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Political Thinking with Nick Robinson
China, Russia and us: Tony Radakin on four years as Chief of the Defence Staff
00:49:53
An exclusive exit interview with Admiral Sir Tony Radakin in the week he steps down.
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BBC Sounds Music Radio podcasts. Hello, and welcome to Political Thinking. I've just been speaking to the man who's just stepped down as the head of the British Armed Forces, the chief of the Defence staff, the guy who's been in charge of the army, the Royal Air Force and his own Royal Navy. We talk, yes, about those extraordinary scenes in China this week in which we saw an alliance of autocrats admiring China's new weaponry. But we also talk not just about the threat from China, from Russia, Britain's preparedness for war, but about what it's like to do this job, what it's like to travel by train during a war to Ukraine, alongside first one British Prime Minister, then two, three and four British Prime Ministers that he has served. And also a rather fascinating assertion of confidence about this war, that for all the deaths, for all the horror, the Red army of Russia has made less progress into Ukraine than a snail would have done if it had started the journey from Russia just across the border. Admiral Sutornia Radican, welcome to Political Thinking.
- [01:56]
B
Well, thank you, Nick. Delighted to be here.
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A
I wonder what impression those images from Beijing had on you as you saw that new weaponry, as you saw that cast list of the world's autocrats. Were you alarmed? Were you impressed? Were you scared?
- [02:11]
B
I think maybe there's two or three things. So, one, you're right, it's reflective of an era that we're stepping into, one where geoeconomic competition has come to an end and it's much more geopolitical. It's about state on state and the risk of state on state competition and the risk that that becomes violent. That's true. The other one is maybe a skepticism. It's a military parade. It's very impressive at one level, but for nations to come together and to be prepared to fight together and to support each other, it's much more substantial than a big parade.
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A
They're not. They're not the Alternative NATO, though they are not.
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B
These are not countries that have a history together, that have a mutual trust that actually will support each other when it comes to war fighting. And you've seen that, you've seen that nobody came to Iran's aid when it was attacked by Israel and America. You know, these countries don't go rushing to help each other out. And we should recognize what's going on. We should be really confident about who we are and who our partnership and allies are. And we need to reflect that. We need to be stronger in the future, but we shouldn't be cowed or scared by it.
- [03:28]
A
I hear you, and I hear you say, in effect it's not a new alternative to NATO. And yet the North Koreans are providing the men that Russia needs on the front line in Ukraine. They're working together, we are told, on space and satellite systems. The Chinese have given coverage to Putin, haven't they? And in return, they seem to be getting some very high tech military technology. So they are cooperating more.
- [03:52]
B
They definitely are. And we should call that out and we should recognize that these are shifts that are happening that mean that we have to get stronger. I don't, don't deny that. But we should also be sober in terms of what's happening. Russia is drawing on North Korea because Russia is desperate for that help. Russia needs Iran's help. Russia needs China's help. That's what's going on. And this isn't some kind of ideological coming together or the trust that we have with our partners. These are. The China relationship with Russia is much more of Russia being a vassal state to China. China's going to be buying more of Russian gas because Russia can't sell it to Europe. And China's going to get a hell of a deal by its power over Russia. That's what's happening. And we need to hedge against it, but we don't need to be suckered by it.
- [04:52]
A
You're already illustrating what many people say of your friends and your critics, which is you're an optimist. And we'll come on to why you're an optimist about the war in Ukraine in a second. But I want you take you back to it, beginning that war that has defined your time as head of the armed forces in Britain. You had conversations with your Russian counterparts just before the invasion, not long after you became chief of the defence staff. Did you look them in the eye? Did you ask them, are you going to do this?
- [05:25]
B
Absolutely. So I accompanied Ben Wallace to Moscow. I think it was about 10 days before the invasion. We've got superb intelligence agencies. We were really clear that Russia was preparing to invade Ukraine.
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A
Ben was Boris Johnson's Defence Secretary.
- [05:41]
B
He was the Defence Secretary at the time. So we went there for Ben Wallace to have a meeting with his opposite number, the Russian Defense Minister. Shoigu and I met with General Gerasimov. We've always said we won't go into the details of those conversations, but we were really clear in saying to Russia that we knew that they had plans to invade Ukraine. And we were also clear in telling them that it would be a disaster and it would be a huge mistake for them as a nation and it would be a tragic war for Russia and its people and that's the way that it's turned out.
- [06:20]
A
Did they lie to you and simply say, no, we're not?
