just because you have different people with different ideas about the speed at which they want to move. And I think Chris Wright wants to, because he is the secretary, wants to lead the agency and show that leadership. And there are a lot of folks that have been kind of doing their own things because, you know, everybody was told, let's get everything done, especially when Doge came in. So there's a lot of churn in the agency, too, and folks are moving around or moving out.

[D]

There was always going to be a lot of Companies that we gave grants to who don't meet their milestones and you know, we're going to drop out. Right. That was so predictable, on par for the course. Right. I think that some of those companies probably should have gotten more grace given all the disruption that's occurred this year around tariffs and stock prices. And, you know, because some of the milestones that they've failed to reach is like raising enough equity, for instance, to move forward with projects. Right now, I think with a lot of the news from China and other things, I think there are people revisiting some of their decisions from six months ago and saying, hey, wait, maybe we shouldn't prematurely hurt that company when that company is providing germanium or whatever it is. And then I think you also have the stuff from the Department of War, which is what happened in the O. Triple B is a lot of the critical minerals focus moved from the Department of Energy to the Department of War. And they have basically one speed, which is, we're going to put money into your company and we want to buy the output. Right. And that hasn't worked well, particularly for MP materials. Everyone has now come to the Department of War and told them that they don't know how to process rare earths and their magnets suck. And so we don't want to buy their stuff. And so now I think they're revisiting. Maybe we do need the expertise at the Department of Energy married with the flex, the Department of War. So I think things are getting a little more clear and that expertise that DOE is known for is becoming more and more valuable.

[B]

All right, well, let's go to the new front in the trade war. So after years of watching Washington block access to advanced chips, Beijing just pulled its own version of that play, announcing sweeping new restrictions on the export of Rare Earth Minerals. U.S. treasury Secretary Scott Besant said it was like pointing a bazooka at at the industrial base of the entire free world, maybe a bit hyperbolic in economic terms. These minerals will not bring the US to its knees. They represent hundreds of millions of dollars in imports. But these minerals are now in everything. Batteries, missiles, wind turbines, power electronics, GPUs and supply disruptions can be a big deal for these industries. So we're going to talk about what those disruptions might be. Under these new rules, foreign companies may need licenses from the Chinese government to trade or process these minerals, giving Beij meaningful trading leverage. And the administration responded by threatening new tariffs, up to 100% for some imports. But one analyst told the New York Times, if China can get around chip restrictions faster than the US can get around rare earth restrictions. That's a big problem for the United States. So let's dig in. Jigger, what's your read broadly on how serious the coming restrictions are? Like, how exposed are US Industries broadly?

[D]

I think China overplayed their hand and I think it's uncharacteristic of China to be so stupid. But they are, I think. Remember, rare earths are not rare, they just are unprofitable to process. And China has made them unprofitable process. So if anyone has a four year head start, they can actually figure out how to diversify the rare earth supply chain easily. And so now I think now that China has overplayed their hand, everybody is going to process rare earths because it just doesn't matter, right? I mean, $200 million of rare earths are in $500 billion worth of finished goods. So if you pay four times more for those rare earths, it doesn't move the needle on the cost of $500 billion worth of finished goods. And so for a long time, people are just like, do we have to pay four times more for these rare earths to process them in an environmentally safe fashion to treat mine, you know, workers like, fairly, to do all of the things that our ethics and our values tell us to do? And now I think China has said, yeah, you got to go do that, right? Because we don't want to own this sector anymore. We want you to diversify away from us. And we are now sending you the ultimate signal to do that. And luckily we had been working on that for four years. So we know who's competent, who's not, who's got better technology. A lot of the venture capitalists have put money into this. And so it's going to be painful for a few years. But now, like, I think all the national security people, all of the economic security people are on board to paying what it takes to diversify the supply chain.

[B]

Catherine, what's your read on the economic impact and then specifically the clean energy industry impact?

[C]

Yeah, it's interesting because I just listened to an interview with Doug Burgum, the Secretary of Interior, and he said just what Jigger said about China overplaying their hand. Just to keep in mind, they mine about 70% of the rare earths so far. They process 85 to 90% and produce over 90% of the magnets. So they do have a huge, you know, most of the market mountain pass, which was what Jigger had referred to MP Materials produces about 10% of the world's supply. So it's still just minuscule. In my meetings in Montreal, there was a motor company and I asked them about magnets and what's happening with China, and they said, we're all just waiting to make sure we can get what we need because they. We are completely reliant on them. So in June, there was a deal. There's an export licensing regime that has some export restrictions, but it also has these forms that you have to fill out. And like Jigger said, you have to promise to do certain things in the context of those forms. There was just an article a couple of days ago that things are starting to heat up again. But this motor company said, look, we think that we understand these forms and how to do it and how to make sure that we can still move forward. I mean, the output with all of our factories here is going to be far more valuable than what those rare earths are purportedly valued at. And yet the knock on effect is massive. So that's where we have to. That's what we have to worry about and look for.

