The “Live from Mom’s Basement” Edition

Summary

---

Podcast Summary: Rational Security

Episode: The “Live from Mom’s Basement” Edition

Date: August 6, 2026
Host: Scott R. Anderson (Lawfare Senior Editor)
Guests: Natalie Orpet (Lawfare Executive Editor), Julia Curley (Lawfare Public Service Fellow), Ari Tabriz (Lawfare Contributing Editor; VP, Chicago Council for Global Affairs)

---

Main Theme

This episode tackles a transformative moment in U.S. national security and foreign policy, focusing on the expanding Iran conflict, the shakeup at the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the repercussions of major law firm Paul Weiss capitulating to Trump administration demands. The conversation is rich with insights on horizontal escalation in the Middle East, the politicization and purging of intelligence leadership, and the ethical dilemmas facing America's legal community.

---

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. The Expanding U.S.-Iran Conflict (“Operation Epic Fury” and Horizontal Escalation)

Overview:

• Five months into the operation, what began as U.S. action against Iranian targets has spiraled into a hot, multi-regional war drawing in new countries, actors, and domains.
• The Trump administration faces growing criticism for a lack of strategic planning and for enabling the conflict to expand uncontrollably.

Key Points:

• Horizontal Escalation:

  • Iran is using its proxies (especially the Houthis, as well as action in Iraq and cyberattacks) to spread the battlefield and retaliate against the U.S. and its allies (07:52, C: Ari).
  • The war now affects Gulf infrastructure, U.S. bases, water/power supplies, and even critical Straits (Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb).
  • Each cycle of violence involves tit-for-tat escalation, social media posturing by Trump, frantic diplomacy (often with third parties like Oman, Qatar), illusory ceasefire deals, and then renewed fighting (10:55, C: Ari).

• Strategic Logic:

  • Iran’s approach is to “win by failing to lose,” using asymmetric attacks where it is weakest in direct confrontation (15:40, B: Julia).
  • With talks at a standstill, proxies reactivated, and economic/cultural pillars (especially in the Gulf) destabilized, Iran lacks incentive for de-escalation.

• U.S. Policy Failures and Regional Impact:

  • The Gulf’s reliance on U.S. security guarantees and open Straits is undermined, pushing states toward alternatives (new ports, pipelines) and closer Chinese ties (19:44, B: Julia; 25:31, A: Scott).
  • The administration’s unilateralism, disregard for expert advice, and patchy legal justifications raise questions about presidential war powers.

Notable Quotes:

• “We are just kind of seeing this play out more broadly throughout the region and we're in a pretty challenging situation.” (12:23, C: Ari)
• “Iran can't answer what we can do, which is a 90 target, a night, blow for blow. ...They're going to fight this war on terrain that favors them, which is spreading the battlefield.” (15:40, B: Julia)

---

2. Presidential War Powers & Legal Constraints

Overview:

• The administration’s use of executive power in the Iran conflict illustrates the erosion of constraints—both legal and procedural—on presidential war-making.

Key Points:

• Legal Framework:

  • The 2001 AUMF is stretched for operations in Iraq due to links with ISIS; the 2002 Iraq AUMF is repealed.
  • The administration claims repeated 60-day clocks per the War Powers Resolution, evading congressional oversight (29:33, D: Natalie).

• Congressional & International Backlash:

  • U.S. unilateralism is raising regional opposition and could undermine U.S. bases.
  • Allies question U.S. credibility and adherence to international law, with actions skirting or openly threatening war crimes (29:33, D: Natalie; 36:46, A: Scott).

• Checks on Presidential Action:

  • Courts are deferential; Congress is slow and politically hamstrung.
  • Some novel litigation and concurrent resolutions could offer new pressure, but obstacles remain high (36:46, A: Scott).

Notable Quotes:

• “No, it [law] is not a meaningful constraint on this president who delights in making the most expansive arguments with respect to the extent of executive power…” (29:33, D: Natalie)
• “There’s kind of an open disregard for what people see as legal limits.” (36:46, A: Scott)

---

3. Purges at ODNI and the Politicization of Intelligence

Overview:

• Following party-line confirmation, new DNI Jay Clayton replaces acting director Bill Pulte, but purges and uncertainty beset the intelligence community.
• Massive uncertainty about leadership, repeated firings, and potential illegal terminations are creating confusion and a climate of fear.

Key Points:

• Transition Chaos:

  • Pulte’s week-long holdover (possibly illegal under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act) was used for a fifth round of purges (44:04, A: Scott; 46:17, B: Julia).
  • No clear rationale for cuts; skepticism about whether further “shrinking” ODNI serves any coherent strategic purpose.

• Politicization & Intimidation:

  • New leadership appears loyal to Trump, serving to intimidate and silence dissent. Selective declassification is being used to target political enemies (49:09, A: Scott; 50:05, B: Julia).
  • These tactics echo throughout other branches (Defense, State), undermining U.S. credibility abroad, deterring expertise, and risking the loss of key intelligence partnerships.

• Legality of Firings:

  • If employees were fired after the new DNI’s Senate confirmation but before swearing-in, litigation could ensue under the FVRA (59:37, D: Natalie).

Notable Quotes:

• “It continually creates the press and the attention around attacking the deep state...But the goal is to deter dissent within the IC, and it has been working.” (50:05, B: Julia)
• “We did a lot of work in the aftermath of the Iraq war to rebuild the credibility of our intelligence...I think we're taking step backs here again.” (53:04, C: Ari)

---

4. The Paul Weiss Law Firm Deal and The Pressure on Legal Institutions

Overview:

• A New York Times exposé details how Paul Weiss, once a pillar of liberal legal activism, became the first major law firm to settle with the Trump administration to avoid executive order sanctions.
• The move triggered partner departures, the ouster of longtime chairman Brad Karp, backlash over diversity policy rollbacks, and concerns that basic legal ethical standards are being warped by authoritarian pressure.

Key Points:

• Law Firms at a Crossroads:

  • The lucrative corporate side of big law increasingly outweighs traditional social justice advocacy, undermining the ethical mission of legal professionals.
  • Past resistance—such as lawsuits from other elite firms against the Trump EO—stands in stark contrast to Paul Weiss’s capitulation.
  • The exodus of diverse partners and star litigators underscores this moral crisis (69:00, D: Natalie).

• Broader Implications:

  • Capitulation “never satisfies the administration; the leopard will eat their face eventually.” (77:33, B: Julia)
  • The wave of “copy and paste” responsiveness is endangering not just law firms, but academia, think tanks, and private industry (78:20, C: Ari).
  • Real business consequences result: client defections, trust erosion, and diminishing professional standing (82:37, D: Natalie).

Notable Quotes:

• “Going after the lawyers is kind of a famous thing for silencing the opposition. And it’s I guess not surprising that they did that here.” (77:33, B: Julia)
• “These firms have often been wrong that it would be better for their business to capitulate. Many firms that have fought back have seen growth in their client base and in their profits.” (82:37, D: Natalie)

---

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• On escalation and the Iran war:

  • “Essentially we're in this cycle where every few weeks we seem to be going through ... tit for tat escalation ... scrambling that happens diplomatically ... then it's, oh, nevermind, we're back to shooting.” (11:20, C: Ari)

• On U.S. credibility:

  • “If the superpower, the United States, had one job in the Middle East, it was to protect their security and ensure the flow of oil ... and we have failed.” (19:44, B: Julia)

• On the intelligence community purges:

  • “It has been fascinating watching the copy and paste tactic that has occurred from law firms to corporations, defense industry, academia, think tanks. ...across the board. ...Once you give an inch, you will keep giving more. And this is where we are now.” (78:20, C: Ari)

• On legal ethics and institutions:

  • “If you are focused on profits, you may experience tensions with your ethical obligations as an attorney that are what you allow you to be an attorney and violations of which should disqualify you from being an attorney at a certain level.” (80:23, D: Natalie)

---

Timestamps for Important Segments

• 00:00–03:40 | Introductions, banter, setting context from “Mom’s Basement”
• 03:40–25:31 | Topic 1: Iran Conflict, escalation, and strategic dynamics
• 25:31–41:39 | Domestic/international legal limits on presidential warmaking; Congress and the courts
• 44:04–58:00 | Topic 2: ODNI leadership drama and the intelligence community purges
• 58:00–65:55 | Legal debate: Federal Vacancies Reform Act and potential litigation
• 65:55–82:37 | Topic 3: Paul Weiss, law firm ethics, corporate pressures, broader institutional consequences
• 82:37–90:35 | Object Lessons (board games, satire, legal system stress)
• 90:35–End | Closing remarks

---

Tone & Language

The discussion is sharp, occasionally darkly humorous, and reflects a sense of urgency over broad institutional crises. The panel oscillates between detailed legal/policy analysis and passionate advocacy for accountability, rule of law, and professional ethics. The tone is critical but grounded in expertise and lived experience.

---

Object Lessons

As per show tradition, panelists share lighthearted or thought-provoking recommendations:

• Ari: “Cozy Stickerville” – a relaxing cooperative legacy board game (83:00)
• Julia: A vintage CIA recruitment poster for “good women,” satirizing current military gender politics (84:39)
• Scott: Two board games – the Greek myth–themed “By Jove” and “Sea Salt & Paper,” a strategic card game (85:40)
• Natalie: Madeline Miller’s novel “Circe” and articles on new legal venues for security cases and the challenges of lawyering amid institutional chaos (87:37, 88:11)

---

Final Takeaway

This episode paints a picture of U.S. national security institutions under severe stress: a Middle East war spinning beyond control, the intelligence community in a state of purge-induced paralysis, and key pillars of legal and civil society caving under political and financial pressures. The panel calls for structural reforms, introspection, and an honest reckoning with the costs of abandoning principle for expediency.

---

For further reading/listening, visit lawfaremedia.org and check out related podcasts and articles from the team. If you value analysis like this, consider supporting Lawfare via Patreon.

