Risky Bulletin Podcast Summary

Podcast: Risky Bulletin (Srsly Risky Biz)
Hosts: Amberly Jack (A), Tom Uren (B)
Episode Date: January 15, 2026
Episode Theme:
This episode delves into China’s recent crackdown on scam compounds—especially those targeting Chinese citizens—and examines US cyber operations in Venezuela, reflecting on the evolving role of cyberwarfare in military planning. The conversation draws on recent news and Tom Uren’s Seriously Risky Business newsletter.

Main Topic 1: China’s Crackdown on Scam Compounds … But Whose Safety?

1. Background and Recent News

• Context:
  China has handed down life sentences and even death penalties related to scam compounds after the extradition of alleged kingpin Chen Xu from Cambodia. This has sparked international attention.
  • Amberly Jack [00:43]: “This is great news. But you’ve looked into that and… it may potentially not be great for anyone that’s not in China.”
• What are scam compounds?
  Large-scale criminal enterprises, often located in border areas of Myanmar, Southeast Asia, and now shifting to other regions. They run “pig-butchering” scams targeting individuals online, frequently subjecting people to forced labor.

2. Analysis of China’s Motives

• China’s Actions Are Reactive & Self-Interested

  • China’s interventions typically follow viral domestic media outcry—especially when incidents involve Chinese citizens (e.g., high-profile rescues).
  • Tom Uren [01:32]: “Every time they take action against scam compounds, it’s because there’s some internal media, domestic media, [that] forces them to act… not a long term strategic plan.”

• Role of the Three Brotherhood Alliance

  • China previously permitted ethnic rebels (the Three Brotherhood Alliance) to attack Myanmar’s ruling junta partly to “clean out scam compounds.”
  • The rebels’ criminal-fighting role was unusual and suggested Chinese influence.
  • Tom Uren [02:50]: “That alliance, which was known as the Three Brotherhood Alliance, one of its goals was to clean out scam compounds. That’s a strange goal for an ethnic rebel group…”

3. Rapid Response—But Only for the Right People

• Striking Examples of Speedy Rescue

  • High-profile cases (e.g., a Chinese actor lured to a compound) received rapid intervention once their story went viral.
  • Tom Uren [05:20]: “…if the right people talk to the right people, we'll pull out this particular individual.”
  • Amberly Jack [06:24]: “If the post goes viral enough and the actor is maybe famous enough, we can get him out in three days.”

• Selective Enforcement

  • China intervenes only when Chinese citizens are affected or public pressure demands it.
  • Tom Uren [07:42]: “It’s so focused on the compounds that are targeting Chinese. If you’re not targeting Chinese citizens, we don’t care. And so it just shapes the industry.”

4. Unintended Consequences—Shifting Scams Elsewhere

• Not a Solution, Just a Shift

  • Crackdowns push the operations to other borders (e.g., Thailand) and new target populations.
  • Tom Uren [08:11]: “The… industry is just moving to different regions. So not on China’s border… it’s also focusing on different target populations.”
  • The use of AI is making cross-border scamming and targeting other nations easier.

• Lingering Frustration/Disappointment

  • Tom Uren [08:59]: “It’s just not as good news as I had hoped. So it continues to be… disappointing, I suppose.”

5. International Response: What Can Others Do?

• Limited Collaboration with China
  • China’s self-interested approach hinders US or multilateral action.
  • Tom Uren [09:53]: “China is the self-interested giant in the region… impossible to imagine the US and China working very well together.”
• Other Regional Partners
  • Thailand and the Philippines are taking stronger stances—possibilities for US collaboration—but resources and influence are limited.
  • Tom Uren [10:28]: “They’re not as influential as China is…but they’re still in the region and… can do more.”

Main Topic 2: US Cyber Operations in Venezuela—A New Military Norm?

1. Operation Overview

• Context:
  The US recently conducted a successful military operation in Venezuela, capturing Nicolas Maduro with apparent support from cyber operations.

  • Trump hinted at using “special expertise” to “make it dark” in Caracas, pointing toward cyber activity to cut power.
  • Tom Uren [11:57]: “Trump seemed to hint about the use of…disruptive cyber operations… to turn out the lights.”

• Validated by Reporting

  • The New York Times confirmed this was a deliberate cyber operation.

2. Why Use Cyber? Advantages and Limits

• Alternative to Physical Sabotage

  • The US has alternatives—physical destruction (e.g., graphite bombs)—but cyber allows for less infrastructure damage and easier restoration.
  • Tom Uren [13:12]: “One of those ways is just to blow up power facilities…with graphite bombs…But sometimes with those, the facility just catches fire.”
  • In Venezuela, preserving infrastructure was strategically preferable.

• Not a Gamechanger—An Incremental Improvement

  • The cyber attack provided a “nice to have” rather than essential advantage.
  • Tom Uren [14:27]: “My assessment is that the cyber operation was a very incremental improvement. Like, we avoid the risk of short circuits. That’s really what we’re achieving here.”
  • The president’s public acknowledgment is significant for the stature of cyber in military operations.

3. The Role (and Future) of Cyber in Military Planning

• Political & Strategic Recognition

  • Presidential notice signals cyber operations will routinely be considered in major operations.
  • Tom Uren [15:40]: “For these types of operations… disruptive cyber operations will be part of the mix. So they’ll be considered every single time…”

• Potential for More Advanced Uses

  • While power was highlighted (a known target type), cyber operations could have also suppressed air defense networks.
  • Public discussion of more sensitive capabilities is unlikely unless urgently needed.
  • Tom Uren [16:50]: “Air defense networks… there was no mention of that… Maybe cyber helped as well, I don’t know. But that seems like if you had that capability, you’d be a lot more cautious about talking about it.”

Memorable Quotes & Moments

| Timestamp | Speaker | Quote | |-----------|---------|-------| | 01:32 | Tom Uren | “Every time they take action against scam compounds, it’s because there’s some internal media… that forces them to act… not a long term strategic plan.” | | 05:20 | Tom Uren | “…if the right people talk to the right people, we’ll pull out this particular individual.” | | 07:42 | Tom Uren | “It’s so focused on the compounds that are targeting Chinese. If you’re not targeting Chinese citizens, we don’t care. And so it just shapes the industry.” | | 09:53 | Tom Uren | “China is the self-interested giant in the region… impossible to imagine the US and China working very well together.” | | 11:57 | Tom Uren | “Trump seemed to hint about the use of…disruptive cyber operations… to turn out the lights.” | | 14:27 | Tom Uren | “My assessment is that the cyber operation was a very incremental improvement… we avoid the risk of short circuits. That’s really what we’re achieving here.” | | 15:40 | Tom Uren | “For these types of operations… disruptive cyber operations will be part of the mix. So they’ll be considered every single time…” |

Key Takeaways

• China’s anti-scam efforts are driven by domestic interests, not global cooperation.
• Actions are reactive, not strategic—focused entirely on protecting Chinese citizens and prestige.
• Crackdowns do not solve the scam industry, but push it to other regions and targets.
• International anti-scam collaboration is possible, especially with Southeast Asian partners, but US-China efforts are a non-starter.
• In warfare, cyber operations are becoming standard, particularly for discrete, reversible and politically advantageous disruption, but are still incremental—often supplementing existing means rather than replacing them.

For further reading and updates, listeners are encouraged to subscribe to Tom Uren’s Seriously Risky Business newsletter at Risky Biz.