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Russian Roulette
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Geopolitics in the South Caucasus
00:47:35
Max and Maria are joined by Richard Giragosian and Jeffrey Mankoff to talk about the current geopolitical moment in the South Caucasus, with a particular focus on the dynamics at play in the relationships between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia.
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- [00:07]
A
Welcome back. I'm Max Bergman, Director of the Stewart center and Europe Russia Eurasia Program at csis.
- [00:12]
B
And I'm Maria Snigavaya, Senior Fellow for Russia and Eurasia.
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A
And you're listening to Russian Roulette, a podcast discussing all things Russia and Eurasia from the center for Strategic International Studies. Hello and welcome back to Russian Roulette. I'm Max Bergman here with my co host, as always, Maria Snagovaya. And today we're going to speak about what is going on between Russia and Azerbaijan. The ties between these two countries strengthened following Russia's perceived siding with Baku over the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and was marked by Putin's 2024 visit to Azerbaijan. But relations have recently soured after a Russian missile mistakenly downed in Azerbaijani plane this past Dec. Russian police then have recently allegedly tortured and killed a pair of Azerbaijani citizens this past June. And then Azerbaijan recently retaliated and responded, arrested two Russian journalists from Sputnik's Baku offices. Diplomatic meetings have been canceled. There's a lot of allegations going back and forth and this is, I think, a really significant development. And so we have two excellent experts here with us to discuss this. First, we have Richard Giragozian. Richard is the founding director of the Regional Studies center rsc, an independent think tank in Yerevan, Armenia, and a guest lecturer at the NATO Defense College in Rome. And we have Jeff Mankoff. Jeff is a distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies and most importantly is a non resident senior associate here on our team at csis. And just to note, Jeff is here in his personal capacity and his views that he is expressing here today do not necessarily represent the views of the United States government and his employer. And Jeff can correct me if I have done the disclaimer justice. But Richard and Jeff, welcome to the podcast.
- [02:11]
C
Thanks. Thanks for having us.
- [02:13]
A
So Jeff, maybe I'll start with you and Richard, feel free to chime in. I gave a brief sort of outline of what's going on between Russia and Azerbaijan, but maybe you could provide some more color. What is happening right now? Why does it feel like relations are descending? And what's the trigger for what seems like a pretty big diplomatic rift?
- [02:35]
C
Yeah, let me provide a little bit of context and then bring it up to the current moment. So I think the nature of the relationship between Russia and Azerbaijan in a lot of ways is unique among Russia's relationships with its post Soviet neighbors. And in part that's because Azerbaijan, more than just about any of them, has pushed relatively successfully to establish its autonomy from Russia, not by pursuing integration with NATO, not by, you know, joining the west, whatever that means, but through having a very strong defense and security and political partnership with Turkey and acting autonomously in its own region, which has meant primarily using military force to restore its control over the breakaway Nagorno Karabakh region. It did that against the preferences, I suppose, of Russia, largely because of its strategic relationship with Turkey, was able to do that in a way that insulated it from strong, at least military, Russian responses, and has then more recently tried to continue expanding its regional influence, interacting with a range of outside powers and also pursuing, even as its leadership has threatened the use of military force, negotiations with Armenia on lasting agreement to end the conflict touched off by the fight over Nagorno Karabakh. And so that is the long term backdrop. In the more immediate term, the leadership of Azerbaijan in Armenia will be meeting soon. We've been hearing stories that they're making concrete progress towards a peace deal, one that they have largely been negotiating amongst themselves with minimal outside influence and certainly very minimal Russian participation. And the consummation of that deal, if and when it happens, would be a significant blow to Russia's ability, ability to manipulate or otherwise influence regional dynamics in this particular region. So I think one way to read the escalation of tensions between these two countries is an effort to throw sand in the gears of this process, to force, and we can talk about Armenia separately, but to force, in this instance, Azerbaijan to adhere to a certain subset, if you will, of Russian preferences in pursuing those negotiations. And then, you know, on top of that, I think there are domestic political reasons for the government of Vilhelmi of the importance of, you know, having a cause to rally the public around now that the Nagorno Karabakh issue is sort of off the table. And Russia, as the former colonial power, is a force that can be used for political mobilization. Obviously a dangerous one because Russia remains quite dangerous, less so perhaps at the moment because it's so busy dealing with Ukraine. But nevertheless, thanks for that, Jeff.
