A (3:59)

So. So it's not exactly the same as super irrigatory actions, because what you believe is that there are some actions which go beyond the call of duty, which you should do, and some actions which go beyond the call of duty, which you shouldn't do.

C (4:14)

That's exactly right, yeah.

A (4:16)

These cases which you should do, which nonetheless are beyond the call of duty, are these very infrequent, or do they crop up very often in one's daily life?

C (4:25)

I think it happens all the time. I think all the time we consider doing things for other people, small things often that we realize, oh, all things considered, I should do that. What I also think is interesting is that it can also happen in context of great heroism. And that's not going to be common. So it's unusual that we have opportunities to be deeply heroic. And I think even more unusual that you're in a situation which, all things considered, you should do something heroic. But I do think that that can happen.

A (4:58)

And by heroic you mean put your life at danger or put your personal safety at danger. What counts as heroism here?

C (5:07)

Yeah, I think heroism involves doing something where there's either a great sacrifice that you make or a great risk that you take. Even among heroic actions, I think some of them are Morally required. So those don't exhibit the phenomenon that I'm interested in. I think we could have a morally required heroic action. If it's very hard to do or very unusual for people to do. Sometimes when nobody's doing the right thing, it can become heroic to do the right thing. But I'm really interested in cases where you don't have to do the heroic thing. But all things considered, you should.

A (5:44)

Can you give us an example of that? This is a case where it's heroic and you're putting your life or you're taking a great risk. It's beyond the call of duty, but you should do it.

C (5:56)

Yeah. So I think that you can find examples like this in just classic kinds of cases of heroism. So imagine that you're on the beach and you see someone floundering in the water and they're in danger of drowning and they really need help. But you can tell that the water is dangerous. And suppose that you can tell that the water is sufficiently dangerous that you know you really would be risking your life. And also you know that you're not required to go in to save them. They're a stranger to you. You're not a lifeguard. You haven't signed up to help them. But you still might make an assessment and think it's dangerous. But I stand a pretty good chance of saving them. You might come to the view I should rush in. And my claim is that could be correct. It could be true that Athi's considered you should rush in even though you're allowed to stay on the shore.

A (6:49)

How do praise and blame fit into this picture? Because if there's no requirement that you do something, it looks like you shouldn't be blamed for not doing it.

C (7:00)

Yet in a lot of these cases, I think that's exactly right. These are cases where if you should do something above and beyond what morality requires and you don't do it, then you're not blameworthy because you haven't done anything bad or anything wrong. But at the same time, I think you can be criticizable. So it's true of you that you should have done it. So there's a kind of moral criticism that you're susceptible to that is not blame.

A (7:27)

That's quite a subtle distinction. In the case that you mentioned earlier about whether you should make a nice stew because your friend is writing a book, you're saying that the person who fails to make the stew is not blameworthy, but they are open to criticism. That's a very nuanced distinction.

C (7:46)

Well, One way of thinking about it is from the friend's perspective. So suppose that the friend read your diary. So the friend who was writing the book, she read your diary, and she saw that you considered making her a stew, and then you didn't. Would it be okay for her to feel resentment of you for not making the stew? Absolutely not. So for her to have bad feelings towards you over your failure to make the stew, that would just be a mistake. And that's one way of seeing that you're not blameworthy. There's two steps that I want to bring you along to. One is the thought that if you were deciding whether to make the stew for your friend, you really can imagine saying to yourself, oh, I should do it. That's what I should do. My claim is, when you say that to yourself, that can be literally correct. You should do it. But just imagine the friend being annoyed with you for not making the stew. That seems crazy. Like she didn't ask for the stew. It was just an idea that you had. It really seems misguided if she would be annoyed with you. And so, in a way, I just want to appeal to what makes sense to us to support the coherence of the view.

A (8:52)

Let me ask you about a classic case in the philosophical literature about strangers on the other side of the world. There are lots of people, as we speak today who are malnourished and people dying of preventable diseases. And in theory, at least, in practice, this may not be very easy. But in theory, at least, we could send money and help that person on the other side of the world and maybe save a life. Is that something that one is not required to do, but should do?

