Pacific Polarity

Jonathan Cheng: Dynasty, Doctrine, and Survival for North Korea

The Wall Street Journal’s Jonathan Cheng discusses his forthcoming book Korean Messiah and the deeper ideological foundations of North Korea. Moving beyond conventional analyses, the conversation explores how Kim Il-sung’s Christian upbringing helped shape the regime’s quasi-religious political culture, and how this—alongside hereditary rule—sets it apart from orthodox Marxism. Cheng situates North Korea within a longer arc of Korean history, highlighting its strategic autonomy, ideological evolution under Kim Jong-un, and surprising continuity with the past. The discussion also examines why the regime may feel vindicated in its choices, and what its trajectory reveals about leadership, legitimacy, and survival in an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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James Zimmerman: Will the Trump-Xi Meeting Happen?

Mar 1601:06:41Tap to summarize

Note: This episode was recorded on March 15 Australia time (March 14 US time). On March 16 Australia time (March 15 US time), Trump threatened to delay his upcoming visit to China, if China doesn’t help unblock the Strait of Hormuz. In response to this news, James Zimmerman provided the following additional comment: China is unlikely to respond to the threat, and it’s not in their best interest to jump into the fray of the hostilities, which is not their battle. They’ll likely say that if Trump cancels, that is on his own volition and unfortunate as Beijing is able and willing to proceed with the planned Summit. But, overall, my guess is that Trump will proceed with the visit knowing that the US-China relationship is too important to postpone.Jersey LeeWelcome to this episode of Pacific Polarity. Today we’re speaking with James Zimmerman. He is a seasoned lawyer with more than three decades of diverse legal experience based in China since 1998 and is currently a partner at the law firm Loeb & Loeb where he advises foreign companies on corporate, transactional regulatory litigation and white collar criminal defense matters. He is also the chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in China and had previously served in this position four times over the past two decades. He is also the author of the acclaimed nonfiction book, The Peking Express: The Bandits Who Stole a Train, Stunned the West and Broke the Republic of China. James Zimmerman, great to have you on.James ZimmermanThank you so much. It’s great to be here. I appreciate the opportunity.Jersey LeeAs I understand, you’ve been involved in the preparations surrounding Trump’s upcoming visit to China. To the extent that you can share, how have these preparations progressed and what can we expect from the visit?James ZimmermanThis might actually be overstating our role, but we, the chamber and its members, are very much engaged with different departments in the U.S. administration, just providing our suggestions and input on the upcoming presidential visits. And we’re doing so because we want to make sure that the business communities, American business community’s agenda is part of that discussion. We are making sure that we’re having conversations with the administrations to let them know that we’re supportive. We’re here. And we’ve got ideas on what we want to see in terms of deliverables, outcome. And so, I mean, that’s why we’ve been making ourselves available.I was in Washington, D.C. two weeks ago meeting with a number of the teams that are participating in the presidential summit and to make ourselves available and to be supportive in any way we can.Jersey LeeWhat might be some of the expectations from the business community that you represent?James ZimmermanWell, I think the best way I’d characterize it is the expectations are generally low. We’re not expecting a grand bargain. We’re not expecting significant deliverables, although I do know that there is some discussions at this point to try to come up with some purchases that may result from the discussions. But overall, I think the goal of the summit is to continue to maintain a stable relationship between the United States and China. And the goal of this summit is not to reach a whole new bargain, a whole new agreement, the key issue is maintaining the stability in the relationships, which I feel is very, very important from the business community’s perspective. So long as the parties continue to talk and the relationship is stable, I think that’s something that’s very important for not just the business community, but the global economy as well, because if the bilateral relationship is stable, that supports stability across the globe and is good for the global economy.Jersey LeeThere’s been quite a number of reports that have noted issues with the preparation process, or at least, as you say, playing down expectations for the visit. There’s reports that there might not be a corporate delegation from America, and some other reports suggest that the preparation process has been a bit rushed, which is why there’s low expectations for outcomes. What do you think of such reporting?James ZimmermanWell, I think that there is some truth to the fact that, yeah, this has all been