Philosophy Bites: Edouard Machery on Variations in Responses to Thought Experiments

Episode Date: November 2, 2025
Host(s): David Edmonds, Nigel Warburton
Guest: Edouard Machery
Theme: Cross-cultural and demographic variation in intuitive responses to philosophical thought experiments

Main Theme and Purpose

This episode explores whether the intuitions philosophers rely on in well-known thought experiments are genuinely universal, or if responses vary across cultures, genders, and generations. Edouard Machery, noted for pioneering empirical philosophy, shares surprising findings from international studies, challenging longstanding philosophical assumptions and offering reflections on the limitations of intuition in philosophical practice.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. What is a Thought Experiment?

• [00:42 - 01:38]
  • Machery emphasizes the complexity and controversy in defining thought experiments but offers a practical description:

    “One imagines a situation that's not actual...and one thinks about what would happen if in that situation, then matters for some scientific or philosophical purposes.”

  • Thought experiments date back to Plato and are central both in philosophy and science (Einstein, etc.).

2. Assumption of Intuitive Universality

• [01:54 - 02:19]
  • There’s a tacit philosophical assumption that their own intuitions—and those of their peers—are widely shared across humanity and culture.
  • The “norm” is for responses to be considered universal, though this is seldom clearly stated.

3. Cross-Cultural Testing of Thought Experiments

• [02:43 - 03:22]
  • Machery and collaborators expanded from studies comparing the USA and Hong Kong to global research in “20 or 30 countries” and many languages.
  • Participants range from small-scale societies in South America to urbanites in Paris, farmers in Morocco to city-dwellers in Beijing.

4. Case Studies: Famous Thought Experiments

a. Gettier Cases

• Explanation: The challenge to the definition of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ (example: John and the broken clock)

  • [04:13 - 05:45]
  • John forms a true, justified belief that it’s 3pm by looking at a (broken) clock.
  • Philosophers agree: John doesn’t know it’s 3pm—his knowledge is just lucky.

• Finding:

  • [06:05 - 07:15]
  • Machery was surprised to find “very little variation” worldwide (over 20 countries, 25 languages):

    “People tend to give the same answer as philosophers, which I was tremendously surprised.”

  • The Gettier intuition appears robust and cross-culturally stable.

b. Kripke’s Godel/Schmidt Case

• Explanation: Are names rigid designators? If Godel (logician) stole his proof, is ‘Godel’ referring to the mathematician or the rightful discoverer Schmidt?

  • [07:35 - 08:43]

• Finding:

  • [08:50 - 09:29]
  • Marked cultural variation:

    “People in North America...tend to say...‘Godel’ is the man who stole the theorem...in Asia...people say the proper name is used to talk about Schmidt.”

  • Children in East Asia also align with this pattern.

• Possible Explanation:

  • [09:34 - 10:06]
  • One hypothesis: causation as a salient concept is more prominent in Western contexts, while less so in East Asia, potentially explaining varying interpretations of naming.

• Philosophical Implication:

  • [10:06 - 10:19]
  • Machery argues it “radically undermines Kripke’s thesis” if intuitions differ so starkly worldwide.

c. Putnam’s Twin Earth / Meaning of ‘Water’

• Explanation: Do people on another planet with a water-like substance (but chemically XYZ) mean the same as ‘water’ on Earth (H2O)?

  • [11:22 - 12:29]
  • Putnam’s view: meanings depend on real, external facts—thus, the answer should be ‘no’.

• Finding:

  • [12:51 - 13:17]
  • Great variability globally; even among Westerners, how questions are framed can shift responses:

    “This is a very, very labile intuition…It’s…fragile. You can manipulate it very easily.”
    “Putnam thought he was getting at a deeply rooted intuition. But...his intuition is very shallow. It’s easily manipulable.”

    • [13:23 - 14:08]

d. The Trolley Problem

• Explanation: Is it morally acceptable to sacrifice one to save five?

