Nukes

Summary

Radiolab: "Nukes" (April 7, 2017) – Episode Summary

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Overview

In this episode of Radiolab, hosts Jad Abumrad and Robert Krulwich, alongside reporter Latif Nasser, embark on a probing investigation into the question of who exactly holds the power to launch nuclear weapons in the United States—and what checks, if any, exist on that power. The episode traces the journey of Harold Herring, a missile launch officer trainee who decades ago asked a simple but dangerous question about safeguards against presidential misuse of nuclear authority. Through Herring’s story, the episode explores the evolving relationship between the military, the President, and atomic weaponry, ultimately interrogating whether humanity’s fate truly rests on the decision of a single individual.

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Key Discussion Points and Insights

Harold Herring: The Man With the Question

[05:13–14:01]

• Background:
  • Harold Herring, a decorated Air Force pilot and Vietnam War veteran, entered missile launch officer training in 1973.
  • He was impressed by the technical safeguards in place at the crew level—dual-key operations, sidearms for mutual deterrence against rogue operators, etc.
• The Critical Question:
  • During training, Harold noticed a gap: extensive checks at the crew level, but an informational blackout about checks on the President’s authority to order a launch.
  • He asked: “Is there a safety net in place if the President is making a crazy decision?” ([12:18])
  • After being asked to put the question in writing, he submitted a letter expressing his concern about blind faith in a single individual:

    "I would be required to assign blind faith values to my judgment of one man, the president. Values which could ultimately include health, personality, and political considerations. This just should not be." – Harold Herring [13:25]

• Consequences:
  • His inquiry resulted in him being removed from training six days before graduation, stripped of clearances, and ultimately forced into early retirement ([26:22]).

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Why Was the Question a Threat?

[31:45–35:19]

• Deterrence Doctrine:
  • The credibility of nuclear deterrence rests on the notion that orders will be executed without hesitation.
  • Former missileer Dr. Sonia McMullen explains:

    “If you start allowing people at the bottom to start making up their mind, then it’s not a credible threat.” – Dr. Sonia McMullen [32:55]

• The Official Response:
  • Strategic Air Command’s General Russ Dougherty argued that Herring’s "affirmative assertion was followed immediately by a personal subjective qualification," implying doubt undermines deterrence ([33:41–34:36]).
  • Herring refutes this:

    “No, no, no, no, I did not say that anywhere. Nowhere did I use those words. That doesn't surprise me.” – Harold Herring [34:36]

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The President’s Nuclear Authority: Historical Evolution

[15:17–24:11]

• Truman Era:
  • The bomb was so new that Truman called the shots—civilian supremacy was paramount (e.g., only civilians had access to the plutonium cores) ([17:47]).
• Eisenhower's Shift:
  • Eisenhower, a former general, allowed more military discretion, especially for small atomic weapons, but retained civilian control for large-scale bombs ([19:29–20:26]).
• Kennedy and Locks:
  • After bomb-related accidents and lax overseas security, Kennedy implemented physical “permissive action links” (simple combination locks) on bombs to ensure Presidential control ([23:03]).
• Nixon and Eroded Trust:
  • Watergate and Nixon’s erratic behavior led to increased anxiety about unchecked presidential authority. Nixon once bragged:

    “If [I] wanted to, [I] could go into the other room, pick up a telephone, and in 20 minutes, 60 million people would be dead.” [24:56]

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Modern Protocols and the Absence of a Check

[35:45–41:33]

• Chain of Command:
  • The President alone can order a nuclear strike; neither Secretary of Defense nor military leaders can override it.
    • Former Defense Secretary William Perry clarifies:

    “Nobody has the right to countermand that decision... He may call the Secretary of Defense for advice... but he may or may not accept that counsel.” [37:30]

• Decision Timeframe:
  • U.S. nuclear doctrine assumes the need for a decision within 6–7 minutes if incoming missiles are detected ([40:15]).
  • Dr. Bruce Blair, former missileer and nuclear command expert, says:

    “The system is set up so that only the President has the authority to order a nuclear war... He has the call directly to Strategic Air Command to do the launching, and they will respond to his orders.” [37:00–38:20]

• No Room for Deliberation:

  “The decision process just is too short for any kind of thoughtful or serious deliberation.” – Dr. Bruce Blair [40:16]

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Calls for Reform: Legislative and Moral Dilemmas

[41:33–44:15]

• Proposed Solutions:
  • William Perry and others advocate for phasing out ICBMs in favor of slower weapons systems (e.g., submarines and bombers) to allow more time for deliberation ([41:47]).
  • Congressmen Ted Lieu and Senator Ed Markey introduced a bill requiring a congressional declaration of war before a presidential first strike ([42:20]).

    “The fate of humanity in our world should not rest on one person.” – Rep. Ted Lieu [42:57]

• The Dilemma:
  • The need for a credible deterrent conflicts with the desire for checks and balances to prevent catastrophic misuse.

    “There are two sort of values here. One is your humane interest in making sure that... the end of the world... is for a just reason... and the ongoing hope that by making this, our system, credible, that we will never have an end of the world.” – Robert Krulwich [44:15]

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Personal Reflections and Legacy

[45:18–47:36]

• Harold Herring’s Later Life:
  • After his forced retirement, Herring became a truck driver and later an addiction counselor, distancing himself from nuclear issues.
  • He still feels his question “deserved an answer, for all of us, not just for me” ([47:08]).
• Lasting Anxiety:
  • The episode ends with the haunting knowledge that, to this day, launching nuclear missiles is ultimately the choice of a single individual, with as little as six minutes to decide.

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The Human Cost: Marshall Islands Survivor’s Story

[55:28–59:15]

• Tony deBrum, Marshall Islands Ambassador:
  • Recounts witnessing the U.S. hydrogen bomb test (Castle Bravo, 1954) as a child:

    “It was as if someone had walked up to you with a flash camera and took a shot right inches from your eyes... I thought it was the end of the world.” – Tony deBrum [56:04–57:31] “Everything turned red. ... The effect was like you’re standing under a glass bowl and somebody poured blood.” [58:25]

  • His testimony reminds listeners of the raw and lasting trauma nuclear weapons have inflicted—not just hypothetical, but real.