late discussions and we’re trying to put something together without a whole lot of planning time. But keep in mind, too, the delegation that Trump led to Saudi Arabia that was all put together at the last minute where CEOs got on board. And I think that there is some discussions that he will be bringing forward to China maybe 20, maybe 30 CEOs that have an interest in ongoing trade and investment in China.I think the expectations and the reporting in general is accurate. I think they’re trying to put something together where we’re going to have some business that will be participating in some way, but the actual outcomes and the actual purchases is something that’s left for observation.Jersey LeeSo it sounds like this is something that’s common in Trump’s visits, instead of specific to this upcoming visit to China. Is that what you’re saying?James ZimmermanYeah, I mean, I think it would be—There are things specific to the U.S.-China relationship that we’re trying to put together, but the last-minute planning is nothing new with this administration, they seem to be doing things quite often at the last minute. Even when I was in Washington, when I met with the Chinese embassy the DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) there had said to me that, wow, we haven’t heard what the plan is, and it’s so hard to have outcomes, so we have to play down expectations because we just don’t have a whole lot of time. That’s the situation here, but we may be surprised, there are some last minute preparations that will, may pull things together, so Trump brings along a real solid group with him, but we’ll have to see what happens.The fact that Secretary of Treasury percent is meeting with Vice Premier He Lifeng in Paris as we speak, a lot of those discussions in Paris are planning the logistics and planning some of the outcomes that will come out of this meeting. So in the next few days, we may be hearing more information.Jersey LeeBeyond the usual conversation over trade and investment, which lots of people have talked about, some reporting suggests that the US might push China to reduce purchases of oil from Russia and Iran, or to push China to exert pressure on Iran to keep the Strait of Hormuz open. Meanwhile, there are suggestions that China may in turn push the U.S. to weaken its support for Taiwan or to significantly weaken export controls. Do you think any of these proposals might find a receptive counterpart here, or are they just thought bubbles, trial balloons?James ZimmermanNo, I don’t think there’s going to be any progress in either direction on the more sensitive topics. Those things take a lot of time to work through, and I think the parties, both the U.S. and China, are more interested in keeping the general stability of the relationship and not throwing a monkey wrench in either direction that’s going to cause any kind of complications. If the U.S. was to pressure China to reduce its purchases of oil or if China was to put pressure on the U.S. to weaken its support for Taiwan, I think you’re opening up a whole week of discussions, a month of discussions, and it just complicates things. And I don’t think either party really wants to go down that path. I think it’s more of, let’s just continue to stabilize the relationship, let’s talk in general terms, and let’s keep things at a very simple pace right now. And I think that’s the direction we’re going in.There’s been a lot of issues that have come up in the past few months that could very easily have derailed the pending truce that’s between the U.S. and China since the presidents met in South Korea back in October, a lot of things have happened, not just Iran, but Venezuela and so forth. But there’s been quite a bit of discipline on both sides to not overreact, to destabilize the relationship. So it’s the same theme. It’s like, let’s not complicate things with very difficult requests at this time. Let’s just keep the relationship stable. So I don’t think you’re going to find that a lot of proposals that are going to be made.Now, there might be, I mean, both sides may take the opportunity to lecture one another on things that they find to be troubling. And I’m sure that Xi Jinping is going to raise questions about both Venezuela and Iran and so forth. And then Trump himself might raise questions about the things that are troubling him as well. But I don’t think those are going to be conversations that are going to result in any grand bargain, so to speak. They’re just too complicated and just not enough time.Jersey LeeOn the topic of the ongoing war in Iran, do you think that’s affecting either side’s thinking towards the meeting? Maybe not to the extent of derailing it, but just thinking about how much importance, how much salience they want to put into this meeting. Because various analysts have made the case that this meeting might be bad optics for both Trump and Xi, but for different reasons, given the current geopolitical context.James ZimmermanYeah, I mean, that’s a concern on both sides. I know that, in communications with people within the Chinese government, they were very concerned, and they continue to be concerned about the optics of providing Trump with a platform, with the opportunity to meet Xi whil...

