Donald Trump (2:13)

He's the fraud. He's a disgrace. So we'll find out whether or not it was a safe election and if it wasn't, he's got a big price to pay.

Patrick Gray (2:22)

It is someone who wasn't even particularly negative about Trump. He was just doing his job and did it successfully.

Donald Trump (2:27)

And he's a bad guy. He's another one. I have no idea who he is, Krebs. No idea who he is.

Patrick Gray (2:35)

Okay, so, Rob, let's just break down exactly what's happened. There has been this presidential memorandum which seems like he's being politically targeted. Another thing that this memorandum does is target his employer. So it revokes the security clearances of everyone working for Sentinel One. And of course, you know, the EDR companies that do government work, they will typically have a few people with clearances. In this case, Sentinel One says it's something like 10 people. This seems like what Trump has done to law firms as well, to bring them to heel, which is to use cancelled classifications as a way to get them to do certain things. There's obviously also the implication that they will lose their government work. I mean, it is pretty extraordinary that the White House is actually targeting Chris's employer in addition to Chris. I mean, this is. This is a form of. What would you call it, like, blacklist? They're trying to blacklist him.

Rob Joyce (3:26)

Yeah, there's no precedence for this, Patrick. Sentinel One's offense really was employing Krebs. Right. Chris is an awesome person. I was around during those election times. I was working with Chris across the years. He had nothing but the best intentions and organized an amazing response to be able to help secure those elections. And to see him singled out years after the fact, as well as Sentinel 1 being targeted just to put pressure around him and kind of dissuade others from being associated. That's a scary place to be.

Patrick Gray (4:10)

Yeah, it really is. And I mean, you know, as we just saw in that montage there, President Trump saying, well, I like how he says he quotes from Chris directly around his comments about the 2020 election being secure and then goes on to say he's never heard of him, which I think is quite, quite funn. But, yeah, I mean, the whole thing is just extraordinary. I do get the impression that Chris's position at Sentinel One is just untenable. Now, I think the only logical thing that can happen from here is that they write him a cheque and he moves on because that company has an obligation to its shareholders, to its staff. And frankly, you know, I know Chris a little. I don't think he would want to cause drama for the company either. I mean, I'm guessing that's, you know, just logically, if you game it out, this seems this is probably what's going to happen, right?

Rob Joyce (5:00)

Yeah. I don't know where it goes, but, you know, this clash really blurs Politics and cybersecurity. So that, to me, makes all of us less safe.

Patrick Gray (5:11)

I mean, I want to be clear, too, and I did say this on Blue sky the other day. I don't feel that Sentinel 1 is the bad guy here. I mean, they've issued a statement that was pretty weak, but they're being singled out by the White House. And, you know, obviously there's an implied threat that they will lose government work, they will lose government sales. I don't really see how they can fight back against this unless there's some sort of solidarity within the industry. If every EDR company got together and said, we're pulling down all of our people who do any classified work or information sharing, you know, unless there was some sort of unified pushback, I don't see that there's anything that they can do here. And that's the. That's the whole point, isn't it?

Rob Joyce (5:49)

Yeah. I think Reuters asked like, 36 different organizations about the. The Sentinel One issue, and only one came out and commented that was, you know, the Cyber Threat Alliance. And, you know, they talked about how they were concerned, everybody else, all the big companies ducked it. Right. They don't want to get drawn into this. And that's the problem. It's a chilling action for me. I just want to thank Krebs for being an awesome American. Right. He continues to do the right thing, and he's getting pinched personally for this. He'll, I imagine, have to pay a lot of lawyers fees, and that's not right for somebody who is doing service for the country.

Patrick Gray (6:33)

Yeah, I mean, you know, he showed a lot of courage last time around in 2020. You know, I believe he and his family were receiving death threats for a long time. You know, I don't know how he's going to play this, whether or not he's going to, you know, go low profile or whether or not he's going to be everywhere. But, yes, it's, it's. It's certainly not fair. Now, some listeners will be wondering also. So last week, Tuesday, Australia time, Monday in the US I actually recorded an episode of Wide World of Cyber with Chris and Alex. And we did talk about Trump's policies and the firing of the NSA leadership and, you know, cuts to CISA and things like that. I wound up publishing that, like, you know, like the day after or the day of this executive action with a note on it saying, well, we recorded this before the. This action was taken. Sentinel 1 asked me to pull down that podcast after it was published, and I did I don't think that was. I personally don't think that was the right decision. But I can also understand that for them, they need to do the corporate equivalent of curling up into a little ball at the moment. So having a podcast out there featuring Chris talking about Trump's policies, I just thought, look, at the end of the day, I'll just pull it down and we'll sort it out later. Maybe we republish it in a few weeks or. Or whatever it is. I just. I probably should have asked them, hey, do you still want me to publish this? But I, you know, it was just such a weird day that I just wound up doing that. So, you know, even though that was an uncontroversial podcast, they just asked me to pull it, and I. And I decided to do that because I don't want to, you know, be the cause of more problems for Sentinel 1 between them and the White House. And as for the future of the Wide World of Cyber podcast, I have no idea what that looks like. You know, I hope we get to continue. I don't know what that's going to be. Look what that's going to look like. Ask me again in a couple of weeks. Now, look, another thing that I need to mention is Adam and I, we were due to travel to the United States, you know, week after next, to travel to next week, actually, to travel to the RSA conference, and we have had to cancel that trip. And look, there's several reasons for this. Australians are being hassled a lot at the border. Well, everyone's being hassled a lot at the border, so we were already looking at having to bring burners with us. But burners only get you so far, because if you do get singled out by customs and they ask to search your devices and they see that they're burners, they can use that as well. Why are you taking burners into our country, sir? Now, I would have been traveling on a foreign media visa. If there's one thing that this group of people hates more than foreigners, it's journalists. So I'm like a double threat. And one of the things I was doing in the United States was recording a live podcast with Chris and Alex at the. At the. At the rsac. So ultimately, I just decided it wasn't worth the risk if they are also, you know, Chris and I were in contact through his time in government. If they are going to try to come up with some sort of charge that he was behaving inappropriately with journalists, the last thing I want is to be held in the United States as a material witness to some sort of grand jury investigation. You know, they intimated they wanted to see if he improperly disclosed classified information, which for the record, absolutely is a ridiculous idea for anyone who knows Chris or dealt with him. But, you know, this is where we are. I am now at the point where I don't feel I can travel to the United States under this administration. And I mean, what, what more is there to say? I mean, I, you know, I even talked to you about this when I was mulling it over. It's, it's nuts.

