Why Pick a Fight With Iran Now?

Summary

---

Podcast Summary: Radio Atlantic — "Why Pick a Fight With Iran Now?"

Date: February 26, 2026
Host: Hanna Rosin (A)
Guests: Nancy Youssef (C), Tom Nichols (E)

---

Episode Overview

This episode of Radio Atlantic explores the escalating tensions between the United States and Iran, examining the military buildup in the region, the dynamics of U.S.-Iran negotiations, and the underlying lack of clarity about American objectives. The hosts and guests analyze the possible motives behind the Trump administration’s actions, the limits of military intervention, and the risks of entering a conflict with unclear ends. Notably, they question why this potential confrontation seems to be happening now and whether there are viable “off ramps” through diplomacy.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The State of U.S.-Iran Negotiations ([00:07]–[06:58])

• Negotiation Scope & Mismatched Agendas
  • The U.S. seeks talks on Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and proxy forces, while Iran wants to restrict negotiations to its nuclear program only.
  • "The overlap on that Venn diagram though, is the future of its nuclear program." — Nancy Youssef ([02:20])
• Military Pressure & Ambiguity
  • The significant U.S. military buildup may serve as pressure, but it surpasses what’s typical for mere leverage.
  • No clear, shared outcome or specific "off ramp" has been established for either side.
  • "There should be some understanding of what could get us to that point. And I think the lack of clarity on that makes it hard...to get a sense of what's the off ramp." — Nancy Youssef ([04:40])
• Limits of Military Strikes
  • U.S. claims to have "obliterated" Iran’s nuclear program are challenged by reporting and satellite imagery.
  • Military action cannot erase the technical knowledge or intent behind a nuclear program.
  • "These programs don't end through strikes alone." — Nancy Youssef ([08:38])

2. Military Preparedness & Constraints ([08:42]–[15:14])

• Current U.S. Posture
  • Approximately 40,000 U.S. troops in the region, but nothing near Iraq invasion levels (170,000+ troops in 2003).
  • The U.S. lacks capacity for "every option," notably regime change or full invasion.
  • "We don't have the capability, for example, to go in and remove the leadership of Iran or put in a regime change..." — Nancy Youssef ([10:18])
• Allies’ Reluctance
  • U.S. partners are hesitant; Gulf states don’t want U.S. jets launching from their bases due to fears of Iranian retaliation.
  • "So far, this is a US Only operation in terms of military assets in the region." — Nancy Youssef ([14:28])
• Signals to Watch
  • Signs of imminent strikes include evacuation of U.S. troops and non-essential personnel.
  • "That's the most tangible signal that I can think of...that we're going to see strikes." — Nancy Youssef ([15:27])

3. Pentagon Perspective & Strategic Questions ([16:45]–[28:08])

• Military’s Key Concern: Lack of Strategic Clarity
  • The core question facing Pentagon leadership: What is the goal? What is the end state?
  • "Why are we doing this? What is the goal here? What is the objective?...What is the end state? What is the...resolution that tells us when we're done?" — Tom Nichols ([17:00])
• Strategy Requires Constraints & Clarity
  • Without clear objectives, the military can't appropriately plan or resource operations.
  • U.S. munitions are depleted due to other commitments (Israel, Ukraine), raising concerns about sustainment in a prolonged conflict.
  • "One definition of strategy is choice within constraints...if you have no constraints, you don't need a strategy." — Tom Nichols ([19:52])
• Communicating with Civilian Leadership
  • Generals express constraints through stockpile and alliance concerns to push for clarity, not by demanding strategy explicitly.
  • "Putting it in these stark terms and then letting it leak. To me, that seems like a strategy on [General Kaine]'s part." — Tom Nichols ([21:12])
• Speculated Presidential Motivation
  • Trump is thought to desire regime change, but hopes it can be achieved quickly and without full-scale intervention—“regime change on the cheap.”
  • "I think what he really wants is regime change...hoping to do regime change on the cheap." — Tom Nichols ([22:25])
• Risks of a “Mafia-style” Foreign Policy
  • Analogous to "The Godfather," Trump may view international relations as a demonstration of dominance for glory and reputation.
  • "He thinks of himself as the head of the commission, that he's the senior boss of the five families...there's an issue of glory involved here." — Tom Nichols ([25:51])
• Biggest Worry: Escalation Without Exit
  • Concern that a leader motivated by ego and lacking strategic planning escalates conflict with no clear exit plan.
  • "He will start the ball rolling on something that starts to turn into a larger conflict and that his answer...is just keep getting bigger hammers every time." — Tom Nichols ([27:20])

