A (5:14)

Good to be talking with you again, Derek.

B (5:16)

You have written and said many times that digital dopamine is consuming America.

A (5:23)

How it is a series of bits that are programming neurons directly to the detriment of our society, but more importantly to our sense of self. Let me be specific and speak first and foremost. As a parent, I have three children, five, four and two. I'm the youngest dad in the Democratic caucus in the House. And as a parent I really feel powerless against what these tech companies have been able to do to our children, which is to attention frack them, to figure out ways to hijack the dopamine reinforcement system in their brains and monetize that dopamine cycle to the tune of trillions of dollars every year. And yet, as a member of Congress on the committee of jurisdiction over tech, I don't feel powerless. I feel angry. And I'm ready to hit back at these companies that have become the wealthiest, most powerful platforms in the history of the world with no accountability to what's best for the American public.

B (6:28)

There's a lot of bad things that one could blame on phones and social media. Teen anxiety, depression, political polarization, gambling addiction, a general dumbing down of the country even. In fact, I think test scores have been falling even outside the pandemic. And there's some analysis, global analysis, that ties that to smartphone implementation and smartphone access. How confident are you that phones and social media are a core original sin of all of these negative modern trends?

A (7:01)

Pretty darn confident. And let's tally some of the liabilities. And Jonathan Haidt has done a great job of this. Starting in about 2012, we did this experiment where we put a Hollywood studio in everybody's pocket and then connected all those Hollywood studios to one another. And it has been a disaster for mental health for our children in particular. The developing brain is really marked by two particular features. One is very highly sensitive dopamine systems, meaning they're very receptive to novel risk and reward. And two is immature prefrontal cortex, underdeveloped judgment. And those manifest slightly differently for young men versus young women. But in general, what we have seen is that a compare and despair social scene for children has made them miserable. They're lonelier, they're angrier, they're sadder, they feel more disconnected than ever before. And that's not just showing up in the statistics. It's showing up in my own interactions with young people. Throughout my district. I oftentimes go to speak to middle schoolers and high schoolers, and one of the first things I'll do is I'll say to everybody, all right, put your heads down, close your eyes, and then raise your hand if you think you would be happier if TikTok had never been invented. And Derek, not all the time, but most of the time, most of the hands go up. These children know that they are not the user, they are the product. And they're sick of being monetized by these companies. Doesn't mean they know exactly how to break free of what is clearly a tragedy of the commons or where we're locked into this really suboptimal equilibrium here. But they know that something is amiss and it's incumbent upon policymakers to be part of the solution.

B (8:51)

I think many people are familiar with, especially if they're listeners of plain English, the case against phones. What they might not be as familiar with is what you, Jake Auchincloss, want to do about it. You have a policy proposal that would directly take on this wave of essentially digitally delivered anxiety and depression. What is your policy solution?

A (9:17)

It's a series of them. One is, I think we need to start talking about what we're talking about when we do policy around these companies. What I mean by that is the major tool that has been used over the last 10 or 15 years has been antitrust. And frankly, parents don't care whether Google has to share information with Bing. It doesn't matter to them. It doesn't affect their life, it doesn't affect their kids screen time, it doesn't stop screen time from stealing from family time. What they care about is their kids. And so we need the Consumer Product Safety Commission to work with the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine and come up with a evidence backed assessment of the effects of social media, of pornography, of online gambling in particular on the developing dopamine system and come up with some neuroscientifically grounded regulations about what is acceptable that would inform adult use and that would restrict children's use. You can know as a parent whether a bicycle helmet is safe. You know, the CPSC says, hey, this thing is safe, we've tested it. Nothing like that exists online to put parents in the driver's seat. So that is sort of a regulatory mindset shift. Stop shaping, stop, stop chasing corporations as they shapeshift across platforms and start just focusing on the target area that they care about, which is the ventral striatum and the delivery of dopamine. Number two is tax them. Tax these companies, it's a vice. They reward the seven deadly sins. And we have a very simple way of getting less of a vice. We've used it for cigarettes or alcohol and that is to tax it and in particular to tax the digital advertising revenues of the social media corporations. So I'm not talking about taxing the users of the platforms, I'm talking about taxing these corporations. Just Meta and Google, for example, make $250 billion every year on digital advertising, pay precious little tax because of all of their international shell companies. We should Just tax their top line digital advertising revenue and plow it back into things that matter in real life. It starts with a premise, and a premise that I think I have a front row seat to. As a member of the Energy and Commerce Committee in Congress and for everyone's awareness. Energy and Commerce Committee in the House has jurisdiction over a huge cross section of the American economy. Everything from energy to tech companies. And what that jurisdictional vantage point has shown me is that we have massively stacked the deck in this country for online activity and against in real life activity. If you try to put a accessory dwelling unit in your backyard so your in laws can live with you, you're going to spend much longer than it's taking Meta to build a data center that's training chatbots that Mark Zuckerberg thinks should have quote, sensual conversations with 12 year olds. That's ridiculous. We need to put some sensible guardrails on Internet activity again, particularly around adolescents. But then we also have to unleash the world of Adam so people can build stuff. And obviously Derek, I don't have to preach to you on this subject, but I think it is important to emphasize that this isn't some Luddite reaction against technology. I think technology is great. I ran the MIT Entrepreneurship competition like I'm all about it. I want technology that solves real problems for people, whether it's disease related or energy related, AI driven robotics that can get us stuff better, faster, cheaper. What I am not as enthusiastic about is a generation of slop thrown across the Internet that creates a post literate society.

