Philosophy Bites: Ofra Magidor on Epistemicism and Moral Vagueness

Date: January 9, 2025
Hosts: David Edmonds & Nigel Warburton
Guest: Ofra Magidor, Professor of Philosophy, Oxford University

Overview

In this episode, David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton interview Ofra Magidor about the philosophical issue of vagueness—particularly how it manifests in moral concepts—and the theory of epistemicism as a response. The discussion tackles classic examples of vagueness (like “tallness”), moves to the application in moral discourse (abortion as a case study), and explores the implications for moral realism, relativism, and the very nature of our moral concepts. Magidor grounds her explanations in contemporary philosophical debates, especially those spearheaded by Timothy Williamson, and weighs objections and alternative viewpoints.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

What is Vagueness?

• Examples: Words like "tall" have clearly defined endpoints ("1 meter is not tall, 2 meters is tall"), but many in-between cases defy clear categorization.
  • "They have borderline cases, cases in the middle where it's really hard to tell, and it's not clear what would determine whether they're tall or not." – Magidor [00:55]
• Contextual Sensitivity: Even specifying ‘tall for a kindergartner’ leaves borderline cases.
• Ordinary Handling: Instructing people to divide into “tall” and “short” exposes fuzziness that can't be eliminated by more information.

Introducing Epistemicism

• Contrast with Other Theories:
  • Some philosophers react to vagueness by claiming, "there is no fact of the matter" in borderline cases, which conflicts with classical logic.
• Epistemicist Position:
  • "Epistemicism is a view of vagueness that wants to…say, even given this phenomena of vagueness, we shouldn't tinker with anything in our normal theories of logic and mathematics. … The person is either tall or not tall." – Magidor [03:02 - 04:32]
  • There is a sharp cutoff, but we can't know it—even in principle.

Notable Quote:

“Vagueness is…a distinctive kind of ignorance. Although words like tall…in fact have a sharp cutoff point…we don’t know what this cutoff point is, and in fact we can’t know what it is.”
– Magidor [06:47]

Applying Epistemicism to Moral Vagueness

• Moral Vagueness: Concepts such as "permissible", "ought", and "wrong" also appear to be vague, as seen in controversial cases like abortion.
• Law vs. Morality:
  • The law must enforce sharp cutoffs, though these often seem arbitrary (e.g., a legal limit measured in weeks).
  • Epistemicism posits an even sharper, possibly “nanosecond-precise” cutoff in reality.

Notable Quote:

"Just like our case with tall, there seem to be a lot of cases in the middle where it’s very hard to know whether it’s permissible and not permissible."
– Magidor [08:05]

• Moral Realism Compatibility:
  • For those who believe in objective moral facts, epistemicism offers a plausible model: there must be a fact of the matter, even in fuzzy cases.
  • "If we abort this fetus, we might be doing something wrong. There has to be a fact of the matter whether what we did is right or wrong." – Magidor [10:14]

Objections to Moral Epistemicism

Objection 1: Action Guidance and “Ought Implies Can”

• Epistemicism allows for moral facts humans can’t access, which raises worry about moral guidance.
• "The moral truth tells us we ought not to abort the fetus, but we also can’t know that this is what the moral truth tells us to do. ... If there’s something we ought to do, then we can do it. And you might think part of being able to do it is being able to know that you ought to do it." – Magidor [12:23]
• Magidor’s Response: This is a broader issue for all theories accepting moral vagueness, not just epistemicism. If in borderline cases “it’s not that you ought not to, nor that you ought to, it’s just not saying anything,” this still leaves agents without action guidance. [13:51 - 15:23]

Objection 2: Semantic Plasticity and Moral Properties

• Epistemicism (especially as developed by Timothy Williamson) says vague terms are highly sensitive (plastic) to small changes in community use.
• “Take our community…using the word permissible…Let’s suppose we end up picking out a particular property… ...and then there’s this other community…they pick out a slightly different property...So just because we’re using the word permissible slightly differently…it turns out that when I say it’s permissible to abort the fetus, I’m saying something true, and when they utter the sentence, they’re saying something false.” – Magidor [19:27 - 22:06]
  • Implication: If each community picks out slightly different moral properties due to small language usage differences, this seems troubling for robust moral realism.