---

Notable Quotes

• "The overlap on that Venn diagram, though, is the future of its nuclear program."
  — Nancy Youssef ([02:20])

• "There should be some understanding of what could get us to that point. And I think the lack of clarity on that makes it hard...to get a sense of what's the off ramp."
  — Nancy Youssef ([04:40])

• "These programs don't end through strikes alone."
  — Nancy Youssef ([08:38])

• "We don't have the capability...to go in and remove the leadership of Iran or put in a regime change..."
  — Nancy Youssef ([10:18])

• "Why are we doing this? What is the goal here? What is the objective?...What is the end state?"
  — Tom Nichols ([17:00])

• "One definition of strategy is choice within constraints...if you have no constraints, you don't need a strategy."
  — Tom Nichols ([19:52])

• "He thinks of himself as the head of the commission, that he's the senior boss of the five families...there's an issue of glory involved here."
  — Tom Nichols ([25:51])

• "He will start the ball rolling on something that starts to turn into a larger conflict and that his answer...is just keep getting bigger hammers every time."
  — Tom Nichols ([27:20])

---

Important Timestamps & Segments

• [00:07] – Episode opening: Setting the scene for US-Iran talks and the military backdrop
• [01:52] – Interview with Nancy Youssef begins (military buildup, negotiation positions)
• [04:40] – Discussion of lack of diplomatic clarity and off-ramps
• [08:38] – Limitations of military strikes against Iran's nuclear program
• [10:18] – Capabilities/limits of US military options in the region
• [14:28] – Lack of allied support and coalition-building
• [15:27] – Practical 'war watch' signals
• [16:45] – Tom Nichols shares Pentagon perspective; strategic questions
• [19:52] – Explanation of strategic constraints (munitions, alliances)
• [22:25] – Discussion of Trump's possible regime change objective
• [25:51] – “Mafia worldview” analogy for Trump's strategic thinking
• [27:20] – Risks of escalation without a clear exit strategy

---

Tone & Language

The episode maintains a measured, analytical, and sometimes skeptical tone. Both Nancy Youssef and Tom Nichols emphasize the uncertainties, the dangers of poorly defined objectives, and the gap between rhetoric and reality surrounding possible U.S. actions against Iran. The language is direct but thoughtful, often highlighting the gap between policy pronouncements and practical military or diplomatic realities.

---

Memorable Moments

• The comparison between the current military buildup and the 2003 Iraq invasion clearly illustrates the limits of current U.S. capabilities.
• Tom Nichols’ analogy likening international affairs to "The Godfather" offers a striking (and slightly humorous) perspective on the psychology behind U.S. foreign policy decisions.
• The pointed and recurring question: “Why now?” underscores the unclear urgency behind the administration’s posture.

---

This episode provides listeners with critical tools to analyze the headlines, highlighting the complexity of the current U.S.-Iran standoff and the risks of pursuing conflict without clear goals or broader strategic planning.

Transcript

[A]

Today we're talking about a potential war with Iran, which is a fast shifting situation. We're recording this episode on Wednesday afternoon, a day before the US And Iran are scheduled to hold talks in Geneva ahead of the negotiation, Iranian officials are giving mixed messages, calling Trump's remarks about Iran big lies, but also saying they hope the two sides can come to an agreement through diplomacy. US Special envoys Steve Witkoff and the President's son in law, Jared Kushner, are meeting with Iran's top negotiator, Abbas Arakchi, along with a mediator from Oman. The backdrop of these talks, meanwhile, includes dozens of U.S. warships and military aircraft recently moved to the region and aimed at Iran, which are possibly a tool to put pressure on Iranian leaders to yield the negotiations, but also it's a bigger buildup than you would typically use for just that purpose. I'm Hanna Rosen. This is Radio Atlantic. President Trump has given many signals lately that he's prepared to go to war with Iran, but very little clarity about what the goal of that war would be.