[B]

So to summarize the points that you both made, we obviously see a lot of sensational headlines when China issues restrictions like this. How serious is this?

[D]

Well, it's clearly serious. I mean, that's why we passed the Inflation Reduction act and now like the O Triple B. Right. I think it's very serious. And we've always known that whether it's in rare earth materials or whether it's in critical minerals broadly. Right. Whether it's lithium or nickel or cobalt or whatever, or whether it's in solar panel manufacturing or battery manufacturing. You know, we have allowed China to systematically lose money in every single sector in order to gain market share. Right? And we all just said, well, we're getting cheap stuff. So, like, it's okay, it's a good trade. Right? But I think everyone knew going in four years ago that that was causing China to have leverage over the rest of the world in ways that were unhealthy. Right. And that we needed to start planning for the day when China was going to use that leverage. And we needed a set of technologies and companies and plans to diversify the supply chain. Right. I think that we were on track to doing that in a slow and stable and methodical way. And, you know, I think when President Trump came in and talked about Liberation Day and picked a fight and, you know, made this thing escalate, like we are now in a place where China has escalated on their side. Right. And so now all of those plans, none of which even had dust on them because they had just been completed a year ago, are now being like scaled up. Right. And it's going to be a time lag. And so it will be done disruptive. But I think after that time lag, I think you will see a permanent understanding by the entire world order that diversification is our friend.

[C]

Yeah. And Steven, when I talked to this motor company about that supply chain, he said you can't just flip a switch. It's going to take a couple of decades to actually put all of this infrastructure into place, which is something we have not focused on the way we should have. So Mountain Pass is one, but there's also some, potentially some more materials in Alaska. There are also all over the world, other places you can get materials. And then we cannot forget about recycling and reprocessing because we could use that to great effect too. I mean, I would just say Umicore, one of the world's largest global recyclers, they've been doing recycling since the 1980s profitably, of all kinds of materials. They don't focus on rare earths, but they focus on all the other, a lot of other critical materials. And we need that infrastructure in place. And so in diversification, I think we need to look at, yes, we need to figure out where we can build a mining infrastructure, but we also need processing and we need recycling all put into place. And what we see right now happening at Department of Energy is that they are starting to cut off some of those options. Like this contract with, or this project with Ascend Elements was basically, they had already been awarded over 300 million for a billion dollar facility in Kentucky. And that's like manufacturing waste and end of life batteries. Like, like, let's not cut off our hands here. Let's like try to make sure that we continue projects that are going to help us build that infrastructure and then that'll guarantee the end products that we're desperately trying to build and that we do excel in.

[B]

Yeah. Catherine, what do you make of the Trump administration's efforts broadly? So they have put some grants in jeopardy for companies that are providing solutions in this space. The DOE is now putting a billion dollars into other critical minerals refining projects. The Defense Department is stockpiling materials. Washington's scrambling to secure supply with allies everywhere from Ukraine to Australia. What do these policy efforts amount to?

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I think it's important to do all of that, but there doesn't seem to be a single organizing systems Approach, which would be, all right, what are all the tools we have? What are, what is everything that we need? And then not just go at it with this whack a mole that basically says anything that the Biden administration did is necessarily bad. So we're not going to do that. We're only going to do this.

[D]

Are you saying that they're winging it, Catherine? Is that what you're saying?

[C]

The thing is the Biden administration did.

[D]

That shoe from the hip.

[C]

I mean, pew, pew, pew, pew. I know. We just, I feel like if we somehow combine some of the, some of the urgency that the Trump administration is acting with and some of the philosophical thinking that the Biden administration have, maybe we would get somewhere in a way that made sense. But right now they're just, they're going at it haphazardly rather than in an organized way. And what that means is that, like, China's very organized. So it's really going to be, it's going to take a lot for us to be able to compete. I think we can, but it's like, like they've got long range thinking. We have very short term thinking in the US and so I think it's just going to be, it's going to take a lot of focus on our part. And I don't think it's going to be like the next three years we're going to do it.

