Podcast Summary: Risky Bulletin – "Between Two Nerds: Why the West Sucks at Information Warfare"

Date: January 19, 2026
Hosts: Tom Muran ("A") & The Grugq ("B")
Theme: Why liberal democracies struggle in the domain of information warfare, through the lens of historical, academic, and contemporary events.

Episode Overview

This episode examines the enduring difficulty Western democracies—specifically the US and its allies—face in recognizing, organizing for, and effectively waging information warfare. The discussion is anchored on a 30-year-old but prescient RAND paper by Dr. Martin Libicki, interwoven with recent real-world examples of psychological operations and propaganda, notably by China and Russia. The hosts unpack why the West frames information operations defensively, contrast this with state-backed propaganda offensives from autocracies, and reflect on both institutional and societal blind spots.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Libicki’s 30-year-old RAND Paper on Information Warfare

Timestamps: [00:03]–[03:34]

• Premise: Libicki's paper anticipates the divergent ways states regard and practice "information warfare."
• Blue Team vs Red Team Analogy:
  • Blue Team: Focused on technical cyberattacks, critical infrastructure, in essence, “Cyber Command” activities.
  • Red Team: Engaged in psychological warfare and shaping public opinion.
  • "There was no conflict because they never contested the same environment." – Tom [01:16]
• Information Warfare is not singular:
  • Libicki argues the term encompasses disparate fields: psychological, technical, and electronic warfare.
  • "There is no information warfare that covers all of them. That doesn't exist." – The Grugq [01:52]
• Cyber operations are no substitute for conventional power:
  • "It's not as powerful as a bomb. Like, it's not a substitute." – The Grugq [02:10]
• Organizational Implication:
  • Libicki concludes creating dedicated military units just for this type of warfare is unwarranted.

2. Contemporary Example: State-Backed Propaganda Recruitment

Timestamps: [03:34]–[07:32]

• Chinese External Propaganda Case:
  • Chinese official tries to recruit an ethnic Chinese blogger to post content subtly favorable to PRC narratives, without overt party promotion.
  • Offer: €40,000/month, aiming to nudge perceptions about Taiwan via analogies with Ukraine.
  • "It's kind of a couple of steps removed from the China good is creating." – Tom [05:20]
  • The sophistication lies in attempts to keep messaging "objective" but implicitly biased.
• Other Examples:
  • Mention of a US citizen apparently recruited by Russian interests at similar high rates, despite low viewership.
  • "Does that indicate that it actually does work?" – Tom [07:32]
• Efficacy Questioned:
  • Unsure if the lavish spending brings proportionate influence, especially on political issues vs. commercial ones.

3. Advertising, Influence, and Measurement

Timestamps: [07:32]–[09:12]

• Comparison to Influencer Advertising:
  • Just like cosmetics or lifestyle products, subtle influencer advocacy is part of digital information operations.
  • "Instagram is more subtle … in line with this suggested form of propaganda … implicitly recommending something." – The Grugq [08:20]
• Does Political Influence Work the Same?
  • Unclear if promoting "two sessions" policy of CCP can be moved like consumer products.
• Transparency as Western Counter:
  • Difficulty for Western democracies to do more than expose such operations; their responses (like the U.S. Global Engagement Center) are limited and often late.

4. Western Responses and Structural Blindspots

Timestamps: [09:12]–[13:26]

• Reluctance to Engage on Information Terrain:
  • The West doesn't recognize information campaigns as "warfare" and won't proactively build equivalent offensive institutions.
  • "We don't have the Department of Paying Influencers to promote general themes during times of peace." – The Grugq [11:15]
  • Football Analogy: The West acts as if they only need a goalie, yielding the midfield and offense to the opponent.
• Institutional Inertia:
  • Activities split between disparate agencies (psychological ops, technical cyber, State Dept. analysis), making a unified response difficult.
  • "We can't unify it because that's just how it is right now. We'd have to reshape the entire government and all of our institutions." – The Grugq [24:04]

5. A Case of Effective Western Info Warfare: Pre-Invasion Ukraine

Timestamps: [13:28]–[16:34]

• Biden Administration’s public intelligence disclosures:
  • Leaked Russian invasion plans prior to the Ukraine war, neutralizing narrative surprises.
  • "By exposing it beforehand, you rob it of all of its power. Like it becomes sort of this pre-scripted, staged event." – The Grugq [13:57]
• Effectiveness Acknowledged, but with Trade-offs:
  • Didn’t stop the invasion, but blunted propaganda.
  • Institutional resistance to burning intelligence quickly or risking assets/sources.