C (9:22)

Well, I think certainly sometimes that could be the case. So I think it's very plausible that for a particular instance of a charitable appeal to help people on the other side of the world, I think it's very plausible that you're not morally required to specifically donate to that charity, but you could be in a situation where, all things considered, you should donate to that charity, and it'll just depend on lots of specific details of your situation, including how much good have you done for other people. Do you know a better way to help people? Do you have specific relationships or obligations that mean that you should help in a different way?

A (10:00)

Okay, but imagine there's a famine in some part of the developing world. There's an appeal in the west for people to donate sums of money to help relieve this famine. I've lived an average life. I'm no better, and no Worse than most people. What do we say about that case?

C (10:17)

Okay, so should you, David, right now donate to famine relief? Yeah. I don't know the answer. I think maybe you should. Again, I think it depends on lots of subtleties. It could just be that it's a nice thing that you could do that you don't have to do. And again, going back to the stew case, I think there are lots of subtleties of the situation that can push it in either direction. So I gave the example that if you are getting a migraine, you shouldn't make the stew. But there are subtler cases, too. What if you brought a lot of work home from the office and you're not going to make enough progress on your work? If you make the stew, you. You ratchet up the work a little, and it starts to seem like, oh, maybe you shouldn't make this do. I think that kind of phenomenon exists with a lot of our choices about whether to do something that we're not required to do, which is all these subtle details of our situation come in to help to determine what we should do.

A (11:11)

I guess the problem with a philosophy that has all these subtle details, which may be the right way to see the world, is that one just doesn't know because there's just too many factors. One doesn't know what one should do and what one is required to do.

C (11:25)

Good. So, I mean, another thing to say is that my view can also help us to formulate more general principles that we might not have realized were available as options. My view isn't all about saying that every particular case is unique and complicated. One thing that I use this central idea to develop is a general view about the ethics of eating meat. So I've noticed that a lot of people are vegetarians for moral reasons. So they're moral vegetarians. And yet they're very accommodating of meat eating behavior in others. They will split the check in a restaurant. They'll go to this restaurant rather than that restaurant so that you can have a hamburger. And in my view, there's a way of making sense of this. Using my view.

A (12:17)

Explain more, because I'm exactly one of those cases. I'm a vegetarian who splits the bill, right?

C (12:23)

So when you do that, you're subsidizing the meat eating of your friends. And there's a question of what's going on with you. So I've been interested in developing a moral view that makes it make sense to be a moral vegetarian who nevertheless accommodates me. Meat eating. And as I see it we can understand moral vegetarians as committed not to the view that eating meat is morally wrong, but merely to the view that, all things considered, one shouldn't eat meat. And then you might think that while it's wrong to accommodate wrongdoing, it may be okay to accommodate other people's choices merely to do things that they shouldn't do that aren't morally wrong. So that's my way of rescuing the coherence of the moral vegetarian who also accommodates meat eating.

A (13:14)

So that's good, because that justifies the way I navigate the world. In what ways might your picture of morality change the way I behave?

C (13:24)

That's a great question. I mean, one thing that I would like to encourage people to recognize is that when they realize that they're not morally required to act in a particular way, nevertheless, moral reasons still have a grip on them. And so it's not just a free for all. At that point, there's still the question of what, all things considered, we should do. How do I want to change your life? It's really about our moral understanding of our situations. So I want to help moral vegetarians to understand what they're doing to make sense of their choices. My own view is that ordinary moral thinking already accommodates this phenomenon, but philosophers have been slow to recognize it. It's sort of part of my picture that it is how ordinary people think about morality. And so I think it's a feature, not a bug. If I'm not so much trying to advocate that people behave differently, I want them to understand their own commitments and other people's commitments differently.

A (14:28)

Liz Harmon, thank you very much indeed.

C (14:30)

Thanks so much for having me.

B (14:39)

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