[B]

Jigger, what do you make of the Trump administration strategy right now? And how does that compare to what was happening under the Biden administration?

[D]

Yeah, so I think strategy is a strong word to use for what the Trump administration is doing. I think in general, I would say that what is working is that the Biden administration had this mandate for offtake, right? Like on 30D tax credits from the electric vehicles, where they had to buy more domestic lithium, et cetera. And then in my opinion, I think the Biden administration completely screwed up the 30D implementation to the point where like redwood materials and MP materials and all these other people hated them because they sort of allowed these workarounds. People didn't actually have to buy domestically. There were like phase ins other things. The Trump administration, with their full on crazy, have convinced everybody who is buying these materials in the United States that they have to buy domestically. So, like, that is like a done deal. Like, I mean, every single automaker that I talk to is like, oh, yeah, we're buying domestically now. I'm sorry, jigger, we didn't listen to you two years ago, but like, we're now definitely Buying domestically. And so from that perspective, I mean, you know, like, I don't know, but like I couldn't convince everyone to buy everything domestically when I was in office. And the Trump administration has scandalized, scared everybody into buying domestically. And the Chinese are dumb enough to like, actually pile on and support the Trump administration's approach to scaring everybody to buy domestically. Right. So the offtake agreements are now in place, which I think is fascinating. And it took me a long time of using logic to try to get people to sign offtake agreements, which they didn't do. Right. So from that perspective, I think we're doing great. From the other perspective, I would say the communications to Wall street and to venture capitalists has haphazard. So I don't know what the actual, like, you know, game plan is and I don't know which early stage companies are going to get financing right now given that they don't quite know, like, what is the plan and like, what, you know, feature should we be optimizing for to make sure that, like, you know, that you're going to support this in the future. Right. Because that's the other problem, Right. Is there's a feeling that if you're not in good with, with the right people and the right consultants and the right investors, that you may not get a grant out of the Department of Energy. I think there's a feeling that this is arbitrary and capricious and not really focused on the quality of the technology, which may or may not be fair. Right. But it goes to, what's the strategy? What am I giving you 5% of my company and ownership for? How does all of this fit together into a coherent strategy that makes investors comfortable that they should invest heavily?

[B]

I want to finish with a look at refining and some of the tech approaches. So mining progress is still mostly on paper. We've got dozens of new mining projects and exploration and permitting. But like, development timelines are really long. Refining is a big bottleneck and we could see much faster progress there. So we're seeing investment in new tech like, you know, N Cycles Electro extraction system. We've got redwood materials run by J.B. straubel, formerly CTO of Tesla. They have, I think, the largest lithium ion battery recycling facility in the US and they can recover up to 95% of material in the batteries. What do you guys make of progress on that front? What I think is referred to as urban mining. How do you see that shaping up and what kind of supply can we get from urban mining applications?

[D]

You mean on the Recycling side. Yeah, we have great technology. So whether it's redwood or licycle. Right. Which I think, you know, completed its sale to Glencore, and now Glencore is finishing that facility in Rochester. I think, you know, we're in this place where we have far better technology than the Chinese have in this area. But like I said before, we had a huge problem with offtake agreements, right? So, like, part of the reason why Cira Resources in their graphite facility in Louisiana had such problems that we provided a loan to is that GM and Tesla refused to buy graphite from them. Now they're not refusing to buy graphite from them. And so they're like, okay, I guess we should buy this stuff. But for a lot of people, because of the way that 30D was structured under the Biden administration, the offtake agreements didn't have to come domestically. So our technology could be the best in the world. But unless. Unless the minerals were at a 10% discount to what they could buy from China, people were continuing to buy from China. I think we've talked a lot about the potential of urban mining and the potential of all these things, but the other problem is that it takes a long time for these batteries to die. When you look at redwood materials, what they realized was a lot of the battery packs that they were getting were actually perfectly fine. And so then they decided to build a data center in 12 days with Crusoe with used batteries. Right. And they were like, well, why are we ripping these things apart when they still have useful life in them? And solar panels are the same, Right. We have these great solar panel recycling companies that we've built in the United States. And a lot of the companies that were going to rip out old 14% efficiency panels and put in 23% efficiency panels rely on. Maybe we'll wait an extra two years before we do that. And so they don't have the feedstock of solar panels to recycle.