Rob Joyce (10:02)

And as an American, that makes me sad, Pat. It really does.

Patrick Gray (10:05)

Yeah.

Rob Joyce (10:06)

But I certainly understand. And hey, I still owe, I still owe Adam a waymo r when he does get it back over here.

Patrick Gray (10:13)

Yeah, exactly. It's a shame. I was really looking forward to it. Anyway, we've got a lot of other stuff to get through, so let's just get into it. This next one, you have already said that you're not going to touch it with a ten foot pole, but the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard in the United States is constituting a new task force which is, quote, designed to, you know, restore, transfer transparency and accountability to the intelligence community. It mentions that there was, what is it? Weaponization, government against American and it's rooting out deep seated politicization, which is, you know, for someone who's spent, you know, 20 plus years reporting on cyber security and I've met a lot of people at these sort of agencies, like they are not the most political people I've come across, let's just to put it mildly. So this all seems a bit weird. It's sort of being billed as like doge for the intelligence community. As I said, you don't want to touch this with a 10 foot pole. So we're just going to move on to the, to the next story here, which is that Senator Ron Wyd in the United States is saying he will do his best to block Trump's nominee for the next Director of CISA until DHS releases a report into telco security. It's an unclassified report that dates back to 2022. You know, he thinks in light of salt typhoon, the public deserves to see this document. It's my feeling that the DHS won't want to release it because if they do spill the tea here, the next time they want to actually look into an industry, no one will talk to them. Is that about the impression you got here as well?

Rob Joyce (11:48)

Yeah, I Think it's fair. And you know, I do understand the worries on SS7 and diameter. Right. It's SS7 is an international protocol used for setting up the public switch telephone network calls and facilitating services like sms. It's been demonstrated as vulnerable and you know, I don't know that Senator Wyden needs this particular report to continue to show that. It's already in fact it's been on 60 Minutes talking about insecur in some of these protocols. But I do think that, you know, we need a CISA director and hopefully we can get, we get the nominee in front of the Senate for a hearing and quick confirmation because we do need these positions filled.

Patrick Gray (12:37)

That's interesting. I didn't realize it was that report. I thought they were talking about something else about the security of like telco systems and practices. But this was actually just a report into weaknesses in SS7.

Rob Joyce (12:47)

I kind of remember when SS7 and diameter, you know, Diameter is the next generation of protocol that, you know, is used in some of the 4G 5G networks. And there was some investigations, I expect, into how it's implemented because, you know, there's also a difference between whether the protocols themselves are vulnerable and how you implement them overall. When these networks were set up, everybody assumed it was a closed networks and closed network and everybody who was on them was a telco and therefore to be trusted. And we found that if you can find your way into these networks, either hacking or as a company, you can do a lot of mischief just by being inside the network that doesn't have a lot of trust.

Patrick Gray (13:37)

Yeah, I mean, in light of the Salt Typhoon campaign, the advice from the US government is for its employees to use over the top services, whether that's WhatsApp or iMessage or Signal, which seems like good advice and deals with the SS7 threat as well. I mean, the report I'd really like to see was the one that was the CSR was preparing into Salt Typhoon, which of course is dead now because the CSRB has been disbanded. By the way, when I've joked previously on the show about how the Trump Admin will reconstitute the CSRB and task it with proving fraud into the 2020 election, I'm only half joking. I think that's actually on the cards. All right, moving on to another piece here. There's this Pall Mall Pact. It's a non binding voluntary agreement that countries are signing which guides them to create policies that are designed to prevent spyware proliferation and to try to sort of regulate that space from what I've seen of it, it actually looks like a pretty good idea. Even though it's voluntary, even though it's non binding, it gives everybody something to work towards. Early reports said the United States would not sign the pact, but it looks like that's actually happening now. I don't know whether that was a reversal of a position or whether or not they just got around to it, but I think this is a really positive thing. And I was curious for your thoughts on this because, you know, as someone who worked in the intelligence community for a long time, I figured you'd have feelings on commercial spyware makers.

