A (2:55)

Well, not everybody agrees with that. Russia doesn't agree with that.

B (2:58)

Yes. Okay. Yes. Fair point. Russia. Russia doesn't agree with that. I guess one question I was left with is there are other AI powered and autonomous weapons being developed. I'm curious, from your perspective, you know, what does this agreement leave uncovered? Or what questions do we still have?

A (3:16)

Sure. I mean, between the United States and its adversaries, there's not really even agreement on foundational definitions. Stuff like, what is an autonomous weapon? The United nations had a group of governmental experts that tried to work on that for many, many years. Then they changed it and said, actually, we're not trying to define it, we're trying to ban it. And they couldn't reach an agreement on either. So the United States has a definition of autonomous weapons. It really focuses on autonomy in the selection and engagement of targets, not other functions that you could conceivably be autonomous in. And that has reached some degree of partial consensus census, at least among the more than 50 countries who have signed on to the United States political declaration on the use of autonomy and weapons systems. But China is not a party to that political declaration and has signaled no interest whatsoever in restrictions on autonomous weapons.

B (4:12)

And so what does that mean? I mean, is there still, you know, after this agreement, anxiety in the defense and kind of natsec community about how China might be using this technology in weaponizing potentially this technology?

A (4:24)

Yes, I think there is a great deal of concern into how China is approaching AI in its military systems and autonomy in its military systems. And that's because of both the things that they might do that might be unnecessarily risky or irresponsible, and also because of the things that they might do that would be simply effective. The United States believes that artificial intelligence is critical to future leadership in military technology. And Chinese leaders believe the exact same thing. So that's what we're thinking about as we look at agreements like this. Can we have some guardrails on the most extreme and unreasonable mixtures of AI and weapons systems? And so nuclear weapons is in some sense a logical place to start there.

B (5:06)

Got it. I'm curious. The timing of this obviously comes as we're expecting a change in administration. The Trump administration has already started to lay out its lineup of national security and foreign diplomacy folks, a lot of China hawks among them. I wonder, what are the chances that any agreement, any commitment that has been made here just sort of gets walked back by the US when this new administration comes to power?

A (5:33)

Sure. So I want to emphasize that this is an agreement in terms of public statement of views. This is not a treaty. This is not an arms control mechanism.

B (5:43)

Right.

A (5:44)

Merely. China has stated publicly that they believe that humans should be in control over the decision to use nuclear weapons. Now, they could be hypocrites and go build a system that does precisely that thing that they said would be bad. And this does not include any arms control, verification, or mechanism for us to detect that, much less prevent that. So it is a pretty modest thing. But it is useful, I think, to have China on the record as stating this is what they think would be good, and then we can work from that to see if in the future there might be some future agreement that would be possible. But frankly, I'm skeptical of that. Not just because of the electoral outcome, but also because of the nature of the Chinese regime and their historical reluctance to participate in any nuclear arms treaties.

B (6:32)

Is that just because they don't want to tie their hands or what's the motivation there?

A (6:37)

I think so far, Chinese leaders have seen arms control as a trick of the powerful to hold back those who are less powerful, sort of agreements that affect us, but don't necessarily affect you. And so they've just been skeptical of the whole enterprise for many, many decades now.

B (6:57)

When you describe this agreement as sort of modest but useful, I'm kind of reminded of many conversations I've had over the last four years where there have been conversations between the US And China, and they're not necessarily super significant outcomes, but people tell me the fact that they're talking is kind of a win or progress in and of itself. And I'm curious, with this being Biden's last meeting with Xi as president, is he leaving office, having moved the ball on this relationship between the US And China?

A (7:30)

Oh, yes. I mean, I think the Biden administration took many actions that changed the nature of the US Chinese relationship. I think overall, one of the things that the Biden administration had to communicate very strongly and very consistently was that we were in a new era of US China relations, and we were not going to magically go back to the period that we were in. In the 1990s and the 2000s, there was some part of the Chinese foreign policy community that sort of had delusions that, well, now that Trump is gone, can we go back to the way things were? And I think what Biden had to say is like, no, things are never going back to the way they were. And part of the reason why they're not going back to the way they were is the experience in the late Obama administration. So, for example, that the Obama administration reached an agreement with the Chinese regime on cybersecurity, espionage for commercial purposes. And the Chinese were violating that agreement before the ink was really even dry in the second Obama administration. And so one of the things that the Biden administration pointed out was they were not trying to reach new signed agreements with China. They were not trying to reach new treaties with China. They were just trying to clarify the relationship, establish means of modest communication where they could state, if China you do this, we will interpret it this way, that sort of clarity of communication, which is a very modest goal. And then on these other areas, like what we were just talking about in terms of this public statement on maintaining human control, that again, is just trying to get China to publicly articulate its views, something that we can perhaps hold them to in future negotiations and discussions. Stay Connected with new Location Sharing Features Coming soon to Snapchat's Family Center Snapchat's In App parental tools that help families stay connected, Request your teens location and share yours back to help keep everyone in the family up to date on each other's comings and goings. Review privacy settings together and have conversations about what choices work best for your family.

B (9:52)

You know, talking about kind of going back, we may not be going back to the 90s or 2000s. I do wonder now if we're going back to 2016, 2018 with Trump coming back into the White House. And you know, by most accounts, kind of the AI voices close to him are particularly focused on defense and national security when it comes to setting AI policy. And when you combine that with kind of China hawks in the Senate and the House, I wonder what you're expecting from this incoming administration when it comes to China and tech.