Is This Moral Relativism?

• Hosts' Concern: If “permissible” means different things in different communities, doesn’t that amount to relativism?
• Magidor’s Clarification:
  • “Moral relativism would think that there’s actually a claim…that it’s true for me but false for you. This isn’t the case here...They’re not making the same claim...they’re expressing slightly different properties.” [23:31]
  • The phenomenon is more akin to a difference of language meaning than relativism about moral truth.

Final Challenges for Moral Realism

• Multiplicity of Moral Properties: Danger that we end up with many near-identical moral-like properties ("permissibility" vs. "permissibility*"), which undermines the idea of a unique, robust moral property.
  • "You might think that doesn’t directly clash with moral realism, but you might think that’s not a nice thing for a moral realist to think…" – Magidor [24:55]
• Historical Shifts: Hosts note that concepts like permissibility plainly shift through history, e.g., "1960s California vs. 1890s London."
  • Magidor: Serious moral realists would hold that “permissibility meant the same thing all along… some people had beliefs…that were wrong.” [26:48]

Exploring an Alternative: Moral Ignorance Without Vagueness

• Not all cases of ignorance involve vagueness. Even in mathematics, with totally precise definitions, “there are open questions...the reason we don’t know how to answer them has nothing at all to do with the phenomena of vagueness.”
• Suggests that some (apparent) instances of “moral vagueness” might just be hard questions, not vague concepts per se. [27:18 - 29:07]

Notable Quote:

"One option about these moral cases is to just think we don’t know the answer to these questions. But that’s not because they are vague, but just because they are very hard questions."
– Magidor [27:18]

Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• “Vagueness is…a distinctive kind of ignorance. …the crucial component…is that we don’t know what this cutoff point is, and in fact we can’t know what it is.”
  — Magidor [06:47]
• “We want to say…there’s a fact of the matter…The person is either tall or not tall. …there’s a sharp cutoff point in reality…”
  — Magidor [04:32]
• "It’s not the case that you ought not to abort the fetus...But of course, on these views it’s also not true that you’re permitted to abort the fetus. …It just doesn’t really tell you anything."
  — Magidor [14:50]
• “That would just be a case where the words are being used in our two languages to mean something slightly different.”
  — Magidor [23:31]
• “One option is to just think we don’t know the answer…but that’s not because they are vague, but just because they are very hard questions.”
  — Magidor [27:18]

Key Timestamps & Segments

• 00:43 – 04:32: What is Vagueness? Classic examples and the epistemicist view
• 06:47 – 07:31: Summary of Epistemicism (“Vagueness is a distinctive kind of ignorance”)
• 08:05 – 09:55: Moral judgments and vagueness; comparison with law
• 10:14 – 12:10: Epistemicism and moral realism; implications for moral facts
• 12:23 – 15:23: Action guidance problem for epistemicism in morality
• 15:33 – 19:21: Semantic plasticity and Timothy Williamson's account
• 19:27 – 23:21: Multiple communities, near-identical language, and moral “properties”
• 23:31 – 24:55: Relativism vs. differences in meaning
• 26:32 – 27:17: The moral realist’s response to historical differences
• 27:18 – 29:34: Ignorance without vagueness – alternative view and closing

Conclusion

This episode provides a nuanced explanation of epistemicism as it relates to both ordinary and moral vagueness. Magidor carefully distinguishes between the theory’s commitment to sharp boundaries (unknown to us) and both the attractions and worries that emerge when applying this model to moral discourse. The conversation covers challenges for moral realism, the limits of action-guidance, and the possibility that what appears to be “moral vagueness” may, in some instances, be deep ignorance rather than genuine indeterminacy.

Magidor encourages further exploration of the idea that moral uncertainty need not always signal vagueness—an under-explored direction in philosophical literature.

Further Listening

For more episodes, books, and ways to support Philosophy Bites, visit philosophybites.com.