  • Classic version: flip a switch to redirect a trolley; footbridge version: push a large man to stop the trolley.
  • Philosophers’ intuition: switching is acceptable; pushing is not.

• Findings:

  • [15:10 - 15:48]

  • Initial research found apparent universality, but:

    • Gender Variation:

      “Men are more likely to actually push the large person on the foot bridge onto the tracks than women.”

    • Generational Variation:

      “People who are born in the 1950s, 1970s are substantially less likely to think that it’s permissible to push the large person...than people born in the 1990s.”

      • [16:48 - 17:00]
      • This is a stable cohort effect, not simply age.

  • Cultural Variation:

    • [17:48 - 18:34]
    • A (tentative) finding that Tibetan Buddhist monks are “willing to push the large person”, defying expectations.

5. Philosophical and Methodological Reflections

a. Should Philosophers Be Skeptical of Thought Experiments?

• [18:53 - 19:30]

• Machery is now a skeptic:

  “Most thought experiments, in fact, are bad tools for doing philosophy. And the conclusion, as I’ve come to, is actually that we should try to use thought experiments as little as we can...check that it’s a deeply rooted reaction to the world.”

• Strong claim:

  “It’s somewhat irresponsible...to speculate about what everyone’s reaction might be to a case and to build very deep philosophy on that without checking.” [19:49]

b. What Makes Intuitions Robust or Fragile?

• [20:16 - 21:09]
• Intuitions are fragile when thought experiments feature “unusual aspects of life” outside everyday experience.
• Factors that influence intuitions: gender, risk aversion, cultural background, language quirks, and more.
• “Our concepts are not really trustworthy when we try to deploy them in those situations.”

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On the Gettier case’s universality:
  “People tend to give the same answer as philosophers, which I was tremendously surprised.” — Edouard Machery ([07:12])

• On Kripke’s naming intuition:
  “People in Asia…say the proper name is used to talk about Schmidt.” — Edouard Machery ([09:07])

• On the variability of the Putnam/Twin Earth intuition:
  “This is a very, very labile intuition…You can get people to switch back and forth between the two intuitions.” — Edouard Machery ([12:55])

• On the gender effect in the trolley problem:
  “Men are more likely to actually push the large person on the foot bridge onto the tracks than women.” — Edouard Machery ([15:39])

• Skepticism about building philosophy on unchecked intuitions:
  “It’s somewhat irresponsible…to build very deep philosophy on [intuitions] without checking.” — Edouard Machery ([19:49])

Timestamps for Key Segments

| Time | Segment/Topic | |-----------|--------------------------------------------------------| | 00:42 | Defining thought experiments | | 03:22 | Global reach and diversity of studies | | 04:13 | Gettier cases explained | | 06:05 | Cross-cultural findings on Gettier cases | | 07:35 | Kripke’s Godel/Schmidt thought experiment | | 08:50 | East-West divergence in naming intuitions | | 11:22 | Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment | | 12:51 | Fragility and manipulability of Twin Earth intuitions | | 15:10 | Trolley problem: universality questioned | | 15:48 | Gender and generational effects in trolley problem | | 17:48 | Cultural variation in Buddhist monks’ responses | | 18:53 | Philosophers’ reliance on intuition—skeptical advice | | 19:49 | Ethical imperative: test intuitions, don't assume them | | 20:16 | What makes intuitions robust or fragile? |

Takeaways for Listeners

• Many classic philosophical intuitions are not cross-culturally robust; some, like the Gettier case, are, but others vary by culture, gender, or generation.
• Philosophers should empirically check whether the intuitions underlying their arguments are shared, or risk building shaky philosophical theories.
• Intuitions easily become unreliable when thought experiments invoke highly unusual circumstances.
• The episode provocatively challenges listeners (and philosophers) to reconsider the foundations of analytic philosophy’s method.

For more in this series, visit www.philosophybytes.com