[B]

My preference is to solve this problem through diplomacy.

[A]

His State of the Union this week was just a repeat of what he said before.

[B]

But one thing is certain. I will never allow the world's number one sponsor of terror, which they are far, to have a nuclear weapon. Can't let that happen.

[A]

Earlier this week, there were reports that General Dan Kaine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, had raised concerns to the President about the scale and risks of the operation in Iran. Today we talked to staff writer Tom Nichols about what military leadership might be thinking right now. But first, ready?

[C]

I'm ready.

[A]

Staff writer Nancy Youssef, who's been tracking the military buildup in the region. Nancy, welcome to the show.

[C]

Great to be with you.

[A]

What conversations have already happened like what do we know is up for negotiation? What do we expect at the talks?

[C]

So it kind of depends on who you ask. If you talk to the Americans, they would say that they want the talks to include several sort of categories. First, the future of Iran's nuclear program. Second. Second, the future of its ballistic missile capability. Third, the use of its proxies across the region. The Iranians would say that the talks have to focus strictly on their nuclear program, that asking them to limit their ballistic missile capability goes against their sovereignty and their ability for self defense. So it depends on who you ask in terms of what specifically has been outlined. The overlap on that Venn diagram, though, is the future of its nuclear program. Having said that, the US has called for a complete Disarmament, which the Iranians have rejected, saying that that would be a threat to them and that they would maintain the program. And so even though we know that they agree that nuclear program is part of the talks, what is an acceptable outcome? We haven't heard publicly at least an agreement on what that would look like. If, for example, the United States agreed to the Iranians limiting their program for the next three to five years, would that be an acceptable outcome for the United States? As the administration's laid it out right now, it would not be.

[A]

Okay, so help me read between the lines here because you have experience following negotiations like this. Is this typical or is this massively wide Gulf in which nobody's even agreeing on what they're talking about?

[C]

I wouldn't describe any of this as typical because we've built up so such a big military force in the region and the threat of force is so imminent. And then on the specifics of the talks, usually let's use the agreement from 2015. It's a months long process that's really deep into the details of their program. So Ernie Moniz, Secretary of Energy at the time, was at those talks because he's an expert on the topic. And so I think one of the reasons you're seeing this gap is that the talks as they've been outlined so far don't appear to be as detailed as I think would be useful to sort of close that gap in terms of working out what's an acceptable outcome.

[A]

So how do you interpret that? Like they've given themselves. It sounds like from what you're saying, less time than they need. And there are a huge number of issues. What does that translate into for you?

[C]

Because of the lack of details? I don't think it's clear what an acceptable outcome would look like. If the point of these talks ultimately is to avoid the use of military force to remove threats as the United States sees them, then there should be some understanding of what could get us to that point. And I think the lack of clarity on that makes it hard for those of us watching to get a sense of what's the off ramp.

[A]

I see. So it hasn't been clear. Okay, if they do this, then we pull back. We don't know what the this is in that scenario. Okay, and what about from the Iran side? Have we seen them budge in negotiations like this in the past?

[C]

So the Iranians have always been pretty firm that they would not give up their program altogether. That that's just an unacceptable line. Having said that, we have heard from them throughout the week that they are interested in a diplomatic solution. But I think they have shown themselves to be skilled negotiators, both in the details of the agreement, but also in buying time for themselves, because for them, time is essential if their goal is to avoid US Military action.

[A]

Right. So it sounds like there still could be off ramps.