A (10:25)

Sure. I mean, I think there's multiple voices in the room on AI policy at the moment, and we won't have perfect clarity on what route the Trump administration is going to take in its first year in office. Until we see some of the people who have been put in various job positions, that's when you learn a lot about about what the Trump administration is going to pursue. But when I talk about that diversity of voices, think about, for example, Elon Musk. Elon Musk said around five years ago that advances in AI research were at risk of summoning the demon, basically saying that AI was an existential threat to humanity. Elon Musk was on record supporting the recent draft California legislation, AI safety regulation, that Governor Gavin Newsom ultimately vetoed. Other parts of the Republican coalition have been much, much more skeptical of regulation across a much more diverse set of outcomes. I do think one Area where there is consistency is around AI and energy as a nexus that when soon to be president again. Donald Trump was asked on the campaign trail about artificial intelligence. He almost always brought the conversation back to energy and the need to remove regulations that were preventing folks from constructing massively energy intensive data centers or the power plants that would provide electricity to those data centers. Energy leadership and AI leadership are really seen as synonymous when it comes to the China relationship specifically. I do think you're correct that that will be primarily seen in national security terms.

B (11:59)

I'm curious what you think the first move is that Trump should make when it does come to China and tech when he takes office. There's certainly a long list of things he could do. I'm curious, if you were tapped or asked for your input, what would it be?

A (12:13)

Well, I do think it's worth pointing out that he's already stated what his first move was going to be. And that's broad across the board tariffs on China to, I think it's fair to say, dramatically reduce the scale of imports of Chinese goods and services in the United States. That's what he sort of stated is going to be his first goal. If it was me, and this is just an issue that I'm personally invested in, I would want him to take a hard look at the policy of semiconductor export controls on the chips that are used to train and operate large AI models, as well as the equipment that is used to operate those chips. The Biden administration actually built upon moves that the Trump administration made in 2018, 2019 and 2020 in this era. But that policy really needs to be multilateral to be successful. And the Biden administration has really succeeded in bringing on US Allies to participate in that policy. And so, as the Trump administration thinks about, how do you not just seem tough on China, but how do you actually be tough on China? How do you create problems for China when it comes to trade and technology? Being multilateral is a really important part of that story.

B (13:25)

Well, that was a key difference between how the Biden administration and the Trump administration seemed to approach China. In a lot of areas, their policies were the same, including, you know, Biden never removed tariffs that Trump put in place on China. But the Biden administration seems to have been much more proactive and open to this idea of working with partners. Whereas Trump administration was often content to kind of go it alone, I guess. Are you anticipating that the go it alone strategy might be coming back?

A (13:56)

It's very tough to predict here. Of course, Trump as a candidate was more than willing to criticize American allies for not spending enough on defense, for taking advantage of United States generosity in other areas. So in many ways, Trump has been critical of US Allies, which sometimes can make it hard to bring them along.

B (14:16)

Right.

A (14:17)

But sometimes that criticism is justified. I would take, for example, the government of Taiwan, which I think it's fair to say in the face of aggressive criticism by Donald Trump, is now looking to dramatically increase its defense spending and to do that mostly by purchasing US Weapons systems. So the carrot and the stick can both be an effective approach to coalition building. One other thing that's worth pointing out that the Biden administration benefited from, and I don't mean benefit in absolute terms, I just mean in this narrow sense of maintaining the coalition, was Russia's invasion of Ukraine and China's backstopping of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I think that very much clarified the stakes in the minds of any many US Allies when they saw here was a direct threat to European peace, prosperity and security. And here was China not only unwilling to criticize Russia's actions, but taking many, many, many steps to make life easier for Russia as they perpetrated this assault on Europe. And that I think was a massive wake up call to the entire European foreign policy community, not just on Russia, but also on China.

B (15:29)

You mentioned how already there's this expectation that Trump will put sweeping tariffs on US trade partners, particularly 60% tariffs on China. That's something he talked about on the campaign trail. I wonder if there is an escalation of the trade war with Beijing as Trump has talked about. Tech has really been a centerpiece in many ways in this rivalry for so long. I know there are concerns that potential retaliation from China could take aim at tech and other sensitive sectors for you. Does this sort of coming trade war, if you will, cast doubt on the future of some of these handshake agreements and general sort of attempts at more bilateral engagement that we've seen in the last four years.

A (16:18)

Oh, yes. I think it's worth pointing out that just in terms of their approach to diplomacy, China very frequently will walk away from every negotiating table if they're mad at you about one particular issue. China will say, you know, we don't like what you're doing in X topic. And so we're completely unwilling to talk to you about unrelated why topic. And so the fact I was, when I was in the Department of defense in 2018, 2019 and 2020, I recall that we had some defense policy coordination talks that were shut down specifically because China was mad at the United States across a whole host of issues and so didn't even want to talk. I think that is a big difference between the United States and China and frankly, even the United States and Russia is the US Sort of learning experience from the Cold War was even adversaries can benef from talking to each other. And China doesn't really come from that historical diplomatic tradition. And they're much more willing to just say if we're mad at you, we don't want to talk to you.

B (17:21)

Well, listen, Gregory, appreciate you making time for us on Politico Tech.

A (17:25)

Hey, thanks for having me.

B (17:30)

That's all for today's Politico Tech. If you enjoy Politico Tech, be sure to subscribe. And for more tech news, subscribe to our newsletters, Digital Future Daily and Morning Tech. Our managing producer is Annie Reese. Our producer is Afraid Abdullah. I'm Stephen Overlea. See you back here tomorrow.