[C]

Yeah, I was going to say feeds. It's not just offtake, it's also feedstock. And you think about where all the materials and minerals are. They're in everything we use every single day, from tiny, tiny objects to much larger things. And being able to recycle, that is really important. But you have to have the collection network set up so you can have all of the great technology in the world. And would say Umicore has. This has a massive plant in Belgium in which they've been doing this for decades. They need a guaranteed feedstock to be able to put in there, because then you actually get minerals that are at full value because those are infinitely recyclable. And we should be able to do that here in the us but you need that. You need the integration of the feedstock with the technology and the offtake to make it all work.

[D]

And maybe you're saying this, and maybe I'm putting words in your mouth, but I think that requires policy.

[C]

Yes, it does.

[D]

So like what Europe has is extended producer responsibility. Right. And so people are not allowed to just have a bunch of AA batteries in their drawer forever. Right. You actually have to have a local place to recycle those AA batteries and all the other, like small batteries, et cetera. And then Umicore has feedstock.

[B]

How much nickel, cobalt or copper do you think we can get from that bobblehead behind you?

[C]

Catherine, it's made of plastic. Only plastic.

[D]

Yeah, there's a whole new definition for couch cushion change. All sorts of AA and AAA batteries in your couch.

[C]

That's your old BlackBerry that's sitting in your drawer of your bedside table. Which, by the way, I still have just in case.

[B]

Yes, I still have mine literally in the drawer in front of me right now.

[D]

Lord Almighty, you guys are sad.

[B]

Open Circuit is brought to you by Natural Power. For nearly two decades, Natural Power has delivered expert, independent engineering and consulting services for renewables projects across the US and beyond. Success in project transactions requires an independent engineer who's laser focused on timelines, understands the nuances of risk, and collaborates seamlessly to develop solutions tailored to your needs. Natural Power excels at working within tight time constraints while ensuring diligence never takes a backseat. With a deep expertise in wind, solar and battery storage, Natural Power delivers top tier support and independent engineering, technical due diligence, energy estimation and developer support accepted by major financiers. Their flexible approach ensures projects are built on a strong foundation powered by expertise driven by sustainability. That is natural power. Find out [e-mail] or click the link in the show notes.

[A]

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[B]

Let'S pull back here and look at the bigger picture. You could argue that the conflict that we're talking about here is not just a chip war or a mineral war, it's a systems war. If you ask American policymakers about what the 21st century tech race is all about, they might say artificial intelligence. Whoever leads AI will lead the world. And what a lot of people are asking is, what if? That's just the wrong way to think about it. So over the last couple of months, we've seen some really fantastic analysis on how China is dominating the systems that underlie the 21st century economy. And people call that system a few different things. Electrotech, the electro industrial stack, or the electric stack. In September, a team at the think tank Ember put together a report on the electrotech revolution outlining China as the first major electro state. Not a huge surprise to our listeners, maybe, but it was a fantastic report. After that, the economics writer Noah Smith put out a great piece on this stack. Andreessen Horowitz partner Ryan McEntish has been writing a lot about it. And Most recently Packy McCormick and Sam D' Amico wrote this blockbuster essay titled the Electric Slide. And they argue that America is just playing the wrong game, pouring capital into intelligence when China builds the infrastructure that intelligence runs on. Or as they put it, America is systematically overemphasizing the role AI will play in the future and underestimating the role electrification will play. Catherine, what is the Electric Stack?

[C]

I feel like we should do the Electric slide, which was 40,000 words long, by the way.

[B]

Let me tell you how many plane.

[C]

Hours were devoted to that.

[B]

That was the essay. The Electric Slide essay was from Sam D' Amico and Paki McCormick. It was very long.

[C]

Yeah, it's super interesting though, if you really want to get the history of everything in the world, that's a good one. So basically he defines, they define the electric stack as lithium ion batteries, which is kind of the heart of this beast. Magnets and electric motors, which are kind of the muscles, power electronics, which is like the nervous system and then embedded compute, which is the brains. And AI needs all of those things. And if you think about this, this in very practical terms, all of these electromagnetic systems, they convert electricity into motion and heat. So like induction stoves, magnetic fields, which are, you can see in MRI machines, light like LED sound in speakers, and then back to electricity with regenerative braking. They're basically in everything we do. And the difference, the huge difference and why we're looking at a world that is going to be completely reliant on this electric stack is that combustion uses chemical energy to produce electricity at enormous losses and a lot less ability to control, whereas electromagnetic systems are very efficient and precise. And those are gonna be the underpinning and are the underpinnings. And if you talk to this, like, motor manufacturing company, like, he's like, motors are in everything. And that's just one piece of the electric stack. So it's a big piece of where we're going, and AI needs all of it.