- [06:23]
B
General Gerasimov was really clear in the very Russian way. We have no plans to invade Ukraine. Ukraine. And that was nonsense. When you're going on exercise, you don't take bloods with you. When you're going on exercise, you don't take mobile crematoria with you. Those were the things that Russia was doing. And you don't put 140,000 troops on the border of a country just because it's a big exercise. And I think the Russian tradition, I think there's a word vernaya or something like that, which is a kind of white light. I. I asked the question. I know that you're going to lie back to me. We have this conversation. We both know that there's a lie at the heart of this conversation. That was what it felt like you.
- [07:08]
A
Had to learn in this job, I suspect, to be not just an admiral, not just the leader of all the armed forces, but not quite a politician, but certainly an international diplomat as well.
- [07:21]
B
Well, you're helped by your service. Cheese. So you're head of the Navy, Army Air Force, and you're head of Strategic Command and you've got a deputy called the Vice Chief. So you've got a team of people that come from across all three services. And then you obviously get much closer to politicians and working with your Defence Ministers. And the big difference as Chief of Defence Staff is that you're the military advisor to both the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister. And that's. That's at the heart of the role.
- [07:50]
A
And I was interested in your valedictory speech in this job, you praise by name. I mean, I would expect you to say, oh, all the people I've served with, thank you Very much. But you praise by name Boris Johnson, who was Prime Minister at the time of the invasion, Ben Wallace. Yes. But also the Foreign Secretary at the time, Liz Truss. Why did you want to praise them? Why were they worthy of that praise?
- [08:12]
B
When the invasion came, they were really clear in terms of that political moment. How was the UK going to respond? So were we going to do another Crimea and look the other way, or were we actually going to respond and support Ukraine and Boris Johnson, Liz Truss, Ben Wallace, both philosophically, practically and politically were really clear that the role of the UK for this particular illegal invasion was to support Ukraine. And I've been fortunate. I've had four Prime Ministers, each has taken that position. And I would also reflect that Ukraine has never been a polarizing issue, I think, for the uk, and it definitely hasn't been politically. And Keir Starmer in opposition, John Healy, as the opposition Defense Secretary, equally took that view at the time. I think we should just acknowledge that it's been really clear and really helpful for someone like me.
- [09:17]
A
And that view was not the conventional wisdom in Whitehall, was it? It wasn't the conventional wisdom around European capitals that we should fight, we should fight for Ukraine. Nor indeed was it the conventional wisdom that that was a fight that could be won.
- [09:32]
B
I would describe it as a. It was a debate in terms of Whitehall as to how we should respond. You know that Russia's about to attack and you were almost waiting to hear. You then get a phone call in the early hours of the morning. You then go in and you meet with Ben Wallace, the Defence Secretary. It's about five o' clock in the morning. You take stop with your own team at 5:30, you go across the road to a COBRA which is being chaired by the Prime Minister. And the Prime Minister comes in and we've been debating it several days beforehand, and Boris Johnson came in and was really, really clear that we were going to be with Ukraine. And then what happened on that morning was it felt to me, it's almost like a political tsunami. You've given your advice, you've reflected on what the intelligence says, what might happen militarily and so on. But it's fundamentally a political moment and one of political leadership. And then that's supported by both the establishment, but especially the Prime Minister, then getting on the phone to European leaders. And what you saw on the 24th of February was the speed of response, which was not a response in the way that we'd seen with Crimea. It was this fresh response of the west saying, we are going to Support Ukraine.
- [10:54]
A
But people took some persuading, didn't they? I'm told that in Berlin, for example, when the intelligence from the UK was presented there, that didn't believe it. So it's not going to happen. He's not going to invade Kiev. Don't be ridiculous. He'll never do any such thing.
- [11:07]
B
So that, that felt to me like the period leading up to it, there was much more of an intelligence debate across Europe and interesting. The specter of Iraq came up and. Yeah. Have you got this wrong? Are you over egging? There were those challenges, those are good debates. We, with our closest partners were really clear that this was going to happen and then there was an acknowledgement by other nations when it did happen and then the system clicks into gear.
- [11:42]
A
Now you've talked of that, the fact you had four prime ministers, not ideal, let's be honest, for leadership through a war, but it meant that you've accompanied, I suspect each and every one of them on trips to Ukraine and got to know Zelenskyy rather well as well. What is that experience like when you get on that train, that long journey you have to make, unlike any other journey you would make around the world?