---

Transcript

[A]

Customers shouldn't have to start from scratch every time they need help. That's why we built fin. FIN answers questions, helps buyers find what they need, and remembers the context from one conversation to the next. Learn more at FIN AI. So, as you guys can probably see, I've made my way out of my murder basement where I often record these episodes. I made it to the place where all 40 year old think tank fellows do their best work. My mommy and daddy's house, where I'm recording from today. So astute video watchers can try and garner whatever lessons about 20 something and teenage Scott from the books on my bookshelf. Although I think the only thing you'll probably make out is my travel Scrabble kit from the 1990s, which does say a lot. I think about me and what I was up to in my high school years. That's all I've really got for you. But yeah, excited to be with you guys from this somewhat more well lit environment.

[B]

Well, there's a tradition of recording Lothair Ratzak from your mom's house that you're

[A]

following in my footsteps.

[B]

I just want you to note, but I was in Hawaii.

[A]

That is slightly. That is slightly nicer in Northern Virginia.

[C]

That was rude. Julia. You can't just, you know, you can't

[D]

just Hawaii drop here and there. I know, exactly. But Ari is in the coolest city in the world.

[C]

That is true. And actually, Natalie, do you know what I did last night? I went on a boat. My colleague owns a boat. And she messaged me at like 4pm and she was like, hey, do you want to go on a boat? And I was like, yes, I want

[A]

to go on a boat.

[C]

Anyways, it was. It was incredible. So I am now officially part of the Chicago cult that I mocked for years and years.

[D]

Welcome.

[C]

Thank you. It's a cozy place.

[A]

You know, I was living in Chicago. Cause when she needed to raise her mic and camera, she just put it on top of a hot pizza pie and brought it up right to the perfect level. And that only works in Chicago. You do it in New York, it doesn't work. You need like 10 pizzas. But in Chicago, one will do it.

[C]

Scott is in with the dad jokes this morning.

[B]

There you go.

[A]

You know, I'm in my fairy's house. Foreign. Hello everyone and welcome back to Rational Security. I am your host, Scott R. Andersen. Thrilled to be back with you again for the show where we invite you to join members of the Lawfare team as we try to make sense of the week's Big national security news stories, whether they are in our lanes or not. I'm thrilled to be back with some of my very talented colleagues to talk through this week's big stories. Joining us at the top of my screen, I will start with Lawfare executive editor Natalie Orpet. Natalie, thank you for hopping back on.

[D]

Thanks for having me.

[A]

Thrilled to have you. And joining us once again is relative newcomer, but a frequent voice of relate here on LawFair. That is LawFair's public service fellow, Julia Curley. Julia, thank you for coming back on the podcast.

[B]

Yeah, absolutely. We should have like a jacket for the, you know, like five, like SNL does. Like when you, when you.

[A]

I like that. I really like that. I don't know what color my jacket would be at this point because I have done literally hundreds of these, but I do. I would like the idea of a jacket.

[B]

We'll get the Lawfare merch department on it.

[A]

Yeah, yeah. Like a technical or dreamcoat sort of vibe is really what I've always been working towards. And I think that's about right. And we'll have a dog on it for Ben's sake. That'll be fine. And joining us once again is Lawford contributing editor and Vice president at the Chicago Council for Global Affairs, Ari Tapatabai. Ari, thank you for finding time to come back on the podcast.

[C]

Thank you for having me.

[A]

From exotic Beantown itself, not Beantown, what I say, that's Boston. From exotic, what is Chicago?

[C]

We do have a bean though, Windy City.

[B]

Yeah.

[A]

That's why I got confused for a second. But then I was like, wait a second, that's wrong. Yeah.

[B]

All right.

[C]

Not to be mistaken with the actual wind, that has to do with politicians, I'm told.

[A]

All right, good to know.

[D]

Look at you, Ari. I'm so proud.

[A]

Hey. Well, we have a lot of news stories to tack through this week. A few familiar ones, a few new ones. Let us dig into it. Topic one for this week, lateral thinking. Five months into operation Epic Fury, maybe depending on what you call that, depending on how you typify the military operation, I should note Trump administration would dispute that the US Iran war has flared back to life and more importantly, spread outward. Over the past several weeks, fighting has jumped to new countries, actors and domains. In a textbook case of what some might call hot horizontal escalation, US and Saudi jets opened a new front by striking Iran backed militias inside Iraq. Iran aligned forces battered Kuwait's water and power infrastructure and Saudi oil facilities. The Houthis apparently firing from Iraqi soil. Wave of Iran linked Tiber attacks hit water utilities here at home. Then last Friday, President Trump threatened what he called the biggest attack since World War II before abruptly calling it off, with talks over reopening the Strait of Hormuz now said, at least by the White House, to be back on, although notably Iran, among others, disputes that. What does this expanding aperture mean for the future trajectory of the Iran war? Squatters rights the Intelligence Committee has a new leader of sorts July 28 the Senate confirmed Jay Clinton, the former SEC chair and Trump's US attorney in Manhattan, as director of national intelligence on a party line vote ending the rocky acting tenure of housing chief Bill Pulte. But a nearly unheard of move the White House left Clayton unsworn in for a week while Pulte stayed on, using the extra days to run a fifth round of purges at an agency he had already nearly in half before Clayton was finally sworn in. This past Monday, Taga has reignited the fight over Section 702 surveillance authorities, which have lapsed and raised potential legal questions about whether Pulte had the authority to keep acting at all. Where does the ODNI go from here, and what does it mean for US national security and the intelligence community? And topic three Weiss guys, A sprawling New York Times investigation published over the weekend pulls back the curtain on how Paul Weiss and I am going to say it like that every time because they have that goddamn comma right there in the middle for no good reason. The first elite law firm to cut a deal with the Trump administration back in early 2025 to escape a punishing executive order, actually made its fateful decision. The reporting details how then chairman Brad Karp enlisted Patriots owner Robert Kraft to reach Trump, agreed to $40 million in pro bono work and a drop the firm DEI policies, and was reportedly blindsided when Trump spun the deal in his own way online. And it lands after a wave of star litigators fled the firm. In response, Karp himself was ousted for his ties to Jeffrey Epstein, and fresh revelations also emerged about the quiet multimillion dollar exit of the firm's first openly transgender partner. What has capitulation, if that's the right thing to call it, cost Paul Weiss. And what lessons should other law firms and the legal community as a whole draw from it? So for our first topic, Ari, I want to come to you. It has been an eventful couple of weeks since we've gotten to talk about the Iran war. It's one of these topics that we could talk about every week, and in a way we do revisit a lot, but there's always little new angles that are emerging over the current state of the conflict and the way it's expanded. I think that the last time we talked about it, horizontal escalation, I think, has been one of the maybe two or three big stories about this. We are seeing a reemergence of a trend that was very real early in the conflict where we saw Iran and to some extent Iranian proxies hitting a number of targets around the region, including parties not directly involved in Israeli and US Military operations. Here we're seeing a number of attacks going arguably even further than I believe they did before, particularly in attacks on US Forces in Jordan. We have the Houthis now finally, after having laid fairly dormant for the last four months, really stepping in a big way, imposing a blockade on Saudi Arabia, now potentially taking this military action at Iran's urging, including potentially from Iraq, which I am very surprised and confused by. So all around, talk to us a little bit about what these big trends are in this horizontal escalation picture and what it tells us about the state of these purported negotiations that are ongoing between the United States and Iran. Although notably the White House says those negotiations are ongoing. The President said that Iran's disputed it. And the only negotiations I think that we have reporting confirmed of is actually more Iran, Oman and to some extent Qatar negotiations, not actually direct US Iran negotiations. So just bring us up to speed a little bit on where all these threads lie.

[C]

Okay, well, so you know, we had this memorandum of understanding that was signed back in June that was supposed to set off this 60 day clock for the United States and Iran to, on a bilateral basis, figure out two sets of main issues, the first being Iran's nuclear program and the second being the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and obviously putting an end to the conflict in a sustainable manner. As I think we expected and probably talked about at the time, the MOU did not hold. We now have confirmation of it. And what has happened is precisely what you described, which is this horizontal escalation that we are seeing. I think the first noteworthy thing is that the proxies, the Iranian proxies at the beginning of the conflict were relatively inactive. And part of that was because of the Israeli campaign over the past three years since October 7, of, you know, degrading Iranian proxies in the region, Lebanese Hezbollah chiefly among them, but also Hamas and others. And so there was a little bit of a delay in some of the proxies, notably the Houthis, who are now in full force, entering the conflict. They had kind of been sitting watching things or they had taken some action, but not a ton of action. And now we're seeing all of, not all of them, but some of them become a lot more active. And obviously that is sparking the risks that many of us had been concerned about when this whole war started, which was that the conflict would obviously drag on for a while, that it would spill over into other countries. And we've said this before, but it's worth repeating that part of the way Iran is obviously, obviously raising the cost on the US for this war because it can't really hit the US Homeland is by targeting and having its proxies target partners in the region, U.S. installations and forces in the region to continue to kind of show that it can also hold the United States and its partners at risk and to ensure that it's not a one side thing where Iran is getting hit and the United States is kind of getting to not remember that it's really in a war, but continue shooting at Iran. So that's where we are. The second piece that I think is important to highlight here is that we've obviously had the situation, the Strait of Hormuz that has been very much in the news. Everybody's been following. Freedom of Navigation has been disrupted there. Now we have a second choke point that is at play here and that is the Bab El Mandab. And we are now seeing disruptions in Freedom of navigation there. And if this trend continues, it is going to be really problematic. The third thing that has been happening is that that we're essentially in this five step process that we seem to be rinsing and repeating. Julia and I will have a piece on this at some point when my Pentagon overlords finally clear it. But essentially we're in this cycle where every few weeks we seem to be going through step one, we have tit for tat escalation. And again, it's increasingly now affecting more countries and more choke points in the region. With Iran hitting US Partners, US Forces, the United States then retaliates and hits some Iranian targets. Then step two, we typically have the kind of tit for tat escalation on social media where the President tends to, you know, have a series of true social posts and talks about blowing up a bunch of targets in Iran, brings in potential civilian infrastructure and, you know, threatens possibly war crimes. Defer to Scott and Natalie on that piece, but certainly, you know, taking a number of steps that are dubious in nature, then you have A lot of scrambling that happens diplomatically. That's step three. You have partners sending messages to Iran saying, hey, everybody should calm down here. Sending messages to the States saying, hey, we're working out a deal. Perhaps, you know, maybe stop tweeting about blowing up bridges and roads and, you know, water installations. And then after that, you typically have step four, which is where the president comes in and says, we may have a deal on the table and therefore insert, you know, Arab leader's name here, has asked me to stop, you know, the tweeting and the fighting. So we're gonna take a break here. And then that happens. And then step five, it's, oh, nevermind, we're back to shooting because it's actually not working out. And rinse and repeat. And this has been the cycle that we've been in. The challenges now pair this with the horizontal escalation we've been talking about, which is that we are just kind of seeing this play out more broadly throughout the. And we're in a pretty challenging situation. So that's my recap of where things have been since we last talked about this, which was probably last week.