Rob Joyce (15:08)

Yeah, I do think that this is a big deal. Right. In general, there's bipartisan consensus in the US that, you know, spyware for higher industry is a problem if it's not done correctly. And in fact, you know, there was an executive order in the previous administration that kind of tightened down on some of the spyware and put some accountability on when the government would use it and how we saw the NSO group be pushed out and essentially driven out of the US market. And so there is some support and I think it's kind of a hint as to this administration's policy that that executive order wasn't pulled down and that they're willing to on to this treaty or onto this agreement. Because I do think we're essentially trying to prevent a cyber arms race in this space where you want the folks who have these capabilities to at least put some consideration into how they're used, who they're sold to, and what are the second order implications of them being a capability in the market that's sold.

Patrick Gray (16:22)

Yeah, yeah, I think that's it. I mean, I wouldn't call it an arms race concern, more of a proliferation concern. Right, which is. Yeah, you just don't want anyone being able to hang up a shingle and sell this stuff to whoever they please. And the fact that that was ever possible is kind of nuts. We have seen previous sort of international agreements and arrangements designed to combat this stuff. Most notoriously or infamously was the Vasana arrangement which sought to regulate dual use technologies. I mean, we talked about that at the time a decade plus ago, and it was just never really suitable for this. And you know, you and I were just talking before we got recording and I think at the root of the problems with Vasana were the spyware industry wasn't really clearly defined at that point. So it was, it was a difficult thing to know how to get your hands around it, which is why they were sort of trying to define exploits as dual use technology and it all, you know, but, well, what if, what if it's metasploit, you know, what if you're using it for pen testing? Like, there was no way for them to really do it in a way that made sense. Whereas now that we're further down the road, it seems like this is something policymakers will be able to get their hands around.

Rob Joyce (17:27)

Yeah. And even in the Pall Mall discussion, there was a German participant who said something like, you can't slap the same rules on spyware vendors and exploit brokers, indicating, you know, there needs to be a need for nuance and hopefully they'll drag some of the industry players into this to make sure that, you know, red team tools and other things are considered. That's where some of the Vasadar agreements started to fall apart, was they didn't have the nuance and the expert input.

Patrick Gray (17:58)

Well, and there was never any enforcement either, as best I could tell. Right. So, yeah, anyway, positive step. And look, speaking of nso, the meta lawsuit against NSO just keeps churning out interesting data points. We've got one here from TechCrunch written up by Lorenzo, where it looks like 1,223 WhatsApp users in 51 countries were targeted in the campaign that this lawsuit's about back in 2019. And it goes into, you know, which, which countries and everything this happened in. So, yeah, the law, the lawsuit just keeps delivering. But also, we've got a story here in Wired about NSO engaging a bunch of lobbyists in the United States right now. Now, previously it looked like they were using lobbying firms much more aligned with, you know, the Democrats. And not surprisingly, now they've pivoted and are looking to lobby Republican lawmakers. I mean, how do you, first of all, how do you think they're going to go with this? And second of all, now that we are in a less permissive environment for these companies, now that it's clear that if you step out of line, you're going to suffer, do you think it might actually be safe to let a company like NSO back into the fold, so to speak?

Rob Joyce (19:14)

Yeah, I'm not sure on the NSO name, just because of all the damage that is associated with the Khashoggi killings and other things, you're still seeing Pegasus used in some questionable places. Now, some of that may be historical popping up, but I do think that.

Patrick Gray (19:37)

They went too far is what I'm hearing here.

Rob Joyce (19:39)

Yeah, that, that there's just there's overreach. And so you know, the charm offensive will only take you so far. But who knows? With the right lobbyist and the right ear, it could happen. Huawei tried the lobbyist route, it didn't work for them. ZTE used some lobbyists and they did avoid the complete death penalty. So, you know, there's a chance. But this is a new administration and you gotta, you gotta shoot your shot back.

Patrick Gray (20:07)

Yeah, exactly Right. They'll give it a crack. Now let's look at what it looks like when you want to get spyware onto a mobile device and you don't have to worry about being particularly targeted. What happens if you're trying to target an ethnic group, say now, we've got a report here from Suzanne Smelley over at the Record, which is a write up of some data out of the NCSC in the UK looking at some spyware that targets Uyghur, Tibetan and Taiwanese groups. And they've done this in a smart way. The Chinese, obviously it's the Chinese. They've done this in a really smart way in that they've just created apps that people from those groups, from those cohorts would like to use. There's like an audio Quran, there's an app called Tibet1. I mean, it's just when you're dealing with niche sort of diasporas, creating an app that's going to be popular among that diaspora isn't actually that hard. And that seems to be the approach the Chinese have taken here. So, you know, on one end you've got the NSO stuff targeted, expensive, whatever, and then you've got stuff like this at the other end of the spectrum, which is you can just go wide by creating sort of, I don't know, like the app version of a watering hole. Right?