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Notable Quotes and Memorable Moments

• On Presidential Power:

  “He doesn’t have to check with anybody... He has that authority because of the nature of the world we live in.” – Dick Cheney [41:04]

• Historians on the System:

  “That the only area that there is not a check and balance is the one that can literally result in the end of the world. That seems strange to me.” – William Perry [41:33]

• Dilemma of Deterrence vs. Humanity:

  “That’s a dilemma. Yeah, you know, that’s a dilemma.” – Dr. Sonia McMullen [44:46]

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Timestamps for Key Segments

• Harold Herring’s Story Begins: [05:13]
• The Question That Changed His Life: [12:18], [13:04]
• Presidential Nuclear Authority – Historical Evolution: [15:17–24:11]
• Nixon’s “60-million” Dead Comment: [24:32–24:56]
• Modern Protocol and Absence of Checks: [37:00]
• Former Defense Secretary on Presidential Authority: [37:30], [38:20]
• Decision Time Window: [40:15]
• Proposed Legislative Solutions: [42:01–42:57]
• Marshall Islands Testimony: [55:28–59:15]

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Summary Table: Who Can Launch Nukes?

| Era | Civilian or Military Control? | Key Safeguard/Issue | |----------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------------------------| | Truman | Civilian (President) | Civilians controlled bomb cores | | Eisenhower | Loosened to Military (small) | Some military discretion for small nukes | | Kennedy+ | Civilian (President) | Locks on bombs, strict control | | Modern | Solely President | No effective external check, rapid launch |

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Radiolab’s Tone and Style

In classic Radiolab style, the episode is inquisitive, dynamic, and sound-rich. The hosts’ bemusement, nervous laughter, and frequent asides highlight the unsettling absurdity and gravity of the topic. The storytelling is intimate, alternating between policy wonks, personal stories, and historical dramatics, all underscored by a commitment to journalistic rigor and human empathy.

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Final Thought

The episode leaves listeners with a sense of unresolved tension: the technological, political, and existential dilemma that the world’s fate may hinge, at any moment, on the character and judgment (or lack thereof) of a single human being.

“I just felt that I had asked a very reasonable question that deserved an answer. And it was not for me alone. It was for all of us.”
— Harold Herring [47:20]

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Transcript

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[Harold Herring]

What?

[Tobin]

Okay.

[Kathy]

All right.

[Tobin]

Okay.

[Kathy]

All right.

[Tobin]

Gadiolab lab. Gadio Lab from. ANG two Homosexuals.

[Jad Abumrad]

That's so funny. I also thought it was hilarious that you were like, before you listen to this chat, I need to sit down.

[Latif Nasser]

And talk to you.

[Jad Abumrad]

We care about how you feel.

[Tobin]

It's so funny. We've both. You have been our boss at different times. I feel like we talk about you almost like concerned parents sometimes. Have you seen Jad lately? Is he eating?

[Jad Abumrad]

So before we launch into the show today, we just want to introduce you to a couple of folks.

[Kathy]

I'm Kathy.

[Tobin]

And I'm Tobin. We are the co hosts of a new show from WNYC studios called Nancy.

[Jad Abumrad]

Why did you call it Nancy? Is that code for something? Is that someone's mom?

[Kathy]

It's whatever you want it to be.

[Jad Abumrad]

Oh, stop it.

[Tobin]

Nancy is like a real old school term for a gay man. It's like sort of back in the day, someone might be called a Nancy boy or, like, such a Nance.

[Jad Abumrad]

Okay, so Nancy, as you can probably gather, is a show about.

[Tobin]

We are very interested in LGBT stories. You know, being lgbt, sexuality, gender, all the stuff that comes with it.

[Jad Abumrad]

And the stories run the gamut. Here's a very quick preview.

[Tobin]

One of the stories I'm working on, which will be early in the season, is a search for the first gay Asian porn star.

[Jad Abumrad]

Enthaubin says at one point he was talking to the director who claims to have discovered this guy.

[Tobin]

Director's name is Shishi Larue. If you've ever tried to have a conversation about racism in porn with a porn director, it's fascinating because really, it just inspires them to pitch more movies.

So, like, black bear would be a black guy. Brown bear would be a Latin guy. We can have a panda bear, and.

[Kathy]

And we could have the.

[Tobin]

Just the regular, or we could have.

[Kathy]

The polar bear as the white bear.

[Robert Krulwich]

Oh, my God. Okay.

[Tobin]

Brilliant.

I feel like I'm listening to you create.

[Kathy]

I am. I'm creating right now. I'm just like, the wheels are turning in My head?

[Jad Abumrad]

No. Kathy, in one of the episodes, you have this incredible conversation with your mom. Can you talk about that?

[Kathy]

Okay, so I keep coming out to my mom, and then we do the classic thing of we don't talk about it anymore because it's uncomfortable for her.

[Jad Abumrad]

So you keep coming out to your mind.

[Kathy]

I keep coming. Yeah. I keep bringing it up because I want it to be a normal thing for us. This is how I feel. Why did you become this way? Why did you choose this? I don't know. Is it because your family influenced you?

[Jad Abumrad]

Why do you think this way?

[Kathy]

Why? It's not something you choose. You just are. I don't have the capability of falling in love with men. Do you know what that means? Capacity. Capacity. It's not possible for me to fall in love with men.

[Robert Krulwich]

Why?

[Kathy]

I don't know.

[Jad Abumrad]

Those are just two clips. I mean, in the series, you also. Tobin and Kathy also dive into the world of gay Republicans, which right now is rapidly changing under President Trump. You hear a truly incredible conversation between HIV positive men of different generations. And the whole thing is driven by a really lovely curiosity.

[Tobin]

I think there's assumptions that we must know everything there is to be about being queer because we are gay, you know, or we are queer. But the reality is, like, there's so much about other people that I don't know within the community, and I think the show provides an opportunity to have those conversations.

[Jad Abumrad]

So this is as much about you guys learning as it is about you guys?

[Tobin]

Oh, absolutely.

[Jad Abumrad]

Oh, yeah. We're all just figuring it out together. Nancy's first season is 12 episodes. It lands April 9, but you can subscribe right now if you go to itunes or wherever you get your podcasts. And I hope you do, because I think it is going to be great.

[Latif Nasser]

Oh, wait, you're listening.

[Unknown Sponsor/Announcer]

Okay.

[Jad Abumrad]

All right.

[Latif Nasser]

Okay.

[Jad Abumrad]

All right. You're listening to Radio Lab Radio from wny.

[Harold Herring]

See?

[Jad Abumrad]

Yep.

[Harold Herring]

Your name again is Cedric. Cedric. I'm gonna write that down.

[Kathy]

And they're on the line now, so you'll be able to talk to them.

[Robert Krulwich]

So, Harold, can you hear me?

[Harold Herring]

Hello.

[Robert Krulwich]

Hi. Okay. I'm Robert Krylowich.

[Jad Abumrad]

I'm Jad Abumrad.

[Robert Krulwich]

This is Radiolab.

[Jad Abumrad]

And a little while ago, our producer, Latif Nasser, brought us a story about a guy.

[Harold Herring]

My name is Harold Herring. I used the mil initial L for.