B (12:55)

In the biggest picture I am totally for this. I mean the way I see this policy is sort of three parts. Number one, research the effects of social media and sort of smartphone ubiquity. Number two, tax the digital vice and, and number three, fix the fact that and this is sort of my gloss on what you just said. The digital world is under regulated and the physical world is overregulated. It is easy to disseminate porn to children and difficult to build enough houses in America. And that is an asymmetry that makes absolutely no sense. I'm on board for all of that, but when I dig into the details of number two, tax and digital vice, I wonder how you feel about. And surely you've heard this criticism. Many of the things that TikTok or Instagram or Facebook are doing are also being done by television. So why would this tax only affect social media companies and not essentially be a kind of across the board tax on anything that consumes our attention In.

A (13:59)

A way that we don't like an important point. The short answer is because we should care about, we should care more about outcomes than process. And this goes to my criticism of the antitrust approach. The antitrust mindset is one that would find your argument very compelling and say, wait a minute, wait a minute. We got to think about the structure of the business, we got to think about how they operate and we have to think about consumer surplus and producer surplus and sort of conspiracies against trade. And my view is like a lot of that has been obviated by the very simple fact that these are monopoly companies. They're really more like utilities at this point. They actually create classically defined a tremendous amount of consumer surplus. So that whole concept is kind of out the door. And what we have seen since social media and since smartphones became ubiquitous with social media is a collapse in social trust and adolescent well being that we hadn't seen before that happened. So we can debate from first principles the relative merits of TV versus social media. But the simple truth is it wasn't until 2012 that you began to see a real corrosion of civil society and well being and the precipitous decline that's been chronicled by Jonathan Haidt. And so we should address the prime driver of that directly.

B (15:14)

What is the world that the auchincloss package would give us? I mean, I could imagine that Google and Facebook, as you said, make $250 billion a year in advertising. If you tax that 10%. All right, well they're still making $225 billion in advertising. And so it's possible that taxing these Goliaths is simply going to leave us with an incredibly similar world. Except that you're just going to have to fight and fight and fight. A handful of companies, Facebook, Amazon, TikTok X that in fact are quite popular according to surveys. More popular certainly than the Democratic Party's brand or Congress. Or Congress, exactly. So I wonder whether this is the right fight to pick. Is this a fight that leaves us with all of the problems that we have in a world of smartphones and social media and short form video. But also now the Democratic Party has antagonized even further Silicon Valley in a way that bites back in terms of the amount that they're donating to Republicans.

A (16:25)

I think this actually could be a defining fight for the Democratic Party. You're right that it's a risky one. For years Democrats have been on our back foot on culture issues, playing defense against a series of sometimes bad faith Sometimes in good faith criticisms. The emerging cultural fault line between in real life effort on one hand and digital dopamine on the other is a culture war issue that Democrats should proactively go out there and pick. These corporations have been treating our children like products. They need to pay for it. I think we can get millennial parents, I think we can get Gen Z on our side on this issue. Not by being moralistic about it and telling people, hey, you're a bad person if you don't put down your phone. I mean, Derek, I bought the book how to break up with your phone in 30 days. I'm on day one still and haven't made it past so far be it for me to lecture anybody and frankly, what an adult decides to do on their phone is, frankly, mostly their business. I think society does have a compelling interest in our kids. And when the average American child spends less time outdoors than a federal inmate does, we have a problem. Particularly when their math scores and their reading scores have been plummeting and their mental health incidents have been spiking, we have a problem. Going after these Social media corporations, of course, is not a silver bullet. Culture is upstream of policy and there needs to be cultural changes. For example, wait until 8th pledges where parents agree not to get smartphones to their kids until 8th grade. I wanna see more smartphone bans in schools. I wanna see just more of a sense of community and the rewards and the virtue of, in real life, engagement, whether it's Elks clubs or going to church or volunteering. We need a lot of different cultural levers to be depressed here, but one of them can and should be that these companies, the Metas, The Googles, the TikToks, are not just digital empires that are totally divorced from any accountability to the voting public. They shouldn't have a liability Shield that section 230 gives them. They shouldn't be basically tax free for creating a lot of negative externalities. They gotta pay.