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Rushali Saha: India's Great Power Aspirations in a Turbulent World

Feb 2600:53:58Tap to summarize

Rushali Saha explores the uncertain state of U.S.–India relations following the rollback of Trump-era tariffs and the announcement of what she characterizes as more framework than finalized agreement. While strategic alignment between Washington and New Delhi remains strong in principle, implementation has long been uneven. India, she argues, is careful not to flatter Trump, mindful of its self-image as an aspiring great power—particularly evident in its insistence that tensions with Pakistan were resolved bilaterally, despite U.S. claims of mediation. On Russia, India resists U.S. pressure to curb oil imports, viewing energy security and strategic autonomy as paramount, while also seeing value in preventing a tighter Russia–China alignment. Regionally and globally, India’s ambitions are constrained by domestic politics, limited state capacity, and reluctance to take hard positions, even as it seeks recognition as a major power. Rushali suggests that India’s consensus-based diplomacy and long-term strategic signalling—especially in the Middle East—may yet bear fruit, but that true great power status will require translating economic scale into sustained global responsibility. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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Ji Xianbai: Imbalances and Geoeconomic Statecraft in the New Era

Feb 1100:41:22Tap to summarize

This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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William Reinsch: The New Trade Disorder

Feb 101:04:24Tap to summarize

William Reinsch dissects Trump’s tariff strategy—framed as revenge, revenue, and reshoring—and its implications for the global trading system. He argues that while the U.S. is the greatest short-term threat to rules-based trade, Trump is unlikely to permanently remake the international order, even as resilience increasingly displaces efficiency as a core trade objective. Reinsch is sceptical of breakthrough U.S.–China trade deals, seeing recurring cycles of confrontation that ultimately favour China, while U.S. debates over export controls reflect uncertainty about how to compete with a technologically capable rival. Looking ahead, he suggests middle powers may play a crucial role in holding the system together, even as China’s overcapacity remains the most serious long-term risk to global trade. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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Zongyuan Zoe Liu: Capital, Consumption, and Competition in China’s Economy