- [05:26]
A
Richard, do you share that take? And Jeff, you didn't really mention the downing of the airliner. Is this being driven by internal politics within Azerbaijan, broader diplomatic concerns, or is this being triggered by just incidents that are occurring? Richard, what's your take?
- [05:43]
D
Well, first of all, I agree with Jeff. I have two additional observations from on the ground, however. First is the broader context. There is both an opening and an opportunity for Azerbaijan to challenge Russia, and that is Russia's distraction where Moscow is overwhelmed by its failed invasion of Ukraine and simply has not been paying attention to developments on the ground. It's been much more reactive. The second observation here is Azerbaijan's been doing a very good job at openly defying Russian interests. In fact, even the humiliation of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers that were deployed to Nagorno Karabakh is representing an emboldened Azerbaijan, sometimes recklessly so, believing it has much stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does and at the same time pushing the envelope. And I do think there will be a price to pay over the medium to long term. But to answer your question, I do think Azerbaijan has been very successful at not only pushing out and pushing back against Russia's traditional role in the region, but more than that, I think Azerbaijan has been utilizing a series of incidents and justifying whether it's the shoot down of the plane, the roundup of ethnic Azerbaijanis, where we see the closure of Russian language schools and now a move against Russian media. And a lot of this is driven for domestic dividends in Azerbaijan, where the father to son dynasty benefits from conflict. From an Armenian perspective, we're quite happy to see them turn away from us and to focus their anger against Russia as well as Iran where tension is increasing. But yes, I think Jeff presented a very good analytical overview of this latest new trend of Azerbaijan's defiance of Russia.
- [07:52]
C
Yeah, if I could just hop in. I think one really striking element of this defiance is how the Azerbaijani authorities treated the Russians that they arrested. So you mentioned that the two Azerbaijani businessmen who were killed in Russian custody. So the Azerbaijani authorities arrested several journalists from Sputnik and some other Russians. And then these individuals were photographed looking like much the worse for wear, like they'd clearly been given the business in government custody. And to do that and then highlight it very publicly is a very open effort at humiliating Russia, which coming from a country the size of Azerbaijan, is quite striking.
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B
Fascinating. I actually have to say with Russia's Goliath weekend, we see the emergence of multiple Davids Davids across the region. And if you might, both of you, perhaps we can start with Jeff, provide our audiences a little bit of the history of the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the background over the last couple of years. Central to understanding the issue, at least looking from the United States, is the enclave of Azerbaijan, the so called Nagorno Karabakh territory with a large Armenian population. Jeff, maybe we can start with you. Would you mind providing our audiences a little bit of the perspective on what's going on between Azerbaijan and Armenia?
- [09:10]
C
Sure. Do we Want to start with the Romans and the Persians or.
- [09:14]
B
Well, maybe a little bit closer to. To the last recent.