- [12:06]
B
Well, it's, it's, as you say, it's a longer time with the Prime Minister than you normally spend. It's one that's quite sobering because you're going into a war zone and you're going to meet a truly wartime leader. In terms of President Zelenskyy, you have a responsibility that is to support Ukraine. That is done principally through political leadership. And then you're applying that either with your intelligence agencies, with your diplomats, with your military support. So you're trying to pull that together to enable this conversation to happen between two leaders. And then it's very personal between the two leaders. And I would. The support for Ukraine has to be heart and head. It can't just be the sober Whitehall staff paper. This is what we should do in our national interest. Because when you then meet a leader who is at war, who has to manage both the war, the morale of his country, keeping the economy going, maintain this phenomenal international relationship so that the, the support continues, then that's both an emotional aspect as well as being a political leadership. When President Zelensky came to Chekers, Prime Minister Sunak, I think he spent an hour and a quarter in the Chekhas study, just the two of them, one on one, and if you look at, there was a photograph where they were about to board a Chinook helicopter and so on and it's a manhunk with Boris Johnson. It was, you know, there was a kind of. There's a bromance and sometimes I was the bad cop. Because it's easier for President Zelenskyy to maybe rail and push against the Chief of Defence Staff than it is to have an awkward conversation with the British Prime Minister.
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A
We'll talk about where Ukraine stands now in a second. I want to talk first though about how you got to that position. Because you weren't the obvious choice to be Chief of the Defence Staff. You were often referred to as an outsider. Not least because the guys making the appointment, Boris Johnson and Ben Wallace, they're old school, you know, Boris Johnson's an old Etonian. Ben Wallace went to Millfield posh public school and to Sandhurst. And you're a boy from Oldham who went to a state grammar school.
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B
Yeah. It's interesting. I never felt that way. I think. I think defense is a meritocracy. I think those politicians know the chiefs well. I think they've got a good choice. It could have been other chiefs. These are. These are good people. There's a bit of timing, there's a bit of luck. I'd be firstly, Lord. Well, I've been first.
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A
What's called radical. Radical.
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B
I don't know. Yeah, I've been firstly, Lord. For a couple of years. I'd tried to move the navy on. There was an element of shaking the navy up. Some of that was. Was difficult because it was in the middle of COVID Some of it was an ambition. We were becoming a carrier nation again. The carrier was. Was deploying on its inaugural deployment to the Far East. There was an ambition, I think the integrated review in 2021. This was a kind of post Brexit world. A talk of a global Britain that was. Wanted to go out into the world. That. That may be reflected. You know, I used to use the phrase in a global navy. Yeah, global Britain, global navy. That might have appealed to Boris Johnson.
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A
Yeah. Because it was his post Brexit vision, wasn't he? So you were saying the right things.
- [15:47]
B
It is, but I don't. I'd like to think that. That the military is apolitical and we support whomever is the British Prime Minister. And I also. But you think there's a good choice.
- [15:56]
A
In the armed forces, for example. I mean, in other words, quite often admirals, generals, they say, you know, father was at Sandhurst or father was at Dartmouth or wherever. Your dad was a computer salesman.
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B
Yes. I had an older brother who Joined the navy as a rating and served for a few years. I lived by the sea. That was part of the draw to join the Navy.
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A
Not ultimately should stress. You moved?
- [16:18]
B
No, moved. We moved to Bristol and used to. And lived in Portishead, near Bristol. But then I think you. Then you start your career and for me, one of the reasons why I stayed in. I was always curious as to where I would end up. I did a law degree at university. This was in the late 80s, when every law graduate could get a job in London. Your tutors were on good number to pick you to go with a large.
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A
Law firm and a large salary to.
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B
Boot, and so on. It felt, if I'm honest, it felt to me that if I'd gone down the lawyer route that I was reasonably confident that maybe I would make a partner in my 30s and so on. And there was something weird about that. I was in my early 20s and know where you might end up. I never knew where I would end up in terms of my naval career. And that curiosity, I think, has driven me all the way through and I've been incredibly lucky and have enjoyed it.
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A
You mentioned the timing and the timing is interesting, isn't it, because you're born at the height of the Cold war, in the mid-60s, two years after the Cuban Missile Crisis. You joined the Navy, what, 1990?
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B
1985. 1985. And then went off to university.
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A
But as the Cold War is coming to an end and the Berlin Wall Falls in 1989, pretty much most of your career in the armed forces has seen the armed forces in retreat, having to constantly make a case for themselves as to why we shouldn't just claim a defence dividend, cash in and say thanks very much. Peace in our time.
