Risky Bulletin — Between Two Nerds: Buying the Magic Weapon

Hosts: Tom Uren (A), Grok (B)
Date: February 16, 2026

Episode Overview

This episode dives deep into a key question for nation-states in the modern age: Is it truly worth investing heavily in military cyber capability—especially if you're not a 'cyber superpower'? Tom Uren and Grok discuss recent headline-grabbing cyber operations allegedly conducted by major powers, the limitations and perceived magic of such "cyberweapons," and the real strategic value (or lack thereof) for middle and smaller powers.

Key Discussion Points

1. Recent High-profile Military Cyber Operations (00:13–03:00)

• US cyber activity during bombing of Iranian nuclear facilities

  • Report that US cyber operation disrupted Iranian air defense, though impact was limited and the language describing it was intentionally vague.
  • Not a complete shutdown: "They didn't say it stopped the whole system ... it was a nice to have." — Tom [00:38]

• Other precedence:

  • US blackout in Caracas (Venezuela): US reportedly switched off power in select areas.
  • Russian attack on Ukrainian networks: Notably, these attacks often target infrastructure operated by third parties, e.g., Viasat.

2. Is Top-tier Cyber Power Actually “Magic”? (02:25–03:59)

• Even at maximum, successful operations have been limited and targeted, not total system-wide failures.
• Restraint not Constraint: The US, for example, "could have done more" but limited their actions intentionally. [03:43]

3. The Club Mentality of Cyber Investment (04:00–06:55)

• Five Eyes advantage: For Australia and similar partners, investing in military cyber makes sense due to shared knowledge base and existing commitments.

• Comparative advantage analogy: Instead of every small nation developing every capability, nations should focus on their strengths (e.g., the Dutch specializing in cyber). [05:52]

  • “You focus on your specialty rather than just trying to be a jack of all trades.” — Tom [05:57]

• For countries with no existing cyber base (ex: Germany), it's probably not worth it.

4. Limitations on Cyber’s Utility in Warfare (07:00–10:50)

• Cyber ops usually surprise attacks: Require long lead times and preparation—not suited for many real-world military contingencies.

  • “I can't imagine Australia launching a surprise attack on anyone, like, ever.” — Tom [07:57]

• Cyber effects are often most useful in the opening stages of conflict, coordinated with kinetic (traditional) forces.

• Military doctrine challenge:

  • Classic military thinking seeks concrete, immediate, and measurable results (“Did we kill the people? Did we capture that hill?”).
  • Cyber doesn’t fit neatly: “The military wants something where they could say, here's a plan... execute, assess. That's very easy if you're blowing stuff up ... [but] not as good as a missile at blowing things up, or ... better than a missile ... at things a missile cannot do.” — Grok [10:03–10:48]

5. Examples: Non-Kinetic (Cognitive) Effects (10:48–13:36)

• ASD (Australian Signals Directorate) and Ransomware:

  • Instead of “warheads on foreheads,” ASD infiltrated criminal forums, subtly sabotaged malware, destroyed developer reputation via planted rumors. [10:48–11:40]
  • “You can't blow up a reputation with a tomahawk.” — Tom [11:40]

• Talking publicly about cyber ops:

  • Sometimes exposure is strategic, especially if the capability is “not as good as a bomb.”
  • Use it and lose it? Not always. “The use it and lose it argument is false in the short term and truer in the long term than people think. ... It's slow.” — Grok [12:05–13:28]

6. The Cyber “Bandwagon” & Its Real Value (13:54–16:17)

• Why do countries want “cyber”?

  • It's fashionable; may stem more from alliances and peer pressure than concrete defensive logic.
  • “It seems to be much more of a keeping up with the Joneses … A high school clique where one person gets an earring and within a week everyone else has an earring … ‘we’re going to get a cyber now.’” — Grok [14:41]

• Militaries rarely know what to do with cyber once they have it.