- [09:20]
C
Sure. So the region, the former Soviet Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, was a region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic whose population was principally ethnic Armenian. That was an arrangement that was made in the early 1920s around the establishment of the Soviet Union, after there had been very intense ethnic conflict between Armenians and at the time they were called Turks. During the 1905 revolution and then again in the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution and the Russian Civil War, there was a history of ethnic violence between these communities. And the decision was made by the Soviet leadership to give this principally ethnic Armenian region to Azerbaijan. And at the time, the population in the first Soviet census was almost 90% ethnic Armenian of Werno Karabakh. That diminished over time, but it was about 90% in the early 1920s. And this was consistent with Soviet nationality policy across a lot of the former Soviet Union. Many of the post Soviet conflicts that we focus on are based on this practice of creating ethnically autonomous regions within the individual Soviet Socialist Republic. So we saw the same thing with Abkhazia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova and so on in the 1980s, during the period of glasnost, when there was more ability to mobilize. One of the things that started happening was that the ethnic Armenian community in Azerbaijani controlled Nagorno Karabakh began mobilizing on behalf of the transfer of that Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Obelisk to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. And there were big demonstrations in the mid to late 1980s around this issue. As Soviet power weakened, these protests became more violent. It erupted into conflict. One of many of these ethno territorial conflicts littering the periphery of the Soviet Union as it collapsed during the first Nagorno Karabakh War, which lasted from, let's say, about 1988 to 1994, the ethnic Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh, with the support of the Armenians in Armenia, and in a lot of cases, the Russian military succeeded in securing control of that territory and some of the surrounding territories that were juridically part of Azerbaijan and had an Azerbaijani population. And so under the 1994 ceasefire agreement, you had this region of Nagorno Karabakh, which was under de facto Armenian control, as well as the seven regions surrounding it that were also under de facto Armenian control, that according to the principle of territorial integrity, as it was recognized around the collapse of the Soviet Union, were druidically part of Azerbaijan. So Armenia kind of wins the First Karabakh war. There's a long process of trying to manage the conflict, come to a lasting peace deal for a variety of reasons that fails and we can talk about those reasons, I suppose. But there's a tension between territorial integrity and the right to self determination. And this is a problem all around the periphery of the former Soviet Union because of these embedded ethnic autonomies. During the 2000s, Azerbaijan's economy booms on the back of its oil and gas. A lot of that money gets funneled into building up the military. And so the balance of power between Yerevan and Baku shifts. And by the mid-2010s, Azerbaijan is in a much stronger position militarily. It develops a strategic alliance with Turkey which plays a big role in training and reforming and in some cases even commanding the Azerbaijani military. There's a series of incidents and then in 2020 Azerbaijan launches an offensive to take back Nagorno Karabakh. This is the second Karabakh war. It proceeds very differently from the first one. Very quickly Azerbaijan overwhelms the Armenian forces, takes back those seven territories surrounding Nagorno Kar, Karabakh and gains a significant chunk of the NKAO itself. There's a ceasefire deal that's reached that provides for Russian peacekeepers. And this is November of 2020. The Russian peacekeepers deploy again. There's this peace process to try and you know, figure out how to, to manage the remaining areas that are under Armenian de facto control. Russia invades Ukraine. The pandemic happened, all of these other things are going on. And amid rising tensions, the Azerbaijani forces make a lightning move into they blockade the road going to Karabakh. There's only a single road that goes through there. And then they launch an offensive into what remains of Armenian controlled Karabakh. It proceeds very, very quickly. They dissolve the de facto state institutions and most of the ethnic Armenian population flees to Armenia. So as an entity Nagorno Karabakh doesn't exist anymore. It's now under the effective control of the Azerbaijani state. Baku has dissolved the instit regions of self rule that existed there and has emphasized combining the former Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast with the surrounding areas in what they now call the Karabakh region. So it's Nagorno Karabakh or highland Karabakh plus lowland Karabakh plus the surrounding region of Zangezur. And the Azerbaijani authorities now portray this all as a single entity and say there is no more Nagorno Karabakh problem. So now we have efforts to sign a peace deal, and that's sort of where we are right now. It's a very delicate process. There are a lot of outstanding issues still, but the Nagorno Karabakh problem as it existed from, let's say, 1988 until 2022 is not there.
- [15:19]
B
Bassett, Nadin thank you so much, Jeff, for very explicit description of what's going on, Richard, and I'd love to bring you in perhaps some comments on Jeff's description and most importantly, some perspective on the current state of relations between Yerevan and Bak, the ongoing negotiations in general. How stable is the situation because we keep hearing, you know, possibility of additional escalation generally. How optimistic are you and who the main players are in this very complicated great power politics, if you will.
