Russian Roulette Podcast — "Chokepoints and Economic Warfare with Edward Fishman"

Date: May 16, 2025
Guests: Edward Fishman (Columbia University, Center on Global Energy Policy)
Hosts: Max Bergman, Maria Snegovaya (CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program)

Episode Overview

This episode features a detailed discussion with Edward Fishman, a well-known sanctions and economic statecraft expert, about his new book Choke Points: American Power in the Age of Economic Warfare. The conversation explores the transformation from post-Cold War globalization to today's era of economic warfare, with a focus on sanctions policy as applied to Russia, Iran, and beyond. The episode examines the effectiveness, consequences, and future of economic coercion as a main instrument in U.S. foreign policy.

Main Theme

The rise of economic warfare, the leveraging of "choke points," and the pivotal role of sanctions in 21st-century American strategy—illustrated through the cases of Iran and Russia, and examined in light of current and potential future sanctions policy.

Key Discussion Points & Insights

1. Defining the "Age of Economic Warfare" ([02:32])

• Fishman introduces the age of economic warfare as a shift from the 1990s era of globalization to a world where sanctions, tariffs, and export controls are central tools of geopolitical competition.
• Despite reliance on sanctions for ambitious U.S. foreign policy goals, there remains, even in government, “a lack of understanding of how sanctions work—even among senior officials” ([04:55]).
• Quote:

  “We didn’t really fully appreciate them, we didn’t understand how they worked, even at the heart of the U.S. government.”
  —Edward Fishman ([04:26])

2. What Is a "Choke Point"? ([06:21])

• Fishman explains a choke point as a part of the global economy dominated by one country with few substitutes, e.g., dollar dominance in global finance.
• Quote:

  “A choke point is a part of the global economy in which one country has a dominant position and there are few, if any, substitutes.”
  —Edward Fishman ([06:25])

• The shift away from military interventions (e.g., naval blockades) to the use of financial tools by policy decree represents a dramatic reduction in the threshold to deploy “economic warfare” ([08:04]).

3. Iran Sanctions: The Blueprint ([10:30])

• Fishman traces how U.S. sanctions evolved during the Bush and Obama eras, with Stuart Levey’s Treasury strategy to isolate Iran, culminating in serious economic damage and leverage for the Iran nuclear deal.
• The Iran case demonstrates that “sanctions can deliver”—but over long timelines (7–9 years before results).
• Quote:

  “Sanctions don’t work overnight.”
  —Edward Fishman ([16:22])

• Congressional pressure played a big role, forcing the executive to act and innovate.

4. Application to Russia: Sanctions 2014–2015 ([16:16])

• Comparison with Iran: 2014 Russia sanctions (“much stronger than is usually seen by the public”) were reactive, not preplanned, amid deep European economic concerns and dependency on Russian energy.
• The innovative approach: Blocking Russia from capital markets, hitting the ability to borrow rather than immediate cutoffs.
• Coinciding oil price crash (outside direct sanction policy) amplified economic pain.
• Potential missed opportunity: Amid Russia’s economic crisis, Western leaders (especially Europe) opted for negotiation rather than increasing pressure—leading to the Minsk agreements and subsequent “sanctions fatigue.”
• Quote:

  “The tragedy of the 2014 Russia sanctions is that they worked a lot better than we expected … but instead wound up sending this message to Putin that we just didn’t have the backbone to actually prosecute a serious economic war against Russia.”
  —Edward Fishman ([21:40])

5. The Europe Factor & Dan Fried’s Diplomacy ([22:10])

• The U.S. played the role of pushing (sometimes coaxing) Europe into the sanctions coalition.
• Dan Fried credited for understanding nuanced European domestic politics and quietly building consensus.
• Quote:

  “He would get commitments oftentimes behind closed doors…and talk about how the U.S.–Hungarian relationship remains strong. He never tried to make anyone look bad.”
  —Edward Fishman ([23:51])

6. Lessons Learned: Sanctions as (Ineffective) Deterrence ([25:38], [33:24])

• Sanctions 2014–2022: Effective in causing economic pain, but inconsistent implementation and lack of escalation or follow-through undermined their deterrent value.

• Examples: No meaningful U.S. response to Russian election interference in 2016; hesitancy to escalate after Minsk; Trump administration inaction.

• Key lesson: It's not just sanctions themselves, but “political consistency and resolve” that determines impact.