Rob Joyce (21:14)

Yeah. Seed them into the places those target communities trust and you're going to have success. And, you know, this isn't new either. China's had this playbook for a long time. I remember there was a ghost net operation all the way back in 2009 where the researchers found they were going after Tibetan exile groups, computers. And, you know, so what's old is new again. And this is just a tactic that works. So you're going to keep going to it?

Patrick Gray (21:42)

Yeah, absolutely. Now, staying with the Chinese, my colleague Catalyn Kimpanu in the Risky Business or the Risky Bulletin newsletter wrote up a really clever technique being used by APT10. This is so cool. So there is a sandbox in Windows where you can run stuff in an EDR Basically has a hard time seeing it. Right. But the saving grace is if you run something in this sandbox, it pops up on the screen in front of the user. So what this crew does is they compromise the box and they set the malware to run in the sandbox from the task scheduler in a different user account, then reboot the box and happy days. Like, in terms of, like, just really simple persistence techniques that rely on core Windows functionality. Like, I love to see this because it just has that slight flavor of old school. Did you get the same sort of nostalgia vibe reading through this one?

Rob Joyce (22:40)

So Adam's not here, but Chef's kiss, right? That's. I am certain that is his assessment. So it's just getting down beneath the security tools and running on that host system in a place that they don't monitor or inspect the processes. That's just really slick. And I. Powershell has been abused for living off the land a lot. And I think we're going to see some creative sandbox and virtualization tradecraft emerge now that this innovation is known. It's just creative, not too high tech, but a whole way of thinking that others will launch off of.

Patrick Gray (23:17)

Yeah, exactly. I dug it as well. Fun stuff. Now this one I expected. And we went through the run sheet just before we got recording. I said, I imagine you won't want to touch this one with a 10 foot pol, but surprisingly you're happy to talk about this one. China has alleged that the NSA hacked the Asian Winter Games or something and to do something that I don't think they really spell out to collect data on participants. They've alleged that a couple of US universities were involved in this campaign. They've dropped a bunch of names, but the whole thing, like the White House has called this a fabrication. And like a lot of these claims from China, the whole thing just reads really weird. Like they talk about like secret encrypted packets or something, which sounds super spooky. And it's just, it's. It's. It's a fever dream. It's like something that was written by five eyes, but if they were, if they had the fever that Adam's got right now, it's just deeply, deeply weird. Like, what's your take on this? As someone who, you know, worked on the sort of teams that China would allege did these sorts of things.

Rob Joyce (24:21)

Yeah. It doesn't happen in a vacuum pad. It follows years of the US publicly attributing attacks, indicting Chinese military personnel for their espionage. It can be seen as Beijing As a wannabe, they want to do the public attribution game, but they just don't know how to get there. I really don't think it's a coincidence that this comes right after some diplomat screwed up to imply that the Volt Typhoon attacks were in fact China. Right, we knew that, but them owning it a bit went too far.

Patrick Gray (24:56)

Just to be clear. This was in a private meeting between a Chinese diplomat and US officials where they said, yeah, what did you expect? Of course we did Vault Typhoon, you're supporting Taiwan and yeah, whoops, yeah.

Rob Joyce (25:07)

And I think that story getting out embarrassed them and they have to reply. But once again it's really weak and a whole bunch of stuff anybody that goes and reads, they talk about. There was like 63% of the attacks came directly from the United States. So which is it? It's a super secret NSA operation that came straight from a USIP with no obfuscation or tons of loud things out of US IPs. Or it's that high end NSA tradecraft. Right?

Patrick Gray (25:36)

Yeah. And I think the point you made too is they're name checking American universities because they don't really understand that in the United States the universities don't operate as an extension of the state.

Rob Joyce (25:47)

Right, yeah, just culturally they don't grok that we, we don't control the universities. So they think something coming out of a university IP is government associ. When it's probably either the weak security in that environment or the open environment that is a university is allowing it.

Patrick Gray (26:09)

So I mean, I think though that like it's one thing for you and me to sort of have a chuckle about this, but I do worry sometimes that this sort of stuff can influence policymakers. Right. Like they read about this in the mainstream press and they don't necessarily understand what the global intelligence dynamics alike and they might sort of be swayed by this. Right. So I think from China's perspective it is a smart strategy, if I'm honest, but it is, I mean to us it's just beyond the pale. Right. Because they're always denying that they've ever done anything like of course we don't hack, America's the big hacker. And like it's just, you know. So I guess what I'm getting at is it's something that is seen one way by people who are sort of at least have some proximity to this or just like me, people who stutter it in the open but pay close attention so we see it one way. Whereas people who are less familiar, you know, they might Actually get. They might actually fall for this sort of stuff or be influenced by it.

Rob Joyce (27:03)

Yeah. It makes me a little proud though because you know, they're trying it because it hurts them. So it's a reflection of the pain we are bringing them by showing their activities and their screw ups. Right. And where they try to identify and name people. Right. You know, back in the day, you know, the PLA was using their own social media apps in the middle of operations so they could be personally identified. And then you see the isoon companies get, get name dropped because of the leaks and, and things like that. I can tell you the NSA tradecraft is not going to identify those individuals. Never has. It's not going to. Right. Well that's why all of this is so humorous.