- [15:49]
D
Well, following Jeff's very insightful description, I would highlight two additional points that are related regarding Nagorno Karaba. First of all was it's important to remember the Nagorno Karabakh conflict erupted during the Gorbachev reform period of glasnost and perestroika. The reason that's so significant is the conflict itself actually predates the independence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. In other words, as a driver, it set the foundation for the development of statehood, it distorted democratization as well as economics and trade. The second point to add is there are two very dangerous precedents from both the war of 2020 and the September 2023 military capture of Nagorno Karabakh by Azerbaijan. The first dangerous precedent is this was very much a validation of the use of force over diplomacy and second, it was very much a victory of authoritarian power over democracy. Both of these dangerous precedents, if left unaddressed, challenge not only Western ideals and values, but could possibly undermine faith and confidence in democracy. Despite that, however, the Armenian government has reached a new vision, a post war accommodation where Armenia, according to the Armenian government, is now cutting its losses, including the loss of Nagorno Karabakh. In other words, for the Armenian prime minister, what is lost is gone. There is no move by Armenia's government to rearm or to actually retake lost territory. That's very important, especially as the current bilateral peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan is just that, bilateral. It has nothing to do with Nagorno Karabakh directly. And even the diplomatic track now ongoing between the Armenian and Azerbaijani governments are comprising three levels. The draft peace treaty where negotiations have closed, much to the credit of both sides, and second, border demarcation. The third element of these negotiations is the most promising connectivity, the restoration of road and rail links between Armenia and Azerbaijan, but also Armenia, Turkey normalization. And this is a win, win, a lift, all boats, both in terms of economics and trade. It's an important post war incentive for Armenia. This connectivity is actually an imperative strategically to regain the loss of deterrence. In other words, economic interdependence as the most effective way to restore deterrence. And in addition, what we see is the current round of talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan have now excluded both the west and Russia. And this is very much localizing both the post war negotiations, but also doing a good job at preventing Russia from becoming more of a spoiler because we do see a storm on the horizon, an angry, vengeful Russia seeking to regain its lost power and influence in the region and in Armenia. So therefore, the loss of Nagorno Karabakh is also a loss of an instrument of leverage for Russia.
- [19:50]
A
Richard, maybe just to follow up on the peace process and then I think I want to turn to Armenia, Russia relations as well, but on the peace process, I mean, it's, I think, rather remarkable, the stance of the Armenians after losing the past two wars. It's common in European history. We see this with Viktor Orban highlighting the Treaty of Trianon in 1919 and pointing to the lost Hungarians in Ukraine and Slovakia. It seems that Armenia has sort of turned the page or closed the book on this conflict, looking to move forward. That strikes me as a huge, in some ways, win for Azerbaijan. As you note, it's an authoritarian country that then has been able to, through military means, readjust its borders and there hasn't been a huge backlash from the United States or the community. And so it strikes me as a huge win for Azerbaijan that there's a potential peace deal on the table. But so what is the holdup here? You note that there's really good progress. It seems that they're close. Are you expecting a deal imminently? What needs to happen to sort of get this over the line?
- [20:52]
D
Well, these are very good questions, and to be quite honest, these are questions equally significant to be answered by the governments of both sides. But I would say as an analyst on the ground, we do see Armenia now engaged in adjusting to a painful, difficult, post war reality of weakness, the need for compromise and concession. Too many missed opportunities have marked both the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Armenia, Azerbaijan tension. What we see, however, is Armenia has a distinct advantage in two ways. First is we have survived the existential threats. The worst is over. The war of 2020, as devastating as it was, also resulted in early elections where the Incumbent Armenian government was surprisingly reelected. Any Western politician would be envious of that accomplishment, especially as it was a genuine free and fair election. The second advantage Armenia has. Armenia is endowed with a rare commodity, legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials, but also in terms of the change of government. Prior to the war in 2018, we saw a rare victory of non violent people power in Armenia, defying the odds and expectations. From an American perspective, nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails. In the Armenian case, it was an important victory and achievement where Armenia is now better positioned than all of her neighbors in terms of the outlook for real stability. And to be honest, we look at the Azerbaijani regime, the government of the Aliyevsky father to son dynasty for over 20 years, and it's Shakespearean with Lady Macbeth, with Mrs. Aliyev. It's also dangerous in terms of the outlook of a likely confrontation between rival Russian backed versus Turkish backed factions. So I do think diplomatically, Azerbaijan is still rather drunk with victory, maximalist in its demands, but is now beginning to sense that the dividends are decreasing. And this is why, to the credit of Azerbaijan, they have closed negotiations over the language of the peace treaty. The preconditions, the holdup is only over the signing ceremony. And I do think it's important to Azerbaijan as a diploma, a certificate of achievement heralding their victory. At the same time, I do worry that given the nature of politics in Azerbaijan, a conflict is a very convenient distraction by the ruling elite in Azerbaijan. If not Armenia, Russia or Iran are domestically seen as productive and effective distractions. And what I mean is, even if the peace treaty is signed tomorrow, it's not enough for Azerbaijan. And this rather punitive peace treaty has no international guarantee nor international guarantor. Therefore, much of Armenia's strategy is to resist the Russian orbit, diversifying its security partners, but also betting heavily on the need for normalization with Turkey as the positive game changer.