  • Politicians love the “magic powers” pitch, but the practical results are often modest.
  • “We were able to turn out the lights for three hours and they go, ‘OK, and this costs how much? More than sending one plane with one bomb?’” — Grok [16:04]

7. Cyber’s Strategic Mismatch (16:27–19:36)

• Conventional cross-border wars are rare; most “flare ups” aren’t planned.

  • Lead-time and surprise required for cyber are ill-suited to these scenarios.
  • “Not a lot of cross border invasions happening these days … ones that do happen tend to be between countries that don’t have a lot of computers in general...” — Grok [16:36]

• The most impressive uses of cyber are invisible:

  • Internal disruptions, attacks on economic infrastructure (e.g., tampering with accounting, sowing mistrust), or gradual erosions of organizational trust and capacity.
  • “[Cyber] can do things you can’t do with anything else and they don’t necessarily show up in ways that you can measure.” — Grok [21:10]

8. Cognitive Effects & Case Studies (19:36–27:10)

• Small, quiet actions—like eroding trust in a regime’s inner circle or degrading a criminal’s operation—may be more strategic than flashy knockouts.

  • Reference to Israeli “Predatory Sparrow” group, which did not cripple Iran but created visible, morale and propaganda effects. [18:40–19:36]

• Manipulation & Disruption at the Margins:

  • U.S. cyber ops against Venezuela: some direct strikes (e.g., wiping intelligence networks) look impressive but are unlikely to tip the scales. Indirect interference (e.g., disrupting pay for security forces) more strategically valuable, though hard to measure.

• Cultural, psychological, and organizational manipulation could have long-term impacts—if executed with deep understanding.

  • “You'd want to find people who have a really, really deep cultural understanding … then they could figure out the things that matter.” — Grok [25:34]
  • Example: Israeli manipulation of PLO finances leading not to blame, but to everyone embezzling more. [26:33]

9. Key Takeaway: The Real “Magic” Is Almost Invisible (27:36–28:07)

• The most impactful cyber operations are not the ones that make headlines, but the subtle, often undetectable campaigns that shape realities beneath the surface.
  • “The stories that I like talking about are actually not the most important ones, and it's the ones that are invisible that are probably changing the world, that unfortunately, we'll never hear about.” — Tom [27:36]
  • “That does make it an absolutely magic capability. ‘I changed the world, but you didn’t see it.’” — Grok [27:55]

Notable Quotes & Memorable Moments

• “Is this as good as it gets? Right. When you are the top cyber superpower and you can turn off the lights in a few neighborhoods in Caracas for a few hours.” — Grok [02:25]
• “You can't blow up a reputation with a tomahawk.” — Tom [11:40]
• “It's not a failure. It's a success beyond what we initially imagined.” — Grok, on financial disruption [27:10]
• “The stories... that are invisible, that are probably the ones that are changing the world, that unfortunately, we'll never hear about.” — Tom [27:36]

Important Timestamps

• 00:13: Introduction to alleged US cyber operations in Iran
• 02:06: Comparison to Venezuelan blackout & Ukraine
• 04:00: Club mentality in cyber investment (Five Eyes, Netherlands)
• 07:57: Limitations of cyber surprise attacks
• 10:48: Non-kinetic cyber use cases (ASD & ransomware)
• 12:05: The "use it and lose it" myth dissected
• 14:41: The peer pressure for nations to invest in cyber
• 16:27: Rarity of suitable scenarios for military cyber ops
• 21:10: Invisible cognitive and economic impacts
• 24:03: The illusion of regime change by cyber means
• 27:36: The real magic is in the subtle, almost invisible operations

Style & Tone

Friendly, candid, and incisive. Tom and Grok avoid technical jargon in favor of approachable, sometimes self-deprecating analogies, often poking fun at the “magic cyberweapon” myth while emphasizing nuance and realism in national cyber policy.

Summary:
Cyber capabilities remain alluring to policymakers as “magic weapons,” but when examined closely, their practical wartime potential is sharply limited—especially for nations outside the superpower club. The real power lies in slow, subtle, invisible operations that erode trust and disrupt systems without fanfare, reshaping adversaries in ways most will never notice or understand. The best cyber punch, it seems, is often the one you don’t even see thrown.