[C]

I think that's the hope. I mean, the President in the State of the Union said that he wants to see diplomacy first. He said that he. He doesn't believe that the Iranians have sort of said the right thing, that he thinks they want a deal. We've heard from inside the Pentagon that there are concerns about some of the second and third order effects that could come from military strikes. It is a costly prospect. And frankly speaking, the United States conducted strikes last June. And while the President has said they obliterated the nuclear program, Stephen Wytkoff came out and said that they could pose a threat within a week. And so we have seen from the administration themselves the limitations of these strikes in terms of achieving the outcome, which is an Iran that doesn't pose a nuclear threat. And so because of all that, you would think that there would be a hope of finding some pathway in which both sides can feel that they have come out on top, short of what could be a protracted, costly, and consequential military action.

[A]

Mm. Let's get into what you just mentioned, because Trump did the same thing, he repeated again in the State of the Union this week, that the US Obliterated the nuclear program and also said they had to go in and make sure Iran had no nuclear weapons. So how do you make sense of that? What does that add up to?

[C]

That they didn't obliterate the nuclear program.

[A]

Okay, but does it add up to that A military action can't obliterate a nuclear program?

[C]

Yes. Okay, and I'll unpack that. Look, let's say the president's right and that the strikes completely eliminated those programs, those facilities, their capability. Okay? That alone doesn't stop their ambition to have a nuclear program. It doesn't remove all the scientists who can rebuild it. So this is not a problem that can be solved strictly through military action, because military action can't deal with those other two factors. But also, we know that it didn't happen the way that the President has described it in terms of a total elimination of the program, that while there was damage, we have seen the Iranians through satellite images, rebuilding it. And so at face value of the President's statement, you can't call that an obliteration of the program. And if you believe, as the evidence would suggest, that there was damage but not obliteration, then also military strikes in and of themselves don't work.

[A]

Right. So essentially these talks are necessary to achieve the goal. If the goal is, you know, limited to the nuclear program, we haven't talked about other potential goals. Then you need these diplomatic talks to get there.

[C]

That's right. These programs don't end through strikes alone.

[A]

Right. And do you get the sense from sources in the Pentagon that they are putting faith in these negotiations to change anything?

[C]

I get the sense from the Pentagon that they were prepared to send as many resources as possible in part in the hopes that their presence would serve as a form of leverage and that they are in the best position possible to defend themselves. Roughly 40,000 U.S. troops in the region, in addition to the thousands now on these aircraft carriers, destroyers, and then on the fighter jets. So they first and foremost want to defend themselves, carry out whatever objective the President outlines. But I wouldn't say that they are hopeful because that's not sort of their job in a way. Their job is sort of preparedness for multiple outcomes. I think the challenge they're having is the same when the public is having is there hasn't been a clear articulation of what the US Wants to achieve. And without that clear objective, it is harder for the military to make plans. Right. Objectives sort of set the agenda for their strike plans. And so until that is outlined, how long does the United States give the Iranians to reach a deal? How much patience does the President have for talks if they fail? What are the military options? What is the US Hoping to achieve through those military options? That hasn't been in my mind clearly articulated such that you see a military planning towards it.

[A]

Right. So all we know is that right now they're preparing for every possible option.

[C]

Not every, because they don't have enough. For example, we don't have the 170,000 U.S. and allied ground troops that we did in the run up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Right. We don't have the capability, for example, to go in and remove the leadership of Iran or put in a regime change such that we are there and able to shape that post outcome. They're preparing for an outcome where it's the same strikes over targets, potentially nuclear targets, potentially ballistic missile and other defense targets, I would say, and potentially to go after leadership from the air.

[A]

I didn't know that, what you just said, that we don't have those potential troops because it seems as if we sometimes talk like we do, like that every option is possible, that we could accomplish whatever we needed to in Iran.

[C]

No, it's such a great point. So right now we have two carriers in the region, more than 120 aircraft and drones, and roughly 40,000 ground troops. In the run up to the 2003 invasion, we had five carriers, multi fold more aircraft and 170,000 US and allied troops assigned to go in Iraq. That's the difference in scale. That doesn't mean that this is small. It's one of the largest military builders we've seen since 2003, but it is not on the same scale of 2003.