- [24:42]
A
Well, we do have an American president that seems very intent on trying to win a Nobel Peace Prize, so I wonder if he might see this. Wait, there's just a signing ceremony to be had. Maybe I can bring people together in the White House, sign this thing, maybe in the Rose Garden and peace will be had and Nobel Peace Prize will be achieved. I guess not the worst outcome for everyone. I perhaps, but Jeff, maybe let's bring Russia back into this Armenia. Russian relations used to be quite positive. Russian peacekeepers were present in this conflict, but there's been a real shift in the Russia, Armenia relationship. Maybe you can explain what is the current state now between the two countries.
- [25:23]
C
Sure. The Russian Armenia relationship has also gone through a series of cycles over the last several years. And maybe we can trace it back to 2018 with the the People Power movement that Richard was alluding to. The Velvet Revolution that brought the current government of Nikol Pashinyan to power. Pashinyan was an outsider to the Armenian political scene. He'd been a journalist, a civil society activist. His accession to power looked to a lot of people sitting in the Kremlin like a color revolution, like the series of upheavals that had occurred in places like Georgia and Ukraine that led to the emergence of leadership that was more pro Western in its orientation and less receptive to Russian tutelage. Now, Pashinyan made an effort from very early on to emphasize that his accession to power did not pretend a geopolitical revolution, that Armenia was not seeking to change its orientation, change its axis the way that, say, Georgia did under Mikhail Saakashv. But nevertheless, I think there was a degree of mistrust towards Pashinyan and his circle on the part of the Russians, just because he was from a segment of the political elite in the society that didn't comport with their ideas of how countries should be run. And then the Karabakh conflict deepened the malaise in this relationship because Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which is a Russian centric security bloc that is premised on the idea, as its name indicates, of collective security, and has a Russian military presence on its soil, has been closely linked to the Russian military industrial complex for its weapons, and so generally considered to have security guarantees of one kind or another, both bilaterally with Moscow and through the csto. And when the conflict with Azerbaijan flared up, both in 2020 and in 2023, Armenian appeals for support were not particularly answered. And initially, the Russian response was the CSTO and bilateral support. Those are about territorial integrity. And because the fighting is confined to Karabakh, which is not juridically part of Armenia, this isn't our problem. And you can sort of make the argument that the Russians had a case, but it didn't go over well in Armenia. And particularly when Azerbaijani forces started striking targets on sovereign Armenian territory, that response became less appealing. And so for a lot of people in the Armenian elite, this whole set of developments raised the question of why accept all of the compromises that come from being dependent on Russia, if, at the end of the day, Russia is not going to actually be there or provide support when it's needed? And in the aftermath, especially of the. The Loss of Karabakh. In 2023, the Armenian government made a big push to move away from Russia to deepen ties with Western institutions. And this meant freezing membership in the csto. Pashinyan didn't go to a couple of the summits. There's talk about potentially making a bid for European Union membership, something that Georgia had already done that now seems to have fizzled a little bit, but very demonstratively show that Armenia had other options. It sought to deepen its security cooperation relationships with outside partners, signed a big arms deal with India and also with France, which has been a long time partner for Armenia, which further then damaged its relationship with Russia and even started talking more with the Turks. And there was a meeting between Pashinyan and Turkish President Erdogan where Pashinyan was widely criticized for accepting a copy of of Erdogan's memoirs. I think it was. And just sort of trying to show that Armenia was not going to be a Russian vassal, that it had these other options. And I think for Armenia this is one of the big. Richard's right, this is one of the big objectives of getting to this mythical peace agreement is having Turkey plugged into the regional security complex in a more dynamic way than