Jan 2400:47:34Tap to summarize

Richard GrayOn today’s episode of Pacific Polarity, we’re talking with Dr. Zoe Liu, who’s the is the Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Previously, she held post-doctoral fellowships at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World Program and the Fletcher School at Tufts University. Dr. Liu is the author of “Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions” and “Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System?”. Dr. Liu, welcome to Pacific Polarity.Zongyuan Zoe LiuThank you for having me.Richard GraySo to begin this conversation, I want to turn first to the Chinese bond and stock markets. In November, China’s issuance of $4 billion in sovereign bonds, denominated in US dollars, was oversubscribed by about 30x. And since September 2024, when China instituted a support package incurring buybacks and overall stock market liquidity, Chinese stocks have outperformed American stocks in that period. And so this carries over to the national champions revenue growth for the BATX, which is Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Xiaomi has outperformed the Magnificent Seven in the United States during the same period. And so what do you glean from this demand for Chinese assets? And what does that tell us about where the two economies are heading?Zongyuan Zoe LiuFirst of all, thank you, Richard and Jersey for having me. Now, I would say China’s stock market was designed in a different way. Back in the early 90s, when the Chinese government started to launch China’s stock market, especially in Shanghai, the idea was not necessarily to support the growth of private companies. It was not about successful startups getting an IPO. Instead, the whole idea was to help state-owned enterprises to restructure themselves and to raise money.Now, fast forward to today, China’s stock market, especially Shanghai and Shenzhen, the composition has changed. You have more companies, not necessarily just state-owned enterprises. But if you look at companies, especially the large capex companies, or in the more successful companies, as well as take a look at what kind of companies are allowed to or being green-lighted to be listed. I’d say many of those are in strategic sectors prioritized by the Chinese government. So from that perspective, I’d say China’s stock market or Chinese equities are less uncertain in terms of returns, as long as investors are putting money along the side of the national team. One of the largest shareholders of BYD is Central Huijin, which is one of the national team.So from that perspective, I’d say, regardless of timing, demand for a Chinese asset, or for that matter, demand for emerging market assets fit into the theme of investors’ diversification strategy, portfolio diversification. And this works especially well in times of returns are low elsewhere.But if we specifically talking about today, like why now, right? I think this speaks to two different things: one is the bet on China’s innovation and high-tech sector, especially sectors that are prioritized by the Chinese government, and then on the other side, it also speaks to investors diversifying amid rising geopolitical tensions, as well as the fragmentation of technology standard between the United States and China.Yes, Chinese equity market so far outperformed, in some measures, outperformed the US, but this does not necessarily mean the equity market is more dynamic and more private market friendly.Richard GrayAnd so as a follow up, do you see it likely that the Chinese government will continue to encourage a bull market or do you think it will eventually be reined in? It seems that there are some general concerns about within the United States over financialization and potentially unsustainable price earning ratios of the American national champions, if you will. And then as a sideline of this, between Baijiu, BATX stocks, bonds and golds, what are your favorite Chinese assets of choice?Zongyuan Zoe LiuYeah, this is a good—you know, as we are talking, as we are chatting now, I think gold price is at a record high now, right? And again, here is not necessarily an endorsement of any other currency or any other asset. It’s more about investors’ shaky confidence in the US dollar as well as dollar denominated asset. Part of the reason is because of concerns about U.S. physical conditions as well as central bank independency and policy uncertainty overall, right? But if you look at U.S. tech sector, I’d say, S&P 500 is doing pretty well, if you just compare S&P 500 with itself.And since we’re talking about concerns about over-financialization or the bubble, I’d say China is not the only concern. I think here in the U.S. as well. So if you let me zoom in on China, I’d say the Chinese government has a good track record to deploy national champions to stabilize equity prices. During covid and in the run up to the trade war, every now and then you see news headlines saying that China’s national teams is being deployed to prop up equity crisis. But I would say these recent years, COVID and now, these are not the first time that national teams have been doing it: 2015, 2016 stock market crash, that was also when the national teams were being developed. And on top of that, China has dedicated domestic-oriented sovereign funds with the goal to finance equity market. So from that perspective, I’d say it really depends upon how you define a bubble. And if we define bubble purely from the perspective of retail investors’ speculation or listed companies’ share buyback or cross-holding, or the unconventional financing model, such as OpenAI and its suppliers or its users, then I just say, this kind of a concern about a bubble less applicable to the Chinese market.Part of the reason, and perhaps very important reason, Richard, is what you were talking about, is the national champion. And more importantly, the Chinese government has been encouraging long-term patient capital to be deployed in China’s equity market. One such example is the encouragement of insurance companies and pension fund to invest in equity market.Jersey LeeSo over the next few months, we’ll likely see a number of meetings between Xi and Trump as they attempt to hash out a broader trade settlement to the kind of now more low-level trade war going on. But that period will also see the start of implementation for the 15th five-year plan. So there’s a lot of talk about the ways that America’s domestic and international policies are increasingly interconnected and intertwined. What is the case for China, particularly in the economic realm?Zongyuan Zoe LiuYes, Jersey, you’re right. At least President Trump is scheduled or is supposed to go to China for a state visit in April. But from now to April, there is quite a few months. So things can happen. But hopefully there is no drama, no unexpected accident so that the two leaders can meet. And I think that would inject momentum at least in the near term to investors as well as policy working level bureaucrats, to work on stabilizing the relationship.But on the other hand, if we recall 2017 during President Trump’s first term, he visited China and the trip was largely considered as successful. But when he came back to the United States shortly after that, what happened was not just trade war 1.0, but also a global campaign against the Chinese tech companies from ZTE to Huawei. So I would say regardless of how successful or how great the trip is, there are structural forces in the bilateral relationship. That means we cannot be overly optimistic about how the trip can improve the relationship. It’s just not realistic.Now, what this means for the Chinese economy, especially considering that this is also the time for the new five-year plan or the 15th five-year plan? I think so far the message has been very clear, right? The message is continued focus and commitment to self-sufficiency, to technology advancement. And on top of that, China has also been identifying the strategic sectors that it wants to develop, from quantum computing, AI and semiconductors, which basically means the China’s economic model remains largely unchanged, which is investment oriented, combined with a government set using industrial policies to achieve self-sufficiency and advancement in dedicated strategic sectors.This means that, despite there has been a growing attention to boost household consumption, it is very hard for government to actually implement policies to achieve the desired goal of boosting household consumption. And let me be more clear here. The goal is not to necessarily boost the consumption. The need to boost household consumption comes from two things. One is the recognition of rising trade attention, and then the second one comes from the realization of overcapacity and the international consequences of overcapacity. So that is to say, attention to boost household consumption is not the goal in itself. The goal is really to continue to achieve self-sufficiency. And why China is so committed to achieve self-sufficiency? A very important reason comes from the realization of the bottleneck, especially with regard to technology that the United States have had over China and the strategic insecurity that the party as well as Chinese companies have experienced since the first Trump administration.Richard GrayYou were talking about industrial policy just a moment ago. I guess in your mind, what are the things that make the ways in which China mobilizes capital unique? We all know some of the general downsides of industrial policy. Sometimes there’s misallocation of capita...