[A]

I mean, to me, what the most amazing and bizarre part of this conflict, although I think it's actually like, was kind of predictable from the outset and a reason why for so long the United States was very reticent about doing this very dramatic step that's been talked about again for a decade or two in various national security circles of directing direct, substantial action against Iran is the extent to which a US Iran conflict is now absorbing almost every other conflict in the region, in part because a lot of other conflicts had a Iran, US Or Iran, other states in the region sort of tension as a strong element of it. So now it's absorbing to some extent the Saudi Arabia, Houthi, Gulf State, Houthi conflict that's been going on for a decade now, tamped down in recent years, but that was a big focus of debates during the first Trump administration. The Yemen civil war, which really was in fact more of a regional proxy conflict, a lot of it over Iran. We have it intersecting with Iraq's own internal challenges with militias, which has been a real focus of the U. S. Iraq relationship, which in theory US Troops are supposed to be exiting the country by the end of September in a way that actually implicates the Islamic State conflict that the United States been a part in since 2014, because the legal authority, at least, that the executive branch has been relying upon for US Military action against the militias in Iraq has been the 2001 AUMF. Because of the nexus to the Islamic state conflict. The 2002 AUMF regarding Iraq has been withdrawn, so that's not available for statutory authorization. Curious as to see if the administration shifts its views that after September 30th. I imagine some lawyers will want to, but who knows if the White House will follow their advice? This is on top of the Lebanon conflict already becoming essentially a huge kind of connector with the Iran US Conflict. And this really complicates, I think, any sort of resolution to these sorts of conflicts, because Iran is pulling in all these other threads that other regional actors the United States has ties to are going to want to have a vested interest in. And I'm sure to some extent, the Israelis, at least we know, want to handle Lebanon separately. That's something that has been a point of friction with the Trump administration precisely because it wants to get, or at least at one point really wanted to get to a deal to resolve the Strait of Hormuz situation. And it's hard to imagine these other things are going to make that much easier now that you have the Houthis active, that you have it affecting the Iraq relationship, all these other nexuses. It's just kind of wild to me. So, Julia, I want to come to you on this. I mean, how predictable an outcome was this for this sort of dramatic action? Like, how much should, frankly, we be holding the Trump administration accountable for unleashing a parade of horribles, potentially, that we seem to be marching down in regards to regional conflict? And where does it go from here? I mean, how much can you put this back into the bottle? And how much is it? Are we looking at a very different regional sort of security dynamic that is going to look profoundly different from what it looked like up until February of this year?

[B]

So I think we can start, of course, that this was predicted, predictable and has now come true. And so, yes, the administration should be held accountable for its obvious lack of planning failures, shutting out the intelligence community from the planning process and just not having an NSE to actually orchestrate the instruments of national power. And this is the inevitable result of amateur hour, which has resulted in a debacle. I want to return, though, to the strategic logic of the Iranian approach now, which I think builds on what Ari said. So you have them opening up these new fronts across the region, new actors getting involved, all, you know, these Iranian proxies, new choke points. But we're also seeing them target new actors or bring the fight into other domains. So we have the first strikes on Kuwaiti water and power. We've got potentially cyber attacks in the United States. The water utilities in at least seven states have mysteriously been targeted. The administration is frankly trying to downplay the potential for an Iranian nexus to these kinds of cyber attacks. But this kind of an approach was always going to be in the Iranian playbook to try to spread violence and disruption around the world, to get others or populations like in the United States to put pressure on their governments to wrap up the war. So this is all based in the fact that Iran can't answer what we can do, which is a 90 target, a night, blow for blow. We can really do damage inside of Iran. They can't answer that. So they're going to fight this war on terrain that favors them, which is spreading the battlefield and winning by failing to lose and refusing to lose. So I think we're going to see more of this because the Iranians have very little incentive to wrap up the conflict now. They've seen the United States move backwards in our war aims repeatedly. They saw us sign up to a ceasefire deal for 60 days that was worse than the status quo ante. So I can't imagine the Iranians who are famous for using an American upcoming election or change of power as a tool to, you know, to put pressure on the Americans to give concessions at the table. This is like a decades long practice for them. They have absolutely no incentive to let us off the hook here.

[A]

Assuming they don't let us off the hook. Let's say Iran has kind of expanded and brought in these different elements, what does that mean for U.S. and regional security interests kind of moving forward? What are the different dynamics here? Obviously there's much more interlinkage between a bunch of different things. Right. And the economic picture is really different. I mean, Gulf states, I think if you can't liberate the Strait of Hormuz, their ability to export things and import things like their quality of life, their economic power base is going to diminish. I don't know if it's going to collapse. I suspect not. And particularly because you already see them working towards certain alternatives. You see the UAE building a port facility that kind of tries to bypass this rate of Hormuz by establishing a new port facility in Fujairah, one of the Emirates on the other side of the peninsula. And then presumably, I think they're going to establish some sort of land transit route between that and the other parts of the Emirates. Abu Dhabi, Dubai. There are other solutions being put forward. New pipelines for oil, for gas, all of which actually the Gulf states are in a position to advance because they have a lot of capital. But it's going to take time and energy. And it still doesn't help you when you're talking about consumer goods and other things that, at least for places like Dubai and to some extent Doha, have been a big part of their selling point. They're selling a luxury lifestyle is actually part of their economic base and power base, cultural power, even. What does it mean if the Gulf states are stuck under the situation where you've got this constant leverage that Iran always had hypothetically, but was never really willing to use? I think because they worried what the worst consequences would be. Now they've kind of lived through the worst consequences and they recognize there's limits on it, and they're much more, at least by my sense of things, seem much more willing and able to actually exercise it. How does that change the regional picture five or ten years from now?

[B]

Well, if the superpower, the United States, had one job in the Middle east, it was to protect from the standpoint of the host countries, was to protect their security and to ensure the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. And we have failed now on the two main things that they have for years expected the United States to be able to perform for them. And once we have failed, it's going to be very difficult to regain our credibility that we'll have the ability to do this. I think that where we are is probably best called a violent competitive bargaining, which is the subject of Ari and I's paper. And when you add in third parties like the Gulf states or allies of the Iranians like the Hezbollah, it's going to become increasingly difficult, even if both sides want to come to an agreement to get everyone's proxies in order and to line them up to abide by a deal. The last thing I want to say on the negotiations and the end game for this. So if you take a step back, interstate conflict usually ends something like this in a messy competitive bargaining, shooting, talking, fighting, repeat. And the United States has not had one of these in its mind for quite some time. We imagine wars like this end in absolute surrender or formal peace agreements. But certainly most conflicts end up with these kind of bleeding stalemates until most both sides decide it's no longer in their interest. And in this case, I think that even if we can reach temporary agreements that will allow the Iranians to dial up the flow of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, I don't know why the Iranians would give up that strategic leverage to dial that back when they're not getting what they want at the negotiating table. So I can see this process of going back and forth from ceasefire to fighting playing out for possibly the rest

[C]

of this year, if I can add a couple of things to what you both just said. So, Scott, I fully agree with you that, you know, Gulf states may be looking to bypass the strait. It's not going to resolve some of the broader issues that they're going to have, which is that they have now for decades tried to position themselves as a play, as a region where you have relative stability. Yes, it's been in the Middle East. And so, you know, you tend to think that there is conflicts and terrorism and all those things, but it's actually been the Gulf region has been fairly insulated partially because of US Installations which had served as a deterrent, which they are no longer being seen as. And so you've had this kind of movement toward having cultural centers. A lot of universities, US Universities, right, have branches throughout the Gulf. A lot of really important museums have branches in the Gulf. So the sort of, you know, there's the energy piece of this, where there is potentially a resolution here, even if this continues. But the element that is focused on tourism, on cultural and kind of the more quote, unquote, soft power side of things, that really depends on stability. And the longer this conflict continues, the more horizontal escalation we see. The more of these proxies become involved and the more the fighting starts to take place against, you know, Gulf partners in the region, the more that is going to kind of depreciate the value proposition that the Gulf has tried to put on the table for the past few decades. When it comes to that sector, that's number one. Number two, as Julia said, part of I think what is going on in the Iranian calculus right now is that the sunk costs are sunk, right? They have paid the price of this conflict and they're now, the longer this goes on, the better off they are because now the proxies are regaining re entering the game in a way that they weren't a few months ago. And perhaps if this war had ended two months ago, we wouldn't be where we wouldn't be where we are, but you wouldn't have the reactivation of the proxies in the same way that you have now. The other piece is that the Iranian regime in its current iteration has serious governance issues that it has to deal with. The longer the war continues, the more it can kick that can to later, the second the shooting stops. They have to think about, oh, by the way, all the economic challenges that led to the mass protests just a few months ago. They're going to have to deal with all of the social problems that continue to exist. They're gonna have to address some of the, you know, the challenges that stem from the mass repression that they conducted just six months ago, the environmental challenges that we, you know, don't talk enough about. But the water shortages, the, you know, all of those things that have been exacerbated by the war, they're going to have to formulate actual policies to address those things or else they're going to have more rounds of mass, not unrest, but like protests. And they don't really want to get to that point. So for them, for this brand new, in some ways Iranian leadership that is less experienced, that does not have any responses, any policies, any, any ways to address the problems that the people have. Being in this kind of state of war where it can, you know, kind of point to an external enemy is actually a very comfortable place to be. And so in some ways they don't really have the incentive to end this conflict. And of course, you know, Julia mentioned this. You have then you have to add in Israel now, all of the proxies, everybody has their own interests that they're pursuing here. And so for this reason, I think I'm personally very skeptical that we're going to see an actual end here, that we're going to see this kind of five step process that I laid out. I think we're going to see some version of this play out for the foreseeable future.