B (18:27)

There's a way in which. I think the most important piece of this policy isn't the details of the policy. It's the fact that you, as a moderate Democrat, are picking a novel fight. And I want to get back to that point in just a little bit, because the idea that Democrats don't fight or don't know how to fight or, or don't know how to pick the right fights is, I think, a really, really important theme that I wanna spend some time on. But before we get there, I do wanna connect this big idea of yours to another big idea of Yours, which is the unaffordability crisis. Like right now, you're talking about the attention economy. That matters a lot. But I think if you wanna know why Democrats have lost so many young voters, you could blame smartphones and political polarization. But you can also blame unaffordability. You can blame the fact that the concept of the American dream feels like it's slipping through the fingers of millennials and Gen Z. And you have a very particular way of going at this issue. You call it the cost disease. Can you spend a little bit of time telling us how you think about this problem in America, the cost disease?

A (19:42)

With pleasure. And there's a famous witticism that every politician is simply regurgitating the ideas of long dead economists. And I am very happily doing that right here, because cost disease is not my idea. It's the idea of William Bommel, an economist of the 1950s and 60s, and it's sometimes called the Bomal effect. His basic point is inflation is not spread evenly across the economy. People talk about inflation, but actually there's many, many different sectors of the economy, from electronics to housing to health care. And inflation's quite lumpy, actually. And the interesting thing is less to look at the sectors where there's a lot of inflation, which in America today is particularly housing, health care and utilities. And you actually learn more by looking at the sectors that have had deflation, where over the course of the last several decades, in real terms, prices have gone way down. Sectors, for example, like electronics. And you ask, well, how did this happen? And the answer was they were cured of cost disease. Cost disease is what happens when the sector is very labor intensive and low productivity growth. Computers is a great example of this. 100 years ago, a computer was an actual person like you would describe yourself in the job description as. I'm a computer. It was a bunch of people, they sat together in a office building and they literally scribbled out algorithms. And then somebody that was a service, it was a very expensive service. And then somebody built the first computer and it was a massive computer. It was the size of a building. And it turned that service into a product. And that was a super expensive product. But then that product became mass produced. They built many, many, many computers over and over again. They got economies of scale and scope and it became incredibly cheap. And now your smartphone does. The number of computations that were still a service from 100 years ago would have taken more people than have ever been alive in the history of the world. So computers were cured of cost disease. The question Is how do we do that for other sectors? I want some of that for healthcare. How do we make that the story of healthcare and housing? And the answer is you take a service, something that's very labor intensive, you turn it into a product, something that can be built or manufactured, and then you scale it, you do it over and over and over again. It's automation at scale. And we know how to do that for housing and to a certain extent to healthcare. But we have held ourselves back, I think, both because of corporate and because of government bureaucracy in curing those sectors of cost disease. And the result is that the middle class is paying more than half of their take home pay for housing and healthcare combined.

B (22:18)

There's a quote that I think is sometimes associated with Agatha Christie. I could not find who actually said it, but it's something like when I was a child, I never thought I would be rich enough to afford a TV and poor enough to not be able to afford a butler or something along those lines. And the point is that like between the early 20th century and the late 20th century, television went from this wild, absurd, futuristic technology that nobody could afford to a technology that is in practically every single manufactured home like trailer in America. Like TVs are ubiquitous. They are cheap because they can be manufactured and that manufacturing can be offshored. Butlers, on the other hand, I mean, where are butlers, right? The cost of labor went up relative to manufactured goods because of Baumel's cost disease. The price of labor, you know, humans kept needing to work. I think that the classic example from Bauml, the original economist, is that a four string quartet is going to need four people to be in that four string quartet no matter how productive the rest of the economy gets. And so you should expect four string quartet performances to get much more expensive over time than than say a piece of electronics. I want you to take this idea, which it's interesting because Balmos cost disease is sometimes an idea that's absolutely beloved by conservatives. They say, look at what's happened to healthcare and education prices in America. It's gone up and up and up. That just goes to show that these dumb Democrats are keeping government in education and healthcare and that's driving up the cost of education and healthcare. I wonder what you see as a cure for the cost disease in something as complicated as healthcare and medicine.

A (24:08)

It is at the risk of being a drone. I think it's really a four step process. The first is you have to decide what sectors you want to treat of cost disease. Because the way that the BOMO effect works. Some sector of the economy will always have it right because there's always going to be sectors where labor productivity is slower than in other sectors and their cost will pool in those sectors. So 100 years from now, some politician will be on a podcast with a public intellectual and they'll be complaining about how haircuts consume half of a middle class family's take home pay because haircuts are very highly non automatable good and will probably become more and more of take home pay. So my view is you want to start at the bottom of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, housing and health care. We need to treat of cost disease. It is not acceptable that those two really basic physiological social goods are that expensive. Number two is to your point about conservative critiques of Democrats. Yeah, we should cut regulations that are preventing standardization and predictability for building at scale or for automating in the first place. Whether that is promoting more genericization and drug development in healthcare, which absolutely can turn a service into a product, whether that is getting rid of redundant or counterproductive building codes or zoning and housing. We should absolutely do that. And then number three is adopt technology. Adopt it ferociously. And most of the private sector is going to do that of their own accord. But where the government can be a productive partner, we should be because technology and commence and in tandem sort of operational improvements to digest that technology is a really important way where you get From n of 1 to n of 1000 and then finally take on the special interests that are fighting to defend the status quo. Sometimes those special interests are going to be sort of government or government adjacent. Sometimes those special interests are going to be corporate. And the old debate within my party of oh, it's government's the problem or no, corporations are the problem, it's just not a very helpful debate. Look at where the problem is, look at the bottleneck and attack that bottleneck.