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Chris Sidoti: The Myanmar Crisis at a Nadir of Human Rights

Jan 1800:41:51Tap to summarize

Chris Sidoti unpacks Myanmar’s war through the lenses of battlefield dynamics, China’s shifting calculations, and the enduring vulnerability of the Rohingya. He argues that China’s recent tilt back toward the junta reflects a short-term stabilisation strategy driven by security and economic interests, but one that will likely prove mistaken as the military’s defeat becomes unavoidable. Against a backdrop of weak and fragmented international action—and an America retreating from human rights leadership—Sidoti contends that regional actors, particularly Australia, must step up. While the global human rights project is at a low ebb amid a return to great-power spheres of influence, he remains convinced that human rights will ultimately re-emerge, because they remain a core aspiration of ordinary people, including those suffering through Myanmar’s conflict. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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Otton Solis: Great and Small Powers Under the Donroe Doctrine

Jan 1000:31:41Tap to summarize

In this episode of Pacific Polarity, Costa Rican economist and former politician Otton Solís Fallas discussed the US capture of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, the logic of the “Donroe Doctrine,” and the consequences of US–China rivalry for smaller states. Otton argues that Washington’s actions mark a return to a colonial-era “might makes right” approach, with Trump discarding democratic rhetoric in favor of a blunt assertion of American interest. He suggests many Latin American countries quietly share this unease but lack the freedom to say so, echoing the region’s historic subordination to external powers. Otton hopes China can act as a necessary economic counterweight that can expand room for maneuver for smaller countries—though he also warns that America’s moral retreat may create a more dangerous world with fewer shared standards. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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Arnaud Bertrand: China, the NSS, and a Post-Hegemonic World

Dec 1501:06:13Tap to summarize

Arnaud Bertrand argues that the new US National Security Strategy signals a reluctant American acceptance of a multipolar world and a search for ways to coexist rather than dominate. He contends that China’s worldview is fundamentally non-missionary and oriented toward an integrated global system rather than bloc confrontation, shaped by history and cultural distance from the West. Arnaud suggests that hawkish shifts in Europe and Japan reflect anxiety over US retrenchment, even as Washington itself increasingly recognises China’s leverage and the need to accommodate its core concerns. Ultimately, he warns against a Cold War mentality, urging states to avoid rigid camps and instead pursue flexible, interest-based engagement in a more fluid global order. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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Shaun Chau: Australia’s COP Drama and the Road Ahead for Climate Action

Nov 2300:48:32Tap to summarize

Cyan Ventures' Shaun Chau discussed Australia’s failed COP bid, the global headwinds facing climate action, and what a pragmatic path forward might look like for the climate camp. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit pacificpolarity.substack.com

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All episodes

Jonathan Cheng: Dynasty, Doctrine, and Survival for North Korea

James Zimmerman: Will the Trump-Xi Meeting Happen?

Rushali Saha: India's Great Power Aspirations in a Turbulent World

Ji Xianbai: Imbalances and Geoeconomic Statecraft in the New Era

William Reinsch: The New Trade Disorder

Zongyuan Zoe Liu: Capital, Consumption, and Competition in China’s Economy

Chris Sidoti: The Myanmar Crisis at a Nadir of Human Rights

Otton Solis: Great and Small Powers Under the Donroe Doctrine

Arnaud Bertrand: China, the NSS, and a Post-Hegemonic World

Shaun Chau: Australia’s COP Drama and the Road Ahead for Climate Action