- [17:56]
B
Yes. So as well as making me feel really old, Neil, you're also reflecting what I think is a big moment, a turning point. So I'm definitely of that era of seeing the very end of the Cold War, then this period of a peace dividend. And what I think is much more significant than people have fully realized in terms of the turning point that we're now in. So the peace dividend is over. The Prime Minister Keir Starmer talks about we now have the new defence dividend. The figures have just been released. For the first time since the end of the Second World War, Europe is spending more on defence than America combined. Combined. This is extraordinary. That Hague summit of a couple of months ago, the Prime Minister committed to an increase in defence spending of over 50%. That's remarkable.
- [19:02]
A
Well, it's a remarkable commitment, but it isn't actually cash in hand, isn't it? Over the years, you've seen politicians come and go and make these sorts of, of promises, say we've got to reverse the cuts and so on and so forth. You must be a bit nervous as you hear of the pressure on the Chancellor now, the pressure to raise taxes, that for all the talk that we will spend 3% of our national output, 3% of GDP at that NATO summit, we're way off that figure. And it's an ambition at the moment, there's no plan to do it, is there?
- [19:37]
B
So we have a plan called the Strategic Defence Review, which is really clear about. We need to strengthen our armed forces. We need to continue with the ambition that we've currently got. We're renewing the nuclear deterrent, we're strengthening the army to make it right at the heart of NATO and make it much more lethal. We continue to invest in big programs like a sixth generation fighter for the Air Force. We're doing something again, incredibly significant. We're adjusting our nuclear posture so the Royal Air Force will once again become a nuclear service. We're investing in the modernization of defence, so all the digital, the connection, the data that flows around so that you can generate targets more quickly and you can prosecute those targets more quickly. So all of that is going on.
- [20:24]
A
Well, you say we are, but you're only doing it if the Chancellor finds the money and you've only got a little increase up till 2027. I suspect this year you've actually been making cuts still, haven't you?
- [20:34]
B
So I don't want to pretend that the 2000 and 20s won't continue to be difficult. They will be difficult. And these are era shifts. And my reflection is that Prime Ministers, governments of whatever hue, they take their first duty of government incredibly seriously. If, if you look at my time either as First Sealord or Chief of Defence, well, we've had increases with Boris Johnson, we then had the increase with the ambition under Liz Truss, we then had the increase with rishi Sunak to 2.5%. With Keir Starmer, you've had the acceleration of 2.5% to 2027. And then you've had this commitment to 3.5% by 2035. The piece that's different with that 3.5% commitment is the international commitment. And that this is an America demanding that Europe steps up. And it's a NATO that recognizes this era shift and the challenges, and therefore it's more than just a domestic thing, it's one that we internationally have to deliver on. And then that's. The delivery is over the next 10 years. And so it's not. I didn't want to pretend that next year we've got oodles more cash, but it's the trajectory and this shift and that's really significant.
- [21:55]
A
But you're speaking as if it's guaranteed. And I want to gently suggest to you that given the politics of the day, it's far from guaranteed. And are you convinced you've won the public over that if they. In a year or two time when the decision has to be made about how you get to that target of extra spending and they're told, yeah, we're spending more on defence, but we're spending less on this thing you like and we're taxing you more, are they really going to agree to spend on defence?
- [22:24]
B
So I think this is where you do get to a dilemma that politicians have. The decision about whether or not we should be spending more money on defence has to be a prime ministerial one, and it has to be decided and focused based on an assessment about the country's security. And you can't always make that clear to the public. And I think there's a dilemma. So my part of my job can't make what clear? So I think the dilemma is I'm the chief of defence. You've got this responsibility to keep the country safe. And we are safe. The UK is safe because we're a nuclear power, we're in NATO, we're in the biggest and strongest gun club ever. And our principal ally is America, the strongest nation on the planet. We're safe for now and for the next few years. But if you look ahead into the2030s, this competition is getting more fierce. Russia is dangerous and we have to strengthen and we have to strengthen collectively, and that isn't a popularity. So I could. I could, as the former Chief of Defence, or when I was Chief of Defence, I could do a speech next week and scare the British public. And that might make the politician's life much easier. It would not be the responsible thing to do and it would be what Putin wants. He wants to frighten our public.
- [23:52]
A
And yet your German counterpart, the chief of defence there, General Carsten Breuer, he said publicly, Russia wants to extend the war from Ukraine. He might attack Putin, he might attack the Baltic states by 2029. So effectively say to his people, we need to be ready for a war, because it would be a war involving Germany, involving Britain, because that would be an attack on a NATO member within a few years time.
- [24:17]
B
Yes. So I think we're all saying that the world is getting more dangerous, that we need to shift the precise date, which year and so on. I think that. And I also think we've got to. We've got to have this confidence in who we are and what our military strength is.
