B (3:01)

That sounds very Nietzsche on first hearing this idea of despising the weak and celebrating the strong.

C (3:08)

Oh, absolutely. And we know that Nietzsche admired Callicles and spoke approvingly of Callicles. And the reason that Callicles is such a challenge for the character of Socrates and, of course, of Plato, is that formally, Callicles appears to agree with Socrates that the fine and noble thing to do and what's beneficial for you are the same thing. The trouble is that Callicles defines both what's fine and noble and what's beneficial for you in ways which Socrates finds completely unacceptable. For Callicles, he's only thinking of your good, your benefit, in terms of accumulating and displaying material wealth, in terms of power over others, in terms of nobody interfering with you.

B (3:56)

So that sounds very egotistical, the idea that the good is somehow just getting what you want.

C (4:03)

It is. And it's not just a psychological egoism. He's not just saying, oh, it's nice to. This is how people are, and that's a nice way to live. It's a normative egoism. He's saying, this is how it should be. And what Callicles does is he takes what was at the time a big debate about the relationship between nomos, which is law, and convention, and phusis, which is nature. And there was a huge debate at the end of the 5th century and early 4th century BCE about what are the relations between the two, and which should we follow if they appear to clash. And quite a few of the sophists who are traveling professional teachers of rhetoric and philosophy, aiming to teach young men how to win in arguments, quite a few of the sophists say, well, actually, we should follow nature, not law or convention. If you can get away with it, just do what you want. And laws and conventions are for the weaklings. And certainly Callicles is not in favor of conventional law or convention. He says conventional laws, he says, they are simply invented by the weak democratic majority to suppress the stronger few, people like him. And they are the chains of these naturally strong few. And we should be throwing them off. If we're strong, we should throw them off, and then the light of true justice will emerge. Now, the challenge that Callicles does here is that though he's rejecting conventional laws and he says, oh, conventional Laws, they're made by people who are too weak to take control. And so they make laws saying that equality of power and wealth is, is the best thing because equality is the most they can possibly hope for. So he dismisses conventional law. But then this is the real challenge. He says there's actually such a thing as a natural law, the law of nature, the law of phusis. And this is natural justice. And in nature it is right. It is actually morally right that naturally strong should rule and that they should have more than everybody else.

B (6:14)

Two things occur to me there. One is that today lots of people think that a degree of altruism could be natural in the sense of groups of people finding ways of living together to preserve the gene pool, as it were. But secondly, only one person can be the strongest. By definition, there's only one who is the strongest. So it's almost like there's a pyramid and whoever's on top of the pyramid just gets to do what they want. And everybody else has to be subservient. And that doesn't seem like a good way to live.

C (6:45)

I think you're absolutely right. There are so many problems with Callicles position to start with, as you suggest. I mean, he's clearly not watched any David Attenborough programs. We would not agree with his view of the natural world. Now. But even if he were correct to say that nature is red in tooth and claw, is he not making a mistake of saying this is how things are, and then moving from that claimed fact fact to what he claims is the value of this is how things should be. And then he's not really thought through the political implications of his position. Is there going to be just one superman or lots of supermen in any particular community or state? And if so, how are they going to get on between themselves? And then crucially, if they do make conventional laws, or would not obeying the conventional laws made by the naturally strong few, would that not be a good thing to do? So that would break down his supposed antithesis between nature and conventional law that his whole argument depends on.

B (7:54)

I'm intrigued. Did Callicles think of himself as that person? Did he have sort of ambitions to be that person, person at the top of the pile?

C (8:04)

Well, and this is where Plato is so cunning and ironical. Callicles is aspiring to be a democratic leader. But here we see in this private conversation between Callicles and Socrates, which Plato is cunningly making public for all of us to read and hear, Callicles shows he's absolutely contemptuous of the people, contemptuous of democracy. So Plato is revealing the hidden motives. Amongst some would be leaders who are trying to get voted in by democratic means, but then cynically use their demagogic skills to turn themselves into tyrants. And Plato, throughout many of his works, but particularly in the Gorgias and in the later Republic, is always clear that democracies are extremely vulnerable to attacks from within.

B (9:00)

And Socrates points out to an inconsistency in callicles argument.