[B]

Jigger, what do you make of the argument that America is playing the wrong game?

[D]

Well, I think that it depends on the assumptions that you're making around the game, right? I mean, I think all of those battery technologies, all of those technologies that Catherine outlined were invented in the United States. So it's not like we didn't actually know that the electricity was valuable. We clearly spent the money to invent all of it. I think for some time, as we discussed earlier, we decided we didn't want to make any of it, and we wanted to outsource our pollution and whatever it is that we were outsourcing to China. And we allowed them to get really good at manufacturing all of these things at scale. And, you know, and we imported a lot of it back, right? So I think if you look at the next five breakthroughs of technology, they're still here in the United States, right? So getting to a thousand, you know, units of density for lithium ion batteries is things that we can do and China can't do, right? So there are lots of things that we can still do to be competitive in this space. I think the underlying argument around the electrostate versus the petro state, I think that's, I think, obvious to anyone who listens to this podcast. It is very clear that we, you know, rely on ones through fuels, right? I mean, all of that work to bring out oil or natural gas or, you know, coal out of the ground, and then you burn it, and then you got to do it all over again, right? And so figuring out how you make a solar panel or a wind turbine or something, which, yeah, maybe you import it once, but then it lasts for 40 years and it sits there, right. Is something that is clearly superior, but more importantly, it is clearly winning, right? So when you look at the first half of 2025, we added about 390 terawatt hours of growth in electricity demand. And for the first time ever it was nuclear, solar and wind that met 100% of that demand growth. Right. And so from that perspective, I think you're starting to see that our technologies here are scaled up enough that you could actually see them being relevant. I think for a lot of our tenure we were getting to 70% of growth or 80% of growth or 90% growth, but now we're at fully 100% of growth every year. I don't think that China is way far ahead of us. I think if you look at that, the production capacity they have now, depending on the sector you're talking about, you're probably talking about 20% of the production capacity needed in 2040. So the rest of that could be built up in China or it could be built up in many other countries around the world. But it is very clear that China picked up on this trend and the importance of it before everybody else did.

[C]

Yeah, and they followed this playbook for a really long time. So people think of China as full of IP theft and cheap labor. And actually they've had a very patient strategy. They iterate, they iterate rapidly and in really vertical and horizontal integrated companies with integrated ecosystems. So they have been able to take, for example, Tesla went to China to build their plant and what that did in China was to say, oh, we should all be doing that too. And we're going to take some of that technology and iterate and iterate and iterate and we're going to get really good at it too. So their performance has been very good, their pricing has been good too. But it's a system that they have and that they've been able to take and iterate on. So they have had a long time to do it. I don't think they're the only ones who can do it. And in fact, Tesla is a good case study for that. The Model 3 again, Tesla in 2024 had made $97.7 billion. BYD from China made 107 billion. So they're a little bit ahead, but not that far ahead. And if we start taking some of those lessons and some of those integration techniques, maybe we can start also making sure that we have enough here to do and we can be productive.

[B]

It seems like what China recognized was how interlinked a lot of these technologies in the electric stack are. So as Sam d' Amico described it, like, manufacturing a specific product is getting a lot more complicated. But, but the stack itself, you can manufacture a lot of the same products in the same location. So it's why A company like BYD can make electric passenger cars, batteries, electronic components for mobile phones, solar systems, electric monorail systems. There's enough commonality among those technologies that it can make sense for a large manufacturer to take them all on. And that seems pretty unique when we look at this set of, of technologies. Do you buy that, Jigger?

[D]