- [24:34]
A
And yes, I want to challenge your optimism, if I can, because lots of people accuse you of being too optimistic. As I say, when you describe how safe we are as a country. Yes, I understand. You say we're a nuclear power, for example, we're in an alliance. But then the third thing you say is, and we're the ally of the most powerful military force on the planet. Weren't you nervous about Donald Trump returning to office, given all that he'd said about NATO?
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B
Well, you then need to look at what's happened since he did come to power. So I was, to be clear, at.
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A
The time, you were nervous, were you?
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B
There was a debate. I think if you're, maybe if you're boring officials like senior military, where your relationship with the US military goes back decades. Same with our intelligence agencies, in the sense of we deploy together, we commanded each other's forces together, you then have these intelligence relationships. So maybe as that part of the establishment, which is less swayed by some of those commentaries. But the more important piece is then meeting with the US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, with our Secretary of Defence, John Healy, and the candid conversation where the US administration says very plainly that they do have new priorities, which is homeland defence and the Indo Pacific, that they are going to demand more of Europe. But this is not a stepping away.
- [26:04]
A
The doubt that I've heard from some very senior people is what if Donald Trump just changes his mind? He's one of the most mercurial individuals in power on the planet. His love of Britain, his words appears to rest on an admiration for the King and the Royal family. The fact he's got some golf courses here and that he struck up an unlikely friendship with Keir Starmer. What happens if someone offends him? I mean, look at what's happened to Modi, the Indian Prime Minister. Modi offends Trump because he hasn't done the right thing. He didn't go on air and say that Trump had brought peace to India and Pakistan. Modi is suddenly frozen out. There are mass tariffs against India and Modi heads off to Shanghai to be part of that support club for the Chinese. Are you not worried that this just rests on the personal whim of Donald Trump.
- [26:56]
B
So it's, I suppose, officials like my former role and those in the intelligence services and the heads of the armed forces as heads of the different services. I suppose our role is to look at this in a slightly more sober way. So not the froth of commentaries, but what is our lived experience. And then when you look at it through that lens, Nick, then the nuclear relationship continues, the intelligence relationship continues, the closeness of our militaries continues, the economic investment continues, the diplomacy continues, and so on. So, so, yes, I get the froth and the commentary and it's terribly exciting and so on. There's a dullness to national strategic interests and we have a mutuality with America, with our Western partners. We should be really confident of who we are, who our real friends are, who our partners are. And that's what I'm saying. I'm not saying the world is sugar coated and everything will be easy and so on. I'm just saying let's be confident and recognize where the economic power is, where the political and diplomatic power is and where the military power is. Okay? And that's what we've got. And we should be really confident in how we might use that and how we can protect ourselves from some of the concerns that are out there.
- [28:23]
A
And yet, I've got to keep saying, and yet, aren't I? What did you think when you saw Vladimir Putin given the red carpet treatment in Alaska by President Trump in return for. As far as we can tell, absolutely nothing.
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B
So if I look back when President Biden was the American president, then it was really clear there were four aspects in terms of the approach. Support Ukraine, impose a cost on Russia, maintain international unity and avoid escalation. And within that, and I think collectively, we've all been successful in meeting those four parameters. What's happened with President Trump is a new demand to say, how does this war end? And I think what you've seen is a British government, you've seen European governments, but most importantly, you're seeing a Ukraine government and President Zelensky saying that he's willing to done the enormous step, he's willing to have an unconditional ceasefire. So when I see President Trump meeting President Putin, I see it as part of this opportunity to try to end the war and bring peace and at least a ceasefire to Ukraine.
- [29:41]
A
Some say there are some brutal truths here. Ukraine will never regain its occupied land, certainly not by force. Time is always going to be on Russia's side, as is it dictatorship. Ukraine is running out of men and the public is losing patience. And Donald Trump is desperate for a ceasefire at pretty much any cost. What makes it sensible still to be an optimist?