[A]

Yeah, and two things just to add on that that jump out at me is the value proposition you put forward. There's also an American shifting value proposition, I suspect on this, because if you cannot transit the Strait of Hormuz riddly, a lot of those naval facilities you're maintaining in the Gulf become a lot less valuable as kind of a forward operating base for the broader region. Or if nothing else, it becomes a kind of recurring cost of doing that because you're going to be taking suffering potshots from the Iranians. You're not going to want to move too readily. Exercises are probably going to be a lot more difficult. Meaning if you want to give your, you know, seamen and other people exercises, you probably can't station them there very easily, at least at the scale you would want to do. And there aren't really a lot of other options in the, you know, particularly the Indian Ocean sort of area that I can think about for US Soldiers. I know there's a facility in Diego Garcia which I think is a major naval facility. Most of the others either in the Gulf, like the Persian Gulf, or kind of on the Red Sea. There's like a Djibouti base. I don't know if that's a naval facility. I think it is. I know there's like a drone facility there. There's some, you know, in the Red Sea, and then you have the eastern Med. But then you have to transit Suez of the Red Sea to get anywhere. So actually, it has pretty big strategic ramifications. If this becomes a real friction point. Maybe the United States is just militarily powerful enough that they can eat those costs and that, frankly, the lack of good alternatives means that they stay there. I suspect it will. But it's a value proposition that's actually kind of declining on both ends. On the flip side, I note also is because of the dynamics of this conflict, it actually gives other strategic actors, particularly China, tons more leverage over all the regional actors because. Because they are. Because they're consuming Iranian oil exports. China, to some extent India, Singapore, I think, are some of the biggest recipients of Iranian oil exports. They have a lot more leverage. Iran needs them to be able to continue receiving this, in part because of U.S. sanctions, which the United States has oscillated a little bit on, in part because of those are just the relationships they have. All of a sudden, they are diplomatically much more influential without having to have any sort of military relationship, because they may be the one party that can negotiate a little entree in with the Iranians to get transit through the Strait. And all of a sudden the Gulf states are going to have to look a lot more towards them. And that kind of question of how much are the Gulf states leaning towards China, leaning towards the United States, to some extent Russia, but less of a meaningful player has been occurring in conversations the last 10 years. And this is a big weak point. It strikes me, for the United States in that competition, to the extent there is one. Now, I want to come to you to another part of this. We've talked about this show. I think a number of times now that there's a good reason to think there's a major strategic and a foreseeable one. It was facilitated by the fact that the president was able to make these decisions more or less on his own, de facto, if not de jure. There are legal arguments that you and I know well regarding domestic law, certainly International law, but even domestic law that says, well, maybe the President isn't able to do these sorts of things. And increasingly this administration has kind of weaseled around them. They haven't completely ignored them. Remember, they are adjusting their casualty figures and are saying, well, we are complying with the War Powers Resolution because Operation Epic Fury ended before 60 days. And this is all periodic follow on military action. That's freestanding, different 60 day clocks. And I'm sure they would say, we haven't had an LLC opinion yet, but I'm sure they would say, yeah, but this conflict was within the president's Article 2 power. It doesn't rise to what the declare war clause says. Congressional authority is needed because US Service members really haven't been put at that much risk. A number have died, a lot have been injured. I don't want to minimize that. But it's not at the scale the executive branch usually looks for, which is usually Korea, Vietnam is where they acknowledge at least that would be the line, or they hint that that might be the line. The Maduro opinion that this administration release actually suggested could be lower than that, interestingly, like Afghanistan, Iraq wars as maybe the threshold, but even that, we're talking about thousands of casualties, major numbers of troops at risk, different from this sort of scale in terms of risk to service members. But the geopolitical consequences are huge, potentially much more dramatic. What does that tell us about the domestic state of the law here? Is law a meaningful constraint on the president? Could it be under other circumstances? And how. How do we need to address that situation? How would we even begin to go about it?

[D]

No, it is not a meaningful constraint on this president who delights in this administration, which delights in making the most expansive arguments with respect to the extent of executive power, and has claimed that all sorts of things under Article 2 empower him to make decisions that are much more unilateral than any president has previously argued. That said, I think with respect to war powers, there's been a long line of increasingly aggressive arguments about why Congress can be kept out of the loop in authorizing military action. It did not start with this president. It didn't even start with the first Trump administration. It's been on a gradual expansion path for many, many administrations in a row. And I think the argum that you have seen, I mean, as you point out, Scott, we haven't seen a specific OLC opinion describing the legal argument for where we are currently in the Iran conflict. We do have some clues about what the legal argument is or the legal thinking is because of its communications with Congress over the War Powers Act. I will refer everyone to Scott's and my podcast about the War Powers Resolution, which is quite detailed because Scott is quite the pro on it. And that is of course, a main domestic law question right now, the power of which is quite limited legally because there's only so much Congress can do to really prevent conflicts from continuing. Though of course there is some power of the purse. But even that is limited because there are quite a few workarounds. Otherwise, domestically, we don't have legislation that is authorizing this conflict as was in place for Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan. And so the Article 2 argument is all that's left there. As we've discussed in many other contexts, there aren't a lot of mechanisms to really challenge that as a legal argument, certainly not through litigation. It's just a very hard question to bring in front of courts. And even if you could, courts tend to be extraordinarily deferential to the executive in these sorts of questions. So to summarize, once again, no, law is not a meaningful constraint on this administration with respect to this conflict. I will note in getting ready for this podcast, I did a sort of roundup check in with the media coverage in other countries of this conflict because my overwhelming sense, as Julia and Ari have mentioned in a number of areas, is that the understanding that Americans have of the conflict is from quite a different angle. We're of course, talking about it in terms of its popularity and in terms of what impact it's having on energy prices and affordability more broadly, which is already an issue, has already been an issue that will be prominent in the midterms. And so what all of this says about domestic politics, but I think the fact that bases all over the Middle east are being struck really is not as much on the radar as it is in other places. Of course, in the States where those bases are located and they were not expecting strikes within their territory, and there has been some collateral damage. You know, these things don't always land precisely within the confines of the precise military installation. And it's really, really worrying for those countries. It really fundamentally changes their understanding of the U.S. role and utility where they are, as Ari was saying. The other thing that was interesting to me about other news coverage is this issue, the legal issue, but from the international law perspective, because a number of outlets, unsurprisingly, especially in France and the UK are talking about the continued unlawfulness of this under international law. The premise of going to war in the first place really really dubious under consensus international law perspective, although the US has always been more aggressive in its thinking about when it is lawful to go to war. And also, of course, as we've talked about before and we don't have time to discuss in depth, but I really want to underscore the importance of the number of times that the Trump administration has threatened what seemed to be pretty obvious unequivocal war crimes if they were actually brought about out, including the really dramatic example from I think a month or two ago at this point about massive civilian carm. The threats, I'll note just for nuance's sake, because this is lawfare, after all. The discussion of hitting infrastructure and energy facilities and things like that is not as unequivocally a war crime because there is some argument in international humanitarian law that that dual use infrastructure can be a legitimate target. It is a very high bar for deciding that. And there's no evidence certainly in the rhetoric about it that that is what the legal argument would be for any of those types of strikes that are being discussed. It really is. The discussion is really oriented around how to inflict damage on Iran without any apparent interest in what is a legitimate military target versus not under international law, which these pieces of it are very, very much ingrained in domestic law in the United States as well. And the last thing that I think really I just have to flag because it was so incredible, the thing that really sort of underscores the concerning aspect of these sort of comments about, you know, how do we inflict damage on Iran, no clear articulation of or reference at all to obligations under international law to not indiscriminately kill civilians or target civilian infrastructure. There was CNN reporting I think yesterday that DoD basically sent around a solicitation to. I actually don't remember maybe Ari or Julia, you recall how broadly it was sent, but sent an email basically soliciting ideas for how to harm Iran and punish Iran, which underscores of course also the lack of strategic planning and the purging of experts who have thought through the possibility of this sort of conflict as their full time jobs for many, many years and could have brought some insights to the conversation. But it's a really remarkable fact that I think is really indicative of a number of threads we've been talking about.

[A]

Yeah, that's all well taken. I mean, the only point I would say in conclusion before we go to our next topic is when the President threatens, when in theory the only real constitutional limit on the President's authority is taking military action of a scale of a major armed conflict. And then he openly threatens, which he did the other day, the biggest air campaign since World War II on his own authority. There's kind of an open disregard for what people see as legal limits. And the one point I'll disagree on, maybe lightly, Natalie, is I do think there's ways to make the law matter for the administration, but they are going to require a very novel litigation, routes I've written about a little bit in the past. I think there are routes there that you could use to bring pressure on the administration, although it's hard to find the right plaintiff and they're not certain. And there are political factors maybe weighing against that. But that calculus is going to change if this war becomes dramatically more costly and unpopular. Perhaps most instinctively is congressional action. A lot of it is hard to do to get past the veto. But there are little routes here. We're beginning to see Congress do little things in terms of enacting the concurrent resolution, directing withdrawal, which raises Chadha problems or questions at least, but is a really notable act and as I've kind of written in that piece you mentioned, potentially opens up an avenue to other sort of congressional action on a strict majority basis, if nothing else. I think we need to start thinking about those sorts of counterbalances here because the consensus that we've been given the president so much authority over these sorts of fundamental decisions is that that there's an assumption that they would be informed, they would be made sort of not conservatively, but not in a manner that's reckless. And this conflict really calls into question more than just about any other US Military action, except for maybe the Iraq war, which the president did with Congress on board. Right. So you get not a pass for that. But it was a inter branch problem here. The Trump administration can't say that. So I do wonder whether this is finally the straw that breaks the camel's back or becomes if it gets more unpopular, that pushes people towards some sort of change in this area. But we'll have to wait and see.