C (9:04)

Well, Socrates picks up on Callicles claim that it's absolutely right in nature that rulers should have more than the ruled. And Socrates says, well that's interesting, because I thought each human being is both a ruler and a ruled, in that reason should rule our desires and our appetites. And Callicles won't have any of this. He said, oh for goodness sake, that means you're just imprisoning yourself. The fine and right thing to do is to let your desires grow as great as possible and then satisfy each in turn when it reaches its peak. And the truly magnificent life is the free and licentious life of the complete unqualified hedonist. So Callicles starts out thinking that his might is right. Political philosophy leads to this unqualified hedonism. Now, Socrates does manage, I think successfully to show that Callicles is not the unqualified hedonist he thinks he is. And he does this through a series of arguments. But the particularly telling one is he says, oh, but Callicles, what about the pleasures of the coward? The coward who is delighted when the enemy flees in battle. Are you really saying that the pleasures of the coward are completely good? And Callicles can't bear that. He admires strength, he admires courage. So he cracks there and he admits he's not an unqualified hedonist. But that still leaves Socrates with a real problem, because if unqualified hedonism does not in fact flow from the might is right political position, then undermining the unqualified hedonism which Socrates does, has not touched the might is right position. And I don't think that the character of Socrates and the Gorgias has the psychological resources and the theory of action and the theory of human flourishing needed to really tackle might is right.

B (11:04)

So let's turn to the republic, because there, through the character of Thrasymachus, Socrates, Plato does address this.

C (11:12)

Yes. So in Republic one we have a debate about the nature of justice and whether it pays the individual to be just. And there's a character called Polemachus who has argued that justice is simply giving each person their due. And that means helping your friends and harming your enemies. And Socrates says, well, no, because it's not the part of a good man ever to harm anybody at all. Because as we've seen in the Gorgias, if you harm somebody else, you are actually damaging your own soul most of all. So he says, no, no, no, justice is not helping your friends and harming your enemies. You do not harm anybody, even your enemies. An extraordinary moment, actually, in Western thought. It's really getting rid of the Homeric law of revenge and prefiguring Jesus's Sermon on the Mount. It's an extraordinary moment. Anyway, Thrasymachus, who is a professional sophist, a teacher of rhetoric and philosophy, training young men how to win arguments in the assembly and the law courts and get on in public life, Thrasymachus can't bear this. He bursts in like a wild beast. Plato writes, and he says, oh, for goodness sake, we all know justice is simply the interest of the stronger. And by this he means whoever or whichever political party is in power in a state, whether it's a tyranny, a monarchy, an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a democracy, whoever or whichever party is in power, he says, they will make the laws in their own interest. They will do this quite cynically. And if you go ahead and obey the laws, you're just a mug. You're simply serving the interests of those in power. And if you can get away with it, you shouldn't obey laws which you have not made. And Socrates questions that and he says, well, supposing the rulers don't really know where their true interest lies. And Thrasymachus says, well, in that case, they're not really rulers. The true ruler does know where their true interest lies, and they make the laws in their own interest.

B (13:21)

So the people are just sheep being fattened up for slaughter?

C (13:24)

Absolutely, yes. One of the arguments Socrates tries to use is that ruling is an art or a craft, a techne, and that any art or craft seeks the good of its subject matter and that the ruler will therefore seek the good of their subjects. And Thrasymachus says, no, rulers are like shepherds, and they are simply fattening up sheep, and they look as if they're caring about their flock, but they're just fattening up the sheep to get a better price for them at market. So it's an extremely sort of cynical view.

B (13:55)

Cynical in the modern sense, yeah, not.

C (13:57)

Cynical as in ancient Greek cynicism. And Thrasymachus says, well, you can apply this rule not just to the public sphere, this also applies in private life. He says that justice is treating other people decently and fairly. Injustice is the ruthless and effective pursuit of your own self interest, and injustice normally pays you much better than justice. Justice is for naive fools. Injustice, he claims, is actually a kind of virtue, an aretan excellence, the excellence of prudent good sense. Now, initially, it might look as if Thrasymachus has got himself into a bit of a muddle. You might think, well, hasn't he contradicted his opening statement that justice is the interest of the stronger? Because if the tyrant is supremely promoting their own tyrannical interest, then surely the tyrant is supremely just, according to Thrasymachus opening statement. But no, he says the tyrant is supremely unjust and all the more admirable for it. What's really going on here is it turns out that his opening statement, the famous one justice is the interest of the stronger, is, is not in fact a complete definition. It's simply a description of how justice operates in the real world, the world of realpolitik. Theoretically, everybody can be both just and unjust. In practice, it's really only the rulers who have the opportunity to be unjust. And the ruled are normally forced to be just, unless nobody's watching. Therefore, the ruled are promoting the interest of the stronger. They are promoting the interest of the rulers by obeying the law.

B (15:54)

Can we go back to that phrase with which he kind of enters the debate? When he says justice is the interest of the stronger, he's describing what goes on. And when he's saying injustice is best, he's telling us what we ought to do. Is that right?