- [30:04]
B
So, various factors. So the first one is that this war has been a disaster for Russia. Putin wanted less NATO, he's got more NATO. We've grown from 30 nations to 32 nations. Putin originally thought that he would subjugate Ukraine in days, if not weeks. That's clearly not the case. It's a facile description, but it's a really important one. If a snail had left Rostov on Don in Russia on 24 February 2022, by now it would have crossed all the way through Ukraine and it will be halfway through Poland. That's how difficult Russia is finding it, just to get those four oblasts. If Russia carries on at the pace that it currently is, it will take it 4.4 years to get the remaining territory in those four oblasts. And having lost a million people killed and wounded, it will lose a further 2 million people killed and wounded. So this is about Ukraine's bravery, Ukraine's courage, our support to Ukraine to keep them in the fight and to keep them imposing that cost on Russia. And then it's for President Zelensky to decide the intricacies of territorial settlements and whether some things are temporary and de facto and what becomes legal and de jure. And we've been really clear that we support Ukraine, and that's for Ukraine to decide. And then it's having the confidence, but also the recognition that Ukraine is not only fighting for its security, it's also a reflection of all of our security. So that's what's going on. And what's different? What's different? But what's different is an America that is willing to lean in even more to see if it can broke a peace. And then there's another set of preparations that if the ceasefire emerges, can we have a coalition of the willing? Is that. And that's being led by UK and France?
- [32:17]
A
Well, it's partly being led by you, isn't it, at the moment, or it was. While you were chief of the defence staff, you were joint military leader of this thing called the coalition of the willing. The countries that come together now, as we speak, the political leaders of all the countries involved in that are having this conversation about exactly what will happen next. You can't anticipate their decisions. Would you like in future still to be part of it, though? Could you play a role in the future?
- [32:45]
B
So the role of a former chief of Defence is to support the person on watch. So Rich Knighton is my successor. I wish him the very best. That feels like the dominant piece for me.
- [32:59]
A
I'm tempted to put the old Boris Johnson thing. If the ball were to come out the back of the scrum, you'd serve if there was a job to do.
- [33:06]
B
But only if it was a very different role to being Chief of Defence. And it doesn't embarrass the current Chief of Defence, so that's clear. But what's happening with the coalition of the willing is even bigger than Russia and Ukraine. It's much more about European security. This adjustment with America, the reassurance to America that Europe is taking more responsibility for its security. The energizing of Europe that this is the richest quartile on the planet, 500 million people. It's got all kinds of capabilities and strategic depth and let's use that to garner a better responsibility for our own security.
- [33:52]
A
Now, clearly, the high point of your time as Chief of Defence Staff was the decision to stand alongside Ukraine. The low point.
- [34:03]
B
There are various low points and difficulties when you're Chief of Defence and the same when you're head of a service.
- [34:10]
A
The Afghan data breach.
- [34:12]
B
So that was a difficult one. I think the most difficult are deaths. So whether that's deaths through training or deaths with accidents, there's a responsibility. I remember when I was First Sea Lord and the Royal Navy, we were responsible for a young army diver losing his life. You face that responsibility, you meet the family. Lance Corporal Partridge was his name. Those are the difficult moments. Another one was with Ukraine in September 2022, when we realized that Russia had shot at a rivet joint, a surveillance plane that was over the Black Sea, about 30 people on board, and the missile had missed the aircraft. And the second missile that Russia had fired from a rogue pilot failed to launch from the aircraft that. I got a heads up as I was leaving Washington. I then had a call on a secret line when we arrived at Heathrow. Those are the sobering moments.
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A
Do you come to dread answering the phone, looking at a message?
- [35:31]
B
No, I don't think you. It's not as intense as that.
- [35:38]
A
But there are moments when it can be. I mentioned the Afghan data breach because although people tend to focus now on the cost, and there's been talk of it costing more than a billion pounds, the leaking of the private details of 19,000 people who'd asked to come to the UK in order to flee the Taliban, accidentally leaked by an official in an email. There was also human cost, wasn't there. There are people who will have died as a result of that leak.
- [36:09]
B
I'm not sure that that's true and I actually think what you've seen is a remarkable, a remarkable ability to try to get people out of Afghanistan that we owe the responsibility to. So you saw that just before I took over with Operation Pitting and a phenomenal effort. And then you've seen. Well, you haven't seen. Then we've kept quiet the other effort that's been going on throughout my time to bring back more people to fulfill our responsibility.
- [36:42]
A
So I haven't been told. Sitting in a room which you were alongside the then Defence Secretary saying, we've accidentally leaked the details of almost 19,000 people and now we've got to get them out if we can.
- [36:55]
B
That's a, it's a shocking problem. You then go into your, you do what the Ministry of Defence does, which is that you bring in phenomenal people to say, right, how are we going to respond? There's a political aspect there, there's a legal aspect, there's a departmental one. How on earth did this happen? How do we make sure it doesn't happen again? Then there's the practical one, which is how are we going to get the people back that we need to get back?
- [37:25]
A
It is kind of mad that that can be in one email though, isn't it? That level of information, one click on.