[C]

Just two things to add to what Natalie said. The first is on the coverage. So a lot of the coverage here in the United States has been focused on public sentiment in the US when it comes to the war. One area that is starting to emerge that is not getting enough attention is public sentiment in the Middle East. And there was reporting recently in the New York Times that there is growing opposition to our presence in Jordan. And I suspect we're going to see more of that throughout the region. And we have all seen this play out over the past couple of decades where when the United States kind of does things unilaterally, when the United States kind of becomes militarily active in the region, there is typically kind of up and down in terms of how the US Presence is viewed in the region. And I think that is a space to watch because it is going to be important if pressure grows on governments throughout the Middle east to kick the US out of their countries, kick US Installations and forces out of the Middle east, coupled with all of the things we've talked about throughout the podcast today of, you know, perhaps the return on investment is no longer seen as making a ton of sense. Perhaps China is seen as a more viable actor and so on and so forth. There might actually be movement. I'm not saying that we're going to get kicked out tomorrow, but there might be more, more, there might be more questions surrounding U.S. presence in the region than we've had in a while, number one. Number two, we've talked a lot about the NSC role in this process, the fact that the President is making unilateral decisions. I think Natalie's point about the crowdsourcing of, you know, how do we essentially win this war within DoD actually raises another problem we haven't talked about in a while, although we, we had early on in the conflict, which is that the civilian side of the Department of Defense has essentially been sidelined and deeply weakened. And the way to conduct operations, the way to think about the strategic objectives, the political objectives, the strategy and so on and so forth, is not to crowdsource things to, to uniformed folks whose job is not to do those things. It's actually to have a strong civilian side of the House, House who helps do that kind of longer term planning. And that is not happening partially because, you know, you have a weak secretary who doesn't have a ton of experience and the folks underneath him, I don't know what they're focused on, Bret Colby and others, but this is evidently not it. So they're going about this exactly the wrong way, which is to crowdsource this to uniform folks who should be actually focusing on the tactical and operational side of the House and not paying attention to or not really be involved as much in what we do strategically, what are the political objectives, how do we get there, and so on and so forth.

[A]

Hey folks, Scott R. Andersen here. Imagine this recent scene with me. It's a balmy 94 degrees here in Washington, D.C. i'm halfway through my bike commute and somehow I'M not miserable. That's the Quint's ultimate commuter short. At work, you've got to be well equipped for the summer heat, and quints is where I speak. Start fewer better pieces premium materials priced 50 to 80% below similar brands because they work directly with ethical factories and cut out the middlemen. What surprised me most this Summer is their CoolMax fabric. Their Chino shorts look sharp enough for a brunch and breathe like gym gear. And the CoolMax Denim is the first pair of jeans I've been able to make it through a D.C. summer in in years. And August is also the right time to reset the closet before the fall rush. So you know, I've already got my eyes on some of the new plaids and patterns. Quince is rolling out their stretched sweater fleece shirt in it's not just clothing. My daughter has started sleeping in a Quint bamboo sleep bag almost every night. They're soft, stretchy and come in a variety of weights so you don't have to worry about your little one melting in the summer heat or shivering when those cool autumn evenings finally come back. Upgrade your everyday Download the quints app for app exclusive offers or go to quince.com security get free shipping on your order and 365 day returns. Now available in Canada and the UK too. That's Q-U-I-N-E.com security security. Now let's get back to the show.

[D]

Thumbtack presents Tile Trouble Every single time

[B]

I use my sink, I make eye

[D]

contact with the uneven grout on my kitchen backsplash. The crooked corners eye me and I'm haunted by more tiling questions than I thought possible. What kind of pro can fix a backsplash?

[B]

Can I replace one cracked tile or

[D]

should I replace them all?

[B]

What?

[D]

What if I just use thumb T? I can hire top rated pros, read reviews and compare prices with a tap all on the app. Thumbtack knows homes.

[B]

Download the app today.

[D]

What makes a vacation Rental of the Year stays guests love and hosts with the most discover top quality homes like the Vacation Rentals of the Year Using the Loved by Guests filter, it highlights top rated vacation rentals with near perfect

[C]

ratings for cleanliness, location and all the good stuff.

[D]

So no more walking into a surprise. We've done the heavy lifting so you can get straight to relaxation.

[C]

Book your next stay with VRBO now.

[A]

But let's move on to our next topic, another repeat customer here on Rational Security. And that is the question of the state of odni. ODNI has a new director. The Office of Director of National Intelligence has a new director of National Intelligence. As of depending on when you count it, last week when Jake Lynn was Senate confirmed or this past Monday when he was sworn in. That gap is a significant one because, of course, we've seen reports mostly from Pulte himself, indicating they've pursued an additional wave of terminations and removal of officials and other actions during that interim period, although notably Senator Mark Warner, the ranking member of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, has cast some cold water and questions as to whether those firings actually have gone through, noting that they haven't seen documentation of them yet, which raises a number of questions on a number of fronts about this disinformation war. I want to come to you, Julia, because I think the operating thought, and I will own up to this in my own analysis, was that Jay Clayton, we thought, was going to have a pretty confident path to confirmation. I think that was more or less accurate, in part because he was seen as somewhat more sober and serious than Bill Pulte in the universe of people working in the Trump administration, I think on the more sober and serious side, although that doesn't mean that he's not without concerns. And perhaps more fundamentally, it was seen as a necessary precondition to getting 7202 authorization, which has very few strong vocal supporters in Congress, but has a lot of quiet supporters in Congress. A lot of people who recognize 702 actually is a really, really important tool for US national security, even if we may have reservations or concerns about how it might be used or the safeguards around it and a variety of other aspects of it. The first part of that, again, has proved more or less true. But the second part has hasn't really manifested in part because of the way that President Trump himself and the Trump administration has managed this, where you have people still raising 702 concerns, in part because it's not clear whether Pulte has actually left or wasn't clear until Monday. Even now, it's not clear exactly what this administration has intended for the intelligence community. So, Julia, talk to us about what the state of the IC is and ODNI are in wake of this sort of action. And we now have Clayton conform confirmed that maybe means something or maybe it doesn't. So what should we be making sense of this?

[B]

Well, thank you, Scott. Yeah. With Pulte still seemingly floating around with announcements of more a fourth and a fifth round of purges at odni, it's really unclear who is in charge, despite the confirmation of Clayton. And so there is broad confusion in the intelligence community. And I don't think it's an accident. I think that Trump was clear from the beginning that this interim period would enable his selection to make certain cuts, to make certain severe cuts to the odni. It is still entirely unclear what for. It seems a consensus view that maybe the ODNI has grown too large, but no one has articulated what parts of the ODNI are no longer necessary or what could be smaller. Smaller is not a destination, it's just a direction. And so it becomes very unclear, in a time where we're at war, when there could be cyber attacks in the mainland United States, what is the cut for? And during the confirmation hearings, I saw no indication that the incoming dni, Clayton, had an answer to that question either. On the hearings themselves, I certainly, for my sins, watched all of them. And it was very frustrating to watch the inability of the incoming DNI to answer a very simple question of who won the 2020 election. And if one of the main jobs of the DNI is to speak truth to the President and not tell him what he wants to hear, he failed that test during his confirmation hearing. And so it undermines, in my mind, this idea that he will be the responsible caretaker. And I've seen a lot of smart commentary that providing a more respectable cover for the politicization of the IC is what Clayton could provide. And people are pointing out parallels to Bill Barr during the first administration or what Ratcliffe is doing at the CIA. Now, just because the person seems to be normal doesn't mean the activity that's happening under their watch is what we would expect of a dni. I will note that one of the main things that we've been worried about with the DNI is selective declassification of intelligence. And so now, as we've been talking here, the White House has announced the declassification of several documents related to the Russia investigation to allegations that the FBI was investigating the President as a Russian asset. All of this is yet more examples of taking the selective declassification of intelligence and using it to go after the President's political enemies. And I've seen no evidence that Clayton is prepared to push back on that.

[A]

So I want to bring back an element of this conversation we've had in the past, which is about what the mechanisms are for pushing back or restricting. I mean, how much difference can a director make, really? I mean, is there anybody who would be in this role that might provide a degree of assurance in this regard? We know that President Trump claims at the end of his first term in office, he declassified unilaterally huge swathes of documents. Those were the documents that he had piled in Mar? A Lago, many of which bore classification markers, had been, and I think probably were still classified despite the claims that he had that Kash Patel backed him up on, claiming that they declassified these sorts of documents while in the White House. The president can do this on his own, I guess. Is there a level of insulation? What difference can it make about who these kind of officials are in there? Julian, let me come to you on that.

[B]

So you are nailing a very difficult problem. The fact is, in the second term, which appears nothing like the first term, the President installed political loyalists above all who had no institutional loyalty, who were personally loyal to him, and it didn't matter how badly they ran their departments, as long as they did the things the president cared about. That would be fine. In the first term, it was entirely different. You had serious professionals heading the CIA at least, and standing in the way of repeated attempts to politicize intelligence. I think that we're not going to be protected by that now. And. And there's very little reason to believe that they're going to do that going forward. And as I rack my brain about why would you put individuals like this in charge to carry out purges and declassifications? One of the main purposes, to my mind, is to punish the enemy within which the administration has repeatedly named is the intelligence community. And by carrying on these kind of performative bloodlettings over at odni, where allegedly hundreds of people can be fired, but nobody knows who they are or what they do. It continually creates the press and the attention around attacking the deep state. And you need fresh content for fresh attacks on the deep state. And so this feels very much like theater. But the goal is to deter dissent within the ic, and it has been working.