Patrick Gray (27:47)

Yeah. I mean at those sort of. Yeah. Five eyes agencies you don't, you can't make mistakes like this because there's procedures around it. And I do also find it funny that they pinned this one on tao, which is a unit of NSA that you used to run that also has not existed for quite some time. It is not called that anymore. But let's move on and talk about mitre. MITRE is warning that it, its funding contract with the US government has not been renewed. It will expire basically I think in a couple of days. And they're saying things could get a little bit screwy, I think. Catalan, my colleague spoke to a source kind of close to this who said, look, the situation is everything will be fine unless someone trips over a cable at the data center. And then things could get really, could get really wild. Now of course, MITRE is not the only organization that issues CVEs. They're not the only company where you can say I've got this bug, I need a number. They're not the only host of this sort of information. But of course it is their program, they developed it, they operate it, they coordinate it. So funding for this program going away would be pretty bad. But I want to hear your thoughts on what that would mean if MITRE was forced to step back from cve.

Rob Joyce (29:02)

So I literally swore out loud when I heard this. The program is administered by Mida, so they are a lot of the infrastructure, it's paid for by cisa, which is, you know, where the problems I expect are originating as they are being cut and squeezed. And it's run by an independent board of directors. But the content is created by those individual vendors that are CVE naming authorities. So as you mentioned, there still are people who can issue CVEs so it's a community program, but what this is doing is it's eroding the effectiveness and the efficiency and you know, like I saw in the MITRE letter or in the assessment of the Mitre things that, you know, the web facing tools that MITRE hosts may go away and they're pointing you to a GitHub repository where the information exists, but it adds the friction of getting to that information. So everything is just not as good. So I really hope industry steps up and you know, picks up the pieces of this artificially induced mess we're going to need to clean out. It's another self induced crisis that's eroding our cybersecurity capabilities writ large. And you know, I, I expect that we will find a way through it. You know, people will, people will fill the vacuum in a voluntary sense and then others hopefully will come in and restore the programmatics. But I need somebody to do it.

Patrick Gray (30:36)

Stuff like this gets weird though, right? Because we've seen similar troubles with nist, right, where they fell behind on data enrichment for the National Vulnerability Database. One of the places people were going to get that contextual information was the Chinese version of their Nvidia, right. To try to get this information, which is, which is nuts. I mean, NIST is at the point where it's given up on enriching anything like older than 2018, which, okay, fair enough. You've got to draw the line somewhere if you've got limited resources. But that has caused problems like that's caused real issues. I kind of feel like this could do the same and probably be even worse than the NIST situation. Like, what's your vibe as to the actual potential impact here?

Rob Joyce (31:16)

Yeah, I think we'll struggle through. There'll be some, some bureaucratic friction. It'll be a lot less effective and timely in the near term. But I think we'll sort it out. I'm an optimist, a glass half full kind of guy, so I think we can pull together a coalition of the willing and dig our way out. But again, it's ready, fire, aim, we've shot ourselves.

Patrick Gray (31:41)

Yeah. Right. Now, moving on to some more sort of bread and butter cybersecurity news. We've got a great write up on this from Dan Gooden over at Ars Technica. A researcher has uncovered a bunch of Chrome extensions that have 4 million installs but are not really visible in the store. Now this suggests to me that these browser extensions are probably being installed either via social engineering or via malware. But that's a lot of installations. And I just think, you know, browser extensions, to me like the risks have been so clear for so long. And it wasn't really until about December last year that the cybersecurity discipline writ large kind of got that right because it just wasn't really happening yet. And now it really, really is. I think most security tooling is not really even prepared to deal with this yet. And in an identity centric world, getting into somebody's browser, it just gets you so much. What are your thoughts on this one?

Rob Joyce (32:40)

Yeah, you've got to think twice before installing a random Chrome extension extension, right? I do think that anything that lives in that browser extension world can look at all of the data you're going to entering and pulling off the web. And nowadays everything comes through that little portal that is your browser. So it's pretty powerful. And I think the researcher here, he didn't catch it outright stealing passwords, but the infrastructure and the code were in place to do a lot of spying on that. What really caught my attention was these extensions were either unlisted or really hard to find in the store. They weren't trying to get them into your browser through the store. So now the question is how were they getting, you know, all of these, all of these millions of installs, Was it, was it adware? Was it, was it in these watering hole types of attacks? I'm not sure. Bundling or third party websites. But the casual Chrome user wouldn't stumble into an unlisted extension. But it shows that they were getting hundreds of thousands of installs for each extension and that's pretty scary.

Patrick Gray (34:02)

Yeah, bundling, I didn't think of that. But that would explain it. If it's some sort of shady commercial arrangement to get a presence in the browser and then figure out what to do with it later. This research was done by someone called John Tuckner who is with a browser extension analysis firm called Secure Annex. I hadn't heard of them previously, but yeah, it's good work. So bundling makes sense. I think the thing that counts against this being malware is we saw in incident response to some North Korean intrusions where they had got malicious extensions into people's browsers. Like the number of hoops they had to jump through to do. It's not like the old days where you got write access on the disk and you can just do whatever you want. Like the hoops they had to jump through to get get malicious extensions into a browser were crazy. So I think you probably hit the nail on the head There.