[Jad Abumrad]

Lewis in honor of my father who asked a question.

[Robert Krulwich]

It was a pretty simple question.

[Jad Abumrad]

Maybe a dangerous question.

[Robert Krulwich]

Maybe a dangerous question. Certainly just the mere asking of it pretty much ruined the man's life.

[Jad Abumrad]

And he never got an answer.

[Latif Nasser]

No.

[Robert Krulwich]

But today on Radiolab, we are going to re ask Harold's question.

[Jad Abumrad]

And this time we get an answer.

[Robert Krulwich]

And Lev Nasser takes it from here.

[Latif Nasser]

Yeah. So our main guy, Harold, he's former military and he's 81 years old.

[Harold Herring]

I'm staying pretty active. I'm competing at the national and world level at duathlon competition.

[Latif Nasser]

And right off the bat, this is the kind of guy you could tell he just does not give up.

[Harold Herring]

I really am not supposed to be competing because I've had both knees replaced.

[Latif Nasser]

But anyway, so Harold grew up in this tiny town called Browns, Illinois, from a poor family. He was the eldest of 11 kids. When he was growing up, he would always hear Air Force planes flying overhead. And that's why from when he was very young, he always wanted to be an Air Force pilot.

[Robert Krulwich]

So why don't you just tell us a little bit about your military background.

[Kathy]

Well, generators.

[Harold Herring]

Most of my career was with the Air Rescue Service.

[Latif Nasser]

This was in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. And if an Air Force pilot went.

[Harold Herring]

Down, got shot down, whatever.

[Latif Nasser]

Harold and his team would jump into their helicopters.

[Harold Herring]

Two Jolly Green heavy lift helicopters.

[Latif Nasser]

They'd fly them in hover over the.

[Harold Herring]

Survivors on the ground, lowering the hoist cable.

[Latif Nasser]

And then a pararescue man would climb down to the forest floor, find the injured soldier and attach the cable to him. And while that was happening, Harold had to hold the helicopter steady. He had to hold his hover.

[Harold Herring]

And a lot of times the enemy would wait until that process started before they opened fire.

[Latif Nasser]

Let's get the hell out of here.

[Kathy]

Okay, talk to me. We're coming out.

[Harold Herring]

I had some wonderful experiences. Probably chief among them was my crew and I. We picked up a pilot that ejected into the North Sea at night in the wintertime.

[Jad Abumrad]

Wow.

[Harold Herring]

200 miles out to. We picked him up and brought him back.

[Latif Nasser]

So it was a super high risk, high adrenaline kind of job.

[Harold Herring]

And I had an outstanding record.

[Latif Nasser]

And then, well, he got old. How old were you around this time?

[Harold Herring]

Oh, about 30. I was old. Pilots my age and with my experience were put into desk jobs. And I wanted to be on the front line if I could.

[Latif Nasser]

This was 1973, middle of the Cold War. So Harold decided that the way for him to be on the front lines without actually having to be on the front lines, you know. Cause he couldn't anymore was to go into training to become a missileer, a missile launch officer. Those are the people who sit in a underground bunker and just wait to get an order to turn their key and unleash a nuclear attack.

[Harold Herring]

In training, I mean, the information I can remember just virtually verbatim is that each missile launch officer has under his direct control more firepower than all generals in all wars in the history of warfare.

[Latif Nasser]

And so. Harold started his training at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Nixon was president at the time. And at the time, the prospect of nuclear war felt very real.

[Harold Herring]

There's a lot of responsibility there, and there's no room for error.

[Latif Nasser]

And so in Harold's training, we were.

[Harold Herring]

A very small class.

[Latif Nasser]

He learned all about the technical stuff.

[Harold Herring]

You know, all the mechanical stuff and emergency procedures that were involved, all the.

[Latif Nasser]

Nitty gritty details of how a missile actually launched.

[Harold Herring]

And then part of the time, we had classroom instruction where he learned about.

[Latif Nasser]

The chain of command and all the different safeguards and checks, right? So imagine that he gets an order to launch. That order has to be decoded. So he would decode the order, and then his partner would decode the order, and then they would verify it with one another. So one guy would be like, okay, I got the order. Alpha, Bravo, 124. And then his partner would say, I confirm Alpha, Bravo, 124. And then they launch. So neither of them has the power to launch on his or her own.

[Harold Herring]

And both of you were armed. You carried a sidearm with you.

[Robert Krulwich]

Why?

[Harold Herring]

Well, you know, it's serious business. And if you had someone that was, you know, if they threatened your life.

[Latif Nasser]

If one of the officers wanted to.

[Harold Herring]

Just go rogue, you had a sidearm, too.

[Robert Krulwich]

Well, if I took my gun and pointed at you and said, turn the key, Harold, what would you say?

[Harold Herring]

I wouldn't do it. I may go down, but I'd be drawing my weapon.

[Robert Krulwich]

And these keys have to be turned simultaneously. So if I shoot you, turn my key, then roll over, get your key, and turn your key. That's too late, right? It has to be a simultaneous.

[Harold Herring]

Yes, yes.

[Latif Nasser]

So the whole point is the system is designed so that no one person can launch a nuclear attack.

[Harold Herring]

I was very pleased, very satisfied with the checks and balances at the crew.

[Latif Nasser]

Member level, you know, the bottom where they're turning the keys.

[Harold Herring]

I was not concerned about that at all.

[Latif Nasser]

But then a few weeks into training.

[Harold Herring]

There was some discussion about preemptive strike.

[Latif Nasser]

Real quick. Obviously, if someone launched a nuclear attack against the U.S. we would be able to strike back, you know, in response. But a preemptive strike would be where we, for whatever reason, decided to strike first.

[Harold Herring]

And that raised a Hair on the back of my neck a little bit. You know, it's just. I thought, we're receiving all of this information about all these elaborate checks and balances within the system, but they never.

[Latif Nasser]

Got any information about how things worked at the presidential level.

[Harold Herring]

There's a complete void or blackout at the level that the order is initiated.

[Robert Krulwich]

When you had this thought, did you say to the other classmates, no, I didn't.

[Harold Herring]

It wasn't my intent to try to create a scene by involving other people, students, whatever.

[Latif Nasser]

So Harold waits until the end of class, walks up to the front of the room, and asks the instructor a.

[Harold Herring]

Question, a very reasonable question.

[Latif Nasser]

He's like, just checking there's a safety net in place if the President is making a crazy decision, right.

[Harold Herring]

To find out more about checks and balances at the top level.

[Latif Nasser]

And the instructor pauses, looks at him, and says, can you put that in writing, please?

[Harold Herring]

Okay.

[Latif Nasser]

And so he did.

[Harold Herring]

Let me find it first. You do your best to have everything ready to go.