[A]

All right, let me come to you, your thoughts on that. I think there's a strong case to be made that this is sort of the intimidation tactic. This is the element that comes in. And it's kind of maybe there's even a couple different pressure points from this one you do have for people who are still there, that they are intimidated or worried about their concerns or the cost of them taking action is much higher. On the other side of this, and we've had colleagues who have made this point here. You've also, by virtue of the buyout plans and other actions, actually removed the people who. Who may have the biggest Ideological objection to some of the things the administration may want to do, because none of this is terribly surprising. These are things the administration has threatened to do. They were concerned they were going to do some of these from fairly early on. Many of them have taken the buyout, many of them have left. They're not in the bureaucracy already anyway. So in some ways you're both increasing the cost of acting out and you are removing the people who might be most willing to bear those costs. Does that strike you as true? I'm curious about your experience where that. Whether that's true or might apply in other parts of the government as well. The Defense Department, the broader diplomatic apparatus outside the ic. We haven't seen quite the same targeted action recently, but obviously DoD has had this kind of ongoing campaign of removal of different people, whether it's from positions of command or promotion opportunities. And then also from, we've seen it, State Department handled a little bit differently. But nonetheless, you do at least have that buyout program. You have had some people rift there as of last summer. Talk to us a bit little about how this tactic's being applied more broadly.

[C]

Yeah, I mean, I agree with everything Julia said, which is that, you know, there is this war of attrition against the sort of workforce across the board. The IC is kind of front and center right now, but it's been true elsewhere, you know. Yeah, I think it is possible that by trying to kind of, you know, by implementing these rifts and what was called the fork at some point and you know, all of these, these general kind of the efforts to reduce the size of the workforce that you're going to get rid of some folks who may have had different ideological views on things. But what you're also losing is a lot of people who are. I'm not saying they're necessarily apolitical, but they are trained in the IC specifically to be apolitical, to just present the best findings they can to inform your decision making. Right. And those folks are not necessarily just leaving because they disagree, disagree with the administration. Many are leaving because it's exhausting to be in the IC right now because of the uncertainty, because of the fact that you're told every single day that you're part of this deep state, the enemy within. And that's not anything that, you know, anybody signs up to do. Like people are there to just do their work, to do their best work and to ultimately help inform the President, make the best decisions that the President is going to make. So, you know, you have this kind of environment that is increasingly toxic. Where you don't have job security, where you're told you're not good enough, where you're told that you're the enemy, and where your work is, frankly, not even informing anything at the end of the day. Right. I mean, we've been talking about this in the context of Iran, but it's true across the board that it's not clear that the IC's assessments are actually factoring into decision making. And if they're not, then what is the point of having all of these agencies and all of these peoples who are very well trained, very good at what they do to the things that they do? And look, if you're a policymaker, there is always going to be times where you're going to be presented with information that you don't like that is true, whether you're a Republican, a Democrat, somewhere in the middle, there's always going to be information that you don't like. And how you choose to deal with it is the thing that matters. And I think this view that the DIC is singularly against this administration is just not true. It's just that this administration makes decisions that don't comport with reality sometimes. So that's the first thing. The second thing we've been focused on sort of the internal, then the domestic ripple effects. I think we should also talk briefly about what all of this means from a national security perspective and allies and partners, and the fact that, you know, when you have an IC that is increasingly politicized, you have a DNI who, as Julia mentioned, is clearly not kind of, you know, there to advance objectives, truth and facts, but is really there to serve one person, number one, allies and partners may be less eager to share information with us, and we've already seen that in some areas that's been reported. But two, we did a lot of work, and Julia can talk to this more than I can, we did a lot of work in the aftermath of the Iraq war to rebuild the credibility of our intelligence and our intelligence apparatus. And I think on some level, we regained some of that after the Ukraine war war where we, the intelligence community, did such a credible job of using intelligence and intelligence disclosures, intelligence sharing, in a really measured, thoughtful way to advance a policy position for the administration. Right. This is where the two sides of the House worked hand in glove, but also just making sure that everything was objective and we had the best assessments that we had, and that really helped us regain that credibility internationally when it comes to our intelligence. And I think we're taking step backs here again. And that is partially because of all the personnel shifts and all of the decisions that have come out, some of the things that Tulsi Gabbard put out on her way out, some of the things that Julia was just talking about now. And so my concern is that in the context of bringing us back to the context of the conflict right now, if we have credible reporting that indicates certain threats, threats that allies and partners may not take us seriously if we need them, because they'll say, well, why would we believe what your intelligence assessments are saying when we know all of these things that, you know, you've, we know what you've been, that you, you yourself have been discrediting your, your intelligence. So, you know, that's one of the concerns that I have, especially in light of the cyber attacks and all of the things that are going on, all the ripple effects of the Iran war that we've talked about. And it's not just Iran, right? There is the China threat there, there is Russia. There is a whole host of things where it would be really great to have credible intelligence and be viewed as credible. And I'm just not sure that we're there anymore.

[A]

So, Natalie, let me pull you in on this because I want to talk about the legal side of this debate over Bill Pulte and his status for a week, but I also want to kind of go to maybe take this a little step broader about kind of looking forward. I think there's a very compelling case to be made that what this administration describes as removing the deep state is really an effort to remove any sort of barriers to advancing what they see as their preferred policy objectives, even when those barriers are things like professional expertise or the informed views of people who've worked on this issue sets for a while. People on the other side will no doubt say and have said and will continue to say that that's actually not what these deep state, quote, unquote, deep state is doing? It's not professional judgment or expertise. It's an ideological agenda. And in fact, that's just opposed ideological agenda agendas. Is there a way to start drawing that sort of line from a neutral principles perspective, whether it's through law and regulation or whether it's through something else, there is going to be this pressure, this point that people genuinely believe in, even though we might not agree with it, that, well, there is an ideological lean in professional civil servants and that hinders certain ideological objectives or aspects of them more than others. Is that just a byproduct of having a professional civil service. Is that just a trade off we have to accept for the many benefits it may provide in terms of providing more expertise, a reservoir of institutional experience and knowledge? Is there a way to distinguish those sorts of considerations there? How do you go about parsing that kind of difficult question?

[D]

Yeah, I mean, I think it's going to be a source of debate and will lead to lots of disagreement, as it already has. I think many, many people would challenge the premise of whether there is an ideological lean among career staff, even to the extent you think there may be. That is different from the question of whether they are able to do their jobs neutrally because human beings are allowed to have opinions and still perform their jobs as they're required to do, which includes respecting the policy decisions and the ultimate orders from whatever administration is in power. And I think the, you know, it's a very tired debate, frankly. So what I think is a little bit more interesting is, as we've discussed in many, many other contexts, whether what we are seeing now with these mass purges, including at odni, but all over the place, as we've been talking about for months and months, whether there should be rethinking of civil service laws and protections. And that is partially what has come up in the context of these purges, particularly the latest purges by Pulte right before Clayton came in. So to answer your first question, a little detour into nerdy law. But I will say that I was looking into this yesterday and no one else seems to have written about it. It was something that we were talking about on Slack and no one quite knew the answer to. And that is in part because it relates to the Federal Vacancies Reform act, which is a notoriously complicated and uncertain piece of legislation that has not been tested a whole lot of times in court. And therefore is the sub a lot of scholarship and law review articles by people who think about this much more than I do. So caveat. What I am about to say with this is my understanding and the people deeply in the weeds on Federal Vacancies Reform act should feel free to correct me if I misstate anything but to do the quick detour. I'll try to keep it brief. But the conflict and how this relates to the personnel matters that I was just talking about is the question of whether there is any means by which individuals, individuals can push back on these purges. And so of course, as we've seen in other contexts, there is a question of whether the employees who were fired by Pulte after he had technically ceased to be the acting DNI will have a claim that they were wrongfully fired and therefore have that serve as a mechanism to push back on the extent of the actions that are being taken. So quick, what is the legality here? The reason that Pulte ceased being the acting is because under the Federal Vacancies Reform act, once the Senate is finished with a nominee, they have confirmed the nominee. That is the point at which an acting official is no longer acting. However, there was this week break that you mentioned before he was actually sworn in and during that lapse it seems that there is no one who is the dni. The provision of the Federal Vacancies Reform act that comes up as what then is possible to do during that one week gap where there is no acting dni could you go about doing these purges or were all of these people illegally fired? Comes down to some key language which is the FERA says an action taken by a person who is not acting in the performance of any function or duty of a vacant office office has no force or effect. And importantly because this came up in our slack conversations cannot be ratified. Which means that unlike other actions that are, you know, maybe done with dubious legality can be cured sort of by the next person who comes in and does have legal authority to act under this statute by its own terms. If an action is unlawfully taken by someone who is technically not in acting official anymore, the next official who is lawfully allowed to take those actions cannot ratify the previous action. Which means that the people who are illegally fired, if this law applies, cannot be fired again by Clayton. At least by the terms of the statute. There are probably workarounds, but set that aside, the key language is function or duty. There's some lack of clarity on whether firing people is a function or duty that is exclusive to the dni. Because there is case law that's says that those terms of the statute only apply to actions that only the acting official could take. So long story short question of whether these employees who were fired between the time when Pulte was no longer acting under the statute, but before Clayton came in during that week or so 10 day I think gap question of whether they will have a viable claim claim that they were illegally fired depends on the language of the fera. It's also notable that they would probably have to bring their claims to the Merit Systems Protection Board, which we've talked about a lot of times in other contexts is very backed up. Lots of reasons to be concerned with that path, but it certainly seems to be a viable legal argument. And I do suspect that someone will bring it because there were, I believe, several hundred people that were fired under this latest purge.

[A]

Yeah, we should give a nod to Thomas Berry, who Cato at Liberty wrote, I think the first analysis that kind of really ID this FVRA issue for Pulte, which I think is a fair one. I'm not sure I follow, but we'll have to wait and see. The idea that these actions can't be repeated by Clayton, it'd be a strange reading of the statute to say that this gives indefinite job security to these people, although maybe that that's not an action that can, since it ratified.