it currently is, opening the border between Armenia and Turkey to trade, which would dramatically reduce Armenia's dependence on Russia and Iran, but also potentially open the door for security cooperation. And it's worth keeping in mind Turkey is a member of NATO. And so one of the things that we've seen in Azerbaijan is the growth of compatibility, standardization, long NATO standards, interoperability. That was the word I was looking for being promoted through the cooperation of the Azerbaijani military with the Turks. There's interest in Armenia in doing something similar. And it's debated within Armenian political circles, but at least in some quarters there's a belief that this actually would be possible if and when there's a peace deal, that the obstacle right now is not Turkey so much as it is Azerbaijan. And that the Turkish government has made clear that as soon as there's a deal they're ready to move very quickly on opening the border, normalization, trade cooperation of various kinds. And so I think that's where we are. And again, that then has significant implications for Armenia's relationship with independence on Russia.
- [30:58]
B
Thank you very much, Jeff and Richard, I wanted to bring you in also with maybe a political science question against this historical perspective, you know, shortly entitled when does Russia Attack? Because in political science there's this broad debate as to whether Russia really dislikes post Soviet states becoming democracies or distancing from it towards the West. Right. And similarly in Armenia, the interesting example of the more recent democratization with Prime Minister Nicole Pashinyan coming to power was that seemingly Russia sort of accepted democratization as long as moved towards democracy, as long as Armenia remained within its sort of sphere of interest. Recently, however, there are all these developments that Jeff has flagged. Just earlier this year, the Armenian executive led by Prime Minister Nicole Pashinyan approved a bill that pushes Armenia towards an application for EU membership. And we already have heard some questions, responses from Russian elite members like Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Vychin stating earlier that Russian business understands that it has no prospects in Armenia because as things stand now, Russia has no prospect of interaction with eu. So the question is then where is this all going? First of all, can we conclude from this experience maybe some can draw some major implications as to what are the real triggers for Russia's invasion are? And second, what do you think that means for Armenia's future going forward?
- [32:23]
D
As usual, a very good question, Maria. And I'll take up your challenge specifically beginning with the historically close ties between Armenia and Russia. It's important to note those historic ties are just that, history no longer current. Armenia has adopted a new strategy that's much more transactional, based on a belated recognition that Russia presents a new challenge for Armenia, a challenge rooted in Russia's role as a very unreliable so called partner for Armenia. However, the real obstacle, the real sticking point is not the Collective Insecurity Treaty Organization, nor is it the Russian military base. It's Armenia's position as a member of Putin's prison, the Eurasian Economic Union that is really the contradiction that will prevent Armenia's EU aspirations full stop. And there is no real will or decision by Armenia to leave that bloc. And the reason is a lesson from Georgia. Armenia is very careful in its incremental reasserting of independence not to unnecessarily provoke Russia, for example, NATO membership is dismissed. Armenia is very careful to adopt a transactional approach where Armenia in diversifying security partners is not looking to replace Russia with the west, but rather to balance, contain or counter Russia to overcome the dependence on Russia. Hence the one and only arms procurement deal since the war was with India on purpose because it's less provocative to Russia as well. And much of our latest activity in securing new security relationships is actually in Japan, South Korea and China and not necessarily the west as we traditionally see it. And this is why I think Russia's position in 2018, as Jeff has outlined I would argue went even further. Moscow was uncharacteristically passive and pensive because of Pashinyan's reliance on the discipline of a domestic agenda. There was no attempt at making Armenia become the Maidan. There was no Victoria Nuland giving out cookies in downtown Yerevo, very much on purpose. What we