Rob Joyce (34:49)

Yeah, it's a case where Chrome extensions have been fruitful for attackers for a number of years. I think 2020 Google had to purge something like more than 500 malicious Chrome extensions. And here we are today where independent researchers are finding things that are not just malicious in the store, but taken through the actions. I think John did some really good work finding shared code across a number of extensions, extensions that talk to the same servers or ask for the same permissions. So he was doing some systemic searching and I know that Google does some things like that. And hopefully these, these kind of independent research efforts will give them the leads that will take out much more in the store that is malicious.

Patrick Gray (35:43)

Yeah. And you can go like, yeah, you might want to check the extensions and you keep an eye on the extensions in your organizations. But do you, do you agree with what I said earlier that maybe people haven't really paid enough attention to this issue? Because I just feel like you don't hear about it nearly enough.

Rob Joyce (35:58)

I agree. Browser extensions are the new mouse.

Patrick Gray (36:01)

Yep, yep, that's it. All right, so we got another piece here from Krebs on security. This is stuff we've talked about previously, which is these Chinese operations that are enrolling stolen cards into like mobile phones for like Apple Pay or the Android equivalent of that. And then they're doing relay attacks to people who are actually in other regions, so relaying transactions back and forth. So we've talked about that before, but now these groups are directly targeting people as the bank. Right. So the pretext has changed. It's not like, hey, you need to pay an unpaid toll or you know, pay a customs fee to release a package from dhl. Now they're actually saying, you know, it is the bank, we need you to give us this code. And that's how they're doing the enrollment. What's interesting though about this story is the approach here and how this is, this scam, this fraud is now taking on this sort of industrial dimension, which is very Chinese in character. It has Chinese characteristics, shall we? We say. Because it just looks like they are scaling this up. Like it's a, like it's a well funded startup at sort of series B stage. They're in the growth phase of this and yeah, what a world.

Rob Joyce (37:12)

Yeah, they're using messaging services, so not the true SMS text messaging. And so they can spam internationally at super low cost. And you know, that jumps over some of the carrier filtering. That probably makes them a little more effective as, as well. But you're right, these techniques get this Deployed at scale. And if you have even a half a percent hit rate and you're doing it by the thousands, hundreds of thousands, millions, that's going to be a lot of success in the end.

Patrick Gray (37:45)

Yeah, and this is really going back to that whole identity versus authentication paradigm. Right where here we've got essentially an excellent technology for authenticating transactions, but the enrollment's weak. And that's what we see with everything like, you know, even a Yubikey or a passkey or whatever. Like you can have these really secure authentication techniques. But identity is hard.

Rob Joyce (38:04)

Yeah, but this campaign was something like 120 or more countries. So this wasn't localized, this was planetary. This was big and at scale.

Patrick Gray (38:14)

It's the Chinese man. It's the way they do it. It's that industriousness. We've got a couple more to go here. The CA browser forum has passed a ballot to reduce the maximum validity of TTLs certificates from 398 days to just 47 days by 2029. Look, this just means we're going to have to all go to programmatic certificates. You know, let's encrypt and whatnot. This has been on the cards for a long time. No surprises here. Yes, I will need to now delegate DNS authority. Anyway, I'm going to have to do some like. Well, actually, Adam Boileau is going to have to do some sort of admin kung fu to get us doing programmatic certs just due to some quirks in the way we run things. But it's time, isn't it? You can't say it's not time to do this.

Rob Joyce (39:04)

Yeah, this is going to be eight times a year and I think it's only going to get faster and faster. It lets us clean up when somebody issues a bad certificate that it won't live in the environment for a long time. Time. It's also going to give us the chance to pay attention to that automation. Don't be surprised if some of the exploitation starts to take advantage of the automation as well. But overall, I think if we can get the infrastructure in place to roll these certificates faster, you get more security, you can push the bad guys out of the ecosystem faster.

Patrick Gray (39:40)

Yeah, I mean, it's a net gain and I mean, a change like this is rooted in the fact that we don't really have effective mechanisms for certificate revocation. Right. So that's what this is about. Now we've got some data out of the Dutch government. So it's from some PhD research by a man named Tom Meuis who's a cybercrime specialist with the police in the Netherlands. And it looks at ransomware and payments. And there's just two really, really interesting data points that I feel like we need to mention, because there's policymakers who listen to this. There's been a policy discussion about whether or not ransomware payments should be banned. I think. I think this data point. There's a data point here that really argues that you shouldn't do that, which is that 95% of organizations that paid ransoms would have gone bankrupt otherwise. Right. So that is a very interesting data point. And the other interesting data point here is that organizations with cyber insurance pay ransoms that are three times the amount, like, per incident than people who don't have the insurance. So it just shows that once the attackers are in an environment, environment, one of the first things they look for are the insurance policies to see if there's coverage, and that really informs how much they ask for. I don't think we should be surprised by this, but it is nice seeing some concrete research that. That shows it, right?