[D]

It can't be ratified. I'm sure that there is some other way that they can be fired as a separate action.

[A]

Right, okay. Yeah, exactly.

[D]

But it can't be ratified, so they would have to be refired.

[A]

Right. I mean, that seems to write me as the bigger question is, is Clayton going to do this again? And maybe this is a good first test of Clayton is to say is this actually going to go forward? Although again, we have to note Senator Warner has issued these statements saying it's not clear these firings actually happened. And that's going to be maybe one way to paper over exact what this sort of issue is. Regardless, there's a lot percolating in the story we're going to have to keep, and it has ramifications not just for the intelligence community but for government writ large because these are similar patterns we're seeing throughout different agencies in the national security apparatus. But for the time being, we have one more topic we need to get to. I want to save some time for it because I cut a topic out of last week and I don't like doing that. I can't do it two weeks in a row. And that is of course, our flaw from friends at the Paul Weiss that has found itself in the odd position of going from being one of the kind of the liberal lions of law firms 15, 20 years ago, maybe more recently than that, to now becoming this really, really emblematic case of the first major law firm to cave to the Trump administration. We have this incredibly in depth account of it from the New York Times, I think with a lot of detail we really hadn't seen before about the decision making that went into it. Natalie, you are our law firm veteran here. I've spent well once somewhere at a law firm. Despite a couple of close calls since then, I have not actually stepped foot into a law firm on a professional basis. But you've spent a fair amount of time there and I should note, not at Paul Weissen, a law firm that took the opposite path and fought the executive order and acquired a preliminary injunction preventing it from going into force. But I'm kind of curious what you make of this story. I think the New York Times account puts it as saying, man, this is a real sort of ethical reversal. This is a firm, and not just a firm, but a person. Brad Karp, the chairman at the time, who made all these decisions that really had trumpeted a lot of its work opposing the first Trump administration, and notes how Karp has a picture of himself with people who he and Affirm had helped represent contesting different immigration policies in the first Trump administration on his office and remarked on it as a proud high point of his career and how quickly basically they took this reverse tack that seemed to do the opposite in weird ways, in part because of the different business structure of the firm. But we've seen some counter narratives come in saying, look, this is risk management. This is what this person's doing. His responsibility in his corporate status was to the other partners of his firm, the equity holders, which in the law firm is the other law firm partners, or at least many of them. That's who their duty is. And their duty is to keep the business alive and keep it doing business. And this was maybe made some strategic mistakes there, but the point has an ethical lapse, misunderstands the nature of his responsibilities. What do you make of that? Out of curiosity, how does this apply to corporate leaders generally and potentially to legal leaders who have this unique profession that you and I are a part of that plays this sort of unique role here. I'm just kind of curious how the story resonated or didn't resonate with you.

[D]

Yeah, I have so many thoughts on this one. I will say I and our former public service fellow James Pierce, wrote a whole article when the law firm first settled about the legal and ethical risks that the firms were undertaking by engaging in these settlements. And some of those have just very much come true. Not to self aggrandize, but we were totally right. So folks should look back at that because we really did try to explain why settling was so, so problematic, not just as a moral issue, but as a real cost to what law firms are supposed to be doing and a cost to clients and a cost to the rule of law and the justice system more broadly. So if you want to read my rantings on that from several months ago, check that out. I'll Leave it brief here. The thing that struck me, one of the things that struck me about this article is it told the story of how this transition happened, which I think was quite accurate in making the point that this wasn't a subject sudden turn at the issuance of the executive order. That in fact there had been major cultural changes afoot within Paul Weiss over the course of starting with Karp's tenure, but really accelerating significantly in the late 2010s and early 2020s. I think, frankly, as a commentary, I think it overstated the sort of interpersonal dynamics between Brad Karp, who's a litigator, and. And Scott Barchay, who is a corporate attorney. But this is a very recognized tension in law firms between the ethos of corporate partners. So those are people who engage in transactions and other sort of sorts of business deals versus litigators. Litigators are of course the ones that fight things in court that tend to do the pro bono work that is very celebrated. Including in Paul Weiss's history has this very proud history going back a long, long time. They've been around at least 100 years, I think, or at least close to it. They famously represented the Scottsboro boys in the 30s. They were the first to name a female partner, the first to hire black associates. I should say first big law firm because obviously I'm sure there were many others in the country. But they like to take credit for it by phrasing it this way. They helped on Brown vs Board of Education, et cetera. I will say, not to sound a little biased coming from Jenner and Block. I think the social justice Paul Weiss reputation was overstated in the article as well. They have always been understood, at least during my existence as an attorney and while in law school. They have always been understood to be a very hard hitting firm, much more business oriented. Even in their litigation. They represented major banks and major Wall street actors. They did do really, really good work. And I don't want to understate that, but I think the article was a little bit too rosy about the extent to which that was their firm sort of reputation and understanding of self. But as the article explains, the transition happened when Brad Karp, as part of his tenure as the firm chairman decided that the firm should expand its corporate practice. Because corporate practice much more lucrative in most cases than litigation for a number of reasons just relating to the business of law. But those matters are extremely lucrative. Paul Weiss was a litigation powerhouse, but consciously decided under Brad Karp's leadership to grow its corporate practice brought on Scott Barchet from Cravath, which is probably the firm with the most strong reputation for being an extremely cutthroat corporate law firm. Barcha had a reputation for being really one of the top M and A lawyers, mergers and acquisition lawyers in the country. So bringing him over to Paul Weiss was a big get. They paid him millions more dollars per year than he was making at Cravath, which I'm sure was also many millions of dollars. So as a reflection of how much they cared. And by early 2020s, I think 2023ish, the corporate practice at Paul Weiss was accounting for 65% of the firm's revenue. And that is how the power dynamics shift within a firm, because the partners who make the most money for the firm then gets distributed among the partners. And this major metric among big law is to look at the profits per partner number as a metric of success, which insert my long rant about how it is abhorrent that success is measured by profits per partner. And that law used to be a profession that was not like the financial sector. But that ship has sailed, unfortunately. So, you know, there were some really interesting sort of backroom stories here about tensions between Karp and Barchay. There was a really very depressing story about the firm's first openly trans partner named Lex Korberg, who had been an associate at Paul Weiss starting as a first year right out of law school, had worked on the landmark Windsor case that went up to the Supreme Court that established the right to recognition of same sex marriage. Incredibly successful, promising from the beginning, made partner in seven years instead of the standard eight at the earliest. And that Barche came in and started to say, you know, clients are going to be turned off by this person and they really have to sort of stay out of view. And also the firm has to stop promoting its work that is potentially controversial. Like it's for example, one case where Paul Weiss was teaming up with the ACLU on fighting a law in Idaho that criminalized doctors who provided gender affirming care, I believe, to trans children. So to wrap up, it's a good story, it's a very good article. They clearly did a lot of work reviewing documents that they were able to obtain from inside the firm, talking to a lot of employees, including former employees, several of whom left in protest after Paul Weiss reached this deal. I think it's worth reading. I think people should understand the dynamics as not just an anecdote of something that happened within Paul Weiss as between these two people, but rather as a representation of A much broader phenomenon of the tension between litigation and corporate practices and how that can really change the ethos and actions and decisions and willingness to fight for principles over profit that we've seen in a lot of firms. Because Paul Weiss was the first to cave, but it was by no means the last. There were eight by the time James and I wrote our piece. And I think there have been more since then.

[A]

So I'm kind of curious, Julia or Ari, just if either of you had a reaction to the story for the simple reason that lawyers are a navel gazing bunch, like nobody is quite as self important as lawyers except for maybe journalists, which why at lawfare we are really high on the hog on ourselves here at the intersection of those two things. And there is something. Lawyers have professional ethics obligations that are different. We obviously, all the way from de Tocqueville on, we all know we're a litigious society and that has pros and cons. And so lawyers plays a prominent role. Is it a little naive to think that law firms can have this sort of double bottom line nature that some people, some firms, people still believe about certain firms? Is it Paul Weiss's experience just a representation of like that's kind of the nature of the corporate form. It's pressure. And maybe we shouldn't pretend like lawyers are all that different from other corporate entities because I think we'd be a little surprised. We'd be less surprised, we're less surprised to see Amazon roll over or other, certainly Lockheed Martin to do similar sorts of things. Why would law firms be different? Or do you have reason to expect more of our lawyers? I don't know if Ari and Julia, you have a reaction to that?

[B]

Well, I don't have anything legal to add to this. I could just broaden it that if anyone in these firms or other professions, parts of civil society, thought that capitulating to the administration would somehow satisfy them, well, the leopard will eat their face eventually in the end. And that's clearly what's happening here. And that perhaps they should look at a broader interest rather than their quarterly earnings reports. I will also say from an authoritarian consolidation point point of view that going after the lawyers is kind of a famous thing for silencing the opposition. And it's I guess not surprising that they did that here. If you're a person who's being persecuted by the administration, you need good legal counsel. And they have systematically tried to deny that to people by going after these firms.

[C]

And I'll just add, I mean, I agree with everything Julia said and she took all of it and everything I was going to say made it more coherent. But the one thing is that it has been fascinating watching the copies and pace tactic that has occurred from law firms to regular kind of corporations, defense industry, academia, think tanks, you name it. We've seen this across the board. And that is the part that is I think the most for me has been the most unsettling is just how quickly things changed in this administration versus even the first Trump administration where there was a bit more of a willingness to kind of, you know, see how things shake out. And this time around, within just weeks of the new administration being in, it seemed like a lot of folks were folding across sectors. And as Julia said, it hasn't really helped anyone because it turns out it doesn't really save you. And you will continue, you know, once you give an inch, you will keep giving more. And this is where we are now.