[Latif Nasser]

No, no, no. Take your time.

[Harold Herring]

Oh, here it is. Okay. There is presently a degree of doubt in my mind as to whether I might someday be called upon to launch nuclear weapons as a result of an invalid, unlawful order.

[Latif Nasser]

This is part of the letter that Harold wrote explaining his question.

[Harold Herring]

I asked myself, how will I know or can I be sure I am participating in a justifiable act?

[Latif Nasser]

In his letter, he says that if he were ordered to turn his key, he would absolutely do so. But because he had not been told what the checks and balances are for the President, he would be doing so.

[Harold Herring]

With a conflict of conscience, which I've underlined. I would be required to assign blind faith values to my judgment of one man, the president. Values which could ultimately include health, personality, and political considerations. This just should not be.

[Latif Nasser]

So.

[Robert Krulwich]

We've got a guy training to be the person who pulls the trigger, and he's sitting there wondering, okay, there's a lot of checks on me, but who's checking the President?

[Jad Abumrad]

And this struck us as a really kind of serious question, because right now we have a president, President Trump, who is clearly interested in nuclear weapons. He talks about it constantly.

[Robert Krulwich]

And you got the thing with North Korea.

[Jad Abumrad]

Yeah. Escalating tensions with North Korea, Syria, for Christ's sakes. Sort of makes you stop and think, like, okay, if and when these decisions get made, how are they made? Is there someone else in the room?

[Robert Krulwich]

And who. If the President is determined, if he's ready to go, is there somebody there who can turn to the President and say, stop?

[Tobin]

That is A great question.

[Latif Nasser]

This is historian Alex Wellerstein. He's the one who introduced us to Harold. He wrote an article in the Washington Post about this very topic.

[Tobin]

Am I at the right place?

[Latif Nasser]

Yeah, you tend to want to be just like a fist's length away. Yeah, yeah, perfect. And he has spent so much time in just archives behind microfilm readers and foiaing documents and doing all kinds of different things to figure out the history of our relationship to this uniquely destructive weapon. And what he found was a kind of tug of war between the military and the president that has gone back more than 70 years.

[Kathy]

As the nation is plunged into mourning by President Roosevelt's death, Harry S. Truman becomes president the seventh.

[Tobin]

Truman learned he had a bomb the day that Roosevelt died.

[Latif Nasser]

This is April 1945. At this point, America has been at war with Japan for over three years.

[Tobin]

It was impressed upon Truman that this was was not just another weapon, that this was something that could be bigger and better than any other weapon before. But there's no point at which somebody says, hey, Mr. President, should we bomb Japan with this bomb? It's assumed that, of course you're going to do it. You have the bomb, you have the enemy. And in fact, nobody ever goes to Truman and says, should we do this?

[Robert Krulwich]

Really?

[Tobin]

They go to him and they say, we are doing this. So Truman writes in his journal, we're going to use the atomic bomb, but we will not use it on a civilian target. We will use it on a purely military target. That's the term, purely military. Purely.

[Latif Nasser]

Now, we can't get into his head to know exactly what he was thinking, but that is what he wrote in his journal at the time.

[Tobin]

And then he says, we will not be killing women and children.

[Robert Krulwich]

So the first atomic bomb is going to be dropped by a president who thinks that he's dropping it on soldiers only.

[Tobin]

He's somewhat congratulating himself on that. No women and children will be killed in this attack.

[Kathy]

The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base.

[Latif Nasser]

That's part of Truman's announcement. After they dropped the bomb, the day.

[Tobin]

After, they get casualty estimates from the Japanese. And he realizes this is not purely a military base.

[Kathy]

There is reason to believe that the Japanese city of Hiroshima a approximately the size of Memphis or Seattle or Rochester, New York, no longer exists.

[Latif Nasser]

The total death toll was almost 200,000.

[Tobin]

So there's a real switch that happens between Truman talking about the bomb and also everything he says about the bomb before he hears about the casualties. It's Held about the greatest thing ever. And this is the greatest day in history. And he's so proud and so happy. And then he hears about the casualties, and he hears about the women and children, and suddenly it becomes a burden.

[Robert Krulwich]

And now what happens?

[Tobin]

So on August 10th, he gets a message from General Groves.

[Kathy]

Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, that.

[Tobin]

Says, We've dropped two bombs. We're gonna have a third one in a week, just FYI. And it's not clear that Truman knew that two bombs were gonna be dropped so soon. So he has just learned that Hiroshima is a city when he just learns that another city gets destroyed, he is not in control.

[Robert Krulwich]

Wow.

[Tobin]

And he has immediately written back to them and says, just stop. Knock it off. You are not gonna drop another bomb without express permission of the President of the United States. So the major theme of Truman's approach to nuclear weapons is to keep them out of the hands of the military.

[Harold Herring]

Hmm.

[Robert Krulwich]

Why?

[Tobin]

He believes that the military, if you give them a new weapon, they will use it. It's not a crazy idea.

[Latif Nasser]

So they actually start to design and build these bombs to make sure the military can't launch them on its own.

[Tobin]

The nuclear of the bomb have to be in the possession of the civilians.

[Robert Krulwich]

The nuclear part. So the plutonium.

[Tobin]

The plutonium. The core.

[Latif Nasser]

Right.

[Tobin]

And the early bombs allow you to do that. The fronts of them actually open up and allow you to stick the core in and close it back up.

[Latif Nasser]

Oh.

[Robert Krulwich]

So the civilians walk into the room with the explosive part. The soldiers open the lid.

[Tobin]

Yes.

[Robert Krulwich]

The civilians put the explosive part in, close the door. Now you have an active bomb.

[Latif Nasser]

So it's like putting in a battery or something, Almost like into your Walkman. Why do I have that analogy? Am I like an 80 year old?

[Robert Krulwich]

Where does the president put the nuclear pipe?

[Tobin]

They have their own vaults with their own guys with their own guns. And their job is to shoot anybody who tries to take a core without presidential authorization.

[Latif Nasser]

Wow. So for the rest of his presidential term, Truman doesn't budge. The nuclear power is his and his alone.

[Tobin]

But the technology starts to make it trickier to do this. If you want a very small atomic bomb, you can't separate the pit out from that. It's just not going to happen. It's physically, like, glued to the explosives and things like that.

[Latif Nasser]

So it's 1953, just a few years before Harold entered the military.

[Kathy]

The commander in chief returns to Fort Benning, Georgia, where he served.

[Latif Nasser]

President Eisenhower comes to power, and he's a former general, Right?

[Robert Krulwich]

Exactly.

[Latif Nasser]

And so he's a little bit left to concerned about who has control over these nuclear weapons. So he eases up a little bit.