B (26:18)

I want to return to two words that you said which were adopt technology. Because in my experience the Democratic Party has had a deteriorating relationship with technology over the last few decades. I think about Bill Clinton, Al Gore, Barack Obama. I think these folks were associated with a positive vision of technology. And I see the vanguard of the Democratic Party today, and especially the left, as being in many ways anti tech, certainly anti social media. And you are clearly not a defender of social media. I wonder how you think about the Democratic Party's relationship to technology, whether you see that as something that is a positive relationship with technology. An important part of the Democratic Party's identity.

A (27:04)

I think being anti tech would not be productive because technology improves standards of living and helps us solve problems. If agentic tutoring, when paired with human tutoring, can help our kids read faster, we should be using that. If new geothermal technologies are going to make it easier to drill five to seven miles deep and have high baseload clean power everywhere in the country, we should totally do that, right? If gene editing helps us cure disease, we should totally do that. Being anti tech is foolish and it's a scarcity mindset. What I think people are reacting to, rightfully, is that technology unto itself is not a value and the value is a sense of belonging. A value is a sense of trust. And these are things that have been degraded by what has been the most salient technology of the last 15 years, which is social media and now its cousin chatbots.

B (28:04)

I want to broaden our focus here to national politics as a party. The Democratic Party has never been less popular, at least if you go by Gallup Time series, and the Democratic Party brand clearly has never been weaker. Why do you think that is?

A (28:18)

I think it's epitomized by the school closures I was elected in 2020. I made reopening the schools my day one issue. What I saw is that in blue states and blue cities, the schools stayed closed for 12 and to some degree 18 months, well past when Dr. Ashish Jha, who would go on to be Biden's Covid coordinator, had said that they, from social and epidemiological perspective, should be reopened in May of 2020. And what I saw was really a tragedy that encapsulates where the party has gone off the rails. First, it was a focus on process rather than outcomes that actually mattered. The outcome that mattered was get kids back into school. And in too many instances, the Democratic Party got fixated on process that was really pivoting around interest groups, variously relatively small slivers of public life. That focus on process over outcome was then paired toxically with a sense of condescension. When parents came with real grief and anger to public forums to express that the schools needed to open, they were met with derision, frankly. And as I said, I have three kids. If I had watched my kids sit at home, miss out on education and social moments that they would never get back, I'd be furious too. And so I picture that episode of one a focus on process over outcome married with condescension to those who objected as really a parable that sums up where the Democrats got it wrong and a host of other issues, whether it's immigration or inflation or otherwise. But those school closures have stayed with me. And you know what, Derek? It's five years past those school closures. Democrats still do not have a compelling education platform, and shame on us for that. We need to have a really strong point of view on how we're going to fix what was broken during that pandemic.

B (30:10)

I want to go back to the idea that school closures are a microcosm for what explains the implosion of the Democratic Party brand. Because one thing that's interesting about that is that you didn't see Joe Biden's popularity plummet in the first two quarters of his presidency when, as far as I understand it, lots of schools were still closed. You saw the Democratic Party really start to collapse in popularity toward the end of the Biden administration and then into the Trump administration. So I want to take seriously this idea that the ingredients that you've put on the table, which I think must, as far as explaining the Democratic Party's decline in popularity, must apply far beyond the school closures. Right. A focused interest groups that shout the loudest rather than the outcomes that matter the most. I hear that as being number one and then a condescending tone toward the kind of undecided or independent middle which is pushing them away from the party. Where in the last year, let's say long after the school closure debate was over, where in the last year or two, do you think those issues have mattered most to voters? I take your point that the school closures are almost like a parable for what's gone wrong in the Democratic Party. But there's no way that and you anticipated this in your reply, there's no way that millions of Americans today find the Democratic Party unlikable because of something that happened in the final quarters of 2020 and the early quarters of 2021 that doesn't seem to match up to me as a causal story. So I wonder whether maybe some of the ingredients in that parable, whether where those ingredients in that school closure story have played out in the last few years that might actually explain what's happened to the Democratic Party's brand.