- [37:32]
B
A computer, it's, I won't go into the detail, it's slightly more complicated than that, but I agree that it's a shocking deficiency that that amount of information was, was, was missed.
- [37:52]
A
I want to bring you back, if I could, to where we began the conversation because we spent most of our time talking about Pooh Putin, about Russia, about Ukraine, because it has dominated your time of Chief of the Defence Staff. But of course the military that was showing off its hardware this week, the military that was saying, look at what we can do, new inter ballistic missiles that could reach the United States, was not Russia, it was the country that is helping Russia, it is China that is the big power now. You visited China as the first chief of the Defence Staff to go in a, in a decade. And you'll know that after your speech you were then attacked by somebody who said, ah, that's an act of appeasement, said the formatory leader, Ian Duncan Smith. Was it right to go?
- [38:36]
B
Yes. It's even more important that P5 nations that nuclear powers have military to military relationships with other countries.
- [38:48]
A
I mean, forgive me, is the jargon for those who are on the Security Council.
- [38:51]
B
Yes. So of the UN and so it's important that we have military to military relations. It's important that you avoid miscalculation. It's important that you're an agent of the government. You're not going there as Tony Radic in off chance as the chief of defense. You're going there at the behest of the prime minister, having met with President Xi at, I think the g, the one of the, the summits last November. And that was on the list of things that might happen this year. And then you have sensible and frank conversations. And again, I won't go into the.
- [39:29]
A
Detail, but does Frank mean don't invade Taiwan?
- [39:33]
B
Frank means that you reflect on Russia going into Ukraine has not worked out as President Putin wanted. Frank means speaking military to military, that we have a responsibility to our political leaders to be honest about what's the art of the possible and what is the cost of trying to fulfill those political aims and that actually the real cost is in thousands of lives and that actually sometimes those political aims are much harder to achieve through the whim of deploying militaries than people want to believe.
- [40:15]
A
Having been there, having listened to what they say, do you fear, as William Hague, Lord Haig, the former conservative foreign secretary, said in the Times this week, that Xi, President Xi, may be calculating now that Taiwan, to quote him, will drop into the lap of the People's Liberation army without it having to fight, that what the Chinese will do is divide Taiwanese political and public opinion. They will convince the United States there's no need to have a fight over this. They will rely on the huge tariffs that Trump has put on the Taiwanese to make the Taiwanese think the game's up, we're not going to be defended by our Western allies. And the Chinese get what they've wanted for decades without ever having to fire a shot.
- [41:02]
B
I come back to maybe the Ukraine experience again. It's nations that decide whether or not they're going to reject invaders. It's nations that decide what they want their future to be. And that's what you're challenging when you glibly say that you're going to take over another nation or that that's what your ambition is and that's what you intend to do. And that I think the experience that we've seen is that. And it's true of Iraq, it's true of Afghanistan, it's true of Ukraine, this sort of geopolitical game of risk that you can subjugate countries with a whim. It's just not true.
- [41:54]
A
Is that a lesson for the Israelis as well?
- [41:57]
B
I think when you look at Israel and what it's done with Iran and some of the success that it's had in putting the nuclear program into the long grass, I think that would be a much clearer military type operation. Last October was really significant. Over a hundred, over 100 high tech jets, fifth generation jets, less than 100 munitions that took out Iran's air defenses. That then meant that Iran, Israel could contemplate further action against Iran. And you saw that earlier this year.
- [42:38]
A
That must have been quite an exciting moment for you as a military man. Do you remember hearing the news?
- [42:43]
B
We've been close enough to Israel to understand some of the things that they've been doing and how they go about it. So from a purely rumor has it.
- [42:52]
A
That you were dancing at the time when you got the call?
- [42:55]
B
No, that was, that was different. We were given the heads up that America was going to strike Iran. I was at a very smart party, about to, about to have a bop and do my worst dad dancing and then looked at my phone and you get these messages saying the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs wants to speak to you and wants to speak to you in 45 minutes time and it needs to be on a secret phone. Well, you know then that it's something quite serious. You then get the message about America is going to strike Iran. You then got this responsibility because you know that Iran's response might be to strike in the region. We've got people deployed in the region. So you speak to your chief of joint operations, you make sure the Prime Minister's aware, you make sure the Defense Secretary and the Foreign Secretary is aware. It's a slightly surreal moment because you go from, from, from party to sober reality.
- [43:56]
A
I don't want to remember what was playing at the time.
- [44:00]
B
I don't. And I again, because I know, I know that, I know what you're trying to do.
- [44:04]
A
I'm told it was murder on the nose.