[Tobin]

And he says in his administration, atomic weapons, small ones, are to be treated as basically any other kind of weapon.

[Kathy]

A nuclear age arsenal of awesome proportions.

[Latif Nasser]

This is archival footage from 1960 when President Eisenhower is getting a first look at some of the newest additions to the nuclear arsenal.

[Kathy]

He pulls out his binoculars to watch helicopters and foot soldiers in the field.

[Latif Nasser]

At that time, they were getting really creative with their new nuclear weapon.

[Kathy]

That bazooka like weapon is the Red Eye, a one man operated missile launcher.

[Robert Krulwich]

Does he continue to maintain authority over the bigger bombs?

[Tobin]

He allows them to be transferred to the military. But he says, don't drop them without my permission. But there are some cases in which he says, under really bad circumstances, you can use some of these weapons without my permission.

[Latif Nasser]

So compared to Truman, he's really shifting that power back to the military.

[Tobin]

Yes, but.

[Kathy]

Good evening my fellow citizens.

[Tobin]

By the time Kennedy is the President.

[Kathy]

It is an ironic but accurate fact.

[Latif Nasser]

1961. Harold is 24. He's a pilot in the Air Force.

[Kathy]

That the two strongest powers are the.

[Latif Nasser]

Two in the most danger of devastation.

[Tobin]

The Soviet capabilities are greatly increased.

[Kathy]

So that signal means to stop whatever you are doing and get to the nearest safe place fast.

[Tobin]

You get real anxieties and some of these anxieties bubble up and popular. These are kind of out there.

[Latif Nasser]

So long, mom. I'm off to drop the bomb, so.

[Kathy]

Don'T wait up for me.

[Latif Nasser]

At this point, popular culture is saturated in nuclear fear.

[Tobin]

First thing will be a white light that'll blind us.

[Kathy]

Then a hot flame that'll burn out. Take it easy. I don't want to die.

[Latif Nasser]

People are building bomb shelters. Kids in classrooms are practicing hiding under their desks.

[Kathy]

And then at this distance, the heat.

[Tony Debroom]

Wave is sufficient to cause melting of.

[Kathy]

The upturned eye wall.

[Tobin]

You have bombers flying from the United States and on these routes that take them near the Soviet borders. And the problem is you put up a lot of bombers.

[Latif Nasser]

It's only a matter of time before.

[Tobin]

You'Ll expect one to crash or have a malfunction.

[Kathy]

A SAC B52 carrying hydrogen munitions.

[Tobin]

And so indeed there are a bunch of accidents where bombers crash with hydrogen bombs on board. They crash in Spain and drop hydrogen bombs. One of them gets dropped in Greenland. They crash in the United States numerous times. There's one in the south where a bomb basically lands on somebody's house. An atomic bomb. Atomic bomb.

[Latif Nasser]

An atomic bomb landed on someone's House.

[Kathy]

Atomic bomb breaks loose from a mounting shackle in a B47 jet over Florence, South Carolina, plummets to Earth.

[Tobin]

It didn't detonate.

[Kathy]

Six were injured. The home of Walter Gregg was turned into a shambles.

[Latif Nasser]

Oh, my God. That would be the most terrifying thing. Imagine you're just brushing your teeth and then.

[Tobin]

Atomic bomb.

[Latif Nasser]

Atomic bomb.

[Robert Krulwich]

And there's a knock on the door and say, excuse me, we're going to remove this.

[Tobin]

So there's all these accidents.

[Latif Nasser]

And on top of that, America is keeping a bunch of its bombs in bases all over the world.

[Tobin]

And they start to worry that some of these bases are not American bases and there aren't that many Americans on them.

[Latif Nasser]

So, for instance, some nukes are kept at a base in Turkey.

[Tobin]

Turkey's our friend, Right? Not a problem.

[Latif Nasser]

But there are, like, two American guys guarding these things.

[Tobin]

They have the keys to turn these missiles on. What do you need to do? If Turkey wants to become a nuclear power, they need to hit these guys over the head with a hammer and take the keys. Now Turkey is a nuclear power.

[Latif Nasser]

Whoa.

[Tobin]

Yeah. This is more or less what Kennedy says.

[Latif Nasser]

Yeah. So Kennedy actually has the exact same instinct that Truman did.

[Tobin]

He issues a directive which says, no weapons can be kept overseas unless they have locks on them. And the first versions of these are very crude. They're like, literally, combination locks.

[Robert Krulwich]

Really? Like bike locks?

[Tobin]

Yeah, they're pretty simple. So you're doing this technological enabling of this kind of vast political metaphor that the President is in control of these nuclear weapons at all times.

[Latif Nasser]

So it's like Truman wanted it close to the chest, and then Eisenhower wanted it out there, and then Kennedy now is pulling it back in.

[Tobin]

Right? Exactly.

[Latif Nasser]

At the time, this felt safe. Who better to trust than the President with something so powerful it could end the world? And even after Kennedy, the laws around this solidify. The power stays with the President.

[Robert Krulwich]

Yes.

[Latif Nasser]

But then you get this guy.

[Kathy]

People have got to know whether or not their President's a crook.

[Latif Nasser]

Richard Milhouse Nixon.

[Kathy]

Well, I'm not a crook.

[Latif Nasser]

And this feeling of safety and really all trust in the presidency just starts to erode.

[Tobin]

So in the last days of his presidency, there was the Watergate break in. There were all the investigations. Nixon was drinking more than the President perhaps ought to. He was under an intense amount of stress. He did a few things that made people uncomfortable.

[Latif Nasser]

The most infamous moment like this happened in the summer of 1974.

[Tobin]

Yes.

[Latif Nasser]

When all the Watergate stuff was really coming to a head.

[Tobin]

He was talking with two congressmen and he was trying to impress upon them what a waste of time this, quote, little burglary was. And to give an example of how minor this was, he explained that his responsibilities were huge. If he wanted to, he could go into the other room, pick up a telephone, and in 20 minutes, 60 million people would be dead.

[Latif Nasser]

Whoa.

[Robert Krulwich]

He said this?

[Tobin]

He said this.

[Latif Nasser]

And that's exactly the kind of situation Harold was thinking about when he asked his question. Like, since I'm the guy with my hand on the key. Just kind of curious here. Is there a system for making sure a president doesn't just walk into the other room, pick up the phone and order me to kill 60 million people?

[Harold Herring]

There's presently a degree of doubt in my mind.

[Latif Nasser]

So he asks this question first out loud, then he does it in writing.

[Harold Herring]

And then I was pulled out of training. I think it was about six days before graduation.

[Latif Nasser]

That leads to a series of meetings with superior officers where they basically tell.

[Harold Herring]

Him that I need to have more faith in our leaders, you know, not to question them. And I was told that I didn't have a need to know.