C (16:10)

Partly. So Thrasymachus is saying what we call justice we normally refer to as obeying the law and treating other people decently and fairly. And if you go along with that, you're actually only obeying the laws made by those in power, the stronger. And why would you do that if you can get away with it? Now, there are lots of inconsistencies in his position, and one of them is he then admits that actually it's not always in your interest to behave unjustly if you're being watched, if you're one of the ruled and you're powerless, and if you get caught and imprisoned or exiled or killed, and that's not in your interest. So really, though he does admire injustice, it's really only recommended for those in a position of power who are not going to suffer as a result of it underlying all this, I think he's got a real tension in his position about how he views the institution of justice. He says, well, actually, the institution of justice is great if it stops other people harming me, so long as I personally never have to go along with it. But what kind of sense does it make to say an institution is great so long as nobody goes along with it? It obviously doesn't. The whole institution would collapse. However, underlying all this is a consistent admiration for the strong, ruthless man. And it is a man. It is a male of affairs who can look after themselves and their own. And despite the differences with Callicles, it does connect him to Callicles.

B (17:48)

So we talked about Callicles and we talked about Thrasymachus. They both seem to be on the side of scarcely contained power. How do they differ?

C (17:58)

So for Callicles, conventional law is simply a cynical and hypocritical and cowardly device of the weak majority to subdue the naturally stronger few. For Thrasymachus, conventional justice is simply a cynical device of the de facto strong, ie, those who are in power to subdue the weak. They both think that conventional justice is completely hypocritical and not grounded in any real morality. They differ in who's exploiting whom. But as you say, underneath it, there is this link. And Plato connects the two positions through the same quote from the lyric poet Pinda about how the mythical hero Heracles was justified in seizing the cows of Geryones simply because Heracles was the stronger and that strength alone justifies his actions.

B (19:01)

So how does Plato or Socrates get us out of this? Because these are real challenges to the view that you should behave in what we conventionally call a just manner.

C (19:13)

Absolutely. And as we've seen in the Gorgias, Socrates does not really deal with this might is right position.

B (19:19)

And.

C (19:20)

And in the Republic, it takes Plato nine more books to think he's even got close to doing it. So the line that Plato takes and gives to the character of Socrates is to make Socrates say that Thrasymachus, and by implication Callicles, has not understood the nature of human flourishing because they have not understood the nature of what it is to be a human being. Both Callicles and Thrasymachus define human flourishing well, being eudaimonia in the Greek, simply in terms of the possession and consumption of material wealth, of power over others, and of nobody interfering with what you feel like doing. In other words, in terms of what Plato in the Republic is going to go on to say are the desires of what we learn are the two non rational aspects or faculties of the human psyche, the appetitive faculty and what is called the spirited or thaumoedic faculty. So Plato realizes that to tackle this absolutely challenging position which Plato thinks is doing huge harm in his Athens, Plato realizes that to tackle that he has got to develop a much more nuanced and subtle psychology. And through this psychology of the tripartite psyche, which we get in book four of the Republic, a reasoning faculty which desires truth and reality, spirited faculty which desires honor and success and respect, and an appetitive faculty that desires physical pleasures and the money that might be needed to acquire them. Through that, Plato gives us a completely new version of what human flourishing consists in, and also human excellence or moral virtue. So he says, your flourishing as an individual depends on the inner harmony between these three faculties with reason and control. And that inner psychic harmony not only constitutes your flourishing, your eudaimonia, but also crucially, your justice, your moral virtue. This is an absolutely crucial turning point again in Western thought. Whereas justice had been conceived in terms of external actions, it's now an inner psychic state, an inner state of the agent. And Plato says, if you've got this inner harmony with reason and control, you're just not going to be motivated to treat other people badly.

B (21:59)

Just one last question. You believe, and you've written a book about this, that Plato does matter. Now, which element of his diagnosis of when power goes wrong is most pertinent for us today?

C (22:11)

I think it's Plato's analysis of how the rot sets in in our politics and makes us vulnerable to tyranny. If we become inattentive to language, if moral terms start becoming subverted, if we become lazy or indifferent to this corruption of moral language and the abuse of freedom of speech. Plato hates tyranny. He thinks it's the worst possible condition for a state to be in. Plato says consistently in the Gorgias, in the Republic and elsewhere, the rot begins with the corruption of language, the abuse of words like freedom and power and their deliberate misapplication, the subversion of moral terms. We need to pay attention to language, both how we use it ourselves and how other people are using it, and using the skills of the modern orator, the modern rhetorician, be it the online influencer or the self serving styled cultural or religious leader, whoever it is, we need to be alert to the tricks they are using to gain power through democratic means, but then use that power to destroy democracy.

B (23:29)

Angie Hobbs, thank you very much.

C (23:31)

Thank you so much. It's been a pleasure.

A (23:39)

For more Philosophy bites, go to www.philosophybytes.com. you can also find details there of Philosophy Bytes books and how to support us.