- [44:06]
B
I know what you're trying to do and I definitely, certainly don't.
- [44:09]
A
As a serious point though, you've said that we can learn from the military success of Israel. Not in Gaza, not in Gaza, yes, but in Iran, for example, also against Hezbollah and Lebanon. In other words, as we look at our defense going forward, without making a moral judgment, but just looking at what can be achieved militarily, is there quite a lot to learn from that conflict?
- [44:34]
B
There's a lot to learn, particularly the Israeli penetration of those terrorist organizations. Then the willingness to act and in the military terms, the success of those. So taking down Lebanese Hezbollah in Lebanon, taking on the Houthis, putting the Iran's nuclear program much further to the right. Militarily, there are things that we need to learn. And again, some of the relationships that you have as a UK Chief of Defence are extraordinary in terms of your insights on how you're used. One of the other slightly bizarre conversations was the Israeli Chief of defense getting in touch to ask me to speak to the Lebanese Chief of defense. He's now their president. Lovely man, Joseph Aoun. But to say, can you. Can you let the Lebanese Chief of defense know that we will go into Lebanon, we won't go further than five miles, but he needs to remove all of the Lebanese army from that, from that board, from the border posts and to clear at least five miles. You then again, these are extraordinary conversations because you're then ringing up a fellow chief, in effect, to say your country is about to be invaded. And again, it's a remarkable position to be in remarkable trust that you're held in. And then you have these really difficult conversations and that. That again, it's a feature of UK's Place with our intelligence agencies and with our military in terms of how we broker and how we operate with other nations.
- [46:34]
A
You are now retiring from that job, although not, of course, retiring per se. It's going to be very hard to give up that sort of insight, that sort of contact, isn't it? Have you been warned there'll be a sort of grieving process that my phone isn't the one that's going off. I'm not the person who has to make the trip.
- [46:54]
B
Yes, I'm fortunate. I've got four boys between 19 and 27 who I think are quite proud of their dad, but they're sort of refreshingly dismissive. So they made the point at the weekend. Dad, you do realise after you've handed over, you'll be Tony who. I think that's healthy. I think that's correct. I go back to. I think it was Roosevelt. The privilege is having been in the arena and it's the same when you're in command. It's not to then be a bit mournful that you're no longer center stage. So I think that's good. There's an element of decompression and stepping away and there's an element of recognizing that this was. You're very fortunate to have these positions, your privilege. And the other phenomenal sense is that you. The speech I gave in the Ministry of defence was this reflection that in these roles you stand on the shoulders of giants, the men and women that serve our country, whether in uniform or civil servants, and temporarily you're allowed to stand on their shoulders, and that these people have got your back, have got the nation's back. And that's the big reflection.
- [48:13]
A
Admiral Suetoni Radikin, thank you very much for joining me on Political Thinking.
- [48:16]
B
Thank you very much.
- [48:18]
A
I don't know about you, but listening to Admiral Suttoni, I'm pretty confident that that will not be the last we'll be hearing from him. This fight alongside Ukraine against Russia was clearly much more than a job. It is a passion. It is his belief. And if he can continue to serve in some way, I'm pretty confident he will. Now, this is the first in a whole series of conversations, rather news interrogations, for a new series of political thinking. All of my previous interviews can be listened to on BBC Sounds, and they come not just with politicians, but people like the admiral who served alongside them, who've advised them or who want to make a difference to the decisions made in our political life. Quick shout out to Amal Rajan for his new podcast, Radical. This week in a fascinating interview, speaks to Dario Amade, the CEO and co founder of the AI company Anthropic, about how that technology is transforming our world, its potential and the risks that it poses. Do subscribe to Political Thinking and indeed to Radical on BBC Sounds or wherever you're listening to. Make sure each new episode drops into your feed. The producer is Daniel Kramer, the editor is Giles Edwards and the studio manager this week was Gareth Jones.
- [49:40]
B
I'm Kate lamble and from BBC Radio 4, this is Derailed the Story of HS2.
- [49:48]
A
It's the tale of a railway which divided British Britain.
- [49:51]
B
An ambitious idea brought down by political reality and what it tells us about why we struggle to build a better future. We'll hear the inside story of how the dream of HS2 was created before.
- [50:04]
A
It morphed into a political nightmare and national punchline.
- [50:08]
B
The absurd spectacle of a hundred million pound bat tunnel holding up the country's.
- [50:14]
A
Single biggest infrastructure project through backroom deals. Bat tunnels and the reality of power in the uk. Listen first on BBC Sounds.