[Latif Nasser]

That leads to a trial where he has this one meeting with this military judge who basically says, here, I have your question in my hand. I will tear it up and we can all forget this ever happened.

[Harold Herring]

But I still wanted the question answered.

[Latif Nasser]

And then that leads to appeals, and he's writing letters.

[Harold Herring]

I would spend days and nights virtually continuously writing the congressman, writing and writing to the president. But it really didn't matter at all what I had to say at that point.

[Latif Nasser]

He's basically like, okay, fine, I don't want to be a launch officer anymore.

[Harold Herring]

I asked to be, you know, reassigned if they weren't going to give the information.

[Latif Nasser]

But instead of reassigning him, my promotional.

[Harold Herring]

Lieutenant colonel was withheld. I was removed from. From flight status, so I no longer would get flight pay. I was then permanently disqualified from the Human Reliability Program. And along with that, my top secret security clearance was taken away from me. And once you have a security clearance removed and you're permanently disqualified, there's no hope for your career. I pursued every avenue available to me to have my military record corrected and to have the findings reversed and to remain in the Air Force. Only after I exhausted all of my appeals was I ordered to be retired.

[Jad Abumrad]

What?

[Unknown Sponsor/Announcer]

Why?

[Jad Abumrad]

I mean, I know that, like the whole military thing, you got to stay in your lane. You don't question your superiors, but why would they? What's missing? Why don't you just ask the question? Why? Why would they why? What's wrong with him asking the question, why is it such a threat?

[Latif Nasser]

Well, I'll tell you right after we take a break.

[Kathy]

This is Timothy Franzik calling from Stillwater, Minnesota. Radiolab is supported in part by the Alfred P. Sloan foundation, enhancing public understanding of science and technology in the modern world. More information about [e-mail].

[Unknown Sponsor/Announcer]

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[Latif Nasser]

Radiolab is supported by Rippling Finance. Teams often spend weeks chasing receipts, reconciling spreadsheets, and fixing errors across disconnected spend tools. This can be frustrating. And that's not software as a service. That's sad software as a disservice. If you've been thinking about replacing stitched together tech stacks with one platform for all departments, Rippling can help. Rippling is a unified platform for global hr, payroll, IT and finance, helping people replace their mess of cobbled together tools with one system designed to help give leaders clarity, speed and control. By uniting employees, teams and departments in one system, Rippling works to remove the bottlenecks, busy work and silos in business software. With Rippling, you can choose to run hr, IT and finance operations as one, or pick and choose the products that best fill the gaps. Right now you can get 6 months free when you go to rippling.com Radiolab learn more at R I P P L-I N G.com Radiolab terms and conditions apply.

[Unknown Sponsor/Announcer]

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[Latif Nasser]

Radiolab is supported by Planet Visionaries, the podcast created in partnership with the Rolex Perpetual Planet Initiative. The show is hosted by Alex Honnold, who you may recognize from Free Solo, where he climbed El Capitan without ropes. Now he's turning his focus to the biggest challenge of all, protecting the only planet we've got. Every episode brings you stories that prove climate optimism isn't naive, it's a strategy. The episodes span the globe, from Arctic scientists and Amazon forest guardians to entrepreneurs reimagining fashion and food systems. You'll hear from explorers, scientists, activists and storytellers who are working to reshape the future in practical human ways. In one episode, Alex sits down with wildlife photographer Bertie Gregory to discuss how animals can teach humans resiliency, empathy and hope in partnership with the Rolex Perpetual Planet Initiative. Check out Planet Visionaries Listen or watch on Apple, Spotify, YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts.

[Jad Abumrad]

Hey, I'm Chad Abumrad.

[Robert Krulwich]

I'm Robert Krulwich.

[Jad Abumrad]

This is Radiolab. And so, Latif, why was Harold's question such a threat?

[Latif Nasser]

Yeah, well, here's how it was put to me.

[Kathy]

You know, the other side has to know the only reason, the only way that. Let me phrase it this way, sure. The whole premise is deterrence. That has been our founding philosophy since we developed these things.

[Latif Nasser]

This is Dr. Sonia McMullen and I'm.

[Kathy]

A former Air Force missileer.

[Latif Nasser]

She had her hand on the nuclear key from 1997 to 2001. And by deterrence, she means there is only world peace. Where there is power to preserve order among nations, we keep other countries from nuking us. B52s represent a shield by making clear that if they do, the missiles are ready, we'll nuke them right back.

[Kathy]

But if the other side doesn't believe that you will respond in kind, then it doesn't work.

[Tobin]

You have to believe my threat is legit. I have to be credible.

[Latif Nasser]

So if you're the guy whose hand is on the key when the order comes down to launch, there can't be any doubt that you will do what you are ordered to do.

[Kathy]

Exactly.

[Tobin]

So the problem with somebody like Harold is that if you start allowing people to at the Bottom to start making up their mind, then it's not a credible threat because what happens?

[Robert Krulwich]

So do you understand in your own mind why they had to have a committee to sit in judgment on him and review some sort of factor? I don't know what I'm involved.

[Tobin]

It's hard to know. I haven't seen their side of it. I'm filing to get access to that side. We'll see how that goes.

[Latif Nasser]

So I found this actually just. We got this this morning. So we actually ended up finding a statement by the commander in chief of Strategic Air Command, General Russ Dougherty. I don't know if you have seen it, Harold, but. And to be fair, we thought we should let Harold respond to it. Do you know what I'm talking about?

[Harold Herring]

No. But he was the sing sack commander in chief of Strategic Air Command.

[Latif Nasser]

Right, right, right. And so let me just read to you what he said.

[Harold Herring]

Sure.

[Latif Nasser]

The major's hesitation initiated extensive hearings and administrative procedures. Later he professed that he really would turn keys and that his hesitation had been misunderstood. I examined the record thoroughly and discovered that for a fact he had repeated several times in the record that he would readily turn keys. Then. In each instance, his affirmative assertion was followed immediately by a personal subjective qualification. Yes, he would turn keys upon receipt of an authentic order from proper authority if he thought the order was legal, if he thought the circumstances necessitated an ICBM launch, if he was convinced that it was a rational moral necessity, and so on. Every affirmative answer was qualified by a subjective condition.

[Harold Herring]

No, no, no, no. I did not say that anywhere. Nowhere did I say that. Nowhere did I use those words. And I'm sorry, but that's just. That's just false. That doesn't surprise me.

[Latif Nasser]

According to Harold, he never wanted to doubt an order coming from the President.

[Harold Herring]

I assume that there had to be some sort of check and balance so that one man couldn't just on a whim order the launch of nuclear weapons.

