Russian Roulette: "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Geopolitics in the South Caucasus"

Date: July 15, 2025
Host: Max Bergman & Maria Snegovaya (CSIS)
Guests:

• Richard Giragosian, Regional Studies Center, Yerevan
• Jeff Mankoff, NDU/CSIS

Episode Overview

This episode examines the rapidly changing geopolitics in the South Caucasus, focusing on recent tensions between Russia and Azerbaijan, Armenia's shifting regional strategy, and the fragile prospects for a lasting peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Host Max Bergman and Maria Snegovaya are joined by regional experts Richard Giragosian and Jeff Mankoff to break down the actors, incidents, and diplomatic evolution in this strategic crossroads.

Key Discussion Points and Insights

1. Recent Tensions: Russia and Azerbaijan

• Max Bergman summarizes the recent diplomatic rift:
  • Russia previously allied more closely with Azerbaijan in Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
  • Relations soured after a Russian missile mistakenly downed an Azerbaijani plane (Dec 2024) and the alleged torture/death of Azerbaijani citizens by Russian police (June 2025).
  • Azerbaijan retaliated by arresting Russian journalists from Sputnik's Baku office. Diplomatic meetings have been canceled.
  • “[This is] a really significant development.” (A, 00:15)
• Jeff Mankoff contextualizes the downturn:
  • Azerbaijan staked out autonomy from Russia by aligning closely with Turkey.
  • It is leveraging incidents (shootdown, arrests) and negotiations with Armenia to reduce Russian influence.
  • Russia’s distraction with Ukraine = opening for Azerbaijan.
  • Incidents serve as political rallying points for Baku’s leadership, now deprived of the “Nagorno Karabakh” issue as a domestic cause. (C, 02:35-05:25)

2. Azerbaijan’s Defiance and Regional Power Shifts

• Richard Giragosian, from Armenia, observes:
  • Azerbaijan exploits Russia’s distraction and challenges Moscow openly.
  • Humiliation of Russian peacekeepers and recent moves against Russian interests are driven partly by a desire for domestic legitimacy.
  • “We’re quite happy to see [Azerbaijan] turn away from us and focus their anger against Russia and Iran...” (D, 05:42)
• Mankoff underscores the boldness:
  • The visible, public rough treatment of detained Russian journalists was “a very open effort at humiliating Russia … coming from a country the size of Azerbaijan, is quite striking.” (C, 07:51)

3. Background: Armenia-Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh

• Mankoff details the historical arc: (C, 09:09–15:18)
  • Rooted in Soviet nationality policy: majority-Armenian Nagorno Karabakh placed within Azerbaijan SSR.
  • Ethnic conflict erupted in the Gorbachev era; initial Armenian victory in the ‘90s.
  • Azerbaijan’s oil wealth and Turkey’s partnership shifted military balance.
  • 2020 Second Karabakh War: Azerbaijan’s rapid, successful offensive retook territory, Russian peacekeepers deployed.
  • 2023-24: Azerbaijan blockades, then rapidly dissolves Armenian control in Karabakh; mass Armenian exodus.
  • “The Nagorno Karabakh problem as it existed from, let's say, 1988 until 2022 is not there.” (C, 15:09)

4. Peace Process and New Regional Dynamics

• Giragosian:
  • Conflict “predates the independence of both Armenia and Azerbaijan. It set the foundation for the development of statehood, distorted democratization, economics, and trade.” (D, 15:49)
  • Two dangerous precedents: (1) force prevails over diplomacy, (2) authoritarianism over democracy.
  • Armenia’s “post-war accommodation” means it has cut its losses (including Karabakh), pursuing peace, not rearmament.
  • Peace negotiations have “excluded both the West and Russia... doing a good job at preventing Russia from becoming more of a spoiler.” (D, 17:11-19:27)
• Bergman queries why Armenia, despite loss, is moving towards peace, and what’s delaying the treaty.
  • Giragosian answers:
    • Armenia “survived existential threats ... is endowed with legitimacy based on genuinely democratic credentials.” (D, 21:11)
    • Azerbaijan is “drunk with victory, maximalist in its demands,” pressing for a punitive peace treaty.
    • The treaty lacks international guarantees—raises risks for Armenia.
    • “Even if the peace treaty is signed tomorrow, it’s not enough for Azerbaijan.” (D, 23:50)

5. Armenia’s Pivot Away from Russia

• Mankoff explains the evolution:
  • 2018’s Velvet Revolution in Armenia unnerved Moscow, even as new leadership stressed continuity.
  • During 2020–2023 wars, Russian support was minimal—even when Armenian territory was struck.
  • Post-Karabakh, Armenia cooled CSTO ties, sought closer Western and regional (India, France) cooperation, and pursued normalization talks with Turkey.
  • “Armenia was not going to be a Russian vassal.” (C, 25:23)
  • Turkey’s potential role: “the obstacle right now is not Turkey so much as it is Azerbaijan” (C, 29:36)

6. What Provokes Russian Intervention?

• Maria Snegovaya asks about Russia’s “red lines.” (B, 30:57)
• Giragosian:
  • Armenia’s strategy is “transactional,” carefully balancing so as not to unnecessarily provoke Moscow.
  • The real obstacle to EU membership is the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). “There is no real will or decision to leave that bloc.”
  • “We are not yet at a crisis because it’s not Putin elevating this discourse.” (D, 34:40)
  • Watch for Russian energy leverage as a bellwether for escalation.