A (32:16)

I think it's someone described the Democratic Party as America's HR department. And that's always stayed with me because again, there's too much of emotion that is process oriented, jargon filled, divorced from outcomes that really matter and then slightly patronizing. I just think that is like it's a sheen across the public's perception of how the party approaches issues, which is a shame to me because I happen to know a lot of elected Democratic officials, and I can tell you that's just really not how they think about issues at all. And this group that I'm chairing, majority Democrats, has 32 of them who are in many ways the exact opposite of that. And so it's not an insurmountable problem that we have. It's like we have to get out there and actually have authentic, in real life engagement that shows people who we are and understand that the true scarce currency in politics is not attention, it's trust. And the party that builds trust back first at a moment of historically low trust in this country is the party that's going to have a generational majority.

B (33:31)

I feel like one answer to the question of where do Democrats go from here is, well, they run toward populism. You run toward the economic populism of Bernie and of fdr. And I want to get your take on populism because three weeks after Donald Trump's inauguration, you went on Ezra Klein's podcast and you offered what you called a Diet Coke theory of Democratic politics. And I would love for you to recapitulate that Diet Coke theory, because I think it, it bears quite directly on the question of where do Democrats go from here.

A (34:00)

The Diet Coke theory is that when someone orders a Coca Cola, they don't want a Diet Coke. And if Democrats think that we are going to beat MAGA populism with a more polite version of populism that sort of offends fewer people, we're going to lose. The way to win is one to understand that the electorate is being realigned. Seventh time in American history, it's happened. First time in my lifetime. But the electorate has been realigned, okay? The biggest city in my district, Fall river, voted for a Democrat for president every year for the last century. Excuse me, every four years for the last century, voted for Donald Trump in 2024. This is a realigned electorate, okay? And I should say Fall river is a multiethnic, working class city, okay? And when there is a realignment happening, the advantage goes to the party that can define the new center, because that is equivalent to defining the terms of debate. So it would be a very tired proposition for us as Democrats to say we're going to have a contest between center and left. One of them will win, and then that faction will go campaign. The much more productive debate would be, let's, as a party, define the new center and take the best ideas from across the variety of ideological factions in American life. The libertarian hostility to centralize and personalize executive power. Yes, we should adopt that. Goodness knows maga's not gonna be welcoming to it. The conservatives traditional support for free enterprise and faith and family. Yes, we should adopt that. We should have different policies that are going to actuate it, but we should uphold those values. Traditional liberals support for due process and civil rights. Yes. Progressives commitment to investing in a level playing field. Yes, I talked about baby bonds, which is a traditionally progressive idea that I think is a great idea. Give people an equity stake in America. Populist skepticism of corporate capture. Yes, when that comes to health insurance or social media corporations, we should adopt those ideas. We should be promiscuous in taking the best ideas from across American life, putting them together into a platform that defines a new center. And when you define the new center, you invite people in to this new debate.

B (36:19)

I don't particularly consider myself a populist, but I want to briefly defend populism here in a way that I don't think many populists will appreciate. I think populism is essentially a political skin suit. I think it's a costume. I think almost any idea can be dressed up as populism. And we acknowledge this when we use the word populist. Trump is a populist. Bernie is a populist. FDR was a populist. Obama knew how to play the populist card. These people's politics have nothing to do with one another. Nothing to do with one another. I think populism is the ability to draw a very specific line in the sand that says over there are the small number of powerful people who are bad and over here are the many people who are good. And to orient your politics around that line, and as I was thinking about your idea for the digital dopamine tax, I thought, wait, Jake Auchincloss is a populist. In a way, he's a narrow populist in that he's drawing a line in the sand that says the vast majority, the largest number of people, the children of America and the phone addicted people of America, they are good. And the small number of people, the social media companies, they are bad. You are Congressman, I'll just name it now you're a touch grass populist. That's what this policy is. It's touch grass populism. So I agree that there is a benefit to being ideologically promiscuous and taking the best ideas from libertarians and conservatives and liberals and maga. I Think. There was a paragraph in my original Abundance Agenda article that said that that's what I wanted abundance liberalism to be. But ultimately, I think politics is about specificity and it's about focus and picking what you want to talk about and who you want to name the enemy. And there's a way in which I think the success of your digital dopamine tax is precisely the power of its populism, that you're a touch grass populist. How do you feel about that accusation, Derek?

A (38:27)

I could not put it better myself. It's almost like you frame ideas for a living. That's exactly right.

B (38:37)

Well, expand beyond the confidence. I mean, like how?

A (38:39)

I can't. I mean, you've nailed it. I am 100%. I'm going to take that term, by the way, in the spirit of ideological promiscuity, a touch grass populist. It is absolutely an us versus them. It is absolutely a moralistic good versus bad. It's absolutely the many versus the few. And I believe that it is productive populism in the sense that it is corralling that energy towards a productive end in the sense that it is a set of policies that are going to expand prosperity and belonging for Americans rather than drag us further into tribalism, which is what too much of particularly ethnically motivated populism tries to do.