[Latif Nasser]

He just wanted to be told that something like that existed so that he and his fellow launch officers would not have to have a conflict of conscience.

[Harold Herring]

And that we not put anybody in a position where they're just following orders and throwing their conscience to the four winds. I think it's an affront to play the game of you don't have the need to know of someone that's doing one of the most serious grave jobs that there is in the armed forces.

[Latif Nasser]

And so since Harold never got an answer to his question, we decided to make it our question.

[Harold Herring]

Where.

[Tobin]

Where do you get somebody who's allowed to question the President because we know that by the time you get to the bottom, there's no way that that's possible. So what about the guy above them? Let's say there's an officer who's one more up the tier. Is he gonna question the order? Well, I don't know. He's getting it from the generals who coordinate all of the nuclear attacks. If it got to him, it must be a legitimate order.

[Robert Krulwich]

Right.

[Tobin]

Maybe those top level major heads of the military branches, maybe. Maybe they get to. I don't know. And so my question is where, if anywhere, if the President issues an order, can they. Will they say no?

[Latif Nasser]

After a lot of digging around, Alex says that he thinks.

[Tobin]

My guess is you're not allowed to question the President more than a couple steps down from the very top. If you're allowed to question the President at all, maybe the Secretary of Defense can do it.

[Latif Nasser]

And when we Talked to Sonia McMullen, our missilier, she also thought that the Secretary of Defense could probably provide a check.

[Kathy]

Secretary of Defense is the first person to say, hey, let's think about this. Let's think about this in detail. All right, we're ready.

[Robert Krulwich]

Okay.

[Kathy]

This is Bill Perry, formerly Secretary of Defense, 19th Secretary of Defense of the United States.

[Latif Nasser]

So we decided to ask an actual Secretary of Defense, William Perry, served under President Clinton from 1994 to 1997.

[Robert Krulwich]

Yeah. Let's just pretend for a moment that the President issues you an order that you disagree with because you don't think the President is of right mind or sober or whatever. What authority do you have as Secretary of Defense, if any?

[Kathy]

Well, the system is set up so that only the President has the authority to order a nuclear war. Nobody has the right to countermand that decision. He might choose to call the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to get his advice or his counsel. But even if he does that, he may or may not accept that counsel.

[Robert Krulwich]

If you, as Secretary of Defense, say to the President, he says, let's go, and you say, let's not.

[Kathy]

First of all, if he calls me.

[Robert Krulwich]

Yeah.

[Kathy]

And then if I say that, Mr. President, that would be a very serious mistake. Don't do that. He might or might not accept my advice.

[Robert Krulwich]

Are you necessary to launch?

[Kathy]

No.

[Robert Krulwich]

No. Suppose everybody in the room thought that it was a bad idea. Would he still be able to do it?

[Kathy]

Yes. He has the call directly to the Strategic Air Command to do the launching, and they will respond to his orders. They don't call the Secretary of Defense or the chairman and say, should I do this? They do it. Yeah. So in our training, we were conditioned almost like a Pavlovian talk.

[Latif Nasser]

This is Dr. Bruce Blair. He was a missile launch officer at the exact time that Harold was training to become one. And ever since then, he basically spent the whole rest of his career studying nuclear command and control.

[Kathy]

I wrote studies so classified that the Pentagon demanded that I not be allowed to read them anymore.

[Latif Nasser]

And we asked him, like, why does it work like this? Why would we give one person that much power?

[Kathy]

It's always been set up that way.

[Robert Krulwich]

Why would that be? What's the.

[Kathy]

Why is that it came out of the Cold War, you know, in the 1960s. I don't know. It's.

[Latif Nasser]

By the 1960s, the US and the Soviet Union were building ICBMs, which are these nuclear missiles that could go from a silo in one country to a target in the other in the matter of minutes. So if the Soviets ever launched their missiles at us, if we're under a.

[Kathy]

Missile attack, there's very little time to assess the attack, to brief the President.

[Latif Nasser]

On his options, because the assumption was that the Soviets would target our missiles.

[Kathy]

Our ICBMs, and they would be the first to go. And so therefore, the President has to decide whether to launch our ICBMs before the other missiles land. For any incoming missiles could destroy the command and control system. And that forces the President to make a decision on how to respond immediately. Because missiles are flying in at four miles per second. He has about six or seven minutes to make that decision.

[Latif Nasser]

Ooh, six minutes.

[Kathy]

The decision process just is too short.

[Latif Nasser]

For any kind of thoughtful or serious deliberation.

[Kathy]

And the pressure is intense. And there, I think you would find that different presidents would respond differently. And their character, their temperament, are they thinking people or are they intuitive people who respond instinctively? And so, you know, you would see a lot of variation in the way presidents react to a nuclear emergency.

[Harold Herring]

The President of the United states now for 50 years, is followed at all times, 24 hours a day by a military aide carrying a football.

[Latif Nasser]

This is then Vice President Dick Cheney, also a former Secretary of Defense, talking on Fox News Sunday. Back in 2008, he could launch the.

[Harold Herring]

Kind of devastating attack the world's never seen. He doesn't have to check with anybody. He doesn't have to call the Congress. He doesn't have to check with the courts. He has that authority because of the nature of the world we live in. It bothers me immensely. That the only area that there is not a check and balance is the one that can literally result in the end of the world. That seems strange to me.

[Robert Krulwich]

Have you thought about this at all and wondered whether there's a better way to do this?

[Kathy]

Yes, I have.

[Robert Krulwich]

What would you suggest?

[Kathy]

I have specifically proposed, and continue to propose unsuccessfully.

[Robert Krulwich]

Again, former Secretary of Defense William Perry.

[Kathy]

We phased out our ICBMs, and to the extent we have to have a nuclear deterrence, we limited the submarines and airplanes because they don't have to launch in five minutes or six minutes or seven minutes.

[Latif Nasser]

And when it comes to preemptive strikes.

[Kathy]

He says we have before the Congress now a bill making a modification which says unless. Unless the United States has been verifiably attacked, then the President has, before he launches his nuclear weapons, has to go to Congress for permission. So our bill is very simple.

[Latif Nasser]

This is Congressman Ted Lew, and he and Senator Ed Markey are the guys who authored the bill.

[Kathy]

It basically says before the President can launch a nuclear first strike, the President must first get a declaration of war from Congress.

[Latif Nasser]

I believe that you introduced this bill before the election, is that right?

[Kathy]

Absolutely, Senator Markey and I believe we need a structural fix. We believe actually Hillary Clinton was going to be president, so this bill would have applied to her. And that's because the fate of humanity in our world should not rest on one person.

[Latif Nasser]

And. Wait, so are you seeing this just as you sizing this up? Is this a systemic problem or is this a problem with one person who just happens to have the office right now?