Rob Joyce (40:55)

Yeah, it's showing a higher level of sophistication, the fact that they aren't guessing random ransom amounts, that they know your policy, they know you're covered, they know they can squeeze you for more. Those criminals are doing the recon in their home work.

Patrick Gray (41:09)

Yeah, exactly. And finally, just to wrap up this week's show, there's been some sort of intrusion at 4chan, which looks like there was. It looks like there was some sort of mean war, meme war between 4chan and Soy Jack, and it's spilled over into packets, fired. You know, image board people are awful, but at least the culture's alive. That's my take on this.

Rob Joyce (41:31)

I look at it like the Internet tire fire that never goes out. It flares back up. Right. But.

Patrick Gray (41:37)

But that warms the cockles of your heart in some weird way.

Rob Joyce (41:41)

Yeah, I do love me a good me more, Patrick. I do.

Patrick Gray (41:45)

All right, well, that actually is it for us this week. Rob, again, thank you not only for joining us on short notice, for you to fill in for Adam, who. Yes. Get better, mate. Hope you're feeling well. Hope you're feeling better. But, yeah, thank you for not only joining us to fill in for Adam. Adam. But also for sharing your thoughts on the Chris Krebs situation with us. I know there is a lot of pressure on people in the United States to not talk about these sorts of things at the moment. So. Yeah, I think that was. That was great. What you Did. And yeah, I look forward to chatting to you again soon.

Rob Joyce (42:19)

Happy to be here and get well soon. Adam.

Patrick Gray (42:27)

That was Rob Joyce there with a look at this week's news and big thanks again to him for that. It is time for this week's sponsor interview now with Fletcher Heisler who is with Authentic. That is Authentic with a K on the end. And Authentic is an open source IDP or identity provider. So you can think of it as like a single sign on thing that you might buy software as a service, but you can run it yourself, Right. So you can get it and just deploy it and do whatever you want with it. It's turning out to be really popular in high side networks because they can't use use software as a service over the Internet, but in all sorts of situations as well. And Authentic makes its money by doing things like selling compliance modules and whatnot. But the guts of the product, it's free, it is open source and yeah, you should definitely check it out and have a play with it. Full disclaimer here. I am an advisor to Authentic. Now I spoke to Fletcher Heisler, who is the founder of the Authentic company, one of the founders, about the identity space. Right. Because it seems to him like there's an awful lot of products crowding out this space that are doing stuff that the identity providers should kind of be doing themselves. So he joined me to talk through all of that and here's what he had to say.

Fletcher Heisler (43:40)

Yeah, Identity is a very crowded space lately and everything around Identity and access, I think we're just seeing a lot of companies crop up to solve, solve very specific problems that in a lot of cases IDPs have kind of created for themselves. And so we're trying to be as vendor agnostic as possible, but use those products to the best of our ability, but also let you consolidate and not have to have a dozen different things to do something pretty straightforward sometimes.

Patrick Gray (44:09)

Yeah. So why don't you walk us through some examples here? I mean, one, we were talking before we got recording and one example you guys gave us is like being able to check device health, right. As part of an authentication flow, which is something, you know, everybody would ultimately like to do. Now if you're in the commercial ecosystem, obviously there's some great integrations there already, like if you're a CrowdStrike plus Octashop, you know, bang, you can get those things to work well. But the point you were making is not everybody's going to want to be a crowdstrike and okta shop and you might want to do your own integrations and that's get. That's a little bit too difficult.

Fletcher Heisler (44:41)

Difficult, definitely. And if you have any other signals from any other products, good luck integrating those into the rest of that flow. So we're not looking to be a device management company. There's obviously a lot of deeper problems to solve there. But if you're using something else, if you're using Fleet or you're using Google's BeyondCorp, like the device Trust connector, you can plug those into Authentic and use those helpful signals dynamically as part of, of login authorization and so forth. And we want you to be able to, let's say Google adds in a new signal. You don't have to wait for us. You can custom map that, you can level up security based on that, you can change your policies very dynamically based on whatever tool you happen to be using for that. We're starting to build in some of those pieces ourselves. So we're starting to build, for instance, Windows Credential Manager, things like that that can sit on your desktop as an agent. And then you have similar signals coming from parts of Authentic, parts of whatever other Device Trust you're using, and you can match those up and level things up accordingly as well.

Patrick Gray (45:51)

Now, Authentic has the types of customers that tend to be perhaps a little bit more forward looking. I mean, some of them, they just have a niche requirement, right, which is why they're going with Authentic. But quite a lot of them are, you know, just tend to be wanting to do new stuff. So when people are coming to you and showing you what they're doing around these types of signals, I mean, is there anything interesting happening there? Is it like less edr, more like they're getting some exotic weird signals? Like what are some of the cool things people are doing to, you know, as part of their authentication flows to like verify Device Trust.

Fletcher Heisler (46:21)

So maybe I'll use like GeoIP as an example. We could all agree, especially with things like VPNs, using an IP by itself, not a surefire way to guarantee security. But there are a lot of really interesting things you can do with that. So we have a standard sort of impossible travel policy, but you could further customize that. So you could say as an example, this particular team, we expect to be connecting on this network or from these locations and even update that easily with your various policies so that again, you're combining signals, you're scoping things down to the expected usage, and you can use those results according to what you very specifically are expecting. As your security team on the other side of the equation.