[A]

So one option, of course, is that Trump is using the buildup as a threat to force Iran's hand at the negotiating table. What do you think of that theory?

[C]

Steven Wykoff said as much. He said in an interview with Fox earlier this week that the president was curious that the presence of US Military forces near their shores wasn't enough to lead to a capitulation of some kind. So they've said that. I would argue that that's a fundamental misreading of the Iranians in that the Iranians see the threat to their program as an existential threat and are prepared to risk war to protect it and are prepared to suffer casualties, arguably more than we are prepared to suffer casualties to dismantle it. So it was revealing to me in terms of how they're revealing the Iranians, if what Stephen Witkoff is saying, saying is an accurate description of the President's position. The other thing I would note is if the use of force is designed to be leveraged and let's assume that I'm wrong and they're right and they've read the Iranians correctly, it is a very, very large presence for leverage. I think the accurate way to think about it is that at one point it was potentially a form of leverage. But they're also there in place to be ready to go should negotiations fail.

[A]

You know, a basic question, why the urgency? Why is this happening now?

[C]

That is the question, and I don't fully know the answer. There are pieces of it that we know. You remember at the end of December 2025, we saw remarkable protests that were happening across Iran and a bid by Iranians to change the leadership within their own country amid real economic hardship. And at that time the president sent out a social media posts saying that we were coming to help. And the Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group started moving towards the region. And then Protests were put down, frankly by the Iranians. Potentially great cost. The estimates are anywhere from 3 to 30,000 killed in the push to end those protests. And then we started hearing this discussion about needing to strike a deal. I don't know if it's a scenario where the president started on this path with one goal in mind, thinking that the regime was in trouble and that there was an opportunity for the US with just a little bit of help could sort of tip the scales in the protesters favor. And it's expanded to something else. That's one potential one, but there hasn't been an articulation for the urgency.

[A]

Now, okay, let's say there is a strike. Is the US on their own in this scenario or do they have backing?

[C]

Well, that's a great question. So far, we haven't heard allied support. We've heard from Gulf partners in the region that they don't want US Military jets taking off from bases in their countries because they're worried about potential retaliatory strikes by the Iranians. We haven't seen an effort by the United States to build a coalition of nations that could help. Now, could some be doing intelligence sharing? Potentially, that might be one way. But in terms of military assets, this is not like the US Campaign against Yemen where you saw a few allied partners support those strikes. So far, this is a US Only operation in terms of military assets in the region.

[A]

You and other national security reporters have essentially been on war watch for the past few weeks. So what kind of signals are you going to be tracking while we all wait to see what happens next?

[C]

So there aren't many. The one practical one that comes to mind for me is if we start to see US Troops being evacuated or non essential being moved out of military bases, that's the most tangible signal that I can think of of potential imminent strikes that would happen maybe hours before a strike would start. But that's the one tangible that comes to mind that I don't have to depend on public statements that I can watch that and know that that's a real possibility, that we're going to see strikes.

[A]

Soon after the break, we talk with Tom Nichols about what the war watch might look like. Inside of the Pentagon,

[D]

Jackson Hewitt handles your taxes and your stress. Inhale our no surprise price of 1. 49 or less. Exhale. Paying more for complicated taxes. You won't. Inhale. New tax law knowledge. Exhale. Missing out on your biggest refund? Certainly not. Don't miss paying 1.49 or less. Rest easy. Jackson Hewitt, Scott Taxes guaranteed Limited time offer for new clients on their draw turns. Participating locations only [e-mail] 149

[A]

Tom, welcome to the show.

[E]

Thank you, Hannah. Nice to be back.

[A]

Okay, so let's say you're a general inside the Pentagon right now. What are you thinking at this moment about Iran? What calculations are you making?