Yeah, I mean, there is a common set of technologies that the United States was extraordinary at. Right. And we continue to export, whether it's in natural gas, combined cycle plants that China really can't make, or whether it's in sort of like compressors and lots of other things that we did. Right. And that was all in the sort of the 70s and we still have that entire supply chain and still export it. Right. China's realized that this next set of technologies, which is part of the Electro state, have a similar level of synergy between all of them. And China frankly has been quite clear about stealing technology on purpose that actually figured out how to do all of it. And I just want to make sure we're crystal clear that all of this technology is stolen. Please don't suggest for a moment that any of it's not stolen. And I could show you, you know, from all of the grants that the Trump administration canceled, that those technologies also have 50 companies in China that have stolen that technology, that are now trying to copy it. Right. So like, so it is all stolen. Yes. And China decided that every single thing they were going to vertically integrate. So that goes back to rare earths that we were talking about before, all the way through to the mining of all of these things, all the way through to the integration into monorails, which then they practiced on internally because they built a lot of electric trains and they built a lot of the technologies in house so they could see how that worked and they could feedback the loop back into manufacturing and say, well actually if you made these changes, then this product, this end product would work better. Right. And so they've got that entire feedback loop within their country, which is so valuable. And it's what I think we're realizing now in the United States that we've lost because we've decided to invent things but not actually manufacture them. So that feedback loop is coming back from China and it's slow compared to if you were to manufacture things here. And so, yeah, look, I think that they have achieved a level of synergy that I think is something that we are not yet taking advantage of.

[B]

So China's industrial base is like one continuous machine with energy manufacturing, logistics all integrated while Ours is very fragmented. What would that kind of integration look like in the US could we ever execute some kind of model that looks akin to the Chinese model?

[C]

I think you could have some of. We could take some of the lessons from it. It's not going to look exactly the same, because in China, they have a different regime, right. It's not a democracy. So they can just say, here's what we're going to do. Y' all go do it. And that's what they do. And we have all these entrepreneurs, which is like, what makes us so great, right? Is this really interesting ecosystem of entrepreneurs. But what I think it does mean is that we need to have more partnerships. We need to. And I look at these funds, like the fund I'm working with, mkb, which is they're saying, all right, how do all of our investments make sense as a group? Like, how do they. How can they all feed off of each other? This is all really important. Even though they may seem like they're different parts of the value chain, they are part of a larger ecosystem. And I think that's. Some of those lessons are really important. And it doesn't have to look exactly like China, but we can still be much more coordinated so that we can iterate more and learn more and produce more here.

[D]

Yeah, I mean, I think that this is something we have to be intentional about having a conversation on, because I do think that. That somehow we are greenwashing China. And I don't understand it exactly, right? Like, when you go to China, like, let's take an example. If you take Sila Nano, right? Which is this extraordinary company, right, that's building their facility in Washington State. If you go to China, there are 30 companies copying sila Nano. Every one of them has gotten free land, free buildings, free equipment, and 2% interest financing from their province, because they want to be the group that does that. All of that is illegal. I don't think anyone is talking about the IP theft anymore. No one is talking about human rights abuses anymore. And we're all just saying, but look how awesome the results of all those human rights abuses and IP theft are, right? So now the question becomes, how do we compete with that? Right? We say, great, we want to do this here, we want to build stuff here, we want to do this stuff here. But we work within a democracy and a capitalist system, which I. I continue to choose to want to live in. And so now we're in a place where our costs are going to be double the cost of their costs, right? For a Variety of reasons which we could go into ad nauseam, but when we decide that we're going to pay double, right? Because that's what it costs to make a good rate of return, to protect ip, to make sure workers are safe, to do all of those things, right? And China is saying, well, we'll give it to you for half the price. Right? And so now you're Brazil or Colombia or Argentina or all these places that are importing BYD vehicles which we now know the Chinese government is subsidizing at $10,000 per vehicle. Right? But like, I don't know, like what is the right response to that? I can on the one hand cheerlead the electro state and on the other hand say that I don't think that every country in the world should copy what China is doing in the way that they're doing it. I don't think that's. And I think for whatever reason for the last 10 years, it has become unacceptable to say that out loud that like now we just need to cheerlead the electoral state and we can't mention the fact that all of these bad practices are destroying industries in not just the United States, but in India, in Jordan, in Turkey, in like Germany, which, whose auto industry might go bankrupt in the next few years.

[B]

No, I think that's exactly right. And I am worried about romanticizing China. China's coordination. Obviously the focus is on China's vertical integration model and speed, which is impressive. But those same traits have produced a lot of waste, overcapacity, financial risk and some of the other impacts that you outlined, particularly human rights abuses. So totally agree that we run the risk.

[C]

Then what do we do? I mean, we don't want to have. We want to have clean air and clean water and land that we can use. Park Service, the Park Service, the Forest Service, et cetera. We don't want all of our land to go to development the way China has done it. And so we need policy, right? We need to put policy in place. We've had policy, a lot of that is still inhibiting the ability to do big things. So what is the answer to this? How do we actually compete? How do we make sure that we set up a system that is better and that is more competitive and that people will want to participate in?