B (39:26)

One thing that I like about the digital dopamine tax, even though I have skepticism about its individual details, is that it's a big idea. And I don't think Democrats, especially centrist Democrats, I don't think they have their big idea. I think if you ask people what's Chuck Schumer's big idea? I don't think a lot of specialists, I think a lot of people who follow politics for a living would be able to tell you what's Hakeem Jeffries big idea. What's Nancy Pelosi's big idea? The equivalent of abolish the police, abolish ice, Medicare for all. I'm not endorsing the substance of those policies. I'm just saying people know what they are and they know the people that are associated with them. The Green New Deal. Do you agree that Democrats, and maybe specifically moderate Democrats, have a big idea deficit?

A (40:17)

Yes.

B (40:19)

Why?

A (40:21)

Over the last decade, the party's been in an ideological straitjacket because the imperative to fight Donald Trump has subsumed a lot of the energy. There was an old maxim that Democrats fall in love and Republicans fall in line. In the last decade, that's flipped. Actually, Republicans fell in Love. In fact, they created a cult of personality and Democrats fell in line to counter that culture and it hadn't worked. If you haven't noticed, Donald Trump's approval ratings are exactly what they were 10 years ago. Because we've been telling people who we're against, not what we're for. The good news is that now there is newfound energy to bring forth new ideas. But ideas are only one of a three part equation. For Democrats to craft a majority, we need ideas, big ideas, cross cutting ideas, as I said, that defy the label of moderate or progressive. We need talent. We need the people out there who can campaign on them, win on them, deliver on them. And we need courage. Because talent plus ideas is going to upend the status quo and there's going to be a lot of defenders of that status quo.

B (41:26)

What does courage mean to you?

A (41:27)

Courage means bearing the opprobrium of your friends and allies. It's easy to go out there as a Democrat and criticize Republicans or vice versa. Courage is Liz Cheney. Courage is. And I saw how she was treated by Republicans in the House. And those Republicans should be ashamed of themselves. How they treated Liz for her courage. Totally ostracized. We're all humans, we're all social creatures. We all seek acclaim and belonging, particularly politicians. And to risk being cast off, it's scary, which is why it needs to be a collective effort that draws strength from one another.

B (42:04)

I've been working for the last few months on a piece that's never really reached publication quality, but I feel like this is a good time to sort of work it out. It's sort of like a two part theory of political success in the 21st century and the extremely simplistic two part theory. And what two part theory isn't simplistic is part one, figure out what you want to say, part two, tell everybody, and that's it. And that might seem so simplistic as to be sort of devoid of any substance. Let me just briefly defend the fact that there's a substance here. I think it's astonishing how many politicians don't actually know what the f they want to say. Yes, I don't need you to affirm verbally to what I'm gonna say next. But I think a huge problem with the Kamala Harris campaign is that it was very, very clear to undecided voters that she did not know what she wanted to say. And now that I've seen clips from her book tour where she had months to think about what she wanted to say about her book and her 107 days, I think it's still clear that she didn't quite know what she wanted to say. And that's a long time to not know what you want to say. And it's not a Kamala Harris problem. I think it's a Democratic Party problem. I think there are too many Democrats who through triangulation or a lack of courage or a sort of perverse fetishizing of a certain sort of ideological sophistication that says I'm for 17 things, so don't make me summarize it into one thing. Just don't know what they want to say in a way that is specific enough for people to remember it. And specificity is a huge part of this. I think that one thing that Zoran Mamdani and Pete Buttigieg and you and AOC have in common, even though you do not at all have the same politics, is that you have specific stories you want to tell, you have specific policies that you want to talk about. And the ability to be specific is a superpower, because if you have something specific that you can say, you want to tell everybody. And that gets to part two, that Democrats need to be more this word's coming back promiscuous with who they talk to. Talk to Joe Rogan, talk to Theo Vaughn, talk to the right, talk to the middle. Talk to the libertarian weirdos, God knows I love them. Talk to the far left. You have to talk to everybody. And you can't be pure about only talking to the people who you Expect agree with 99% of what you think. So help me edit this piece for final publication. The two parter one. Figure out what you want to say. Number two, tell everybody. Where am I oversimplifying and what am I missing?

A (44:26)

I would say yes and the and is and I think maybe a bridge between 1 and 2 is not only does it need to be specific the what you want to say, the surge one on one tutoring to every student in America, the build 5 million more homes, the Medicaid public option, whatever. It has to be mimetic, which is to say it has to be an idea that is not only understood by the person hearing the idea. That person then needs to be able to repeat that idea to somebody else in a way that retains the integrity of the idea so that it can spread orally as well as through the written word. And the reason I really emphasize that in terms of how you actually tell everybody is because what has really collapsed in media over the last 30 years is trust. I Don't have a way to prove this offhand, but my guess is the number of people who command attention in the economy, the attention economy today is about the same as it was 50 years ago. They have very different platforms obviously, but it's probably about the same number of people. It's still a power law. There's still a relatively small handful of people who really command a lot of attention. What's changed is now there's all these local trusted intermediaries. The neighbor, the cousin, the friend who. Who somebody who has given up on our online debate as a country goes to to hear about what people stand for. And if your ideas can't make it to that trusted local intermediary and then be relayed to the, you know, the end user of them, they're not going, you can't quote, tell everybody. That's the bridge to me to be between 1 and 2 is mimesis, is you gotta have these ideas, be capturable. Let's tax the social media corporations and use the funds to build a thousand trade schools.