7. Role of the West and Regional Actors

• Bergman and Giragosian:
  • Skepticism about a meaningful U.S. role; American attempts may provoke Moscow and Ankara.
  • EU, less provocative, is already on the ground (EU monitors; trade and connectivity projects); more likely to be a positive actor. (D, 38:10)
  • Iran remains absent.
  • “Diplomacy is for the first time in a long time … face to face between the parties … without a third party, neither the OSCE, the West, and helpfully without Russia.” (D, 40:03)
• Mankoff:
  • EU accession or formal presence complicated by geography.
  • For the U.S., direct interests are limited.
  • If a peace deal enables transit/corridor projects, EU and Turkish interests will be the greatest. (C, 41:08–43:05)

8. Armenia’s Domestic Political Outlook

• Snegovaya asks about Pashinyan’s prospects, criticism, church conflict, and opposition weakness.
• Giragosian:
  • The government was re-elected after losing the war, not from support but due to “fear and hatred of the opposition.”
  • “No credible alternative, unfortunately … the lack of a viable, constructive opposition is bad for everyone, including the government itself.” (D, 43:57)
  • Conflict with the Armenian church is more personal/political than religious, tied to past regime connections.
  • “There is danger, there is threat, but it's still manageable. ... The credentials, the achievements [of Armenian democracy] are real. … I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy … it's the institutional development of democracy that needs to be the coming priority, especially by the West.” (D, 45:46)

Notable Quotes & Moments

• On Azerbaijan’s Risk-Taking:

  • “[Azerbaijan has] been very successful ... at openly defying Russian interests. Even the humiliation of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers … an emboldened Azerbaijan, sometimes recklessly so, believing it has much stronger blind Turkish support than it truly does.”
    (D, 05:42)

• On Karabakh’s Transformation:

  • “As an entity, Nagorno Karabakh doesn’t exist anymore. It's now under the effective control of the Azerbaijani state. … The problem as it existed... is not there.”
    (C, 14:38)

• On Armenia’s Strategic Shift:

  • “Armenia is a rare non-violent people power victory … better positioned than all of her neighbors in terms of the outlook for real stability.”
    (D, 21:28)

• On Democratic Backsliding and Security:

  • “If left unaddressed, [the victory of force over diplomacy] could possibly undermine faith and confidence in democracy...”
    (D, 15:54)

• On Peace Treaty Prospects:

  • “The preconditions—the holdup—is only over the signing ceremony. ... It's important to Azerbaijan as a diploma, a certificate of achievement heralding their victory.”
    (D, 23:00)

• On Russia’s Leverage:

  • “We will know we've crossed the line with Russia when and if Russia demands to reopen negotiations over subsidized natural gas supplies to Armenia.”
    (D, 36:13)

• On EU vs U.S. Role:

  • “It’s the European Union that’s the less provocative actor. ... It's also in terms of the EU stepping up in terms of filling a dangerous vacuum ... of Russian weakness and rather questionable or unreliable U.S. policies.”
    (D, 38:24)

• On Democratic Institutions:

  • “The lack of a viable, constructive opposition is bad for everyone, including the government itself… I'm worried about the weakness of the institutions of democracy as I am worried about the United States, to be quite honest with you.”
    (D, 43:57; 45:55)

Key Timestamps

• 00:15–02:11: Setting the context—the Russia-Azerbaijan diplomatic rift
• 02:35–05:25: Mankoff on Azerbaijan’s autonomy, Turkey’s role, and Russia’s declining leverage
• 05:42–08:31: Giragosian on Azerbaijani defiance and domestic drivers; Mankoff on public humiliation of Russia
• 09:09–15:18: Mankoff’s historical deep dive into Armenia-Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh
• 15:49–19:49: Giragosian on the conflict’s roots, war precedents, and post-war peace process
• 23:50–24:42: Armenia’s post-war reality and peace treaty status
• 25:23–29:36: Mankoff on Armenia’s strategic pivot from Russia; Turkey’s potential as a partner
• 32:22–36:13: Giragosian on what triggers Russian intervention and Armenia's calculated approach
• 38:10–41:08: Giragosian and Mankoff on Western and EU roles, Iran’s absence
• 43:57–46:32: Armenia’s domestic politics, opposition weakness, church conflict, and institutional challenges

Tone and Language

The discussion is frank, analytical, and grounded in both policy expertise and lived regional experience. Both guests offer critical yet hopeful takes on democratization, express skepticism about outside intervention, and stress the urgency and fragility of the process. Humor and references to European history, Shakespeare, and even U.S. politics contribute to a lively, relatable tone.

Conclusion

The episode provides a clear-eyed assessment of the South Caucasus’s fast-moving landscape. Armenia emerges as a tentative democratic success story under extraordinary pressure, Azerbaijan as bold but risky in its posture, and Russia as increasingly reactive and distracted. While the peace process is closer than ever, lingering threats—from spoilers inside and outside the region—remain acute. The ultimate message: the region’s future hinges on creativity, resilience, and a careful recalibration of old alliances. As Richard summarizes, Armenia's next great challenge is the “institutional development of democracy.”