see now, however, is a recent arrest of a Russian Armenian businessman as a move by the Armenian government to preempt Russian interference in our coming elections in June 2026. We will see the largely discredited opposition in Armenia ever more desperate. It in its pleading for Russian support. That hasn't come. Part of the reason is, in my opinion, for Putin's Russia, a democratic, legitimate leader of Armenia is not that much of a threat, given Russia's economic leverage and Russia's position over key sectors of the economy, especially energy. And in that regard, I do think we're not yet at a genuine crisis. I don't see a real risk or threat of direct Russian intervention, and precisely for two reasons. One is much of the discourse against Armenia coming from Moscow. The messenger is very important. It's usually Foreign Minister Lavrov, presidential spokesman Peskov, or the crazy lady at the Foreign Ministry. My point here is it's not Vladimir Putin. We're not yet at a crisis because it's not Putin elevating this discourse. And the second reason is there's a bellwether test. We will know we've crossed the line with Russia when and if Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia. So we're not quite there yet. And finally, this is more a distracted Russia after its failed invasion, a surprisingly incompetent, weak Russian armed forces, which is a very important lesson learned in the near abroad. And I do think that is an aberration. It's not the norm. This is why the clock is ticking for Armenia, for Azerbaijan and looking to Turkey, looking in this regard, Richard, maybe.
- [37:23]
A
I could follow up asking about Armenia's relations with the west, with the United States, and what the US role is both in its relationship with Armenia and in trying to resolve this conflict. Is there a role for the United States, for instance, to engage Turkey? President Trump and Erdogan have seemingly a good relationship and also between Armenia and the European Union. Armenia has taken steps to potentially apply for EU membership. I think that would be a long way in the distance, but shows a clear sign of intent to move closer to the eu. At the same time, Georgia is unfortunately moving further away. But curious how you see Armenia's relations with the west. And what is the role for both Brussels and Washington in this region and with Armenia specifically?
- [38:10]
D
Very good question, Max. First, having myself moved to Armenia from Washington after working for 20 years there, I will start with the U.S. i'm very skeptical. I'm very skeptical in terms of doubts and questions over the sustainability of US Post war engagement in Armenia or the south caucuses. And it's more than just the disruption, the unpredictability, the volatility of the Trump administration. But I do think, for example, a US Role is not welcome. The reason from an Armenian perspective is when and if the US Prioritizes Armenia, Turkey normalization, that will be a blow to that potential opening. In other words, it will provoke an unnecessary reaction from Moscow as well as Erdogan. At the same time, it's the European Union that's the less provocative actor. It's also already engaged. We have an unprecedented deployment of EU monitors in Armenia, despite Armenia's ties with Russia. And I do think EU engagement, especially in terms of post war trade and transport. As an American, only now do I understand the EU's concept of connectivity. Now I get it. I see it. It's a practical level of engagement. It's also in terms of the EU stepping up in terms of filling a dangerous vacuum and void of Russian weakness and rather questionable or unreliable U.S. policies. But more than that, I think the one country we didn't talk about, Iran, is also important for the reason we didn't talk about it. Iran has long neglected and still refuses to return to its role traditionally as a regional player. Iran is not present. This is between Russia and Turkey and to a degree the eu. Iran remains overwhelmed by everything else. But I do think it's important that that diplomacy post war relations in the region for the first time in a very long time are face to face between the parties to the conflicts themselves. Armenia, Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, without a third party, neither the osce, the west, and helpfully without Russia.
- [40:52]
A
Jeff, maybe to turn to you, any thoughts on how you see Armenia's engagement and maybe the role of the west in the region and in this conflict. And then we'll turn to Maria for Maria has one more final question for Richard on some of the domestic political situation in Armenia.