6. The 2016 Election and Vague Impact

Timestamps: [16:34]–[24:04]

• Russian Info Ops as Case Study:
  • Hosts debate the scale and provability of its electoral impact.
  • "They created the space where that [Comey’s announcement] was more impactful than it would have been otherwise." – The Grugq [21:25]
• Structural Challenges:
  • Western governments want measurable results, but effects are diffuse and hard to quantify.
• Absurd Example:
  • Difficulty distinguishing paid Russian stunts from organic activism.
  • "…couldn’t tell which of the three Hillary impersonators in Gitmo costumes in cages on the back of a truck was paid for by the Russians that weekend." – The Grugq [23:48]

7. Societal Learning and Media Maturity

Timestamps: [24:04]–[28:15]

• Society Adapting to Info Ops:
  • Changes in newsrooms’ handling of leaked/hacked material—2016 vs. more recent examples.
  • *"It felt like they were responsibly handled. That material, like the hack itself, became the news rather than …" – Tom [25:52]
• Public Learning from Internet Outrage:
  • Referencing the collective online shaming of the "Friday" song singer as an example of evolving online norms.
  • "…these days you don't have that sort of dogpile effect … we've learned that it's not really a thing that we should be doing." – The Grugq [26:04]
  • Hosts debate whether improved behavior signifies maturity or merely opportunism.

8. Libicki’s Prescience and “MeTV”

Timestamps: [28:17]–[32:27]

• Libicki’s (1990s) Foresight:
  • Identified declining costs to reach a mass audience; the potential for a saturated, personalized information landscape.
  • "For $2 million, anyone could lease a direct broadcast satellite and beam their message to the entire globe." – The Grugq [28:44]
• Prediction of Personal Filter Bubbles:
  • Described the future as a “500 channel supranational information superhighway” leading to extreme localization/personalization (“MeTV”), not a unified global perspective.
  • Hosts point out the actual outcome: centralized, algorithm-driven media “feeds” rather than true user choice.
  • "Even his dystopian vision … is better than what we ended up with." – The Grugq [32:12]

Notable Quotes

• On institutional blindspots:
  "All of these different types of information warfare exist in different institutions … it would have to be united under one organization … I can't see it happening because it would cross so many institutional boundaries." – The Grugq [19:00]
• On tactical differences:
  "…the blue team just doesn't respect the red team approach as being real. Like, it's not an actual warfare type event. It doesn't count because it's using influencers and bloggers." – The Grugq [18:16]
• On prescient vision:
  "He says, '…the cost of accessing people … for $2 million, anyone could lease a direct broadcast satellite …'" – The Grugq [28:44]
• On algorithmic reality:
  "It's not channels, it's algorithms that shape what you see. And yeah, my YouTube, I'm sure, is very different from your YouTube or my MeTV." – Tom [31:21]

Key Timestamps

• [00:03] – Episode start, Libicki's paper introduction
• [01:52] – Information warfare's fragmentation
• [03:34] – Chinese influencer recruitment revelation
• [07:32] – Comparing political influence and commercial advertising
• [11:15] – Institutional limitations in Western responses
• [13:47] – Biden administration's Ukraine info ops blueprint
• [17:03] – 2016 election, Russian campaign impact debate
• [24:04] – Societal learning from past info ops
• [28:17] – Libicki’s forecasts and the rise of ‘MeTV’

Tone and Takeaways

• Curious but skeptical: The hosts balance appreciation for the cleverness of adversary tactics with doubts about their true efficacy.
• Wry, irreverent humor: Mocking offers to propagandists, self-aware jokes about their own market value, and dry references to dystopian Internet culture.
• Critical of Western inertia: They acknowledge both the moral and structural barriers faced by democracies in waging “offensive” information warfare, and the challenges in even imagining a solution.
• Nuanced on solutions: The Biden Ukraine leaks are presented as a rare, positive example; ultimately, the hosts are more pessimistic than optimistic, feeling that even well-diagnosed warnings went unheeded for decades.

For New Listeners

This episode offers a deep yet accessible exploration of why democracies are institutionally and culturally clumsy at competing in the modern info-wars arena. It threads together long-term historical analysis, recent case studies, and clear-eyed self-critique—all delivered with trademark Risky Biz wit. Even those unfamiliar with the original paper or specific cases will find a lucid, big-picture account of why “winning” in the information environment remains elusive for the West.