[B]

I think the US is not even really in the same game that China is, and that's part of the problem. Like we can sit here and talk about what a coordinated strategy would look like in the us but it is so clear that the US doesn't even really know the rules of the game or care much about it at this stage. And so that's what worries me. China is so far ahead in recognizing the strategic value of these industries. There's a lot of ball game left. There's still a long way to go before we see who really dominates these industries long term. And I think the US Absolutely has a shot. But right now, the US Just isn't recognizing that this the same game.

[D]

Well, no, I don't think that's true at all. I think the US did recognize this is the same game. And that's where the Inflation Reduction act came from. That's why we had 920 new manufacturing facilities that were announced. Right. And people were under construction. I think that there's clearly been, you know, like a step back and we are a petro state. Right. I mean, bottom line is, is that, that, you know, I think what the Carlyle Group described within the new jewel order is that people are going more local. China doesn't have local. And so they're doing electrostate stuff because that's what they can do. The US has, you know, huge amounts of oil and gas, and so they are continuing to use those supply chains because we have them. Right. And it's local. I think that, that, you know, but I think when you think about the innovation cycle and all these other pieces, there are things that we have tried. I will not suggest to you that all of it was successful, but I think that we have tried things. And I think now the question really becomes that now that China has overplayed their hand on rare earths, the question is whether the rest of the countries around the world will recognize that this is something we have to work together on. Because I do think the Biden administration was good at boxing in China. And to get a lot of countries around, around the world to recognize that China needed to be forced to be better partners within the global economy. I think that that went away during Liberation Day, but it feels like it's coming back. Right. I mean, I think that after we put tariffs on Chinese steel, the Europeans started seeing huge amounts of steel getting dumped into Europe. And so now they've put tariffs on China. And so you're starting to see China playing whack a mole around the world where they're, they're being shut out of market after market. I don't know that this is coordinated. And so it'd be good for it to be more coordinated. I think Basset probably does have an ability to coordinate it more than most. But look, I think that the technologies continue to grow rapidly. I would make the case that solar panels are likely at a place of stability, although perovskites, I think are very interesting as a next leg up on technology. But I would suggest that batteries are in its infancy. When you think about where we can get to on density, on safety, on all sorts of things, on recyclability, which we talked about before, et cetera, I mean, my sense is that the amount of technology that's still yet to be discovered and implemented into batteries is very high. And I think the same thing is true with electric vehicles. The same thing is true with self driving cars and some of those types of things. And so. So I think that this battle is worth fighting because I don't think that we're even close to where the supply chain will be in 2040.

[C]

Yeah, it's astounding because over 35 years, the cost of all these electric stack components has dropped by 99%, which is pretty phenomenal. And demand will continue to rise and then the cost curve will continue to go down. Jigger. It does seem like even though we've squeezed a lot out of it already, there's a lot more to do and it might take a little time because there's a gap between innovation, like the scientific innovation, and scaling. And we have to make sure that we close that gap that we have that really are manufacturing products and that we really make sure that we nurture from the science and the discovery into scale. And I think that's where we need to focus more, because we, as you said, the Biden administration worked really hard on scale and on closing that gap. And that is a lot of what is kind of coming apart right now. And we need to try to pull that back together if we're going to continue to succeed.

[B]

So let's bring this back around to the broad theme and the electric slide essay. Highly recommend people check it out. Be warned, it is hundreds of pages. I thought about printing it out and then I looked at like the 300 pages or whatever it was, and I did not do that.

[D]

Oh, no, no. You gotta go to Staples and get another 500 pack of recycled paper. I did use that app that they recommended, 11th state or whatever, which turns anything into a podcast. And that was great because then I could just skip through all the history crap and go to the rest of their stuff. I think I got through it in only 27 minutes.

[B]

Yeah, totally. And NotebookLM is really good for that too. If you upload it there, Google will Create a little podcast for you to walk through it. It's quite good. So lots of ways to consume it. But to bring it to the conclusion of the essay, they're basically arguing that the US right now thinks that the high ground is in intelligence, in AI in chips and software. But in this new era, intelligence depends on largely electricity capacity, electrons, not ideas. And that we're investing in all this cognitive horsepower while we're outsourcing the muscle of the future global economy. And so America's greatest strength, strength, which is like its innovation culture, which we just described, has been decoupled from its capacity to manufacture and deploy at scale. And so I wonder if y' all agree with that conclusion and if so, what the long term economic consequences are. You know, they basically say AI won't solve this. For us to maximize its potential, we need to pair it with electric action. What do y' all make of that conclusion?