[E]

I think one of the questions that they must have is aside from all of the operational details, which the Pentagon is very good at, why are we doing this? What is the goal here? What is the objective? Because this is how they are trained to think, and rightly so. We are going to apply military force to an enemy regime. What is it exactly we want them to do? Sign an agreement. Agree to sign an agreement? Is it regime change? How many people are we willing to kill? How many people are we willing to lose? What is the end state? What is the. The outcome, the resolution that tells us when we're done?

[A]

And why is that? An important set of questions? Are those operational questions because we know what weapons and ships we need? Why is that the main calculation? Because it seems like a political question. So why is it a military question?

[E]

It's a strategic question. It's not a tactical question about, you know, how to fight with small groups of planes or men or tanks. It's not an operational question. It's not about how to move large military assets around and achieve objectives in the theater. It's a strategic question. And that's what generals and admirals are supposed to be thinking about and working with the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council and the State Department and everybody else to give the President good advice and especially to get clarity from the President about what it is we're supposed to be doing. You know, we teach military officers in war colleges, Ends, ways, means, strategy, you know, is a dance among these things. What's really worrisome, and again, going back to that, you know, notional general or admiral in the Pentagon, they have to be thinking, the president hasn't made this case to Congress. He hasn't made it to the people of the United States. I doubt he's made it to his own generals because he's so mercurial and changes his mind. I think it's really revealing that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, it leaked out that he had concerns, that he was trying to caution the President about this whole business. But without knowing where you're going, any road gets you there.

[A]

So here's what was confusing to me about the news about General Dan Kaine, which you mentioned, the way he put it was, any operations against Iran will face challenges because the U.S. munitions stockpile has been depleted by defense of Israel and support for Ukraine. Can you analyze that for me? That's not about what you just said, that's about something very specific. How much munitions do we have?

[E]

Well, you know, one of the ways that the military, the senior military communicates to the senior civilian leadership is to talk about constraints. One definition of strategy is choice within constraints. Because if you think about it, if you have no constraints, you don't need a strategy. Right. If you're Superman, you can do anything you want and you don't really have to think about how you're going to do it. You just kind of use your superpowers and make it happen. But the issue of munition stocks will come into play depending on how long a war the President is considering. And once again, we don't have any clarity on that. Is this going to be two nights, three nights, then we're not going to have. Then Cain's concerns are not going to come into play in a very short term, one and done kind of strike. But if we're going in there for a month, two months, three months, and we're just going to pound a country of more than 90 million people, you know, that's going to be a problem. He also. I just want to say one other thing, Hana. He brought up some other stuff, including things like alliances. So it wasn't just about munitions. I mean, he was kind of issuing a general concern that we are not in the best strategic condition right now.

[A]

Right. So it would be inappropriate or out of protocol for him to say, can you name a strategy, Mr. President? That's not the way generals communicate. They communicate very strongly.

[E]

Absolutely not. The only thing he could say is, well, if you're asking me. And the thing that you can then let leak out, any general is going to say, I'm concerned about munition stocks. I wanna make sure our alliances are in order, wanna make sure that we have all our ducks in a row. That's normal. Putting it in these stark terms and then letting it leak. To me, that seems like a strategy on Kaine's part.

[A]

So what is your sense about how much Trump would hear that message and take that position into account? How does that message get received inside the White House?

[E]

I don't know. Kaine supposedly is one of the few people he respects and will listen to. But when we say, this is a person Donald Trump listens to, that verb. Listens is really doing a lot of Work. This is not a deliberative president who takes on board news that he doesn't like. We saw it in his first term, and we're certainly seeing it now.

[A]

Okay, so from a general's perspective, you're not clear about the mission. You don't necessarily know how to plan for it. What's your guess about what Trump's main goal is in Iran? What he's trying to accomplish?