B (46:07)

Yeah, the idea needs to be built for virality. I was just thinking about the political memes that jumped to my head as you were talking. Medicare for all, build the wall, Hope and change, Green New Deal. And since I've been reading about China recently, the policies of one child policy and zero Covid came to mind too. When I think about these ideas, to say nothing again of their substance. They're all short, they're basically all three words and they all have numbers in them. There's something interesting about that. They tend to have the numbers 01 or infinity 01 or infinity 0 Covid build the wall, one wall, Medicare for everyone, infinity. It's almost as if there's a power to these numbers. 0, 1, infinity. And I just think it's so important to use memorable language in this way to make our ideas as elemental as possible so that they spread when we share them.

A (47:06)

And I think there is another element here is using in real life engagements to vet the resonance of those ideas. I really as a politician cannot stress this enough how much it matters to talk about things in a crowded room. It's like stand up comedy. Stand up comics don't know what's funny until they deliver it to a live crowded audience. Because laughter is contagious and I think political resonance is contagious. An audience picks something up and you feel the room's energy change when you're talking about things, which is part of why I am so calm. I can point you to the polling but it's not the point that interests me. It's the feeling in living rooms when I'm talking to parents about social media and the effect on their kids that convinces me this is a winning issue for Democrats. The energy changes in the room and that's what majority of Democrats have been doing. We're in Atlanta, we're in Michigan, we're in California with some of these really talented elected leaders doing in real life events and we're sort of like playing some of our best hits. But then we're seeing what lyrics the crowd is going to chant back at us. Because those lyrics that people are chanting back, that's the policy that you want to take front and center.

B (48:09)

Yeah. God, I can only imagine being a politician and talking about Bommel's cost disease in a room of 100 people and they all go crazy with productivity divergences.

A (48:17)

Like, yes, I did it in Fall River, Massachusetts and I have the Wall Street Journal to attest to it. I'm not going to claim that people were throwing undergarments at me like a rock star, but it was.

B (48:28)

Yeah, I'm making fun of you, but I think Bummel's cross disease is an incredibly important point. If people are clapping about this in Massachusetts, I think that's great. Is there an example of a policy that you're sort of like workshopping like that you think is important but you haven't found the melodic hook to make it catch on with the throngs of audiences when you go back to, to Massachusetts?

A (48:48)

Yeah, Medicaid. The Republicans are attacking Medicaid. Their theory of the case, and I'm on the committee of jurisdiction, we did this debate is that Americans think Medicaid is for other people, particularly immigrants. And I think they're making a huge mistake politically. And on a policy perspective, I think Democrats, our opportunity is to lean into Medicaid and to say no, no, no. Medicaid is long term care. Medicaid is at home care. Medicaid is addiction services. And we've got to find a way to make Medicaid a sustainable path for long term services. And supports for the middle class like a public option buy in to Medicaid. And as a way to put downward pressure on healthcare inflation, as you said earlier, like the Medicare for all versus not Medicare for all is not productive to me. I think the party needs to rally to Medicaid as a way to bring down costs and expand access. And I think the middle class will be with us on it.

B (49:43)

Yeah, that's an important one. And yeah, Medicaid is hard to sexy up.

A (49:47)

Yes, it is.

B (49:49)

Yeah. But I mean, I mean this in total seriousness. It's hard to sexy up, but I mean, what does the Democratic Party stand for if not standing for helping the vulnerable and making sure they don't enter medical bankruptcy? Right. That's so fundamental to what I would hope to think of as the core identity of the party.

A (50:04)

And it's about uncertainty and anxiety. I met recently with a bunch of financial advisors who consult to my constituents. And it's always a very helpful way for me to like kind of get a secondhand assessment, aggregated assessment of how my constituents are thinking about financial security. And what really popped in this conversation is an unexpected healthcare cost. Not just of yourself. If you're, you know, 55 year old parent, it's of your kids and even more so of your parents. You're sitting there thinking, Mike, you know, dad's 80, mom's 75, dad's got Alzheimer's, worried about mom's mobility and you know, we're one event away from things going totally sideways and I'm already trying to save for my kids college education. That anxiety is so deep and people do not feel supported on long term care and the predictability of their healthcare expenses. And I think saying to people, oh, healthcare is free. I think it's disingenuous. Healthcare is not free. People, you know, doctors and nurses and clinicians, they need a salary, not free. But it also shouldn't devour a third of your take home pay and go up by 15% year over year.