- [41:09]
C
Sure. I think Richard pretty well covered the ground. Just a couple of things, I might add. Geography matters and I think this is true from the perspective both of the United States and the EU when it comes to looking at the South Caucasus. The idea of the EU formally expanding into the region would be a challenge given that there would not be any shared EU borders with any of the states in the South Caucasus and including Armenia without including Georgia would be even more complicated because everything would have to pass through Georgia. And as we said, Georgia is moving in the, in the retrograde direction at this point. As far as the United States goes, I think the question of what U.S. interests in the region are comparatively, the answer to that question is comparatively limited. It is an important transit route, but one that is of much more benefit to the EU and to Turkey than it is to the United States. I think to the extent that the US and the EU remain aligned on these broader strategic objectives, and that's an open question in my mind, this could be an area where you see some cooperation, but it really is going to be the EU that's driving these activities. And there's investment through programs like the Global Gateway, Treseca energy companies that are interested in expanding purchases of Caspian oil and gas from particularly Azerbaijan, but potentially from the east side of the Caspian as well. And again, if you have regional peace in the Caucasus, that creates a lot more opportunities for transit routes. Much of the transit infrastructure that exists now bypasses Armenia because Armenia and Azerbaijan have been formally at war for the last 30 years. If you can start building integrated transit networks and both Azerbaijan and Armenia have their visions of regional connectivity, I think those become much more realistic if there's a peace deal and the region is open to international investment. And that's one of the things that should be right next on the agenda if and when we actually get to the signing ceremony.
- [43:06]
B
Thank you so much, Richard. And as Max suggested, perhaps a last question given the limited time, but nonetheless fascinating about domestic situation inside Armenia. The region itself obviously is quite new to the democratic current. So it's fascinating to learn for our listeners to understand the current position of the Pashinian government, which is facing a lot of criticism both from within and outside broader Armenian diaspora. And also the government approval ratings recently are below 20% as the government is also in the midst of a heated dispute with the leadership of the Armenian Orthodox Church. And I have to mention perhaps the role of the Orthodox Church in the region is less understood but nonetheless fascinating topic because we've seen it's a controversial role it's taken in case of Georgia. So perhaps you can, you can tell us a little bit about all of this complex dynamic unraveling.
- [43:58]
D
Well, very briefly, what we see to better understand the domestic situation in Armenia. We have an incumbent government that was re elected after losing a war that is most likely to win the next election in the coming June. This is less about support for the government than it is about fear and hatred of the opposition. In other words, there is no credible alternative, unfortunately, to the Armenian government. And I say unfortunately because the lack of a viable, constructive opposition is bad for everyone, including the government itself. But what we see now is a style of governance by the prime minister of Armenia that remains dangerously impulsive, sometimes bordering on reckless. The Armenian church conflict is both less than it seems and more than it seems. It's less than it seems because it's not new, nor is it a surprise. This is unfinished business for the Armenian prime minister. The head of the Armenian Church, notoriously corrupt, rather authoritarian, was much more closely affiliated with the previous government. And this is a personal clash more than a political conflict conflict. It's also less about the church and more about a conflict or targeting of the church leadership. And that's an important distinction. Not that I support it. But to better clarify, it's also more than it seems because it's also about Russia, where we see the arrest of the Russian Armenian businessman. We see also the seizure of weapons in the the fifth, now fifth coup attempt allegation in Armenia. And there is danger, there is threat, but it's still manageable. Fortunately, more than that, I do expect, unfortunately, no real opposition emerging anytime soon, a likely reelection of the government. And unfortunately, what worries me is not democracy. The credentials, the achievements are real. They're hard fought. I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy as I am worried about the United States, to be quite honest with you. But in Armenia, which is more fragile, it's the institutional development of democracy that needs to be the coming priority, especially by the West.
- [46:33]
A
Unfortunately, we're going to have to end it there. We could go on. I have a lot more questions to ask, but Richard Jeff, thank you so much for joining us today. And as usual, thanks to all our great listeners for tuning in. As always, if you haven't already, please be sure to subscribe to our show and give us a five star rating. Additionally, if you get the chance, be sure to check out our sister podcast, the Europhile, wherever you get your podcasts and we will see you next time on Russian Roulette.
- [47:05]
B
You've been listening to Russian Roulette. We hope you enjoyed this episode and tune in again soon. And be sure to check out all the latest analysis by the Europe, Russia and eurasia program@csis.org Russian Roulette releases new.
- [47:19]
A
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