Patrick Gray (47:12)

Now another thing that you've mentioned is something that you don't feel should exist is a lot of this onboarding and offboarding users stuff. It is kind of strange when you think about it when you've got these companies that call themselves identity providers providers and yet there's a burgeoning market of other vendors who, who solely exist to do the user provisioning. I've always got the impression that's because the, you know, the SSO IDP providers can't really be bothered or don't really want to get involved in writing integrations for a million other products. Right, where, where a lot of user accounts need to be provisioned. You know, I'm guessing you're going to be wanting to do some of this that. But where do you draw the line, right? Like how, how do you as an identity provider go, well maybe we're going to support, you know, provisioning credentials from our directory, you know, through this integration into this set of products. But like you can't play the game of trying to cover everything, right? So, so like how do you, how do you handle that and where do you draw the line?

Fletcher Heisler (48:08)

Yeah, yeah. Well you know, where the legacy players, maybe Octa, Ping, et cetera are, are technically ahead of us just in years in the game. They have a vast marketplace of. These are applications we have pre built integrations for. But it's very much an 8020 where those have to be maintained. Things change over time. You can't necessarily get all the details you want or the customization and flexibility there. Whereas the way that we built things with authentic, you can reach in and modify that yourself. You don't even have to wait for us most of the time to make any changes. So as an example, workday is probably a particularly nasty integration to work with. Most of the time we didn't have a pre built one. We were able to build that with a customer I think in under a week and then we're able to benefit other customers by saying yes, here's how we did it, here's the policy to stand up. But they could also reach in and custom map any attributes they want, make full use of that at a much more flexible way way. As things change over time we're also going to be introducing sort of a blueprints marketplace. So allowing our customers, our users, our wider community to contribute their configurations back so that not just us, but the rest of the community could say here's an integration I've built, we can Read that in, modify it, build upon that. And then it's also kind of a group effort the that we're all stronger by sharing our information and our configurations and our best practices. So we can kind of leverage our wider community to do that as well.

Patrick Gray (49:49)

Yeah. Now one thing that you have also looked at recently is actually stuff like Knock Knock, which is trying to take SSO and glue it to the network layer. You're doing some interesting stuff as well around tying authentication to some services like SSH and RDP through like a web proxy, which makes a lot of sense, but there's no network sort of component to that. Is that something you're looking at as well? Are we going to be competing?

Fletcher Heisler (50:18)

So that's the interesting part. Things like Knock knock again shouldn't exist if we'd all done our jobs right. But I'm really glad that they do. And similarly, you know, we have some overlapping functionality there. You can get RDP and SSH in the browser. You can SSO into legacy applications with both products, but they've gone really deep on the networking side. And so you can integrate Knock Knock and Authentic and you can make custom scripts, I think, in Knock Knock as well. So you can leverage all of the details, all of the power behind both by integrating those very flexibly together. So that's the nice part about everything being an API, everything being terraformable as well, that you can have infrastructure as code as well and repeat this in an automated way, share it with another team. They could do the same thing easily as well.

Patrick Gray (51:12)

Now, one sort of unlikely integration that's proving to be quite popular for Authentic is actually with like, what is it, Apple Business Manager or something. It's like popular in schools and whatnot. Why don't you walk us through that?

Fletcher Heisler (51:24)

Sure. Ssf. So Shared Signals framework is right now basically synonymous with Apple Business Manager or School Manager. It's an open protocol that could be implemented, probably will, by some other major companies and systems eventually. We had a large school looking to roll this out for again device health and user enrollment. We're now using it ourselves as well for our own employees to automatically enroll them with an authentic account and so forth. That was an interesting one because it started out early on, just on the Okta side as an implementation. We had to do a little bit of reverse engineering. So I'm pretty sure we're the second in terms of IDPs to be able to offer that kind of support. There's always the protocol of how things should be done by the standard and then the practicalities of how things actually get implemented.

Patrick Gray (52:19)

Fletcher Heisler, always a pleasure to chat to you, my friend. Always good to talk through all of this stuff. Great to see you. And I believe you'll be at RSA.

Fletcher Heisler (52:27)

We'll be at the RSA conference. We'll be sponsoring BSides SF as well.

Patrick Gray (52:32)

Are you doing a booth?

Fletcher Heisler (52:33)

We are.

Patrick Gray (52:35)

Wow. There you go. Open source project with a booth. That's crazy times. All right, mate, great to chat to you and I'll see you over there.

Fletcher Heisler (52:43)

Sounds good. Thanks so much.

Patrick Gray (52:47)

That was Fletcher Heisler from Authentic there. Big thanks to him for that. And I guess if you want to find Authentic, just Google Authentic with a K and like SSO or identity and you will find them. But that is it for this week's show. I do hope you enjoyed it. I'm actually on leave next week, so I'll be back in two weeks with another weekly edition of the show. But until then, I've been Patrick Gray. Thanks for listening.