[E]

You know, trying to get inside the decision loop of somebody like Donald Trump is very difficult. I think what he really wants is regime change. But I think because, you know, the way he tends to. The way the president tends to wishcast and, you know, ignore problems, he's hoping to do regime change on the cheap. Can it be done? Maybe. I mean, look, if Donald Trump somehow cleanly and efficiently removes one of the worst regimes in the world, I'll congratulate him. But I don't think it's gonna be that easy, and I don't think he's thinking of it in those terms. And the problem for the generals is that when you're thinking about a goal like regime change, that's really not a military operation. That's where you really need good intelligence. You need the CIA, you need people on the ground. You need Iran experts, you need allies who are gonna help you with intelligence. All that the military can do is kind of pull the fangs out of the regime's ability to repress people so it can hit their military targets and ground their aircraft. I mean, that's what we did to Muammar Gaddafi. We did not depose. We, the United States and Europe, did not depose Muammar Qaddafi. We basically just stripped away his military ability so that he couldn't defend himself. We kind of put him on an even more even footing with the people that wanted to overthrow him.

[A]

All right, so let's play out a couple of scenarios with the information that the Pentagon has right now. If we were to go to war, what would that look like?

[E]

Well, the first order of business for Americans playing in away games like this is to suppress all of the enemy's air defenses. It's to gain control of the skies. And so what you'll see is waves of flights coming off of those carriers and from American bases that are going to hit air defense sites, radars, basically, to just blind and take out anything that could be a threat to our aircraft. What you do with that? You know, I'm back to saying it. It depends on what you think you're there to do. If you're going after the nuclear sites, then you're going to hit those sites and any associated infrastructure you can find, and you're going to try and do that with as few casualties as possible. If, on the other hand, you've decided that you're going to go big and that you want to take down the regime, then you're going to do a who bunch of different things. You're going to strike communications nodes, you're going to strike all. All things that give the government control and power and the ability to command. So you're going to hit command posts, you're going to communications, you're going to try and hit the leadership, you're going to try and figure out where they are and, you know, hit their bunkers. I mean, there is a lot. It's a very different profile for that kind of operation. And you're going to price in that you may lose some of your people, but that you're also going to kill a fair number of Iranians in that kind of operation as well.

[A]

Okay, so your best guess is that what he wants, even if it doesn't end up going this way or he articulates it is something like regime change, because there's something heroic in that. What do you think his understanding is of the US's influence in the world and how it should behave?

[E]

You know, I think the best model for how Donald Trump understands the world is a great book. There are two great books of international affairs. One is the Peloponnesian War, and the other is the Godfather. The Godfather explains everything you need to know about international affairs in the modern era. That the world is basically a violent and unruly place, which is true. And that it's ruled by families. And, you know, there's Putin's family and there's Don Xi Jinping and there's the unruly neighborhoods to the south. And I think he thinks of himself as the head of the commission, that he's the senior boss of the five families. So this upstart in Iran, he needs to make his bones here, not only to show who's boss, but again, because I do think there's an issue of glory involved here. I mean, he, you know, I know that this sounds like kind of dime store psychology, but you're talking about a man who keeps plastering his name on things in Washington and has started a diplomatic crisis with our own allies because they didn't give him a peace prize.

[A]

Okay, so let's say this is the theory. It's sort of mafia, like a little bit arbitrary and determined by whims. If that is true, what do you most worry about in that scenario?

[E]

I most worry about people like Trump and Putin, among others, walking into situations that they don't know how to get out of later. You know, Trump is not a man who ever admits a mistake. He backs down while declaring victory. And, you know, backing down sometimes is his only option. But I worry that he is so invested in his own image and his own ego and his own, you know, again, his sense of, you know, glory, that he will start the ball rolling on something that starts to turn into a larger conflict and that his answer and the only way he thinks he can get out of it is just keep getting bigger hammers every time.

[A]

Well, Tom, thank you so much for helping us understand what's going on.

[E]

My pleasure. Thanks, Honor

[A]

this episode of Radio Atlantic was produced by Rosie Hughes and Janae West. It was edited by Claudina Baid. Rob Smirciak engineered and provided original music. Genevieve Finn, fact Checked. Claudina Baid is the executive producer of Atlantic Audio, and Andrea Valdez is our managing editor. Listeners, if you enjoy the show, you can support our work and the work of all Atlantic journalists when you subscribe to the [e-mail] listener I'm Hanna Rosen. Thank you for listening.