[Kathy]

It's absolutely a systemic problem, and it's also a problem with the current person in the office of the President. But you could see future presidents, right, that could be elected with judgment or temperament issues, or maybe they simply go to advanced age and get Alzheimer's. Right, or some other sort of issue. That's why we can't have a system where there's so little checks and balances.

[Latif Nasser]

Do you know about this bill or.

[Kathy]

Have you heard of it? No, actually, I don't. And that's interesting. That is a very interesting bill that. Let me say it this way.

[Latif Nasser]

Yeah.

[Kathy]

On one hand I agree because again, I always like to have checks and balances. On the other hand, I also think that it says to a potential adversary, Now there's doubt.

[Robert Krulwich]

So there are two sort of values here. One is your humane interest in making sure that the end of the world, if it comes to that, that is happening for a good reason and a just reason, as best you can define it. And the ongoing hope that by making this, our system credible, that we will never have an end of the world. So my question to you is, how do you weigh those together?

[Kathy]

Yeah. Well, that's a dilemma. Yeah, you know, that's a dilemma.

[Latif Nasser]

So after the military forced Harold to retire, he became a truck driver.

[Harold Herring]

And once I got that job, I made up my mind that I was going to devote my time to making a living for my family and to that company. And I wasn't going to be off dealing with this subject anymore.

[Latif Nasser]

And eventually he started doing addiction counseling at the Salvation army, mostly with homeless people. What's your sort of emotional state around all this right now? Like, how often is this something you still think about? How. What do you. How do you feel right now?

[Harold Herring]

Well, I'm, I'm just. I just. I think that common sense, I think the goodness in human beings begs for a resolution of this. I just think that the need for that is at least as great now as it's ever been in the history of our republic. And I might add, on a personal level, that I had. I mean, I was really committed to the military, to the Air Force, volunteered several times, you know, to do my duty with respect to the Vietnam War. And I just felt that I had asked a very reasonable question that deserved an answer. And it was not for me alone. It was for all of us.

[Jad Abumrad]

I keep thinking about those six minutes.

[Robert Krulwich]

Not a lot of time.

[Jad Abumrad]

Big props to reporter Latif Nasser. This story was Produced by Annie McEwan with production help from Simon Adler.

[Robert Krulwich]

And a big thank you to historian and reporter Ron Rosenbaum, whose research we relied on in some part for this story.

[Jad Abumrad]

And to our special consulting researcher, Alex Wellstein, who is by day a nuclear historian at the Stevens Institute of Technology in New Jersey.

[Robert Krulwich]

And to the U.S. air Force, to Captain Chris Mesnard and to Carla Pampy and to Lieutenant Esther Willette and to Lieutenant Veronica Perez.

[Jad Abumrad]

Also, thanks to Elaine Scarry, Ryan Pettigrew at the Nixon Presidential Library, Ryan Firkamp, Robin Berry and Lisa Berry, Tom Woodruff, Doreen DeBroom and Ray Peter. And finally, the Tampa Bay Times, who we worked with over the past two years on the previous two episodes we put out about police violence. Their project called why Cops Shoot, is now online. Definitely, definitely check it [e-mail] why copshoot. That's tampabay.com ycopshoot I'm Jad Abumrad.

[Robert Krulwich]

I'm Robert Krulwich.

[Jad Abumrad]

Thanks for listening.

[Kathy]

To hear the message again, press 2. Start of message this is Bruce Blair at Princeton. I'm Bill Perry. Radiolab is produced by Jad Abumrad. Dylan Keefe is our director of sound design, Norn Wheeler, senior editor. Jamie York is our senior producer. Our staff includes Simon Adler, Brenna Ferrell, David Gebbel, Matt Kielty, Robert Kruelwich, Penny McEwen, Lateef Nasser, Melissa O', Donnell, Arianne Wack and Molly Webster. With how from Tracy Hunt, Valentina Bohanini, Nigar Patali, Phoebe Wang and KD Ferguson. Our fact checker is Michelle Harris. End of message.

[Tony Debroom]

I'll be happy to share whatever I may remember. Remember this took place early in the morning of March 1, 1954. So it's been a while.

[Jad Abumrad]

So a couple weeks back, the writer Sam Keane put us in touch with.

[Tony Debroom]

This guy, but was quite traumatic and hard to forget.

[Robert Krulwich]

How old were you on that day in 1954?

[Tony Debroom]

I was nine years old.

[Robert Krulwich]

Nine years old. Okay, good. All right.

[Jad Abumrad]

His name is Tony Debroom. He is an ambassador for the Marshall Islands in the North Pacific. And he tells this story about a particular moment that happened when he was nine on a day very early in the morning.

[Tony Debroom]

At that moment, in that early morning hours, I was out fishing with my grandfather. It was customary village that we lived in to, to go net fishing, pro net fishing, for scats.

[Jad Abumrad]

Tony says he and his grandpa were out on the beach before the sun had risen, and they waded through the water, tossing their net, pulling it back, tossing it out, pulling it back. And after they'd done that for a.

[Tony Debroom]

While, the sun was beginning to, to, to, to rise from the east. And I was carrying the basket he was throwing the net when the flash went off. We were temporarily blinded by the flash. It was as if someone had walked up to you with a, with a flash camera and, and, and, and, and took a shot right, you know, inches from your eyes. I cannot with any certainty tell you how many seconds passed, but. We felt the shock. It was like the real heavy burst of wind going through the land.

[Jad Abumrad]

He says he turned away from the light and back towards the shore.

[Tony Debroom]

You can see the vegetation move. It's indescribable. I thought it was the end of the world.

[Jad Abumrad]

What Tony didn't know is that 300 miles away, the US had just tested a bomb they called Castle Bravo. It was a hydrogen bomb about a thousand times as strong as the bomb that dropped on Hiroshima.

[Tony Debroom]

And then the rumble and the roar and the thunder of the sound of the explosion, because it was not one big explosion that goes just boom and that's it. The chain reaction caused it to roll like thunder.

[Jad Abumrad]

And then, he says, the sky erupted.

[Tony Debroom]

Everything turned red. The sky turned red. The ocean was red. The sand was red. My grandfather was red, and the fish we caught were red. The whole atmosphere, the whole hemisphere, the effect was like you're standing under a glass bowl and somebody poured blood. We. We were terrified.

[Jad Abumrad]

That explosion and the many others like it would poison the Marshall Islands, poison its people. But in that moment, Tony says he and his grandpa just stood there, listening to the explosions and staring at the blood red sky.

[Tony Debroom]

It seemed to have lasted for what. What seemed like hours. I am now 72 years old, and every time I speak about this, my. My skin still crawls, and I still get goosebumps.