B (51:20)

I agree with that. I want to do a beat on the Democratic Party and young men and you touch on this in the Times piece. You've touched on it in other contexts. You know, the Democratic Party has not won a majority of the male vote, I believe since the 1970s in a presidential election. So when people talk about the Democratic Party having a problem with men, this is not a problem that was invented in 2016 or 2024. This is a problem that goes back decades. And I wonder how you diagnose it and how you think about a reasonable prescription, especially for this generation of young men, that if the polls are accurate, swung dramatically toward Donald Trump in 2024 and now are basically fed up with him. His popularity has plummeted among young men in the last few months. How do we get these guys back?

A (52:13)

You're right on. I think the analysis of where we're at, an 18 year old man was more likely to vote for Donald Trump than a 75 year old man, which is really stunning, right in 2024. How we don't get them back is through a patronizing tone of meeting young men where they're at. I have been 18 years old in my life. I don't want to meet an 18 year old man where he's at. An 18 year old man needs a lot of guidance about where he's going to get to. And it's patronizing to suggest otherwise. What we need to do is stop condescending and start building and give young men, I think, what they're really seeking, which is camaraderie and challenge in pursuit of a common mission. This is what I wanted when I graduated from college and joined the Marine Corps. I wanted to suffer together with other young men in pursuit of something that felt bigger than me. And we're not giving young men, I think enough of those channels. Every society from time immemorial has struggled with this. The combination of dopamine seeking and high testosterone and adrenaline that characterizes 16 to 25 year old males. This is a challenge for every society about how they route them. And if we don't make a constructive decision about how we want to route that energy, corporations are going to route it towards online gambling and pornography and social media and it's going to be corrosive and self destructive and we're going to waste a tremendous resource which should be getting directed towards enterprise and service. And here is where we go back to your, I think, fair rebuttal of like do you really want government involved in these decisions? We have to be, because if we're on the sidelines it's going to be these mega corporations that decide how young men are spending their time. Doesn't mean that we have governments like program young men's time. But it does say that we should have a point of view as a party about what is productive behavior that we should emphasize in real life. Sweating and striving over the mindless pursuit of digital dopamine that we should be directing. We should be uplifting trade schools and military service and the benefits of enterprise and the importance of marriage and taking care of your family. These should be principles that define the Democratic party's view of the good life.

B (54:24)

I agree with so much of that. I'm concerned that the typical gettable 18 to 25 year old male voter does not wanna join the Marines. He wants to play Call of Duty. And if that's talking down, then it's talking down. I just think that's the state of reality. And I wonder whether an emphasis on prescribed civil service rubs up against the very male inclination, especially very young male inclination, to just be left alone. Stop telling me I'm using the wrong words. Stop telling me I'm thinking the wrong thoughts. Just let me do my own thing. And this is where I think the sort of my sort of, like, platform concept of abundance liberalism is sort of reactivated a little bit. Like, I want to make it easier for these guys to find a job. I want to make it easier for them to buy a house. I want our politicians to model what it means to be a good husband and father and neighbor. But I want that to be modeled rather than prescribed, because I basically just want to build the platform upon which they feel free to make their own decisions, and that they will find that vision of a political party more appealing than the vision of a political party that is swapping out the HR department for the army recruiter. Both of those might feel a little bit too prescriptive for a generation that prizes its independence, even if that independence might lead them to make a bunch of terrible decisions, which, frankly, we all made at 18. So I guess I wonder how you feel about that potential downside.

A (56:23)

I One part agree, one part disagree, a part agree is that culture is upstream of politics 100%. Culture eats politics for breakfast. And we can't fix many of these elements politically. We can model it, we can embed it in our definition of the good life as politicians and what we aspire to, but we are downstream of cultural forces and need to respect that. Yes. Where I disagree is your thesis that males at that age in particular are individualistic. I actually strongly disagree with that. In fact, one of the defining features of adolescent males is when they're left to their own devices, what they do is they form teams. You see this in how young boys play. You see this in how adolescent males behave. They immediately form teams. And sometimes it can be very constructive where it's company formation, and sometimes it can be very destructive where it's gang formation. But much more so than with females. Males are focused on forming teams and setting up rules for competition. And so we just need to route that impulse towards, okay, you want to join a team? Here's a bunch of different teams. One's a Union, one's 2nd Battalion, 7th Marines. One is the local Elks Lodge. They're all great teams, but you should join a team. You should be a productive member of it. You have responsibilities as well as rights, and get to work.

B (57:44)

I love that. That's a great answer. This was awesome. I could talk to you for five hours. But this is not a Joe Rogan podcast and I will fix that by just having you back in the show sometime soon. Congressman Jake Auchincloss, thank you much.

A (57:54)

Always a pleasure.

B (58:00)

Thank you for listening. Plain English is reported and hosted by me, Derek Thompson. This episode was produced by Devin Beraldi and Devin Rinaldo. If you like what we're doing here, please rate and subscribe. New episodes drop every Tuesday and Friday.