[A]

Yeah, I think it's a fair point. The one thing I would say on this just before we wrap up trap is look, if we expect these things from institutions, you need to set up institutional elements that reinforce this. You can have unlimited liability partnerships, corporate requirements for a variety of things, ethics guidelines, compliance with them and kind of enforcement mechanisms like maybe require a deal with the government to be voted on by a majority of partners instead of investing with the sort of leadership. And that's something I think probably just didn't seem like you would need before this last go around. But I don't think there's maybe that's something that really institutions that they want to be serious about these sorts of commitments need to start thinking about those institutional reinforcements, not just in government and private institutions too. And when people are deciding which of those institutions to go work for and commit their careers to, that's a factor they need to take into account.

[D]

Yeah. Two more quick things. Number one, yes, navel gazy but also very specific role in society and in a democratic society to uphold the rule of law, to make our justice system work.

[B]

Work.

[D]

I have much more to say on that, but I won't. There's also the one factor that I do hope will help to serve as a lesson learned by the firms is it is as I said, it is absolutely the case that the sort of corporatization of big law in particular has been problematic and is in many respects the incentives that come with that are inconsistent with the obligations that you take on when you are sworn into the bar. I mean, it's really that simple. If you are focused on profits, you may experience tensions with your ethical obligations as an attorney that are what you allow you to be an attorney and violations of which should disqualify you from being an attorney at a certain level. And, you know, if that's the choice that some firms are making, that's the choice they're making. I find it incredibly problematic, and I hope they will be held accountable. But the last thing I'll say is I do hope that the one thing that may help push back or get people to reconsider is that these firms have often been wrong that it would be better for their business to capitulate. Many of the firms that have fought back have seen growth in their client base and in their profits. As I said, there are a couple of things that James and I flagged that are really starting to unfold, including clients becoming really worried that the firms that did capitulate are no longer able to represent them in the way that they are supposed to because they're under so much pressure from the administration. And that's how you lose clients. And when you lose clients, you lose money. When you lose credibility, you're not getting new clients. There are all sorts of. Even if all you care about is business, there are all sorts of business costs that I think in making the decision that it would be better for business to fold was incredibly shortsighted. And I hope that they continue to see the costs of that and rethink. In addition to the the leopard will eventually eat your face or the bully will ask you for more money, obviously, again phenomenon, I hope they will see that they were wrong in this being the path to take to save the business.

[A]

Well, with that, we are out of time for this episode, but this would not be rational security if we not leave you with some object lessons to ponder over in the week to come. Ari, what did you bring for us today?

[C]

All right, you're all going to make fun of me for this, but let's go. Okay. I have recommended video in the past. I'm going to recommend a board game.

[A]

Ooh, I'm doing a board game, too. I don't think it's the same one, but I'd be very curious.

[C]

It would be really fun if we did the same board game because it just has a dorkiest title. So I've been hearing a lot of buzz about this particular board game. It's called Cozy Stickerville, and it is absolutely delightful. It is not.

[B]

Okay, good.

[C]

So it's a co op legacy game, which if you're me and you're a Bad winner and a sore loser, and you need to save your marriage. You only play co op games. And so this is kind of a crossover between the Sims and Animal Crossing. It's basically a legacy game that you play over 10 years. So 10 sessions, and you're creating your town. Each individual character that you add, each little kind of, you know, institution that you add brings with it a storyline that you follow over the course of X number of sessions. It's kind of like if you're trying to play a legacy game, but you don't want to be super deep into a Sleeping Gods or a Pandemic Legacy, which we played during the pandemic with our friends. This is just a really easy, low lift thing to do. It's 30 minutes, the rules are easy, and it's just like a chill game you can play with while enjoying a glass of wine or whatever beverage of your choice.

[A]

I love it. I love it. My wife and I play not cooperative games. We occasionally play. Like, we like to take little card games with us when we travel because the only time we ever have downtime to do a little, you know, like Monopoly. Go Started us on this, but then it turns out it's actually not a very good game. So we've broadened our horizon now to other games. But I like that suggestion. Let's work that one in. Julia, what did you bring for us this week? I don't see a guitar.

[B]

What? No.

[A]

I fully expect you to pull a tambourine out from underneath the desk.

[B]

Just hold that thought for a second. So with all the difficult news in the war with Iran, I'm grateful that we have a Secretary of War who is laser focused on the issues that matter. Specifically the low testosterone counts of our soldiers. And so today I'd like to thank Secretary Hegseth for providing gender affirming care to at least some of the United States military. Okay, you're right. It's not my actual object lesson, but it's related. So this is my object lesson. For those listening at home, this is a poster from the Central Intelligence agency from the 1950s that says, we're looking for a future good women. And I would like to suggest, based on that object lesson, that perhaps, Secretary Hegseth, instead of perhaps looking for a more high T military, which is currently running into some trouble, they might look for a more high E military.

[A]

Hey, I love it. I love it, I love it. Put it on a T shirt, folks.

[D]

Right here.

[A]

Well, for my object lesson this week, we, I think, are collectively getting back into the classics. Thank you. Thanks to Christopher Nolan and the Odyssey taking theaters by storm. I don't know if y' all have seen it. I have somewhat mixed feelings if I'm being completely honest. But regardless, I appreciate that people are getting into classics. I was a junior classicist and Greek and Roman myth nerd growing up and it made me remember that. And being at my parents house today made me remember an old board game that I actually found in their basement the other day and I should have brought up for object lesson but I'm just going to mention it to people to find if you can. And that's the game, by Jove. Do you all remember this game when you were kids? It hasn't been reprinted in a while, but you can still find old copies around. It is a Greek myth board game. It's kind of like Monopoly. Like it's just like a roll and move it around. So it's very much for kids. It's not that strategic. It's not strategic at all as I can recall. But it's super fun. And they basically pick one of the Greek myth figures, Roman myth, I don't know which name convention it uses and then you move around and go through all the different myths. But it's a great educational game for little kids who are into this. And this is actually how I learned about and got into Greek myths when I was like 6 or 7. My parents got this at a scholastic school sale. So if you can find By Jove, grab it. If you own the rights to By Jove, this is a good time to reprint it. I'm shocked this isn't being reprinted right now. This is your moment, guys. Get on it. Because kids will be into this, families will be into this, it'll be exciting. But because Ari raised it, I will actually go since that one might be actually hard to act on. I'll recommend the card game that I looked up the name of to make sure I get it right that I do play with my wife now which is a fun matching game with beautiful origami art which is really cool to look at called Sea salt and Paper. It's just a little deck kind of complex matching game that has actually strategically fairly complex and can play with multiple players and is different every time. And my wife kicks my ass at it regularly when we have the opportunity to play. So I recommend it. It used to kind of hard to find, but I think I just saw it in a Walmart the other day when I happened to be in Walmart for the first time in 10 years. So maybe it's a bigger, more out there game than I realized. But check that one out. If you can't find. By Jove. And with that, Natalie, what did you bring for us? Let's bring us home.

[D]

Okay, well, a second object lesson. I'm going to sneak in. I just finished reading Circe, which I started reading separate from the Odyssey Excitement. It's by Madeline Miller and I really like. I'm extremely late to the game. It came out forever ago, but really enjoyable.

[A]

So this isn't the fourth object lessons to endorse Madeline Miller and Circe.

[B]

Really.

[A]

I've done it once. Alan has done it. Somebody else did it. I can't remember who. Until you were the fourth, I believe.

[D]

Oh, okay. Sorry. Well.

[A]

Which is just a testament to what a good book it is. It's a wonderful book.

[C]

Yeah.

[D]

Well, also, it will give me a little credit before I tell everyone to read one very depressing article and one just very good article, the latter of which is by our associate editor, Peter Beck, which is his dispatch from attending the first hearing of a court that has been in existence for 30 years. And this was the very first time it had a case, which is the Alien Terrorist Removal Court. The second article was a New York Times piece looking at the separation boards that are currently firing just tons. I don't actually remember what the numbers are, but a really significant number of trans military members. And it is the story focused largely on an attorney who's been representing a number of these troops in their proceedings. The common theme of both of these articles, which is, as regular listeners will know, is a pet issue of most mine, is that in both of these contexts, the lawyering is just so hard and so demoralizing and so underappreciated, frankly, in both of those respects, because litigating in an environment where the laws, the rules, the procedures are so uncertain and everyone is sort of making it up as they go along long is a terrible place to litigate. And it is especially terrible place to litigate if you are the defendant or in the case of those who are being the military is trying to separate from their positions, including several of whom are very close to retirement. It's impossible. And the lack of due process rights, just by virtue of the fact that these courts and procedures are new and being handled very badly, is just a constant source of frustration and anger. Frankly, for me, as someone who litigated in Guantanamo, where that was also the case, everyone was making it up as they went along and it's just a real miscarriage of justice so read those articles, enjoy that common thread, and then go read Circe with that recommendation.

[A]

That brings us to the end of this week's episode. Rational Insecurity is of course a production of Lawfare, so be sure to visit Lawfare Media for our show page, for links to past episodes, for our written work and the written work of other Lawfare contributors, and for information on Lawfare's other phenomenal podcast series. While you're at it, be sure to follow Lawfare on social media wherever you socialize your media. Be sure to leave a rating or review wherever you might be listening, and sign up to become a material supporter of Lawfare on Patreon for an ad free version of this podcast, among other special benefits. For more information, visit lawfairmedia.org support our audio engineer and producer this week was Noam Osband of Go Rodeo and our music, as always, was performed by Sophia Yan. Once again edited by the wonderful Jen Patcha on behalf of my guests Ari, Julia and Natalie, I am Scott R. Andersen and we will talk to you next week. Until then, goodbye. You're great at protecting your data, but lots of places could still expose you to identity theft.

[B]

I thought I was safe.

[C]

If that happens, Lifelock gives you a

[A]

US based restoration agent who will stick by your side from start to finish.

[C]

Phone calls, filing documentation, preparing insurance claims.

[A]

Your agent handles it all. In fact, we're so confident restoration is guaranteed. Pour your money back. Isn't it nice to have someone like that on your side? Save up to 30% your first [e-mail] podcast terms apply.