[D]

No, I think they missed the story. They missed the plot completely. I mean, the notion that, like, the United States has ever failed to meet its electricity supply is ridiculous. Like, we've never failed and we won't fail this time. Like, you might, like, keep coal plants running longer for stupid reasons, and we might not deploy DERs and demand flexibility as fast as we should, or we might not do that or this or that. But I think China's actually not good at what they're suggesting that they're good at at. Right. Like when you think about, like, what India has done, and India is building massive amounts of new electricity generation and reducing coal and natural gas production. Why? Because India doesn't curtail 25% of its solar and wind because they actually know how to run a freaking grid. China doesn't know how to run their grid. So as a result, they build tons of solar and wind. And yes, they're building coal because they almost had blackouts eight years ago because they still didn't figure out integration of so and when back then. Right. So I don't think that their conclusion is as well researched as they suggest. I don't think that the US will have any problems meeting AI load growth. Now, we could do it the expensive way or we could do it the cheap way. And we've been talking about doing it the cheap way. But we will not fail to meet the requirements of AI load growth.

[B]

And I don't think it's just about meeting AI load growth. I think it's more about who controls and has more power power in the future global economy. And I think that's a separate question. From whether we meet AI.

[D]

Right. But where does that.

[B]

It does feel to me that the US Is on a trajectory to losing that game.

[D]

Well, sure. I mean, that's why we think, like, Trump shouldn't have become president. But I think in terms of where this influence comes from, it comes from trust. And people don't trust China. People trust China to be pro China and to do what's in China's best interest. Like, when you look at Belt and Road, it was a heroic failure. There's not a single country in Belt and Road who are like, the Chinese treated us fairly. We had such a good time with the Chinese. Like, yeah, like, sometimes stuff is cheap and so you import it from China. I get it. Right. But, like, I am not seeing the same level of diplomatic, like. Like, partnership between China and the countries that they're exporting to and, you know, like, what the west had built in the past. Yes. Trump is destroying a lot of that, you know, goodwill. I totally get it, and I wish he wouldn't, but I don't think China's replacing it.

[C]

Yeah, I see a lot of other countries trying to look internally, the uk, eu, Canada, looking at, like, how can we do this? Or, you know, how do we do this ourselves if we don't have good partners out there in some of the biggest economies in the world. World. I mean, I still feel like there's a huge amount that we can do. And just hearing these companies give their pitches for this fund was so heartening because they're building plants in the US they are part of the electric stack. They weren't all AI, but some of it helps AI be better. So I do think that there's a huge amount of hope here that we're not lost to China. I just would hate for us to hurt too many relationships in the process, because it does take a long time to get those back.

[B]

Well, if you want to dig into this topic, there's a lot for you to read. There's the essay that we've been talking about, the Electric Slide. I'll attach in the show notes an essay from economics writer Noah Smith. I'll put the one in from Andreessen Horowitz, and I will put the Ember Report on the electrotech revolution in there as well. So lots of reading for you. Really good analysis here. I think I find myself a little bit more worried than you, Jigger. But this is still a very long game.

[D]

Yoga. Yoga, my friend. It's happy Diwali week. Right? We all need to just breathe. But look, I mean, I am a big fan of the competition. I believe very strongly that we need people to push us in the direction of decarbonizing the economy, of improving human flourishing, doing all the things that the electoral state does. And so I'm super excited about all the progress that we're making.

[B]

Catherine, good to see you as always.

[C]

You too. I'm going to go and see how many batteries I can use in the next half an hour.

[D]

I'm going to find all of those dead batteries in all my drawers in the house and recycle them today.

[C]

Oh my bobblehead Pope has a solar panel on the back so that he.

[B]

Can move on his own Integrated manufacturing Man, China's figured it out. Open Circuit is produced by Latitude Media. My co hosts, they are Jigar Shah and Kathryn Hamilton and the show is edited by me, Stephen Lacy. Our Technical director is Sean Marquand. Ann Bailey is our senior story editor for in depth reporting on the trends we talk about every week, from AI power demand to clean energy manufacturing to grid modernization. Sign up to Latitude Media's daily or our AI Energy Nexus newsletter and please give us a five star rating. Wherever you get your podcast and share links to the show to people who you think would get value from this conversation, you can find transcripts if you need to reference [e-mail] and we will see you next week.