Philosophy Bites Podcast Summary

Episode: Robert Williams on Decision Making Under Indeterminacy
Hosts: David Edmonds and Nigel Warburton
Guest: Robert Williams
Date: January 9, 2025

Episode Overview

This episode explores the philosophical distinction between uncertainty and indeterminacy, focusing on the implications of indeterminacy for rational decision-making. Robert Williams, a philosopher known for work on logic, vagueness, and metaphysics, discusses how indeterminacy challenges our concepts of truth, logic, and ethical decision-making, especially in cases where facts seem to lack determinate answers.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Uncertainty vs. Indeterminacy

• Uncertainty:
  • Results from ignorance; there is a fact of the matter, but we do not know it.
  • Example: Not knowing whether the bank will invest ethically ([00:52]).
• Indeterminacy:
  • Arises from vagueness or lack of definite facts in the world.
  • Example: The "heap" problem—when does a collection of stones become a heap? Some cases are borderline, and it's objectively undetermined if they qualify ([01:21], [01:54]).
• Quote:
  • Robert Williams: “Those are cases where it may be indeterminate whether what I’ve got is a heap or not... there’s no fact of the matter about whether they’re yellow or not.” ([01:54])

2. Philosophical Positions on Indeterminacy

• Uncertainty Reductionism (Timothy Williamson):
  • All cases are about ignorance, not true indeterminacy; there's always a fact of the matter ([03:09]).
  • Quote:
    • Williams: “He’s saying, well, you thought there was this interesting category...in fact there’s no such phenomenon. All there is is ignorance.” ([03:09])
  • Even with vague concepts, there must be a "magic" cutoff point (e.g., the specific stone that makes a heap) ([03:50]).
• Motivations for Classical Logic:
  • Simplicity and theoretical success of classical logic drive skepticism about indeterminacy ([04:31]).
  • All meaningful statements must be either true or false—no in-betweens ([05:12], [05:45]).
  • Quote:
    • Williams: “[Classical logic]...for any proposition or any meaningful sentence, those things would either be true or false.” ([05:45])

3. Ethical Decision Making under Indeterminacy

• Applying Uncertainty Reductionism:
  • Ethical borderline cases (e.g., the status of a fetus as a person) are treated as uncertain, not indeterminate ([06:30], [06:51]).
  • Quote:
    • Warburton: “You might say that there is a fact of the matter...it’s just you don’t happen to know the fact.” ([07:54])
• Accepting Genuine Indeterminacy:
  • Suggests there are no clear facts of the matter in certain moral contexts.
  • Raises the question: How should we act when it's not simply that we lack knowledge, but the world itself is indeterminate? ([08:14])
  • Williams explores the idea of degrees of truth as a possible response ([08:14]).
    • Example: Something can be “0.75 yellow” in a vague color case.
    • This challenges how we form rational attitudes and decisions ([08:49], [09:35]).

4. Theories of Truth and Alternatives to Classical Logic

• Degrees of Truth:
  • Logic must be revised to account for statements that are true to some degree ([08:14], [09:58]).
  • This introduces complexity and potential challenges to well-established theories ([10:22]).
  • Quote:
    • Williams: “If you’ve got something intermediate between truth and falsity...what should I do in this case? What’s the correct attitude to have when something is kind of halfway between?” ([09:35])
• Alternative Accounts of Indeterminacy:
  • Some try to stay as close as possible to classical logic but admit multiple plausible interpretations due to linguistic openness ([11:32]-[14:30]).
  • Borderline statements occur because our conventions leave gaps in meaning with multiple valid precise interpretations ([12:45]).
  • Even if every interpretation is classical, their collective disagreement creates indeterminacy at the meta-level ([13:31]).
  • Quote:
    • Williams: “[T]here may be more than one [interpretation]…after you’ve...filtered out all the ones that contradict all the paradigm cases that we’ve got, all the settled linguistic conventions.” ([12:56])
    • "It’s a fact that the colour patch is yellow or not yellow, despite being borderline." ([14:20])

5. Philosophical Progress and Open Questions

• Williams suggests we are early in developing adequate rival theories to the classical, uncertainty-based view ([15:32]).
• Quote:
  • Williams: “We’re nearer the beginning than the end…what has to be done is to build up the rivals to the uncertainty reductionist view…so that you can actually measure their virtues and vices…” ([15:32])

Notable Quotes

• “Those are cases where it may be indeterminate whether what I’ve got is a heap or not.” — Robert Williams ([01:54])
• “He’s saying...in fact there’s no such phenomenon. All there is is ignorance.” — Robert Williams on Timothy Williamson ([03:09])
• “If you’ve got something intermediate between truth and falsity...what should I do in this case?” — Robert Williams ([09:35])
• “It’s a fact that the colour patch is yellow or not yellow, despite being borderline.” — Robert Williams ([14:20])
• “We’re nearer the beginning than the end…what has to be done is to build up the rivals to the uncertainty reductionist view…” — Robert Williams ([15:32])

Key Timestamps

• 00:52 – Distinction between uncertainty and indeterminacy introduced
• 01:54 – Examples of indeterminacy: heap, color spectrum
• 03:09 – Williamson’s view: indeterminacy as ignorance
• 05:45 – Commitment of classical logic: bivalence (true or false)
• 06:51 – Moral indeterminacy: personhood and ethics
• 08:14 – Williams introduces degrees of truth
• 09:35 – Rational attitudes in presence of graded truth
• 12:45 – Multiple classical interpretations and linguistic conventions
• 14:20 – The fact of a disjunction being true even if each component is unclear
• 15:32 – Williams on the need for more development in theories of indeterminacy

Summary

This episode delves into complex philosophical territory, clearly distinguishing between uncertainty (ignorance about determinate facts) and indeterminacy (the world itself not providing a definite answer). It examines foundational debates between the classical, reductionist theories (as articulated by Timothy Williamson) and emerging alternatives which accept indeterminacy's reality, including approaches based on degrees of truth. The discussion also probes the ethical implications of indeterminacy in real-world decision-making and highlights significant unresolved challenges for philosophers seeking to develop robust theories accommodating vagueness and indeterminacy. Williams concludes that much work remains to be done, situating philosophical inquiry on this topic at its beginning stages.