  “The tragedy of that whole period is that the sanctions actually worked quite well. But politically, we gave Putin a number of reasons to doubt our resolve.”
  —Edward Fishman ([29:55])

7. War in Ukraine: The 2022 Sanctions Escalation ([33:24])

• 2022 saw “sanctions from hell” implemented—rapid and severe measures including freezing Russia’s Central Bank assets.
• Initial impact was dramatic: market closures, capital controls, panic in Russia.
• Missed escalation: Reluctance to fully target Russian energy flows (especially oil)—largely due to inflation and political risk fears in the West.
• Quote:

  “The initial salvo of sanctions was quite impressive…The problem was that we just didn’t continue escalating.”
  —Edward Fishman ([35:07])

• Oil price cap innovation: Diminished efficacy as Russia circumvented maritime insurance and tanker controls with a “shadow fleet.” Stronger secondary sanctions and enforcement could have made it more effective ([41:03]).
• Quote:

  “…the problem with the price cap wasn’t the idea…but that you could do it using maritime insurance and shipping as the key choke points. …The West underestimated how quickly Russia would build workarounds.”
  —Edward Fishman ([41:07])

8. The Need for a New Bureaucratic Architecture ([44:33])

• Fishman calls for a standing “warfare committee” or even a Department of Economic Security to centralize expertise and policy on sanctions, export controls, and tariffs, modeled in part after Japan.

• Currently, sanction policy is fragmented, legacy of war-on-terror structures; future requires an agile, coordinated interagency approach.

  “…we can’t be using the policy apparatus that really came out of 9/11 and the war on terror. …It’s not built for the current era of great power competition.”
  —Edward Fishman ([44:45])

9. Sanctions Relief and the Way Forward ([46:59])

• Skepticism about prospects for a broad “sanctions rollback” on Russia in absence of a real peace agreement and congressional resistance.

• Lessons from Iran: The U.S. is very effective at “turning off” economic activity but poor at spurring businesses to re-enter markets after sanctions end.

• For Russia, sanctions relief (even if partial) would not necessarily translate into a flood of investment.

• Cautions about lack of concrete frozen Russian assets to “unfreeze” as leverage in future diplomacy.

  “If you were to get some sort of partial lifting of Russia sanctions, I don’t think you’re going to see a giant flowering of business opportunities in Russia for American companies.”
  —Edward Fishman ([50:14])

Notable Quotes & Moments

• On the transformation of American policy thinking:

  “During that period of globalization…sanctions, tariffs, export controls are really tremendous and extraordinary moves of government intervention…”
  —Edward Fishman ([02:57])

• On political will versus technical capability:

  “Putin knew that we had the capability. …It was the will that he doubted.”
  —Edward Fishman ([33:42])

• On opportunity costs of caution:

  “I think the tragedy…is that the sanctions actually worked a lot better than we expected…but…we just didn’t have the backbone…”
  —Edward Fishman ([21:40])

• On the nuances and limits of sanctions relief:

  “It’s very good at telling banks and companies the things that they can’t do. But it’s not quite as good at saying, you should do this or you must do this.”
  —Edward Fishman ([49:11])

Important Timestamps

• Edward Fishman introduces “choke points” & the age of economic warfare – [02:32]–[06:21]
• Iran sanctions: origins and lessons – [10:30]–[16:16]
• 2014 Russia sanctions: strategy, dilemmas, and outcome – [16:16]–[22:10]
• Role of Dan Fried and coalition-building in Europe – [22:10]–[25:38]
• How effective were sanctions 2014–2022? – [25:38]–[33:24]
• The 2022 Ukraine war sanctions and their limits – [33:24]–[38:24]
• Oil price cap: innovation and workarounds – [40:10]–[43:40]
• The case for building a new economic statecraft bureaucracy – [44:33]–[46:59]
• Sanctions rollback debate, Iran precedents, and limits of relief – [46:59]–[51:48]

Summary & Takeaways

• Economic warfare and "choke point" sanctions are now at the forefront of U.S. strategic tools, but consistent political will—more than tools or technical capacity—is crucial for their long-term effectiveness.
• U.S.-led sanctions against Russia in 2014 and 2022 were more effective economically than commonly appreciated, but inconsistent follow-through undercut their political goal, especially as a deterrent.
• The future requires deeper expertise, more sophisticated planning, and a centralized approach to economic statecraft—especially as great power competition with China intensifies.
• Fishman is skeptical that sanction relief, without deeper structural change and accountability, will bear fruit, as evidenced by the Iran case.
• The episode is candid, analytical, and offers rich insights for listeners interested in geopolitics, sanctions, and international economics.